Could the South have won the Civil War?

Could the South have won the Civil War

  • Yes

    Votes: 46 59.0%
  • No

    Votes: 32 41.0%

  • Total voters
    78
That is ideal scenario, bama, but ... Can you name me a time when a victorious army actually pursued an defeated army and stomped on it?

There is a reason for that lack. The victorious army is as discombobulated as the defeated army. Reorganizing after a victory is as much an impediment as the retreat is for the other.

It would be nice to think of Grant pursuing Beauregard after Shiloh, or Meade pursuing Lee after Gettysburg, or Bragg pursuing Rosecrans after Chickamauga, but none of that happened. It couldn't.

The one absolute, never ending, unchangable, constant attribute of hind sight is the abilty to analyze things after the fact when one can say " here! don't you see! Do it this way!...oh D_AM_N if they had only done thus and so, then such and such would have been the result.... Why I love hindsight! :smile:
 
Didn't anwer my question, Bama. Name one time when a victorious army actually pursued a defeated army and stomped on it.

If that is armchair general hindsight, so be it. Mine Creek comes to mind. And Chantilly. It didn't happen all that often.

It's not a matter of if and then. It just wasn't done. The victorious arny just sat down and had dinner while the victorious general chased around looking for wagons and cohesive units and whatever else was needed for a pursuit.
 
Regarding Bragg after Chickamauga, you're proposition ignores certain realities. First, as early as September 21, Bragg sent out Forrest and Wheeler on postbattle recon missions north, east and west of the Chickamauga Creek. Wheeler dithered. Forrest, on the other hand, came back with info that suggested that the AotC was unfortified and ripe for attacking in Chattanooga. Unfortunately he missed the fact that the Federals were already well into creating fortifications to defend the town. It is likely that if Bragg followed Forrest's advice an attack would have been a bloody failure. This comes from Dave Powell's Failure In The Saddle.

I remember having discussions with Dave. I don't agree with him completely, but my point lies earlier.

Bragg/the AoT command was so disjointed and ineffective that they absolutely blew chance after chance to destroy the AoC before and during the two days of battle at Chickamauga. On the 2nd day, Bragg appears not to have noticed that Rosecrans was shattered and that he should be pursuing. He blamed Longstreet for not telling him the battle was won. While there might be a minor scrap of truth in that, Longstreet's reply was that he thought the roaring cheers of his men should have been enough notice to any commander.

The time to pursue was then, before Thomas got off the field. A Jackson would have pursued into the darkness until he could go no more, then had the pursuit start again before first light. Bragg needs to be attacking the Union columns all the way back to Chattanooga without respite. Sending some cavalry out the next day is tame and lame.


Regarding Meade, Lee's army was fairly well beaten up. Every division in the ANV had been engaged and some, like Heth's, Rodes' and Pickett's were really shot up. In terms of divisions, that's one third of Lee's army. The AotP had also suffered. Three of Meade's most aggressive corps commanders were killed or wounded - Reynolds, Hancock and Sickles. The only almost fresh corps available was the Sixth, but they had conducted the march of their lives just to get to Gettysburg on the afternoon of July 2. Meade wound up having to call on William (?) French to take over Third Corps. There were faster snails than French. He sent for Couch from Harrisburg by the Fourth of July. Meade had to guess what route Lee would take -Lee knew what route he would take. Meade had to worry about administrative duties around Gettysburg, too. In short, Meade did just about everything he could or should to pursue Lee. Finally, Stuart deserves high praise for covering the withdrawal as does Imboden for how he protected the wagon train full of wounded Confederates.

Oh, I think Meade did a good job, as did Lee, Stuart and the ANV, on the way back to Virginia. I don't really think there is a clear-cut way to show how to rip up the ANV on the way back. If you push right after the main body, you'll be attacking uphill against Longstreet at one of the gaps: sure to be bloody.

But strong men armed have often done amazing things in situations like that by being bold and determined. Under pressure, unexpected things happen in combat. Great commanders understand that in their bones. Meade was just a bit new and not quite the right personality to take the risk, although he was a very tough fighter when roused. Doing what I am talking about might have led to a very bloody nose (5-10,000 more casulaties) for the AoP. Only truly rare commanders take these kind of risks. Lee and Grant show that they might. Maybe Sheridan or Jackson. Hard to see anyone else doing it.


