Dan Sickles, Union Savior?

Really?

OpnDownfall said:
The question, then was it possible for 3d Corps to effectively cover the ground from Hancocks's left, up to and including LRT?
It does look like a lot of ground to cover for one Union Corps and still be strong enough to repel a full blooded offenseive from

Really? Does it look like an unreasonable amount of ground? On the map to me it kind've looks like if Sickles had stuck it out between Hancock's left and Little Round Top that he would be covering about the same amount of ground as Hancock was.

To me it almost doesn't really matter where Lee's blow eventually would've fallen; his assault would've hit the fishhook square on. I think Lee's assault is going to hit Hancock.
 
The line Sickles was supposed to hold was considerably shorter than the one he chose to hold. I believe I read that the ground he was assigned would have been stretching his corps somewhat thin, but nowhere near as tenuously as his chosen position.

ole
 
Dan Sickles: Union Savior?

For the purposes' of this thread, where Longstreets attack falls, does matter.
If Longstreet is attacking Hancock, then Sickles movement forward did more harm than good, to 3d Corps at least. But, if he is indeed planning his attack on Sickles' Crops. Then it would seem that meeting the attack from the more forward position allowed 3d Corps to absorb the full brunt of the attack and rob it of all impetus, something problematic if that corps had received the attack on its flank while facing West.
So if Lee planned his attack to include LRT, then 3d Corps would become the main target, whether inteded by Lee or not.
If nothing else was learned from Day 2, a single Union Corps stood little chance of standing up to an all-out attack by a much bigger Confederate corps, especially if attacked on one of its flanks. If not Sickles' then Hancock's.
 
Hancock or Sickles

OpnDownfall said:
For the purposes' of this thread, where Longstreets attack falls, does matter.
If Longstreet is attacking Hancock, then Sickles movement forward did more harm than good, to 3d Corps at least. But, if he is indeed planning his attack on Sickles' Crops. Then it would seem that meeting the attack from the more forward position allowed 3d Corps to absorb the full brunt of the attack and rob it of all impetus

Actually I'm of the opinion that if Longstreet is attacking Hancock, Sickles' movement forward aids the Hancock. On Day 2 Longstreet's Corps is making the major assault, but Anderson from Hill's Corps is also sent in. Anderson's division DOES hit Hancock on his left flank and DOES make a penetration, but it is unsupported (this is also one of the reasons why Lee orders Pickett's charge the next day, he thinks Union center is vulnerable). Nevertheless, if Sickles is in his proper position (from Hancock's left to the Little Round Top), the Confederate assault would land square onto Hancock's left and that, in my opinion, would be A LOT of firepower at a concentrated point. Sickles' movement forward absorbs the shock from McLaws and Hood, pressure NOT applied to Hancock.

Anderson, being on the 'left' of the Confederate assault, I think appropriately demonstrates Lee's actual target for Day 2, Hood and McLaws should be hitting to the right of Anderson of course, so we're looking at an assault targeting Hancock's left and if Sickles' had stayed in position, possibly the junction between the two corps.

BUT EVEN IF the attack is aimed lower on the Union fishook, specifically at Sickles' proposed position between Hancock and the Little Round Top, again the assault would be landing SQUARE onto the fishook; WHEREAS by moving forward, elements of the assault hit Hancock, Sickles in the Peach Orchard with Hood trying to move around Sickles' left - ie. the attack is diffused over a wider area.
 
The movement of Sickles forward does rob Longstreet's attack of impetus, which is a good thing. We can't truly know what would have happened if he had stayed in his original position, but the fighting would either have been much harder for both, or more just plain disastrous to the Confederates, because they are attacking higher ground under plunging artillery fire. It may well have been Pickett's charge a day earlier.

The fact that Sickles moved forward and robbed the attack of its full force is a key factor, but it wasn't as if Sickles was thinking that at the time. He saw what he thought was better ground, and he left his right flank open and exposed his men to a brutal attack that practically destroyed the Third Corps as a unit, as it was later consolidated into either the Second or Fifth Corps (can't remember which; if someone knows, put it in :smile:).

