Featured Did Ewell stand a chance of taking Cemetery Hill on July 1?

And even if he did, who cares?

If Ewell takes Cemetery Hill, Meade falls back to the Pipe Creek Line and the Battle of Gettysburg is a one-day skirmish between fragments of both armies. Period. End of story.

That's why this science fiction scenario--which comes up again and again, like playing whack-a-mole--so drives me crazy. I REALLY wish it would just die and never rear its ugly, ugly head again, but I know it will.....
I agree. Meade had prepared to use the Pipe Creek for his ground and would have preferred to fight there over Gettysburg. The question is, would Lee have attacked Meade there?
 
I say he did not. Even though Northern troops were thin on the hill at one point it was ringed by artillery and an attack from the town would have taken far too long to organize. an attack by Ewell on Cemetery Hill would have resulted in disaster for Ewell's Corps. The boys in blue were determined to hold that hill and had the guns to keep it.

BillO my friend you may present your battle plan.
Agree. Ewell can't take Cemetary Hill. Ewell's troops are in exhausted disarray. The Hill has streets,fences,houses,etc. to be negotiated,and is quite steep. Ewell also has about 4,000 Federal prisoners. The Federals have 40+ artillery pieces on the Hill ready to rock......like I said,Ewell can't take Cemetary Hill!
 
Last edited:
A good yardstick is to measure combat power of the attackers and defenders. Generally the attackers should have a superior ratio of 3:1 to 6:1 over the defender to seize and hold his position.

Numbers of troops and multipliers like artillery are fairly objective. But then there are subjective factors which increase or decrease combat power; fatigue, morale, the ability to organize terrain for defense or offense, state of training, etc. You can do the arithmetic for the objective factors but the subjective is harder to calculate.

Organizing a captured position to resist counter attack and the handling of prisoners are also factors which can turn success into defeat.

Then there is the quality of leadership. By this I mean particularly a clear statement of the objective, unity of command and simple orders.

Yeah. I think Ewell was not a strong enough presence to provide that leadership at this particular moment. Not a waffler - but Jackson saying "Do it." would not have to be repeated, Ewell doesn't have that air established over his men the way Jackson did.

And without that, 2nd Corps (Rodes and Early) really isn't in good enough shape to crush the Federals there. It might win - but its going to look less than an irresistible force. Smith's men being fresh and Hancock being there is pretty serious if any of the other units take their cue from this.

I don't know if its impossible, but its not merely "Give the order and it is done.".
 
Last edited:
The fault lay in the end of Ewell's pursuit of the Federals before him on June 30th. He had successfully driven and routed the bluebirds through the town and he had the power, at that split second, to destroy them and take command of Culp's Hill, when he unexpectedly and suddenly froze! Although Early and Johnson urged him to continue his attack, it was as if he suddenly realized that Jackson wasn't there. (Sandie Pendleton at that critical moment of indecision whispered to Kyd Douglas -- "If only we had Jackson for one hour!") He could not make a decision; Early even said he would himself be responsible for the consequences. But Ewell had fresh orders from Lee not to bring on a general engagement as Hill and Longstreet weren't up, yet Lee was not there to see what was right in front of Ewell for the taking -- the commanding position on Cemetery Ridge! Commanding a division under Jackson Ewell was aggressive, determined and willingly exposed himself to danger (Front Royal, Cross Keys, Malvern Hill, Cedar Run). But he had also learned to obey and not to dispute orders. With Jackson at the helm he could be aggressive and initiate action that brought a favorable response from his commanding general. But now, gone from the army for a year recuperating, with the responsibility of a new wife, and in command of Jackson's Corps without the leadership he had always had thrown behind him, Ewell suddenly became paralyzed at that exact moment and sought an escape route (Lee's order). His division commanders could not stir his blood. I am reminded of the scene in Band of Brothers where Lt. Dyke is ordered by Major Winters to take the town of Foy and upon finding himself in the midst of a storm of artillery shells he suddenly loses his mind. Everyone around him is screaming at him to "Move Forward" and he is perfectly frozen from sheer terror. I think the analogy is just. Ewell at Gettysburg simply becomes another tragic figure of the "forlorn hope."
 
