Featured Did Ewell stand a chance of taking Cemetery Hill on July 1?

What ever the case his orders were if Practicalbel. Lee to my knowledge never condemned Ewell and I've not seen an on the spot wittness that has. Please let me know if one exists.

Didn't Major Taylor (Lee's aide and the one who delivered the orders) roundly criticize Ewell for not taking Cemetery Hill? I may have the name wrong but the one who took Lee's orders to Ewell did find fault with his actions.
 
According to what I'm reading in the Harry Pfanz book on the first day (admittedly my only source) Gordon was willing to attach his brigade to assist in an assault on the hill, Pender had a fresh brigade and Johnson's division was approaching the scene. That would have given Ewell 2 divisions plus 2 brigades to attack with. Is that enough? we'll never know cause Ewell seemed to need to ask anyone and everyone their opinions twice. IMO Jackson would have at least tried.

Okay, so we have one brigade from Pender (Lane? Thomas?) and Gordon's not-nearly-as-unhurt-as-claimed brigade, Johnson's division (far enough away that by the time it comes up and is ready to attack the situation is quite different than the initial set up of the Union defenders), and. .. what's the second division? Anderson, who Lee is keeping as the army reserve? Rodes, whose division has three brigades at over a third losses already (Not that the Union troops immediately to hand are better off, but it does have to be noted how much more you can ask of these men for the attacker, who is doing something harder)?

"Jackson would have at least tried." says nothing about whether it would be a good idea or a bad idea.

"We'll never know" is not a good way to indicate there's any reason why Ewell should have treated this any differently than he did. Of course its uncertain. Why is Ewell expected to be decisive in deciding to be aggressive when those who have hindsight and a clear list of Union forces can't be?
 
I think it a very fair statement to say that the most detailed analysis of this entire issue is in my book, Last Chance for Victory: Robert E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign, pp. 159-221, 510-511 and 514-515.

Lee sent two orders to Ewell to take the heights, the first delivered by Walter Taylor and the second by James Power Smith. Many participants on both sides (including generals Hancock and Wainright on the Federal side) believed that a Confederate attack certainly would have succeeded if made within the hour following the defeats of the Federal First and Eleventh corps. There were a multitude of very good military reasons for this belief, the most obvious being that the ground was at that time held by only one very, very undistinguished brigade from Eleventh Corps along with a single supporting battery of three-inch ordnance rifles whose canister discharges could stop a single, determined regiment, let alone a larger force.

In any case, I invite the forum members to carefully read and digest the analysis cited above.

Regards,
 
What do you consider sufficient force to drive off "one very, very undistinguished brigade from Eleventh Corps along with a single supporting battery of three-inch ordnance rifles"?
 
We can look at his in hind sight, but what did Ewell believe was holding the hill? General Ewell had to try to discover the size and condition of his forces and the size and condition of the enemy. Ewell had to do this in real time and could not look back at the true facts like we can.
 
Okay, so we have one brigade from Pender (Lane? Thomas?) and Gordon's not-nearly-as-unhurt-as-claimed brigade, Johnson's division (far enough away that by the time it comes up and is ready to attack the situation is quite different than the initial set up of the Union defenders), and. .. what's the second division? Anderson, who Lee is keeping as the army reserve? Rodes, whose division has three brigades at over a third losses already (Not that the Union troops immediately to hand are better off, but it does have to be noted how much more you can ask of these men for the attacker, who is doing something harder)?

"Jackson would have at least tried." says nothing about whether it would be a good idea or a bad idea.

"We'll never know" is not a good way to indicate there's any reason why Ewell should have treated this any differently than he did. Of course its uncertain. Why is Ewell expected to be decisive in deciding to be aggressive when those who have hindsight and a clear list of Union forces can't be?
When I wrote that Jackson would have tried says nothing about it being a good idea or a bad idea. A famous maxim states that if it's stupid but it works it isn't stupid. Jackson wouldn't have hesitated to go up Culps hill and if it worked it would have been a very smart thing to do. If it hadn't then he would have traded the lives of some of his men for knowledge of what he would have to do to take it. In battle as in life timing and more than a bit of luck are crucial. Scott Bowden seems to understand where I'm going with this. I haven't read his book but he seems to get it.
 