The high ground at the Peach Orchard wasn't really all that great a position to begin with. Even if Sickles hadn't taken it, and Alexander had put artillery there, it was commanded itself by roughly equal ground on Cemetery Ridge and higher ground on Little Round Top. Alexander himself stated after the battle that the ground in the Peach Orchard was useless to both sides, because it was commanded from both the Union and the Confederate lines. And the fact that his flank was hanging left a possible disaster waiting to happen from the beginning.

So yes, it slowed Longstreet down, and took momentum from the attacks of McLaws, Anderson and Hood, but at what cost? It cost a corps, and many, many men in some of the fiercest fighting of the day. Sickles moved his men into a mediocre, not better position. And even though it very well may have saved the day, it was still ill advised and I don't think any of the credit should go to Sickles. It should go to the men who fought in the Peach Orchard, in the Wheatfield, the Rose Farm, Devils Den, and Little Round Top. They fought hard to hold an almost unholdable position.
 
A most excellent post, J_Man. It deserves some better response than I have in me at this hour. Will try again tomorrow.
 
Dan Sickles; Union Savior?

Mediocre position; as opposed to what better position? In any case Sickles was not the only General officer to misread the terrain and made wrong decicisons based on inadequate information, that influenced the battle at Gettysburg, some of them of much higher rank.
As I have noted, it is unlikely that Hancock's Corps would have withstood Longstreets attack any better than Sickles and Sickles in his original postion would have been as vulnerable as he was in his forward position except (like Hancock) he would have been facing the wrong direction.
Did not Lee want to take the Peach Orchard in the first place, so that he could establish a artillery base to support his attack? I don't think it fair to blame Sickles for making the same mistake as Lee, IF it was a mistake.
If one admits that Sickles movement forstalled an overwhelming Confederate attack on the Left Flank of the AoP and more than likely saved the 2d Day for the Union, which Led directly to Pickett's Charge on the 3d day, then one might logically claim that the sacrifice of 3d Corps was justified, whatever the intents of Lee, Meade, Longstreet or Sickles. might have been at the time.
 
OpnDownfall said:
Mediocre position; as opposed to what better position? In any case Sickles was not the only General officer to misread the terrain and made wrong decicisons based on inadequate information, that influenced the battle at Gettysburg, some of them of much higher rank.
As I have noted, it is unlikely that Hancock's Corps would have withstood Longstreets attack any better than Sickles and Sickles in his original postion would have been as vulnerable as he was in his forward position except (like Hancock) he would have been facing the wrong direction.
Did not Lee want to take the Peach Orchard in the first place, so that he could establish a artillery base to support his attack? I don't think it fair to blame Sickles for making the same mistake as Lee, IF it was a mistake.
If one admits that Sickles movement forstalled an overwhelming Confederate attack on the Left Flank of the AoP and more than likely saved the 2d Day for the Union, which Led directly to Pickett's Charge on the 3d day, then one might logically claim that the sacrifice of 3d Corps was justified, whatever the intents of Lee, Meade, Longstreet or Sickles. might have been at the time.

Lee might have wanted it, but Lee is guilty of making a few bad command decisions during the battle of Gettysburg, not just Picketts charge. And to have charged men on high ground would have been suicide.

The Peach Orchard, as I said earlier, was not a better position than where Sickles had been posted. Sure, it dominated the left end of Hancock's line. But, if Sickles had remained in the position he had been assigned, he would have enjoyed superior position to any Confederate artillery posted in the Peach Orchard. Three batteries were put in place from the summit of LRT to the hill just north of what is Wheatfield Road. The positions on LRT, as stated earlier, dominated the Peach Orchard, and could rain shot and shell down on the enemy artillery, making the position wholly untenable to Alexander's guns.

