Grant Did Grant Fight A Pyrrhic War?

In fairness to Butler, he was given quite a big task to deal with in quite a short space of time - and his distraction effort was at the very least proportional to the strength he had.

The disembarkation is May 5, at which point there were already six brigades (Hunton, Gracie, Barton, Clingman, Bushrod Johnson) in the Richmond/Petersburg defences of which all except Hunton's were facing Butler by the 6th. By the 9th four more have arrived (Hagood, Wise, Hoke, Kemper) and another five arrive by the 17th (Ransom, Colquitt, Corse, Martin, Evans).
Functionally at this point Butler is facing off against 14 brigades and there's a fifteenth in the form of Hunton; for comparison at Spotsylvania Lee has 35 brigades.

May 22nd Grant's ordered most of Butler's field force stripped from him; this effectively reduces the ability of Butler to keep a large enemy force contained. Given how out of Grant's total campaign strength (north of 200,000 PFD counting the residue of Butler's forces) Butler amounted to less than 20% of it, I would argue that if Butler kept 20% of Lee's total available forces focused on him before having troops stripped from him then Butler would be doing a good job at distracting Lee.

20% of Lee's total brigade count as of the 17th is 10 brigades, so at that point Butler was doing a good job.

After more than half of Butler's force is stripped from him, he'd be doing a good job if he kept perhaps less than five brigades occupied.
 
I agree was Hunter was about as incompetent as Butler.
And Grant knew he could tolerate Butler as long as Grant remained at City Point most of the time. But because someone had to command independently in the Shenandoah Valley, he needed someone there who rather be killed than be defeated. Sheridan, Wilson, Upton all ended up there, at one point.
 
In fairness to Butler, he was given quite a big task to deal with in quite a short space of time - and his distraction effort was at the very least proportional to the strength he had.

The disembarkation is May 5, at which point there were already six brigades (Hunton, Gracie, Barton, Clingman, Bushrod Johnson) in the Richmond/Petersburg defences of which all except Hunton's were facing Butler by the 6th. By the 9th four more have arrived (Hagood, Wise, Hoke, Kemper) and another five arrive by the 17th (Ransom, Colquitt, Corse, Martin, Evans).
Functionally at this point Butler is facing off against 14 brigades and there's a fifteenth in the form of Hunton; for comparison at Spotsylvania Lee has 35 brigades.

May 22nd Grant's ordered most of Butler's field force stripped from him; this effectively reduces the ability of Butler to keep a large enemy force contained. Given how out of Grant's total campaign strength (north of 200,000 PFD counting the residue of Butler's forces) Butler amounted to less than 20% of it, I would argue that if Butler kept 20% of Lee's total available forces focused on him before having troops stripped from him then Butler would be doing a good job at distracting Lee.

20% of Lee's total brigade count as of the 17th is 10 brigades, so at that point Butler was doing a good job.

After more than half of Butler's force is stripped from him, he'd be doing a good job if he kept perhaps less than five brigades occupied.
Butler's force was still in eastern Virginia, and the Confederates were not near City Point and Harrison's Landing. Therefor Grant's negative remarks about Butler were intemperate and not repeated.
Butler's real failings were in No. Carolina, when time was of the essence. There was a suspected Confederate ironclad that might have capable of crossing the Atlantic and there was a timetable for withdrawing Schofield's force from Tennessee and inserting it into No. Carolina to attempt to shorten the war.
Butler's Fort Fisher operation was time sensitive. His Virginia operation was not time as sensitive.
 
And Grant knew he could tolerate Butler as long as Grant remained at City Point most of the time. But because someone had to command independently in the Shenandoah Valley, he needed someone there who rather be killed than be defeated. Sheridan, Wilson, Upton all ended up there, at one point.

I understand Grant's command problems, I was just pointing out what Randall had to say about Grant's displeasure at his Butler problem.
 
