Destroying railroad lines is harder than it sounds.

major bill

Brev. Brig. Gen'l
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Aug 25, 2012
Both the Union and the Confederacy tried to impact the enemy by raiding behind the enemy army and destroy railroad lines. So much effort was put in to this, but how effective was this? Damaging railroad lines was harder than some might believe. It has been stated that it took almost as long to destroy railroad lines as it did to repair them. Simply tearing up the rails are quickly fixed. Heating the rails and twisting them around trees was more time consuming to the raider, and it also did take a bit longer to straighten the rails, but still railroad breaks were often repaired in days.

Mounted raids were not real effective, however large scale expeditions like Sherman's expedition through Mississippi in February 1864 damaged railroad lines enough that it took four months to repair.

Was there any better technology that could have been used to actually destroy the rails? It appears that The US Military Railroads had a portable device invented by e. C Smeed, but I seem to have difficulties finding how wide spreed the use of Smeed's rail twister was. From what I have seen the Smeed rail twister was not too complicated and wonder why it took so long for either side to come up with a device that destroyed the rail.
 
After posting this thread it occurred to me this should be moved to the railroad four, could this be done?
 
Trestle bridges were a common target, such as the Purdy raid prior to Shiloh. There were weak points that both side knew how to exploit, like catching the enemy off-guard, or weakly defended areas of high impact. Being always purposeful, their aims were concentrated more and more to focus on strategic longevity, instead of quick interruption. The railroad campaign was very successful in moving huge numbers of troops along the rail for protection, and the confederates harassed the devil out of them in the south. Much could be accomplished in gaining information concerning your enemy by putting them into embarrassing postures of defend and chase.
Lubliner.
 
I guess my question would be, even if the damage was temporary, was that worth it? If a raid went out, destroyed some tracks, and came back with few to no injuries, captures, or deaths, a commander might think that the delay gained, even if a brief halt in service, was worth the trouble. If attacking rail lines could happen as part of a raid that also gathered intelligence, disrupted other enemy actions, gathered supplies, etc., then the fact that the damage wasn't permanent might be acceptable.
 
Even a temporary interruption in service can serve the strategic needs of a campaign if it delays or denies access to troops and materiel. It doesn't matter that full service is restored 3 days later if it means a detour at a critical time. A raid also hits at enemy morale. It says to both military and civilian sectors that you can hit them anytime, anywhere.
 
It was also the distance of track that was torn up that mattered. The following in an except from the fall of 1863.

"On October 16, 1863, Battle’s Brigade was moved to the railroad near Bristow Station and commenced tearing up the tracks, all in the pouring rain. Each company had a certain distance of track to pull up, burn the ties and bend the iron.[1] Although wet to the skin, no man uttered a word of complaint, but all worked and talked in excellent humour. After finishing their share of the work they dried their dripping, wet clothes, erected the Yankee tents they had captured, and slept soundly and comfortably on the bare, cold, wet ground.[2] Lee’s Army had torn the tracks up from Manassas to the Rappahannock River![3]"


[1] Greensboro Record, October 1, 1903, “Captain Jonathan Whitehead Williams – His Life and Times With the 5th​ Alabama, C.S.A. Company “D” Greensboro Guards”
[2] “A Sketch of the 12th​ Alabama Infantry” by Robert E. Park, pages 60-61
[3] Letter of Jeremiah Tate dated November 1, 1863 – The Gilder Lehrman Collection, New York Historical Society (GLC2082.44)
 
Yes, destroying a rail line was difficult. But even a limited guerrilla presence could be effective. Weakening a trestle by sawing through the supports could be done pretty quickly by a few people or taking out the spikes on a rail and moving it a foot. Harassing methods like these could require numerous crews along the line to make repairs. It would require frequent inspections of the lines. It would require guards on large vulnerable trestles. And it would slow trains down to prevent derailments and so on. The Union discovered pretty early that keeping a rail line operational where the civilians were hostile required considerable manpower. For high value lines like the one used by Sherman for the advance on Atlanta, the cost was worth it. But otherwise, it was just not worth the trouble.