I suppose it will be taking as nitpicking, but I'm going to say it anyway: The battle of Gettysburg began on July 1, not June 30.

But more usefully, I quote the following from the reports of General Rodes and Early.

From General Rodes ( http://www.civilwarhome.com/rodesgettysburg.html );

The enemy was thus routed at all points. My division followed him closely into and through the town, Doles and Ramseur entering in such close contact with the enemy that the former, who penetrated the heart of the town first of all, had two sharp and successful encounters with the enemy in its streets, and the latter, who entered farther to the right, captured the colors of the One hundred and fiftieth Pennsylvania Regiment in its streets, Lieutenant [F. M.] Harney, of his brigade, tearing them from the hands of the color-bearer, and falling almost immediately thereafter, mortally wounded.
In the pursuit, the division captured about 2,500 prisoners--so many as to embarrass its movements materially.
The troops, being greatly exhausted by their march and somewhat disorganized by the hot engagement and rapid pursuit, were halted and prepared for further action. I did not change their position materially, nor order another attack, for the following reasons: 1st, in the midst of the engagement just described, the corps commander informed me, through one of his officers, that the general commanding did not wish a general engagement brought on, and hence, had it been possible to do so then, I would have stopped the attack at once; but this, of course, it was impossible to do then; 2d, before the completion of his defeat before the town, the enemy had begun to establish a line of battle on the heights back of the town, and by the time my line was in a condition to renew the attack, he displayed quite a formidable line of infantry and artillery immediately in my front, extending smartly to my right, and as far as I could see to my left, in front of Early. To have attacked this line with my division alone, diminished as it had been by a loss of 2,500 men, would have been absurd. Seeing no Confederate troops at all on my right; finding that General Early, whom I encountered in the streets of the town within thirty minutes after its occupation by our forces, was awaiting further instructions, and, receiving no orders to advance, though my superiors were upon the ground, I concluded that the order not to bring on a general engagement was still in force, and hence placed my lines and skirmishers in a defensive attitude, and determined to await orders or further movements either on the part of Early or of the troops on my right.

And from General Early ( http://www.civilwarhome.com/earlygettysburg.html ):

Hays' brigade entered the town, fighting its way, and Avery moved to the left of it across the railroad, and took his position in the fields on the left, and facing Cemetery Hill, which here presented a very rugged ascent. This movement was made under the fire of artillery from this hill, which had previously opened when my artillery had first opened its fire, but Avery succeeded in placing his men under the cover of a low ridge which here runs through the fields from the town. Hays' brigade was formed in line in the street running through the middle of the town.
A very large number of prisoners were captured in the town, and before reaching it, their number being so great as really to embarrass us. Two pieces of artillery (Napoleons) were also captured outside of the town, the capture being claimed by both brigades; but it is unnecessary to decide which reached these pieces first, as the capture was unquestionably due to the joint valor of both brigades.
While these operations were going on with my division, I saw, farther to the right, the enemy's force on that part of the line falling back and moving in comparatively good order on the right of the town toward the range of hills in the rear, and I sent back for a battery of artillery to be brought up to open on this force and the town, from which a fire was opened on my brigades, but before it got up, my men had entered the town, and the force on the right had retired beyond reach. I had at the same time sent an order to General Smith to advance with his brigade, but he thought proper not to comply with this order, on account of a report that the enemy was advancing on the York road.
As soon as my brigades had entered the town, I rode into that place myself, and, after ascertaining the condition of things, I rode to find General Ewell and General Rodes, or General Hill, for the purpose of urging an immediate advance upon the enemy before he should recover from his evident dismay, in order to get possession of the hills to which he had fallen back with the remnant of iris forces; but before I found either of these officers, General Smith's son, who was acting as his aide, came to me with a message from the general, stating that a large force of the enemy, consisting of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, was advancing on the York road, and that we were about to be flanked: and though I had no faith in this report, I thought proper to send General Gordon with his brigade to take charge of Smith's also, and to keep a lookout on the York road, and stop any further alarm.
Meeting with an officer of Major-General Pender's staff, I sent word by him to General Hill that if he would send up a division, we could take the hill to which the enemy had retreated; and shortly after meeting with General Ewell, I communicated my views to him, and was informed that Johnson's division was coming up, and it was determined with this division to get possession of a wooded hill to the left of Cemetery Hill, which it commanded; but this division arrived at a late hour, and its movement having been delayed by the report of the advance on the York road, no effort to get possession of the wooded hill on the left of the town was made that night.