Now let me define more clearly what I mean by a mediocre position. For one, it is not the better ground, for there was superior ground, much more defensible, behind where Sickles put his men. By pushing his corps forward, Sickles not only had to defend it, but keep the enemy from getting around his position and losing the high ground behind him. To do this,he had to extend his lines, which made the left as vulnerable as the right. If you look at the maps of the fighting on the left during the second day, you will see that there were only two brigades positioned between the Peach Orchard and Devils Den. Hardly enough to stand up to the better part of Hood's and Mclaw's Divisions. The position might have been defensible had a better corps commander been in place, but I don't think any of the others would have left the high ground. Sickles poorly allocated troops and picked a poor position to hold.

The line that Sickles was assigned was a fine defensive position. It was chosen by men trained to locate and occupy good ground. Hancock and Meade knew what they were doing. Sickles had no training and was a political general. He saw what he thought was better ground and it turned out he was wrong. Colonel Alexander, when he came to the Peach Orchard after the Federals were driven out looked toward the Union line and realized that had Sickles been positioned further back, where he was supposed to be, though Alexander didn't know that, the Confederate assault would have failed miserably and probably driven nobody off. In speaking of the Cemetery Ridge positions, he noted that the ridge offered "good cover behind it and endless fine positions for batteries." What ground is he speaking of? Why its the very ground Sickles was to have held.

Hood was ordered to attack the Federal line. He was not to go around the flank, but charge straight ahead, against his wishes. He knew that it was suicide. The reason he went up LRT was because of Sickles line extending out, forcing him up the hills. The signal station was still on LRT, and Warren probably still would have gone up there. If there was a threat, it would most likely have been taken care of with the Fifth Corps, securing the flank, making the attack even more disastrous for the Confederates.

The move forward may have been helpful, to be sure, as I have said. It took the oomph out of the attack. But that does not, in my opinion, justify it. Sickles was a glory hound, looking out for his own good and fortune, and he destroyed his corps and lost a leg for it. He tried to hold a position thats superiority was illusionary. It was through efforts of the men of the Second and Fifth Corps that the line was saved. The Third Corps fought valiantly to be sure, but what else were they to do? Sickles wasted his corps. The ends do not always justify the means.
 
Lost Corps

J_Man0507 said:
It cost a corps, and many, many men in some of the fiercest fighting of the day. Sickles moved his men into a mediocre, not better position. And even though it very well may have saved the day, it was still ill advised and I don't think any of the credit should go to Sickles. It should go to the men who fought in the Peach Orchard, in the Wheatfield, the Rose Farm, Devils Den, and Little Round Top. They fought hard to hold an almost unholdable position.

I think the Feds were going to lose a corps (or the equivalent of one, one way or another); you are going to lose something to beat off an 1863 Confederate Corps. Its difficult to determine which would've been a better position, the Peach Orchard, or Sickles' original position, but even if we consider Meade's original position to be better, I am still concerned that the full weight of a Confederate Corps will make the entire fishhook untenable. The Federals can 'afford' to lose the Peach Orchard, they cannot lose any position on the fishhook, for any substantial period of time of course)
 
cw1865 said:
I think the Feds were going to lose a corps (or the equivalent of one, one way or another); you are going to lose something to beat off an 1863 Confederate Corps. Its difficult to determine which would've been a better position, the Peach Orchard, or Sickles' original position, but even if we consider Meade's original position to be better, I am still concerned that the full weight of a Confederate Corps will make the entire fishhook untenable. The Federals can 'afford' to lose the Peach Orchard, they cannot lose any position on the fishhook, for any substantial period of time of course)

The Army of the Potomac had already lost a corps. The First Corps was all but used up after the first day. To be sure, they would lose the equivalent of one, but it would be fairly spread out over the entire army. Two corps were rendered unusable during the battle. Even if the full weight of the attack had fallen on the original position, there were two corps in reserve that could come up and add their weight. And if artillery is placed right, and Hunt was a good artillerist, with good fields of fire, the attack would have lost momentum and it would have been Pickett's Charge a day early.
 
Sickles' position may have been a "better" one for his corps, but it was not a "better" one for Meade's army. The move carried discretion too far. He placed his corps in harms way and, in doing so, bollixed up Meade's arrangement.

ole
 
Dan Sickles; Union Savior?