But the poster is largely correct, raids into hostile territory to disrupt rail lines were frequently problematic For two reasons. First, cavalry raids into hostile terrain were high risk. Cavalry forces were often destroyed. Secondly, because the cavalry had to keep moving to avoid destruction, they did not have the time to thoroughly damage rail lines.
 
however large scale expeditions like Sherman's expedition through Mississippi in February 1864 damaged railroad lines enough that it took four months to repair.

Actually, regarding Sherman`s Meridian Campaign, even though he tore up numerous miles of rail-road, it was all repaired with-in 6 weeks after he returned to Vicksburg, as well as most of the more critical public buildings in and around Meridian which he destroyed during that campaign. Lt. General Stephen D. Lee spoke on this soon after the war and again in his 1879 thesis of the campaign.

Below is what Lt. General S. D. Lee wrote in December 1879:

"Major George Whitfield, now at Columbus, Mississippi, in twenty-six working days had the trains on the Mobile and Ohio railroad running the same through Meridian as before Sherman's trip. Major Pritchard, in about the same working time, had the other road (Vicksburg & Alabama) in running order."

Major George Whitfield was in charge of the Pioneer Corps who rebuilt and repaired the damaged rail-road during and after the Meridian Campaign. He and Pritchard together had both rail-roads which ran through Meridian, that was destroyed by Sherman for 20 miles north, south, east and west of Meridian, back operating in only 26 working days.
 
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Forrest was an excellent railroad wrecker - and they did stay wrecked for a longer time than even Sherman could do it. He's famous for his 'neckties' but Forrest would burn the ties and warp the track...Sherman's could be straightened but Forrest's needed ironing! He always combined it with a raid, or a series of raids conducted by his brothers. Supplies would be disrupted for some time even if the tracks were fixed quickly. That's why Sherman was as paranoid as a cat about Forrest trashing his logistics line before he was ready to lose it himself before he went into Georgia.
 
diane, below is an account of Federal cavalry, under the command of Judson Kilpatrick, out destroying railroad around Atlanta in August 1864, recorded in the book; "Four Years in the Saddle; History of the First Regiment Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, War of the Rebellion 1861 - 1865." , pages 175-177, by Captain W. L. Curry, Columbus, Ohio (1898). The book was written from daily journal entries of Capt. Curry during the war which he later used in writing his book, detailing his experiences. Below he details how he and his regiment went about being ordered to dismount and tear up the railroads around Atlanta during that campaign:

" ...In a few minutes and just as the sun was dropping behind the mountain, the command was given, "right, forward, fours right", and we were off on what proved to be one of the hardest cavalry raids during our four years` service. Soon after dusk we struck the enemy`s pickets, which proved to be the advance of Ross` and Ferguson`s brigades of cavalry, and a brisk skirmish was kept up all night and during the greater part of the time we were dismounted, as the enemy would throw up barricades at every good position at bridges or along the edge of a wood and they gave us so much trouble that instead of reaching the West Point railroad at midnight, as was intended, we did not strike it until just about daybreak of the nineteenth (August 1864).

The regiment, under orders from Col. Long, dismounted, commenced tearing up and destroying the railroad track and succeeded in tearing up about a mile of the track near and south-west of Fairburn. Cavalry, when they became accustomed to this kind of work, would tear up a track very rapidly. When the order is given to dismount, number one, two and three dismount, and number four always holds horses, remains mounted and leads the other three horses. Number three hands his reigns to number four, number two ties his reign to the bit of number three and number one to reign of number two. The men then form along one side of the track in close order and at command grasp the rails and ties and turn the track over and sometimes a half mile of track is turned before a joint is broken, the men move along rapidly and many rods of the track will be standing up on edge. If there is time the rails are then torn loose from the ties by picks and axes, carried for that purpose, the ties are piled up and the rails on top of them and then the ties are fired and, thus the rails are heated and bent out of shape by being twisted around trees or telegraph poles, are left there to cool, and no doubt some of them are there yet to mark the trail of the cavalry raiders. The regiment destroyed about half a mile of the track, when the brigade was attacked by the Cavalry and artillery of the enemy in both the rear and left flank.