Bolding is mine, but the words are all theirs.
 
Last edited:
I suppose it will be taking as nitpicking, but I'm going to say it anyway: The battle of Gettysburg began on July 1, not June 30.

But more usefully, I quote the following from the reports of General Rodes and Early.

From General Rodes ( http://www.civilwarhome.com/rodesgettysburg.html );

The enemy was thus routed at all points. My division followed him closely into and through the town, Doles and Ramseur entering in such close contact with the enemy that the former, who penetrated the heart of the town first of all, had two sharp and successful encounters with the enemy in its streets, and the latter, who entered farther to the right, captured the colors of the One hundred and fiftieth Pennsylvania Regiment in its streets, Lieutenant [F. M.] Harney, of his brigade, tearing them from the hands of the color-bearer, and falling almost immediately thereafter, mortally wounded.
In the pursuit, the division captured about 2,500 prisoners--so many as to embarrass its movements materially.
The troops, being greatly exhausted by their march and somewhat disorganized by the hot engagement and rapid pursuit, were halted and prepared for further action. I did not change their position materially, nor order another attack, for the following reasons: 1st, in the midst of the engagement just described, the corps commander informed me, through one of his officers, that the general commanding did not wish a general engagement brought on, and hence, had it been possible to do so then, I would have stopped the attack at once; but this, of course, it was impossible to do then; 2d, before the completion of his defeat before the town, the enemy had begun to establish a line of battle on the heights back of the town, and by the time my line was in a condition to renew the attack, he displayed quite a formidable line of infantry and artillery immediately in my front, extending smartly to my right, and as far as I could see to my left, in front of Early. To have attacked this line with my division alone, diminished as it had been by a loss of 2,500 men, would have been absurd. Seeing no Confederate troops at all on my right; finding that General Early, whom I encountered in the streets of the town within thirty minutes after its occupation by our forces, was awaiting further instructions, and, receiving no orders to advance, though my superiors were upon the ground, I concluded that the order not to bring on a general engagement was still in force, and hence placed my lines and skirmishers in a defensive attitude, and determined to await orders or further movements either on the part of Early or of the troops on my right.

And from General Early ( http://www.civilwarhome.com/earlygettysburg.html ):