Grant was reluctant to change the Army of Potomac command structure. That reluctance disappeared after Cold Harbor and The Crater.
Sedwick had died. Wright and the whole VI Corp were detached from Meade and formed the basis of Grant's strike force.
William Smith was relieved.
Burnside was pressured to go back to Rhode Island.
Hancock was eased out to a make believe convalescent corp.
Warren lasted longer, but his operation plans were closely detailed until he was relieved too.
Only Meade had the political pull, as the hero of Gettysburg, to survive the reshuffling.
When Grant gained full control over eastern operations, the war ended in about 8 1/2 months, which saved a lot of Confederate lives.
 
Each Grant operation had similar features. He wanted to achieve an unopposed river crossing to access a favorable operation area. Then he cut the opponent's logistical connections. Then he pressured the entrapped army, slowly if permitted, but savagely, as at Fort Fisher, when the end of the war was looming and the US financial picture was stressed. It was only common sense, backed by the huge advantage of the US in warships, colliers, transports and river barges. Sherman did something similar, but his railroad connection became his river, which had never been done before. And when Sherman left Atlanta to head east, he had specific locations on a Union occupied coast to march towards.
 
By May 26 Lee had taken a nearly impregnable position between the Annas' (north and south rivers). Grant says on that he was going to take a day to get in position to attack, but after reconnoitering the ground, says, "To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter of our men, that even success would not justify." [page 9] Grant therefore decides to turn Lee's right, and gives his plan how he will achieve this. He has called up cavalry to the North side of Pamunkey to connect near Hanovertown, which had a severe engagement at Haw's Store on the 28th. His plans for Hunter were set forth as early as May 25, saying, "If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should do so, living on the country. The railroads and canals should be destroyed beyond possibility of repair for weeks. Completing this, he could find his way back to his original base, or from about Gordonsville join this army." [page 8]. By May 30, he requests all pontoon bridges to be taken to City Point so he may effect a crossing. After Cold Harbor, on June 5, Grant states, "Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to make, all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside the city. I have therefore resolved on the following plan:...". He proceeds to state his intent on holding ground, taking advantage of any circumstance, send west the cavalry to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad from Beaver Dam for some 20 to 25 miles; crossing the James at a favorable point. As far as Butler's failure, Grant comments thusly on May 22; "The force under Butler is not detaining 10,000 men in Richmond, and is not even keeping the roads south of the city cut. Under these circumstances I think it advisable to have all of it here except enough to keep a foothold at City Point...." [page 7]. General Grant gives a good breakdown synopsis of his overall plans from the beginning of his command appointment beginning on page 12 and running to the end.
Lubliner.
 
Each Grant operation had similar features

To add to that excellent analysis, I would mention Grant's use of diversionary attacks to confuse the enemy and cause the enemy to draw off reinforcements from the main attack. Examples: 1) Sherman's assault at Chickasaw Bluff in conjunction with Grant's planned movement down the Mississippi Central Railroad towards Vicksburg 2) Hooker's assault on Lookout Mountain in conjunction with main movement against Missionary Ridge 3) Sheridan's raid against the Virginia Central Railroad in conjunction with Grant's crossing of the James River towards Petersburg 4) Hancock's assault at Deep Bottom in conjunction with Burnside's mining and movement against Elliot's Salient.
 
As far as Butler's failure, Grant comments thusly on May 22; "The force under Butler is not detaining 10,000 men in Richmond, and is not even keeping the roads south of the city cut. Under these circumstances I think it advisable to have all of it here except enough to keep a foothold at City Point...." [page 7].
But at that time there were something like nine brigades directly facing Butler, plus a couple more who were around Richmond and thus held in place in case of a different move by Butler. Indeed, of the fifteen total brigades which were around Richmond as of the 17th only five joined Lee by the time of the North Anna battles; the other ten had been delayed enough by Butler's mere presence in strength that they couldn't join Lee until a later date if at all.

Surely those brigades averaged at least about 1,000 men PFD? Lee's starting infantry brigades each averaged something closer to 1,500 PFD, after all.
 