We were ordered to mount, and the regiment galloped forward to join the brigade which had crossed the track and had the advance. The brigade formed a line of battle facing toward the left and just as we began to advance a battery galloped into position on a little knoll to the right of our line. The line was advancing at a walk when an officer came dashing down from the battery, who proved to be the dashing dare-devil, Kilpatrick, and he ordered the line forward at a gallop across the field. He was mounted on an Arabian horse and looked the ideal cavalry man as he dashed forward in front of our line, his horse clearing a wide ditch running across the field and into which several horses fell, as they were urged to jump it by their riders. The brigade dashed into the woods and soon routed the enemy, taking a number of prisoners. During all this time Kilpatrick's headquarters band, mounted on white horses, was enlivening the scene by playing some patriotic airs. We soon fell back to the road and the column again moved towards Jonesborough, the Second Brigade having the advance.

We struck the enemy in a short time and attacked them at once, pushing them back slowly, but steadily, all day. The country was thickly wooded and a very bad place for cavalry to operate. The enemy would throw up barricades at every favorable position, such as woods, streams or ravines, firing on the advance from ambuscades, the progress of the column was much retarded, and the enemy made every effort to keep our column back from the railroad until re-enforcements could be moved down from Atlanta. About noon the advance halted and dismounted in a thick piece of woods to let the horses rest, and eat a hard-tack raw pork sandwich. The men were all sitting or lying down when all at once the rebels fired a volley and charged the advance guard, driving them back on the reserve before we could mount.

Colonel Long ordered the First forward dismounted and on double-quick. A part of the regiment was on the right of the road and advanced across a little field in which there was a melon patch and it was amusing to see the boys grab for the melons regardless of the balls that were knocking up the dust on all sides. As it was very hot and the men were almost famished after the long run, the melons were very refreshing after the rebel rear guard was routed. The rebel force was pushed back steadily until we reached Flint River and on the east side of this stream they had thrown up works, dug rifle-pits and had a strong position. As soon as our advance appeared a rebel battery opened up and the Chicago Board of Trade Battery was put in position and after a lively artillery duel the rebel battery was silenced."


In the account above Capt. W. L. Curry was speaking of the fighting which occurred on 18-19 Aug 1864, when they were sent from Sandtown to destroy a section of the West Point R.R. near Fairburn, just west of Atlanta. Here they were aggressively engaged by the cavalry brigades belonging to Brig. General`s Samuel Wragg Ferguson and Lawrence Sullivan Ross, which led to violent and bloody fighting that went on through the night and well into the early hours of the following day. Ferguson`s Cavalry Brigade was comprised of: the 2nd Alabama Cavalry (Col. Richard G. Earle / Col. John N. Carpenter), 56th Alabama Partisan Rangers (Col. William Boyles), 12th Mississippi Cavalry ( Col. William M. Inge), 11th Mississippi Cavalry (Col. Robert O. Perrin) and 9th Mississippi Cavalry ( Col. Horace H. Miller). Ross` Cavalry Brigade was comprised of: the 3rd Texas Cavalry, 6th Texas Cavalry, 9th Texas Cavalry and the 1st Texas Legion.

