Current consensus about if Ewell should have taken Cemetery Hill on July 1st.

major bill

Brev. Brig. Gen'l
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One of the great controversies about the Battle of Gettysburg revolves around if Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell should have taken Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863. In the past many historians fault him for not doing so. But what about more current historians? Since some of the early books about the Battle of Gettysburg were written additional information has emerged. However, has this additional information changed how historians view Ewell not doing so? recently I have seen a bit more sympathy for Ewell.

We would have to understand what Ewell did and did not know on July 1st. We also need to look at what orders Ewell have received and how Ewell interpreted these orders. Most people think taking Cemetery Hill would have been a cake walk, but this might not be true.
 
There is no room to deploy for an attack NW of the hills.(Gettysburg is in the way) So he would have had to do it North.

Cemetery hill was defended with at least one fresh brigade of infantry, a lot of tired infantry and a lot of artillery.
And federal reinforcements was coming in from the east, in a perfect position to flank the attack.

It is unlikely that he would have been able to get into position and make the attack in time... before dark and/or getting hit in the flank by federal reinforcements.


Now this Is just my opinion, I really have no idea what the newest books on Gettysburg say.
 
I believe the negative thinking about Ewell and Gettysburg originated with the Lost Cause proponents who were seeking to find fault with anybody except Lee for the outcome of that battle. Lee's orders to Ewell about carrying Cemetery Hill were very discretionary; Lee certainly had to know that Ewell was not the type of commander who was comfortable interpreting superior orders on his own initiative. And given that Ewell had just engaged in a hard fought and successful pushback of the Union XI Corps (and had previously performed well in the opening stages of the campaign at Winchester), was unfamiliar with the terrain and opposing force, and was facing limited daylight left, it is not surprising that Ewell chose to stand down.
 
Two of his division were disorganized and exhausted and Johnston's division had not yet arrived. Rode's division was badly mauled. Early's division was in a bit better condition. BG. William "Extra Billy" Smith believed that Union troops were approaching from the east which may have troubled Early. Early did send a brigade to support Smith on the chance this might be true. So the first question is did Ewell have enough organized troops to take Cemetery Hill before Johnston's division arrived? If not, when would Johnston arrive and how long before his men could be prepared enough to aid in the attack?
 
I believe the negative thinking about Ewell and Gettysburg originated with the Lost Cause proponents who were seeking to find fault with anybody except Lee for the outcome of that battle. Lee's orders to Ewell about carrying Cemetery Hill were very discretionary; Lee certainly had to know that Ewell was not the type of commander who was comfortable interpreting superior orders on his own initiative. And given that Ewell had just engaged in a hard fought and successful pushback of the Union XI Corps (and had previously performed well in the opening stages of the campaign at Winchester), was unfamiliar with the terrain and opposing force, and was facing limited daylight left, it is not surprising that Ewell chose to stand down.
I think the negative propaganda about Ewell actually started at the time, with that notorious quote by Jackson acolyte Sandie Pendleton. As I and others have laid out in detail in another recent thread, and sas you suggest here, there were ample reasons why Ewell's decision not to attack the Cemetery Hill position c. 5-7 pm on July 1 was both the only plausible course and the sound military course.
 
Two of his division were disorganized and exhausted and Johnston's division had not yet arrived. Rode's division was badly mauled. Early's division was in a bit better condition. BG. William "Extra Billy" Smith believed that Union troops were approaching from the east which may have troubled Early. Early did send a brigade to support Smith on the chance this might be true. So the first question is did Ewell have enough organized troops to take Cemetery Hill before Johnston's division arrived? If not, when would Johnston arrive and how long before his men could be prepared enough to aid in the attack?
I would add that Lee told him he couldn't count on getting any help from Hill.
 
Didn't seem that Hill was able to offer much help to anybody during the 3 days.

From what I understand it wasn't that Hill was unwilling (or unable) to provide help, it's that Lee didn't allow Hill's only fresh troops to help the assault. Ewell was willing to give it a go if he got reinforcements but Lee declined to give that help.
 
At least one knowledgeable person, who was present at the time, thought that Cemetery Hill was a strong position for the Army of the Potomac. At 5:25 p.m. on July 1, 1863, General W. S. Hancock sent a message to General Meade that said in part, "We have now taken up a position in the cemetery, and cannot well be taken. It is a position, however, easily turned." He goes on to note that Slocum is advancing and can take a position on the right, while he also expects the Third Corps to arrive shortly, and believes that its advance will protect the left. With these two corps advancing, the position might not be turned so easily. Based on these observations, it would seem that if Cemetery Hill is to be taken by Ewell, he needs to take Culp's Hill on the Union right. A reconnaissance is sent out belatedly by Johnson. The report, after losing some men taken prisoner, is that Culp's Hill is occupied. Little do they know that it is occupied by only one regiment (7th Indiana).