To add to that excellent analysis, I would mention Grant's use of diversionary attacks to confuse the enemy and cause the enemy to draw off reinforcements from the main attack. Examples: 1) Sherman's assault at Chickasaw Bluff in conjunction with Grant's planned movement down the Mississippi Central Railroad towards Vicksburg 2) Hooker's assault on Lookout Mountain in conjunction with main movement against Missionary Ridge 3) Sheridan's raid against the Virginia Central Railroad in conjunction with Grant's crossing of the James River towards Petersburg 4) Hancock's assault at Deep Bottom in conjunction with Burnside's mining and movement against Elliot's Salient.
And in the end, Lee and Grant knew what would happen. There would be an attack on the Richmond lines and from the left of the US position towards the southside railroad, and Lee would be unable to block both attacks. Grant could play classic extend the lines tactics, with expensive, but infallible logistical support for the whole line.
 
But at that time there were something like nine brigades directly facing Butler, plus a couple more who were around Richmond and thus held in place in case of a different move by Butler. Indeed, of the fifteen total brigades which were around Richmond as of the 17th only five joined Lee by the time of the North Anna battles; the other ten had been delayed enough by Butler's mere presence in strength that they couldn't join Lee until a later date if at all.

Surely those brigades averaged at least about 1,000 men PFD? Lee's starting infantry brigades each averaged something closer to 1,500 PFD, after all.
As @wausaubob pointed out, the charge wasn't repeated. It seems Grant had a moment of early despair that Breckinridge's men, Pickett's men and Ewell's men were showing up on his front, by prisoner claims. Whatever amount Lee had wasn't entirely known. You are mainly reading hindsight into a totally on the moment reaction of cause and e=affect. I was quoting Grant, not deducing an overall agenda.
Lubliner.
 
But at that time there were something like nine brigades directly facing Butler, plus a couple more who were around Richmond and thus held in place in case of a different move by Butler. Indeed, of the fifteen total brigades which were around Richmond as of the 17th only five joined Lee by the time of the North Anna battles; the other ten had been delayed enough by Butler's mere presence in strength that they couldn't join Lee until a later date if at all.

Surely those brigades averaged at least about 1,000 men PFD? Lee's starting infantry brigades each averaged something closer to 1,500 PFD, after all.
Grant said it, but Butler's omissions were not nearly as damaging as those of William F. Smith, Winfield Scott Hancock or William Rosecrans. Butler may have forced Lee to withdraw towards Richmond faster, or Butler might have been crushed and his army routed.
Butler was still there. His logistical positions were still protected, and his command was not shredded. His positive achievement was limited, but his force was conserved.
 
As @wausaubob pointed out, the charge wasn't repeated. It seems Grant had a moment of early despair that Breckinridge's men, Pickett's men and Ewell's men were showing up on his front, by prisoner claims. Whatever amount Lee had wasn't entirely known. You are mainly reading hindsight into a totally on the moment reaction of cause and e=affect. I was quoting Grant, not deducing an overall agenda.
Lubliner.
And if Butler had done the same thing at Fort Fisher, affected the landing, moved the provisions ashore, entrenched and hung on, Grant would have been forced to come to Butler's aid, and the fort would have fallen, probably by New Years Day. However Butler left the peninsula and in the second attempt to take the fort "full cooperation" with Porter was as close as the head of the army could come to saying you are under command of the navy. Terry did not need a diagram, I suspect.
 
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In support of other's comments concerning purpose:
"My idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army, if possible, north of Richmond, then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the James River to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat." [page 11] Grant to Halleck, June 5, 1864, in front of Cold Harbor, Va.
Lubliner.
 
I don't think Lee thought Grant was fighting a war of attrition. In the Wilderness Lee understood that Grant was trying to reduce Lee's ability to manuever and pick the tactical ground. It was a giant rifle fight and each side had to deal with movement by the other. At Spotsylvania, if the US could get close the hastily constructed fortifications, they could breakthrough and they did, for awhile. Cold Harbor was the battle that was a clear mistake. The generals of the Army of the Potomac omitted to scout the positions that were opposing them and were probably intimidated by Meade and hoping to disgrace Grant by that point.
 