During the Meridian Campaign, Sherman sent entire infantry regiments out to destroy the railroad while the cavalry protected them as they carried out their work. From 14-18 Feb 1864 in and around Meridian, the Federal cavalry under Col. Edward Winslow, was constantly skirmishing against Maj. General Stephen D. Lee`s Cavalry (Jackson, Ferguson, Adams, Ross and Starke), as the Federal infantry was tearing up the railroads. The infantry could perform more thorough work than the cavalry when it came to tearing up railroads. During the railroad wars in west Tennessee and northern Mississippi, in which Forrest participated, it was his cavalry performing the destruction. And the fact that they were able to tear up the railroads so well is a testament to his command and his men`s commitment, determination and work ethic.
 
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diane, below is an account of Federal cavalry, under the command of Judson Kilpatrick, out destroying railroad around Atlanta in August 1864, recorded in the book; "Four Years in the Saddle; History of the First Regiment Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, War of the Rebellion 1861 - 1865." , pages 175-177, by Captain W. L. Curry, Columbus, Ohio (1898). The book was written from daily journal entries of Capt. Curry during the war which he later used in writing his book, detailing his experiences. Below he details how he and his regiment went about being ordered to dismount and tear up the railroads around Atlanta during that campaign:

" ...In a few minutes and just as the sun was dropping behind the mountain, the command was given, "right, forward, fours right", and we were off on what proved to be one of the hardest cavalry raids during our four years` service. Soon after dusk we struck the enemy`s pickets, which proved to be the advance of Ross` and Ferguson`s brigades of cavalry, and a brisk skirmish was kept up all night and during the greater part of the time we were dismounted, as the enemy would throw up barricades at every good position at bridges or along the edge of a wood and they gave us so much trouble that instead of reaching the West Point railroad at midnight, as was intended, we did not strike it until just about daybreak of the nineteenth (August 1864).

The regiment, under orders from Col. Long, dismounted, commenced tearing up and destroying the railroad track and succeeded in tearing up about a mile of the track near and south-west of Fairburn. Cavalry, when they became accustomed to this kind of work, would tear up a track very rapidly. When the order is given to dismount, number one, two and three dismount, and number four always holds horses, remains mounted and leads the other three horses. Number three hands his reigns to number four, number two ties his reign to the bit of number three and number one to reign of number two. The men then form along one side of the track in close order and at command grasp the rails and ties and turn the track over and sometimes a half mile of track is turned before a joint is broken, the men move along rapidly and many rods of the track will be standing up on edge. If there is time the rails are then torn loose from the ties by picks and axes, carried for that purpose, the ties are piled up and the rails on top of them and then the ties are fired and, thus the rails are heated and bent out of shape by being twisted around trees or telegraph poles, are left there to cool, and no doubt some of them are there yet to mark the trail of the cavalry raiders. The regiment destroyed about half a mile of the track, when the brigade was attacked by the Cavalry and artillery of the enemy in both the rear and left flank.

We were ordered to mount, and the regiment galloped forward to join the brigade which had crossed the track and had the advance. The brigade formed a line of battle facing toward the left and just as we began to advance a battery galloped into position on a little knoll to the right of our line. The line was advancing at a walk when an officer came dashing down from the battery, who proved to be the dashing dare-devil, Kilpatrick, and he ordered the line forward at a gallop across the field. He was mounted on an Arabian horse and looked the ideal cavalry man as he dashed forward in front of our line, his horse clearing a wide ditch running across the field and into which several horses fell, as they were urged to jump it by their riders. The brigade dashed into the woods and soon routed the enemy, taking a number of prisoners. During all this time Kilpatrick's headquarters band, mounted on white horses, was enlivening the scene by playing some patriotic airs. We soon fell back to the road and the column again moved towards Jonesborough, the Second Brigade having the advance.

We struck the enemy in a short time and attacked them at once, pushing them back slowly, but steadily, all day. The country was thickly wooded and a very bad place for cavalry to operate. The enemy would throw up barricades at every favorable position, such as woods, streams or ravines, firing on the advance from ambuscades, the progress of the column was much retarded, and the enemy made every effort to keep our column back from the railroad until re-enforcements could be moved down from Atlanta. About noon the advance halted and dismounted in a thick piece of woods to let the horses rest, and eat a hard-tack raw pork sandwich. The men were all sitting or lying down when all at once the rebels fired a volley and charged the advance guard, driving them back on the reserve before we could mount.