I'm all in favor of a good argument for Ewell having sufficient forces to make a successful attack if one can demonstrate that's the case, or Ewell being given definite orders to attack if that's the case (which renders whether he was right to wait moot, soldiers obey orders) - but faulting him for not attacking regardless of either of those two apply is considerably less impressive.
 
If I remember correctly, while Cemetery Hill was held in force by Union troops, Culp's Hill remained practically undefended well into the night. As already pointed out, if the Confederates gain Culp's Hill, Cemetery Hill is rendered untenable. I have never understood why the debate about what Ewell could have done on the evening of July 1 always focuses on Cemetery Hill rather than Culp's Hill.
 
If I remember correctly, while Cemetery Hill was held in force by Union troops, Culp's Hill remained practically undefended well into the night.
Wadsworth's division of the 1st Corps occupied Culp's Hill in "the evening" (according to Wadsworth), which is somewhat vague as to when but I think it was early enough to have made a difference to Ewell.
 
Re Ewell and Culp's Hill:

Ewell gave Allegheny Johnson (and his fresh troops) discretionary orders to attack Culp's Hill as soon as his troops arrived. Johnson sent scouts who found a picket from Indiana on the side Hill and thought it was occupied, so he aborted the attack. Not certain on how many Union troops were on Culp's Hill, but there were troops
 
Re Ewell and Culp's Hill:

Ewell gave Allegheny Johnson (and his fresh troops) discretionary orders to attack Culp's Hill as soon as his troops arrived. Johnson sent scouts who found a picket from Indiana on the side Hill and thought it was occupied, so he aborted the attack. Not certain on how many Union troops were on Culp's Hill, but there were troops

Not only that, but it was near dark, if not dark, by the time Johnson arrived on the field.

Another question - why would Confederate occupation of Culp's Hill render the Federal position on Cemetery Hill/Ridge untenable? Wasn't the hill heavily forested so that artillery would be ineffective?
 
Not only that, but it was near dark, if not dark, by the time Johnson arrived on the field.

Another question - why would Confederate occupation of Culp's Hill render the Federal position on Cemetery Hill/Ridge untenable? Wasn't the hill heavily forested so that artillery would be ineffective?

Not dark :smile: July 1st 1863 was a full moon. Here:

Wednesday
1 July 1863 Eastern Standard Time

SUN
Begin civil twilight 4:11 a.m.
Sunrise 4:44 a.m.
Sun transit 12:12 p.m.
Sunset 7:41 p.m.
End civil twilight 8:13 p.m.

MOON
Moonrise 7:10 p.m. on preceding day
Moon transit 12:07 a.m.
Moonset 5:08 a.m.
Moonrise 8:02 p.m.
Moonset 6:23 a.m. on following day



That said, I agree that taking Culp's Hill did not guarantee Cemetery Hill by any means...
 
If I remember correctly, while Cemetery Hill was held in force by Union troops, Culp's Hill remained practically undefended well into the night. As already pointed out, if the Confederates gain Culp's Hill, Cemetery Hill is rendered untenable. I have never understood why the debate about what Ewell could have done on the evening of July 1 always focuses on Cemetery Hill rather than Culp's Hill.

Culps Hill was heavily wooded. Even if Ewell takes Culps Hill there's nowhere to mount a bunch of artillery up there to shell the Union position. If you take Culps on July 1, the XI Corps is still on Cemetary Hill the next morning.

Cemetary Hill was the key to the entire Union position
 
I think it a very fair statement to say that the most detailed analysis of this entire issue is in my book, Last Chance for Victory: Robert E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign, pp. 159-221, 510-511 and 514-515.