Just the opposite Ole, Sickles' forward movent was bad for the 3d Corps but good for the Union Cause and vice versa for the original placement.
Lee's early morning reconnaisance, had indicated that LRT was unoccupied so two confederate division were to attack the Union Left from the S and W followed closely by the rest of Lonstreets Corps moving further North, guiding on the Emmitsburg Rd, before turning more or less NNE ( probably at a slight angle to the Union Line) into Sickles Corps, by brigades With a Division from Hill's Corps hitting, approximately, the junction between Hancock and Sickles Corps.
The history of the war in Va. indicates that a major assault on the flanks of the AoP up to 1863 almost always resulted in a major victory by the ANV. There is little to indicate from Meades or his other corps commanders actions that anticipated such a move.
The Confederate attack, was not merely slowed down, the whole impetus of the attack was completely dissipated in a strike at a position that was Not part of the Union Main Line of Resistance.
The reasons for Sickles move,may or may not be to ones liking, but the results of the move are not in doubt.
I will concede that staying in it's original position would probably have resulted in fewer overall casualties than those from its more forward position, but 3d Corps would still have been shattered by the flank attack and Hancock would have been rolled up along Cemetary Ridge. Losing Cemetary Hill and the Battle (not the war).
 
The thing with those flank attacks was that they were always surprise attacks; Jackson at Chancellorsville for example. They were made on an unexpecting flank and were successful because there was no resistance. There would have been no surprise this time. You have the signal station on top of LRT which would have spotted Hood's and McClaws coming, and would have relayed the news down the line. Troops would most likely be sent to defend LRT and most likely securing the left flank of Sickle's Line, had he stayed in position. So Hood can not just go up and over, but he would have to do the same thing as before and try to attack LRT. There would have been no surprise as to Longstreet's attack. The Federal's seeing the movement, would probably maneuver to counter and break up the attack. The Confederates would have been under concentrated artillery and musket fire, and the attack would have most likely fallen apart.
 
Dan Sickles; Union Savior?

McClellan anticipated Lee's attack on his Right on the Peninsula and Porter was well dug in and better prepared for the attack than Meade or Hancock apparently were at Gettysburg.
Even with Lee's plan miscarrying, the ANV broke through in the end and the battle was a great confederate victory.
There is some controversy, as to how much the signals from LRT, just before and during the attack, helped or confused Meade and his staff. With all that advanced information, the battle was a near run thing, with darkness ending the fighting as much as the piecemeal reinforcements.
The chances of a single Union Corps repulsing an all out attack on their flanks (even if well dug in, which Hancock nor Sickles were not) is problematic and goes against most experience during the war so far, in the East. ,
 
OpnDownfall said:
McClellan anticipated Lee's attack on his Right on the Peninsula and Porter was well dug in and better prepared for the attack than Meade or Hancock apparently were at Gettysburg.
Even with Lee's plan miscarrying, the ANV broke through in the end and the battle was a great confederate victory.
There is some controversy, as to how much the signals from LRT, just before and during the attack, helped or confused Meade and his staff. With all that advanced information, the battle was a near run thing, with darkness ending the fighting as much as the piecemeal reinforcements.
The chances of a single Union Corps repulsing an all out attack on their flanks (even if well dug in, which Hancock nor Sickles were not) is problematic and goes against most experience during the war so far, in the East. ,

While the Seven Days battles have gone down as a Confederate Victory, all but one of the separate battles were in reality, Union victories. The Union forces held the field after every battle, except for one (which escapes me at the moment). The Confederates won a strategic victory, not tactical. McClellan's men stymied Lee, but Little Mac pulled back like a fool instead of pressing his advantage.

As to the signal station. If a message goes out that there is a strong enemy force forming across the way, at least a staff officer would come and take a look, probably Warren or one from Hancock's Corps. This is in essence what happened. Warren was sent to see what was going on. It was already known that the Confederates were going to attack there, it was just when and where exactly.