Colonel Long ordered the First forward dismounted and on double-quick. A part of the regiment was on the right of the road and advanced across a little field in which there was a melon patch and it was amusing to see the boys grab for the melons regardless of the balls that were knocking up the dust on all sides. As it was very hot and the men were almost famished after the long run, the melons were very refreshing after the rebel rear guard was routed. The rebel force was pushed back steadily until we reached Flint River and on the east side of this stream they had thrown up works, dug rifle-pits and had a strong position. As soon as our advance appeared a rebel battery opened up and the Chicago Board of Trade Battery was put in position and after a lively artillery duel the rebel battery was silenced."


In the account above Capt. W. L. Curry was speaking of the fighting which occurred on 18-19 Aug 1864, when they were sent from Sandtown to destroy a section of the West Point R.R. near Fairburn, just west of Atlanta. Here they were aggressively engaged by the cavalry brigades belonging to Brig. General`s Samuel Wragg Ferguson and Lawrence Sullivan Ross, which led to violent and bloody fighting that went on through the night and well into the early hours of the following day. Ferguson`s Cavalry Brigade was comprised of: the 2nd Alabama Cavalry (Col. Richard G. Earle / Col. John N. Carpenter), 56th Alabama Partisan Rangers (Col. William Boyles), 12th Mississippi Cavalry ( Col. William M. Inge), 11th Mississippi Cavalry (Col. Robert O. Perrin) and 9th Mississippi Cavalry ( Col. Horace H. Miller). Ross` Cavalry Brigade was comprised of: the 3rd Texas Cavalry, 6th Texas Cavalry, 9th Texas Cavalry and the 1st Texas Legion.

During the Meridian Campaign, Sherman sent entire infantry regiments out to destroy the railroad while the cavalry protected them as they carried out their work. From 14-18 Feb 1864 in and around Meridian, the Federal cavalry under Col. Edward Winslow, was constantly skirmishing against Maj. General Stephen D. Lee`s Cavalry (Jackson, Ferguson, Adams, Ross and Starke), as the Federal infantry was tearing up the railroads. The infantry could perform more thorough work than the cavalry when it came to tearing up railroads. During the railroad wars in west Tennessee and northern Mississippi, in which Forrest participated, it was his cavalry performing the destruction. And the fact that they were able to tear up the railroads so well is a testament to his command and his men`s commitment, determination and work ethic.
If you can find the account of losses in killed, wounded, and missing from this action, I would very much appreciate it.
Thanks,
Lubliner.
 
In his memoir, Joseph Johnston state’s that Sherman’s RR regiments could repair breaks in the line quicker than a man on a good horse could report that the line had been broken. When Sherman left Atlanta, the rails on the road to Chattanooga was literally pulled up & hauled away. Confederate cavalry raiders were incapable of doing anything like that.
The problem with interdicting a rail road is that they are easy to repair. The rail line has to be hit repeatedly, at great cost. The repairs are quick
& inexpensive.
In the West, rail lines were under constant attack by regular Confederate cavalry & banditti. The effect was analogous to giving a low dose of an antibiotic. Instead of stopping the movement of supplies, the Confederate attacks made the Federal track repair response brilliant. They could literally repair track faster than it could be destroyed.
Morgan, Forrest, Wheeler could annoy, but they were incapable of doing permanent damage to the rail roads.
One thing to keep in mind is that nature was far better at destroying rail roads than Confederate cavalry ever was. Repeatedly, storms wiped out bridges & roadbed on a wide scale. At one point every bridge within 40 miles of Nashville was washed out. No sooner had it been repaired, it happen again. The attacks by man were pinpricks compared with the weather.
 