We often hear that Lee ordered Ewell to take the hill "if practicable". But that is only part of the order. Lee's order also goes on to say that Ewell should not bring on a general engagement until the rest of the divisions of the army, which are being hurried forward, arrive. Ewell would be aware that Johnson's Division of his own Corps had only just arrived, and surely Johnson would have informed Ewell that Longstreet's Corps was behind him. Hence, whether being buried forward or not, the rest of the divisions of the army had not yet arrived. Any attempt by Ewell to take Cemetery Hill, which was occupied by both infantry and artillery, would have been a direct violation of Lee's order.

At least that's how I see it.
 
From what I understand it wasn't that Hill was unwilling (or unable) to provide help, it's that Lee didn't allow Hill's only fresh troops to help the assault. Ewell was willing to give it a go if he got reinforcements but Lee declined to give that help.
True, but I think the post was (accurately) referring to Hill's generally poor performance throughout the battle. Who knows whether Hill's actions on July 1 played a role in Lee's decision.
 
True, but I think the post was (accurately) referring to Hill's generally poor performance throughout the battle. Who knows whether Hill's actions on July 1 played a role in Lee's decision.

It is true that Hill was largely MIA those three days, but in this instance the decision to keep back Anderson's division was Lee's. Ewell asked Lee for help, from whatever source it could be drawn, and Lee demured.
 
It is true that Hill was largely MIA those three days, but in this instance the decision to keep back Anderson's division was Lee's. Ewell asked Lee for help, from whatever source it could be drawn, and Lee demured.
I'm not sure we disagree. My (admittedly speculative) point is that Hill's "indisposition" and resulting performance on July 1 may have played a role in Lee's decision to withhold Hill's forces. Anderson was under Hill's command. Maybe I'm missing your point ....
 
I'm not sure we disagree. My (admittedly speculative) point is that Hill's "indisposition" and resulting performance on July 1 may have played a role in Lee's decision to withhold Hill's forces. Anderson was under Hill's command. Maybe I'm missing your point ....

Yeah, I think we're on the same page here. It's probably me that is misunderstanding the initial point - I thought jackt62 was saying that Hill was at fault for not sending Anderson over and I was pointing out the decision came from Lee. Probably was a bit pedantic on my part . . .
 
I just now finished Cemetery Hill by Terry L. Jones which was published in 2003 so perhaps not "current" view. In the book the author seems to believe that Ewell was probably correct in not attaching Cemetery Hill until Johnston's division arrived. Once Johnston did arrive it was probably too late to attack that day. Terry Jones does not go in to the possibility of a night attack. Night attacks are hard to control and it is uncertain if Ewell even considered a night attack.
 
I just now finished Cemetery Hill by Terry L. Jones which was published in 2003 so perhaps not "current" view. In the book the author seems to believe that Ewell was probably correct in not attaching Cemetery Hill until Johnston's division arrived. Once Johnston did arrive it was probably too late to attack that day. Terry Jones does not go in to the possibility of a night attack. Night attacks are hard to control and it is uncertain if Ewell even considered a night attack.
I'd have to find it but I think there is a moire recent article in Gettysburg magazine which agrees that the numerous hurdles in place meant that Ewell made the right decision. And, as was pointed out, the starting point for all of this is an ambiguous order from Lee.
 
The Rebs had a long March to get to Northern Gettysburg so they were exhausted, then fought a battle, some of their Units were scattered in the Town after chasing the Yanks thru it, and night was approaching. Ewell was correct. History is always blaming others instead of Lee. Lee was in charge so he's responsible. Lee's been placed on a Pedestal which is Baloney. The first time I went to Gettysburg and stood at "The High Water Mark" and looked out over that field I was shocked as to what the Hell was Lee thinking! Equally as stupid, suicidal, and boneheaded as Burnside at Fredericksburg.
 
The Rebs had a long March to get to Northern Gettysburg so they were exhausted, then fought a battle, some of their Units were scattered in the Town after chasing the Yanks thru it, and night was approaching. Ewell was correct. History is always blaming others instead of Lee. Lee was in charge so he's responsible. Lee's been placed on a Pedestal which is Baloney.
In this specific case Lee did the right thing. Instructed the relevant commander "on the ground" about not only what he wanted done,
but also the authority to judge the situation himself and if he judged an attack impractical to call off it off.
 
I just now finished Cemetery Hill by Terry L. Jones which was published in 2003 so perhaps not "current" view. In the book the author seems to believe that Ewell was probably correct in not attaching Cemetery Hill until Johnston's division arrived. Once Johnston did arrive it was probably too late to attack that day. Terry Jones does not go in to the possibility of a night attack. Night attacks are hard to control and it is uncertain if Ewell even considered a night attack.
Yup just look at the Night attack the next day on that position, it failed.
 
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