Hays' brigade entered the town, fighting its way, and Avery moved to the left of it across the railroad, and took his position in the fields on the left, and facing Cemetery Hill, which here presented a very rugged ascent. This movement was made under the fire of artillery from this hill, which had previously opened when my artillery had first opened its fire, but Avery succeeded in placing his men under the cover of a low ridge which here runs through the fields from the town. Hays' brigade was formed in line in the street running through the middle of the town.
A very large number of prisoners were captured in the town, and before reaching it, their number being so great as really to embarrass us. Two pieces of artillery (Napoleons) were also captured outside of the town, the capture being claimed by both brigades; but it is unnecessary to decide which reached these pieces first, as the capture was unquestionably due to the joint valor of both brigades.
While these operations were going on with my division, I saw, farther to the right, the enemy's force on that part of the line falling back and moving in comparatively good order on the right of the town toward the range of hills in the rear, and I sent back for a battery of artillery to be brought up to open on this force and the town, from which a fire was opened on my brigades, but before it got up, my men had entered the town, and the force on the right had retired beyond reach. I had at the same time sent an order to General Smith to advance with his brigade, but he thought proper not to comply with this order, on account of a report that the enemy was advancing on the York road.
As soon as my brigades had entered the town, I rode into that place myself, and, after ascertaining the condition of things, I rode to find General Ewell and General Rodes, or General Hill, for the purpose of urging an immediate advance upon the enemy before he should recover from his evident dismay, in order to get possession of the hills to which he had fallen back with the remnant of iris forces; but before I found either of these officers, General Smith's son, who was acting as his aide, came to me with a message from the general, stating that a large force of the enemy, consisting of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, was advancing on the York road, and that we were about to be flanked: and though I had no faith in this report, I thought proper to send General Gordon with his brigade to take charge of Smith's also, and to keep a lookout on the York road, and stop any further alarm.
Meeting with an officer of Major-General Pender's staff, I sent word by him to General Hill that if he would send up a division, we could take the hill to which the enemy had retreated; and shortly after meeting with General Ewell, I communicated my views to him, and was informed that Johnson's division was coming up, and it was determined with this division to get possession of a wooded hill to the left of Cemetery Hill, which it commanded; but this division arrived at a late hour, and its movement having been delayed by the report of the advance on the York road, no effort to get possession of the wooded hill on the left of the town was made that night.


Bolding is mine, but the words are all theirs.
 
After being confronted with the Union army having more than 24 additional hours to entrench and receive reinforcements, weren't two Confederate brigades (Hayes & Avery) able to make it to the summit of East Cemetery Hill at the end of Day 2?
 
After being confronted with the Union army having more than 24 additional hours to entrench and receive reinforcements, weren't two Confederate brigades (Hayes & Avery) able to make it to the summit of East Cemetery Hill at the end of Day 2?

24 additional hours neither saw this position strengthened significantly (the vast majority of the Union army is not on this spot) or entrenched (little entrenching done by the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg).

But as far as making to to the summit - if they did, it was only a few men for a very short period of time - they were, as Pfanz put it "driven back primarily by units of the Eleventh Corps.", not Carroll's brigade.

I would not say that as much could not have been done on July 1, but I cannot see this indicating that the hill was Ewell's for the taking.
 
Did Ewell stand a chance of taking Cemetery Hill? In my dead-honest opinion, I believe that it all came down to Johnson's arrival during the late hours of July 1st. His men arrived right before dark due to the fact that a supply train had blocked the road north of Gettysburg. He was, in fact, ordered by Ewell to take the larger Culp's Hill, but only if the Federals did not occupy it in force. And so when Johnson's pickets skirmished with Federal skirmishers, the attack was called off; Ewell awoke to fined that the hill had not been taken.

I shall go by two scenarios:
1) Johnson's division arrives behind Rodes' and Early's divisions.
2)Johnson arrives at the historically-accurate time.

Scenario 1:
Ewell arrives in Gettysburg and Major Taylor informs him that Lee has ordered him to attack and take Cemetery Hill, if practical. Ewell discusses the attack with all three of his division commanders. Rodes deters from such an assault while Early urges for aggression. Ewell then turns to Johnson, who informs his corps commander that his men, who had not been engaged, were formed and ready to advance, and orders him forward.
Johnson's 7,000 men of the "Stonewall Division", along with elements of the other two divisions, marched for the hill, where they receive murderous fire from Federal artillery posted on the hill. However, the recent avalanche of retreating Federals and the weight of the attack on such a small area, forces the Union army to retreat from Cemetery Hill, occupying the taller Culp's Hill, where they began to throw up breastworks.
And so, despite nearly 2,500 casualties, Johnson and his division manage to take Cemetery Hill, giving the Confederate forces an anchor on the high ground.