Taking out the bridges and other supporting structures, which sometimes included garrisons, was part of why Forrest was considered the best at railroad destruction. True, it wasn't it permanent but it was more than a little annoyance. That was part of Sullivan's mission when he cornered Forrest at Parkers Crossroads - to stop the 'brigand' from destroying more of the Northwestern Railroad.
 
If you can find the account of losses in killed, wounded, and missing from this action, I would very much appreciate it.
Thanks,
Lubliner.

Federal casualties from Kilpatrick`s raid (18 - 22 Aug 1864), specifically regarding the 3rd Cavalry Division, 2nd Brigade, Commanded by Colonel Eli Long:

1st Ohio Volunteer Cavalry: 4 killed, 14 wounded and 2 missing.
3d Ohio Volunteer Cavalry: 8 killed, 30 wounded and 7 missing.
4th Ohio Volunteer Cavalry: 3 killed, 24 wounded and 7 missing

Total: 15 killed, 68 wounded and 16 missing.

This including actions at Fairburn, the Flint River, Jonesboro, Lovejoy`s Station and Nash`s Farm from 18-22 August 1864.

Colonel Beroth B. Eggleston, 1st Ohio Cavalry, who assumed command of the Second Brigade once Colonel Long was incapacitated by his injuries, stated that:

"The loss of the brigade during this expedition was in killed, wounded, and missing, 7 officers and 87 men, including Colonel Long and Captain William H. Scott, of First Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, inspector on the colonel's staff. The latter was severely wounded in the charge upon the rebel cavalry. The loss inflicted upon the enemy is unknown, but must have been considerable. We brought off 14 prisoner."
 
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There is a misunderstanding about why Forrest was in West Tennessee. If you have ever been there, it is obvious that there was nothing of strategic value for him to either attack or defend. He was there at the insistence of slaveholders in Mississippi & North Alabama. Had he operated against river traffic or rail communications, it would not have mattered anyway. The war was being won or lost in GA. As Jefferson Davis said, Forrest’s genius was wasted on back waters without strategic importance. I figure Davis knew what he was talking about.
 
If Forrest had been turned loose on Sherman's lifeline during the Atlanta Campaign (instead of Wheeler), I have to wonder how long the railroad tunnel at Tunnel Hill would have remained intact...
My wife's g-g-uncle General John Sprague received a Metal of Honor for saving Sherman's ordinance trains while greatly outnumbered by Confederate cavalry. It seems to me that by that time of the war, Army of the Tennessee soldiers could deal with just about anything Confed. cavalry could dish out. As Joseph Johnston said, the Union railroad regiments could repair railroads faster than his cavalry could destroy it. Forrest was a tactical genius, unfortunately the men in command were not strategic geniuses.
 
Yes, destroying a rail line was difficult. But even a limited guerrilla presence could be effective. Weakening a trestle by sawing through the supports could be done pretty quickly by a few people or taking out the spikes on a rail and moving it a foot. Harassing methods like these could require numerous crews along the line to make repairs. It would require frequent inspections of the lines. It would require guards on large vulnerable trestles. And it would slow trains down to prevent derailments and so on. The Union discovered pretty early that keeping a rail line operational where the civilians were hostile required considerable manpower. For high value lines like the one used by Sherman for the advance on Atlanta, the cost was worth it. But otherwise, it was just not worth the trouble.

But the poster is largely correct, raids into hostile territory to disrupt rail lines were frequently problematic For two reasons. First, cavalry raids into hostile terrain were high risk. Cavalry forces were often destroyed. Secondly, because the cavalry had to keep moving to avoid destruction, they did not have the time to thoroughly damage rail lines.
The problem was that just disrupting the rail road here & there now & again was nothing but an annoyance. A ten boxcar train delivered 90,000 daily rations, significantly more if loaded with marching rations. It did not take much of a window for massive volumes of supplies to come down the railroad. Ten trainloads of ten cars each was almost a million daily rations.
 
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