As @wausaubob pointed out, the charge wasn't repeated. It seems Grant had a moment of early despair that Breckinridge's men, Pickett's men and Ewell's men were showing up on his front, by prisoner claims. Whatever amount Lee had wasn't entirely known. You are mainly reading hindsight into a totally on the moment reaction of cause and e=affect. I was quoting Grant, not deducing an overall agenda.
But if that's the basis that Grant used to withdraw the troops, then surely it indicates that the problem isn't so much "Butler failed to tie down troops" but "Grant thought Butler failed to tie down troops, and turned it into a self fulfilling prophecy".

The reason I wanted to highlight this is that Butler is oft blamed for spoiling Grant's concept of operations, when in fact (as we can see) while Butler didn't exceed expectations he also didn't fall short of the minimum requirement for the CoA.
 
I don't think Lee thought Grant was fighting a war of attrition

And neither did Grant think that. The Overland Campaign was still conceived by Grant as a war of movement and it remained that way until it finally played out at Cold Harbor, after which Grant revised his strategy to cross the James and mount offensives from the south. As far as Lee is concerned, his assaults at the Wilderness were straight from his old playbook of dividing his forces and mounting flank attacks. But after the Wilderness, even Lee was forced to concede that he could no longer mount those type of assaults, and had to assume defensive positions thereafter at Spotsylvania, North Anna, and Cold Harbor.
 
Admittedy, I am NO fan of Grant. And I am talking about Grant the General, Grant the Commander in Chief and Grant the President. All I can do is give him credit for being tenacious and using his great numerical advantage plus an unlimited supply of materials to "out gun" Lee in '64 and '65 and win the war. That's it. Being honest, I'd say a major re-assessment to the man is due. If it's OK to do that with Lee the General, why not Grant? To me, there is nothing to like and admire about him.

1. Was Grant in favor of an all out war against Southern armies as well as the Southern people? Most assuredly - YES. All you have to do is look at what Sherman and Sheridan did under his watch to the southern civilians who happened to be in their way. Burn and plunder; it all happened quite often with Yankee troops. Maybe you can say the end justified the means? With Grant it did.

2. What was Grant's policy against the Indians following the war? Remove, kill the Indians and buffalo and make way for the white settlers to occupy all the land. Grant even broke treaties he signed with the Indians; noteworthy is the one he signed giving the Indians all of the Black Hills.

3. Grant was one of the worst presidents our nation has ever had. Corruption was rampant! Just look at the record and history of the man. The only good thing I can point to, in regards to Grant, is when he made Yellowstone a national park.

Anyone else like and admire this man?
 
Anyone else like and admire this man?
I think Grant is pretty much an adequate general - broadly competent with flaws, that is.
I don't think he was the first or only such general the Union had (including in the East), and I think other Union generals if granted the same resources could have won the same campaign, but there were also other Union generals if granted the same resources could have lost the campaign. But controlling a large army is a difficult skill and Grant was able to do it, and it's not like the Union was overflowing with such generals.
 
What was Grant's policy against the Indians following the war? Remove, kill the Indians and buffalo and make way for the white settlers to occupy all the land. Grant even broke treaties he signed with the Indians; noteworthy is the one he signed giving the Indians all of the Black Hills.

That assessment is not supported by the historical record. As president, Grant advocated a "Peace Policy" towards Native Americans, which broadly speaking consisted of a non-military solution to assimilate Native Americans in reservations. According to Grant, “The building of railroads and the access thereby given to all the agricultural and mineral regions of the country is rapidly bringing civilized settlements into contact with all the tribes of Indians. . . . I see no remedy for this except in placing all the Indians on large reservations . . . and giving them absolute protection there.” We can certainly argue the efficacy and the morality of that policy (which ultimately fell apart) but it is wrong to characterize Grant as being a hard liner when it came to dealing with the Native American tribes.
 
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