Scenario 2:
Johnson arrives to find his fellow division commanders discussing the plan of action with General Ewell, who turns to him and orders his division, foot-sore from a long march, to advance and take Cemetery Hill. But night was falling quickly and Johnson was forced to hurry his men into battle lines. Night had fully fallen by the time his men were marching up the hill, and the Federals had plenty of time to prepare brief defenses along the crest of the hill, inflicting serious casualties on Johnson's tired division. A small breakthrough was made, however, the Federal reinforcements were at hand and drove the rebels back down to Gettysburg.

Conclusion:
The fact whether or not Ewell could or could not take the hill, in my opinion, relied on whether Johnson had arrived earlier when expected, or had been delayed as he had all those years ago.
 
Lee gave Ewell discretionary orders and Ewell exercised his discretion.

Did Ewell stand a chance? Well, like most things there was a chance, small as it might be. Ewell looked at the situation and decided the odds were not in favor of his being able to take Cemetery Hill. I think he was right.
 
I'd say there was at least a chance - maybe even a good chance, given the state of the Union army at the time; but nothing's certain, especially where Gettysburg's concerned!
Since posting this back in 2014 I've read Gettysburg - July 1 by David Martin in which he points out that by the evening over 40 pieces of Union artillery were posted on Cemetery Hill and surrounding points like Stevens Knoll, I've changed my mind and say a big NOT A CHANCE IN ****.
 
The Union Xll corps was coming up Baltimore Pike right? Where were they late afternoon?
 
Late to the discussion, but thought I would toss my hat in the ring and say "not bloody likely". Any battle is like slow developing chess; moves and countermoves -- and the quality of the Union "chess player" changed when Hancock arrived and took charge of the overall battlefield. So it is no longer Ewell vs Howard, therefore "if practicable" was realistically off the table for either Cemetary or Culp's Hill. Ewell tried to get east -- but was easily checked -- by the artillery on Cemetary Hill. My position on this relies on Hancock's own after-action report, with bolding and underlining mine: "...At 3 p.m. I arrived at Gettysburg and assumed the command. At this time the First and Eleventh Corps were retiring through the town, closely pursued by the enemy. The cavalry of General Buford was occupying a firm position on the plain to the left of Gettysburg, covering the rear of the retreating corps. The Third Corps had not yet arrived from Emmitsburg. Orders were at once given to establish a line of battle on Cemetery Hill, with skirmishers occupying that part of the town immediately in our front. The position just on the southern edge of Gettysburg, overlooking the town and commanding the Emmitsburg and Taneytown roads and the Baltimore turnpike, was already partially occupied on my arrival by direction of Major-General Howard. Some difficulty was experienced in forming the troops of the Eleventh Corps, but by vigorous efforts, a sufficiently formidable line was established to deter the enemy from any serious assault on the position. They pushed forward a line of battle for a short distance east of the Baltimore turnpike, but it was easily checked by the fire of our artillery." (From http://www.civilwarhome.com/hancockgettysburg.html)
 
Last edited:
And even if he did, who cares?

If Ewell takes Cemetery Hill, Meade falls back to the Pipe Creek Line and the Battle of Gettysburg is a one-day skirmish between fragments of both armies. Period. End of story.

That's why this science fiction scenario--which comes up again and again, like playing whack-a-mole--so drives me crazy. I REALLY wish it would just die and never rear its ugly, ugly head again, but I know it will.....
I see this thread was started over 5 years ago and has not had a contribution in over a year... but hey... I'm fascinated by this very important topic, have a couple of thoughts to share, and it was after all on the home page. :smile:

I tend to agree with the OP that Ewell was not likely to succeed. His men would have been exhausted and would likely have not been well supported. In reply to the above, I would also agree in principal but please remember that a political solution was very appealing to the Confederacy. If Lee would have chased the AoP out of southern PA and back into Maryland, he could possibly have claimed the strategic victory on northern soil he was looking for. He could also have sent a wing of his army - perhaps Ewell again - northward to threaten Harrisburg. It's anyone's guess if that would have made a significant difference.
 
Back
Top