Now lets go with what we have, assuming that Sickles doesn't move forward. A message is seen from the station, saying that enemy troops have been spotted and are forming to attack. Warren is dispatched and he sees an imminent attack which is going to go against the line below. What will he do? Most likely the same thing he did when Sickles moved forward. He is going to get the Fifth Corps, which is bivouacked nearby, and artillery, maybe Hazlett's battery and others, to form up on the left of Sickles and extend the line. If the attack avoids LRT as it was supposed to, Hood and McClaws would have fire coming down on them from the heights, so they either attack it or retreat, and Hood being who he is, he would have attacked. But even Hood saw the attack as foolhardy, because once their were guns on those heights, it was over. He didn't say this, but I quote Sam Hood from the movie Gettysburg: "They don't even have to use guns. All they need to do is roll rocks down on us." With men on that hill, the flank is secure.

I still say that had Sickles stayed, with artillery in place and the Fifth Corps coming up to reinforce the flank, it would have been Pickett's Charge a day early. The oncoming attack would have been decimated by artillery in good postion (which even the enemy artillery commander recognized) with good fields of fire, and reinforcements a plenty, they would not have been able to achieve and exploit a breakthrough. And the casualty count on the Union side would have been much lower, and that of the Confederates the same or higher.
 
Dan Sickles,Union Savior?

All very well and good, if everyone from Meade, Warren Sickles and Hancock on down made all the right assumptions and all the right moves, at the right time.
Real time, real experience during the war argues that perfection in the heat of battle was rarely achieved.
Experience, argues that, at Best, 3d Corps would have been, at least partially, driven back from his position and this is assuming that in this scenario, the attack of Hill division does not occur or does not get the penetration on Cemetary Ridge, that it did in real life.
So at the end of Dau 2. the confederate left has at least pushed back the extreme right of the Union Line on Cemetary Ridge enveloping the extreme of the Union's MLR.
Anyone have any idea's on what Meade's plans were, in case such an untoward event occurred? Like the Seven Days, the morale of the Commanding General is usually more important than that of his army. McClellan Told Porter to be prepared and immediately began to plan his retreat (saved his army, lost the battle). McClellan was more interested in not losing rather than winning. Meade had Butterfield, drawing up maps and planning the AoP's retreat if things got too hot too early.
Knowing what we know now of Meade's abilities and disabilities. even a partial lodgement of the ANV on his right, ON Cemetary Ridge, would most likely have been the signal to Meade to retreat to fight another day (saving his army, losing the battle)
 
That is what this threads is about: an assumption. It is being assumed that Sickles in his original position would have been driven off. I am making the counterpoint to that. With an attack on that flank, the Fifth Corp would most likely have been brought up to secure it. Warren is highly likely to have done the same thing as he did in the actual scenario; go to LRT to observe what was going on with the Confederates, see that LRT needed men on it, and call for them to come up. To hold LRT down to where the end of Sickles line was would take about a division. That leaves atleast two divisions in reserve to bolster the Federal line on Cemetery Ridge. I reiterate the point that the Second and Third Corps would have been able to hold, even though not without a tough fight. The reason for the breakthrough on Day Two is because Hancock is trying to fill gaps left all over because of Sickles. If Sickles doesn't move, there are no gaps to fill.

Now, in the event that Meade did lose on the Second Day, no matter the movements of troops, he most likely would have pulled back to the Pipe Creek line that was his original intent to hold in the first place. This would force Lee to attack him on good ground of Meade's choosing. Lee can't stay in the North because his communication and supply line is too extended, and he can't just go around and try to attack Baltimore or Washington because then he would have the enemy in his rear. Even if the AoP had had to pull out on the Second day, Lee still would have had to leave Pennsylvania and get back to his lines of supply and communication and return to Virginia.
 
Good Point

J_Man0507 said:
It is being assumed that Sickles in his original position would have been driven off. I am making the counterpoint to that.

And from the Sickles' defender, the point does have merit. Hancock and Sickles are both backed up by two corps.
 
Well, you guys jumped about a mile ahead while I was sleeping. Will have to let this one alone until the pace slows a bit. Am enjoying the action. Keep on truckin.

ole
 
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