Given the circumstances, I don't think Grant could have been any more aggressive than Meade or Bragg. Plus, look at Grant after Chattanooga. Effective pursuit just wasn't normally in the cards after CW battles.

Yet Grant showed throughout the Civil War that he did act this way: Henry & Donelson followed by the taking of Nashville. Chopped up at Shiloh, he wants to pursue as Beauregard retreats. Price and Van Dorn (Iuka and Corinth), once again Grant wants to pursue and destroy. Raid his rear, he always tries to hunt down and destroy the raiders. Vicksburg Campaign: nothing but a rolling pursuit with battle after battle until he has Pemberton trapped. Vicksburg surrenders, he turns Sherman loose on Joe Johnston with 50,000 men. The Overland Campaign to Appomattox, always pursuits whenever an enemy retreats.

At Chattanooga, Grant called back the pursuit because he was being messaged by Lincoln to remember Burnside in Knoxville, and because Burnside was presenting his situation as desperate (flatly wrong; Longstreet was in worse shape, and Burnside was well supplied). Cleburne's rear-guard action probably still saved the Aot from another drubbing.

I think Grant would have tried more (and quicker) simply because that is what he always did. He regarded all maneuver as having the goal of closing with and fighting the enemy. He also understood that the Union could stand the blows better. Trading 5-10,000 casualties in the pursuit would be harsh but OK: Lee and the Confederacy could not afford to take the losses.

That doesn't mean the pursuit would have resulted in a great Union victory on the field. Any battle has risks, and the ANV showed many times their courage and determination. But any Suthern losses North of the Potomac could be devasting and irreplacable.

Tim
 
The inherent problem with a "what if" for any given battle is we lack the insight and creativity of a truly outstanding commander.
For example, had Meade failed to meet Lee at Gettysburg, the boards would be thick with people who would say it wasn't reasonable or even possible for a general in command for only three days to meet, let alone stop Lee.

The thing is that more things were possible than happened.

Chickamauga, I think, represents a huge lost opportunity. In hindsight, there are a thousand reasons why it couldn't have happened any other way. On the other hand, the ingredients were there. I recall reading in Rommel's Papers (was in the college library) that if an army can retreat in good order, it can cause the opposing army to outstrip its supplies and when that happens, maul it severely. If there was a better opportunity for the CS armies to do this than Chickamauga, I don't know it - and it nearly worked.
Had Grainger not arrived at Snodgrass Hill, had Bragg made any of a hundred decisions differently, we'd be discussing how impossible it was for Rosecrans to have won.

Generals "add value" by many things - by their attention to logistics, their ability to keep track of their army, and as we so often forget, by their ability to create and see things that escape not only us, but their peers.
 
Regarding Bragg after Chickamauga, you're proposition ignores certain realities. First, as early as September 21, Bragg sent out Forrest and Wheeler on postbattle recon missions north, east and west of the Chickamauga Creek. Wheeler dithered. Forrest, on the other hand, came back with info that suggested that the AotC was unfortified and ripe for attacking in Chattanooga. Unfortunately he missed the fact that the Federals were already well into creating fortifications to defend the town. It is likely that if Bragg followed Forrest's advice an attack would have been a bloody failure. This comes from Dave Powell's Failure In The Saddle.

I remember having discussions with Dave. I don't agree with him completely, but my point lies earlier.

Bragg/the AoT command was so disjointed and ineffective that they absolutely blew chance after chance to destroy the AoC before and during the two days of battle at Chickamauga. On the 2nd day, Bragg appears not to have noticed that Rosecrans was shattered and that he should be pursuing. He blamed Longstreet for not telling him the battle was won. While there might be a minor scrap of truth in that, Longstreet's reply was that he thought the roaring cheers of his men should have been enough notice to any commander.

The time to pursue was then, before Thomas got off the field. A Jackson would have pursued into the darkness until he could go no more, then had the pursuit start again before first light. Bragg needs to be attacking the Union columns all the way back to Chattanooga without respite. Sending some cavalry out the next day is tame and lame.