Lee sent two orders to Ewell to take the heights, the first delivered by Walter Taylor and the second by James Power Smith. Many participants on both sides (including generals Hancock and Wainright on the Federal side) believed that a Confederate attack certainly would have succeeded if made within the hour following the defeats of the Federal First and Eleventh corps. There were a multitude of very good military reasons for this belief, the most obvious being that the ground was at that time held by only one very, very undistinguished brigade from Eleventh Corps along with a single supporting battery of three-inch ordnance rifles whose canister discharges could stop a single, determined regiment, let alone a larger force.

In any case, I invite the forum members to carefully read and digest the analysis cited above.

Regards,
i am assuming that you are refering to ames brigade since they were the first brigade placed in position at the base of the hill. unfortunately they were attached to the 11th corps. they had been trying to move to a different corps after chancellorsville. hooker ordered howard to dig in, howard refused because the confederate army was so far away. the 75th OVI's col. reily heard reports of confederate movements in their direction, howard dismissed those reports, reily did not. the 75th OVI set up defenses and as the 11th corps ran for their lives, they held their ground for 10 minutes until they were finally pushed back. col. reily and 150 of his men were killed in that 10 minutes while the rest ran. to say that they were undistinguished is a little unfair.

ames brigade was a hard fighting brigade that unfortunately was placed under incompetent leadership. ames placed his men in position with the 17th connecticut and 25th OVI facing the town. howard ordered him to move the 17th connecticut to the right of the brigade to face the front, and where was the brigade hit from??? from the town. at this point, the 25th and 75th who suffered major losses at chancellorsville and trying to hold barlow's knoll on july 1, could not hold the line and the brigade was forced to fall back to the top of the hill. it is believed that if the 17th connecticut who was the strongest unit left in the brigade wasn't moved by howard, they might have held. it all comes down to howard and his poor leadership, not the brigade.
 
I think Scott Bowden is referring to Smith's brigade, left in reserve, but that raises a question pertinent to "what could Ewell do?" - how soon was Ames's brigade formed on Cemetery Hill?
 
I think Scott Bowden is referring to Smith's brigade, left in reserve, but that raises a question pertinent to "what could Ewell do?" - how soon was Ames's brigade formed on Cemetery Hill?
ames brigade was placed as soon as they left benner's hill/barlow's knoll. i don't have any knowledge of smith being there yet at that time. i believe the only reenforcements on the hill at that time was rickett's battery.
 
What do you consider sufficient force to drive off "one very, very undistinguished brigade from Eleventh Corps along with a single supporting battery of three-inch ordnance rifles"?
A good yardstick is to measure combat power of the attackers and defenders. Generally the attackers should have a superior ratio of 3:1 to 6:1 over the defender to seize and hold his position.

Numbers of troops and multipliers like artillery are fairly objective. But then there are subjective factors which increase or decrease combat power; fatigue, morale, the ability to organize terrain for defense or offense, state of training, etc. You can do the arithmetic for the objective factors but the subjective is harder to calculate.

Organizing a captured position to resist counter attack and the handling of prisoners are also factors which can turn success into defeat.

Then there is the quality of leadership. By this I mean particularly a clear statement of the objective, unity of command and simple orders.
 
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A good yardstick is to measure combat power of the attackers and defenders. Generally the attackers should have a superior ratio of 3:1 to 6:1 over the defender to seize and hold his position.

Numbers of troops and multipliers like artillery are fairly objective. But then there are subjective factors which increase or decrease combat power; fatigue, morale, the ability to organize terrain for defense or offense, state of training, etc. You can do the arithmetic for the objective factors but the subjective is harder to calculate.

Organizing a captured position to resist counter attack and the handling of prisoners are also factors which can turn success into defeat.

Then there is the quality of leadership. By this I mean particularly a clear statement of the objective, unity of command and simple orders.
yes this.
 
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