Debunking another historical myth

Moe Daoust

Corporal
Joined
Jun 11, 2018
It seems that there are many myths surrounding George B. McClellan. The notion McClellan came into possession of the Lost Order just before noon on September 13, 1861 is one example. The tale in which the Ninth Corps was supposed to have commenced its attack at 10 a.m. on the morning of September 17, 1862 is yet another. Both of these myths have been debunked. In fact, we now know it was closer to 3 p.m. when McClellan was handed the Lost Order and that he did not squander the afternoon as had previously been thought. As for when the Ninth Corps made its first attempt to take Rohrbach’s Bridge, it’s now clear that this actually took place at “about 9 a.m.” and that Burnside lied about the 10 a.m. start in an attempt to lessen the excessive amount of time it had taken for him to cross Antietam Creek. What follows is a third such example.


THE MYTH

On page 195 of his Landscape Turned Red”, Stephen W. Sears writes, “As the clamor of the guns intensified on the Confederate left, a flag-signal report from the First Corps was relayed to headquarters, and McClellan was heard to remark, ‘All goes well: Hooker is driving them. ’ As yet he had issued no orders to Burnside’s Ninth Corps . . . or to Sumner’s Second Corps. The fight remained Hooker’s alone, with Mansfield’s Twelfth Corps still in reserve.” Later, on page 218, Sears writes, “Hooker’s message that he was driving the enemy was gratifying [to McClellan,] but within a matter of minutes it was clear that events were taking a turn for the worst. The battle line in ragged butternut that stormed out of the West Wood near the Dunker church at 7 A.M. – Hoods division – was clearly visible from headquarters. At 7:20 Sumner was ordered to the rescue.”

THE FACTS

- First of all, McClellan got that message from Hooker at about 8 a.m. and this is confirmed in William Child’s, A History of the Fifth Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers (p. 120) when he writes, "At about 8 a. m., Colonel [Edward] Cross visited and was introduced to General McClellan. The general was in good spirits, though thin and careworn. A messenger came from the signal station with dispatches from General Hooker to General McClellan. He read them, turned to the group of officers and said, 'All goes well; Hooker is driving them.'

- Cross’s account is somewhat confirmed in the following communication, which was sent to Sumner at 8:30 a.m., while in the midst of his advance, “Gnl. Hooker appears to be driving the enemy rapidly. If he does not require your assistance on his right, please push up on the left through the ravine at the head of which the house was burned this morning, getting possession of the woods to the right as soon as possible & push on toward Sharpsburg and a little to its rear as rapidly as possible. Use your artillery freely" (Marion Armstrong, Unfurl those Colors, p. 171.) The wording in this communication to Sumner is so similar to what Colonel Cross overheard McClellan say after he read Hooker's dispatches, and sent so soon afterward, that there can be little doubt Cross was correct in his estimate of the time.

- Where, then, did Sears come up with the notion Hooker’s dispatch reached McClellan before 7:20 a.m.? He certainly doesn’t provide any source for this in his annotations. Was it nothing more than speculation on his part? Whatever the case, he was entirely wrong about the time.

- Then again, based on Cross’s account and the 8:30 a.m. communication to Sumner, Sears’s theory regarding McClellan hitting the panic button, upon seeing Hood’s troops emerge from the West Woods, effectively gets thrown out the window. But there’s more. Recently discovered in the Second Corps's correspondences by Marion Armstrong, the 7:20 a.m. order to Sumner reads: "The Comdg. General directs that you move Sedgwick and French across the creek by the fords which Capt. Custer will point out to you. You will cross in as solid a mass as possible and communicate with Genl. Hooker immediately. Genl. Richardson's Division will not cross till further orders. You will cross your artillery over the bridge and halt after you cross until you ascertain if Genl. Hooker wants assistance.” From this as well as the 8:30 a.m. communication, it becomes clear that Sumner had not been sent on a rescue mission or anything of the sort. Where did Sears come up with this clearly preposterous scenario?

- By 8 a.m. Mansfield’s Twelfth Corps was already on the field. What’s more, it had never been held in reserve. Hooker had simply failed to bring it forward before commencing his attack, as McClellan had intended. In other words, the fight had never been "Hooker's alone."

- By all indications, an order was sent to Burnside at 8 a.m. to open his attack. Presumably, this was sent as a consequence of Hooker’s message.

In effect, Sears’s account of these events is not only misleading but it also borders on fiction or otherwise known as a myth. That myth has now been debunked.
 
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