Oh, I think Meade did a good job, as did Lee, Stuart and the ANV, on the way back to Virginia. I don't really think there is a clear-cut way to show how to rip up the ANV on the way back. If you push right after the main body, you'll be attacking uphill against Longstreet at one of the gaps: sure to be bloody.

But strong men armed have often done amazing things in situations like that by being bold and determined. Under pressure, unexpected things happen in combat. Great commanders understand that in their bones. Meade was just a bit new and not quite the right personality to take the risk, although he was a very tough fighter when roused. Doing what I am talking about might have led to a very bloody nose (5-10,000 more casulaties) for the AoP. Only truly rare commanders take these kind of risks. Lee and Grant show that they might. Maybe Sheridan or Jackson. Hard to see anyone else doing it.




Yet Grant showed throughout the Civil War that he did act this way: Henry & Donelson followed by the taking of Nashville. Chopped up at Shiloh, he wants to pursue as Beauregard retreats. Price and Van Dorn (Iuka and Corinth), once again Grant wants to pursue and destroy. Raid his rear, he always tries to hunt down and destroy the raiders. Vicksburg Campaign: nothing but a rolling pursuit with battle after battle until he has Pemberton trapped. Vicksburg surrenders, he turns Sherman loose on Joe Johnston with 50,000 men. The Overland Campaign to Appomattox, always pursuits whenever an enemy retreats.

At Chattanooga, Grant called back the pursuit because he was being messaged by Lincoln to remember Burnside in Knoxville, and because Burnside was presenting his situation as desperate (flatly wrong; Longstreet was in worse shape, and Burnside was well supplied). Cleburne's rear-guard action probably still saved the Aot from another drubbing.

I think Grant would have tried more (and quicker) simply because that is what he always did. He regarded all maneuver as having the goal of closing with and fighting the enemy. He also understood that the Union could stand the blows better. Trading 5-10,000 casualties in the pursuit would be harsh but OK: Lee and the Confederacy could not afford to take the losses.

That doesn't mean the pursuit would have resulted in a great Union victory on the field. Any battle has risks, and the ANV showed many times their courage and determination. But any Suthern losses North of the Potomac could be devasting and irreplacable.

Tim

What is it you disagree with Dave about?

Regarding the emboldened comments above, I don't think it's safe to assume that Jackson would have pursued the AotC like it was a fete accompli. We simply can not know for sure. There were plenty of times that Jackson was found wanting on a tactical level.

Regarding Meade after Gettysburg, I believe that Meade did about as well as could be expected under the circumstances. History shows in that war that pursuit was a very difficult undertaking. That was true for Grant, Lee, Jackson, Sheridan, Bragg, etc.

Regarding Grant and the post action at Iuka/Corinth, remember he was not on the fields. It was easier for him to order pursuit than it was to conduct it. But I agree that Grant was the one guy who best understood how to pursue, it just wasn't always in the cards. Like you said, Vicksburg was a key example of it. That said, he knew his objective, knew how and when to ignore Washington to his benefit, and had more freedom to act than a Meade or Rosecrans would have (especially since Meade was brand new to army command).
 
Had Robert E. Lee actually listened to Jackson and Longstreet, and formulated a more defensive battle strategy instead of an offensive one, yes, the South could have won. Most successful Generals from Caesar's time on up to Napoleon knew that it was more effectual to "bring the enemy to you" than to "go to him!" The South is expansive, with challenging terrain that the North would have had to traverse, navigate, and, succeed in doing so. Fighting on home turf is more to a General's liking than going on some wild goose chase. Invading the North, holding on to Richmond instead of protecting more important railroad outposts and water ways was the South's undoing. We should have used the manpower we had, held the North off with the hopes of the Northern folks getting sick of the war, and perhaps things would have turned out differently.
 
Didn't work out so well west of Virginia did it?

You win a war by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country and if you can do it by killing him in his own backyard you don't have to worry about burying anyone in your own backyard.

Had Robert E. Lee actually listened to Jackson and Longstreet, and formulated a more defensive battle strategy instead of an offensive one, yes, the South could have won. Most successful Generals from Caesar's time on up to Napoleon knew that it was more effectual to "bring the enemy to you" than to "go to him!" The South is expansive, with challenging terrain that the North would have had to traverse, navigate, and, succeed in doing so. Fighting on home turf is more to a General's liking than going on some wild goose chase. Invading the North, holding on to Richmond instead of protecting more important railroad outposts and water ways was the South's undoing. We should have used the manpower we had, held the North off with the hopes of the Northern folks getting sick of the war, and perhaps things would have turned out differently.
 
Interesting point about the CSA Navy being to small. Did the South have the resources to build a large enough navy and equip them with state of the art navel artilery? Did the South have enough manpower for both an effective army and navy. The North had intergrated navel crews to man their ships where would the South get enough saliors? It seems to big a challeng but maybe it could of been overcome?
Thanks;
Leftyhunter
 
Interesting point about the CSA Navy being to small. Did the South have the resources to build a large enough navy and equip them with state of the art navel artilery? Did the South have enough manpower for both an effective army and navy. The North had intergrated navel crews to man their ships where would the South get enough saliors? It seems to big a challeng but maybe it could of been overcome?
Thanks;
Leftyhunter
The Confederacy had no navy to speak of. For that matter, neither did the Union. The major difference was that Northern factories could build big engines; Southern factories could not. The Union had a huge fishing industry -- there were sailors aplently. The Confederacy got rolling by buying British ships and hiring British crews.

Which is not to say the Confederacy had nothing -- just not enough for a war lasting more than 90 days.
 
Hi Ole,
Thats my point. One of our members said if the CSA Navy was stronger maybe the South would of won. I just dont see that being possible for the reasons stated above. Yes the CSA Navy wasn't bad in relation to their size the CSS Alabama has you know did a good job but it was a Britsh made ship with British cannon and British saliors or so I read. The CSA made a determined effort to fight the US Navy in the strategic inland rivers but just lacked enough men and boats. I just dont see how the CSA could of won a naval war despite having motivated sailors. I am not saying the other member is wrong it just seems there were to many obstacles for a viable CSA navy to be created.

Leftyhunter
 
I don't think the South could have won, with major mistakes by Confederate commanders and the inability to resupply their armies and lack of replacements for their dead, whereas the North had plenty of supply lines and more than enough replacements.
 
Yes, the South could have won. They never could have succeeded in conquering the North, considering the numerical and economic advantages of the North. But they didn't need to do so. All they had to do was resist Union efforts to defeat them until political will in the Union collapsed. To win, all they had to do was not lose. And that was clearly achievable.
 
As others have said, it was not impossible for the South to win, but it was unlikely. A war for independence almost by definition involves a smaller part of some political entity trying to break away from the larger part, so the odds are generally against them. The South basically needed to turn every Union incursion into a Bull Run. Otherwise we have what we had historically, some Union expeditions are repulsed, others are successful; and the net result is progress for the Union and hope of total victory if they keep pressing onward.

They needed to smash Grant's army at Fort Donelson rather than losing an army of their own. Ironically they got it right shortly thereafter with the concentration of forces for the attack at Shiloh, but they were already behind on points, so to speak.

Although I'm a former Navy officer and enjoy naval history, I think Confederate naval efforts were largely wasted, esepcially the devotion of limited industrial resources to the construction of ironclads. Confederate warships never significantly impacted the course of the war. The blockade was maintained mainly by ships operating offshore, whether or not some ironclad chased them away from the harbor entrance. The Confederates' industrial priority should have been maintaining and improving their railroad system; forgive me if I harp on this too much, but the ability to shift troops on interior lines was the key advantage they needed to exploit.
 
If everything had gone right for the North and the South had put up a good fight while going down, I think the Union could have put an end to the Civil War in about 2 years. These things take time.

I do not doubt that both sides produced men of bravery and skill as both officers and enlisted men. That much is obvious. But building an army is not about just that. It is about logistics and organization and experience and training and a host of other things. Simply learning how to keep a large force together in camp is a sore trial: note the massive losses to disease in the opening months of the war, largely preventable with experienced officers and non-coms, training, experience, organization and medical expertise.

In the European militaries of the mid-Nineteenth Century, it was generally assumed it took about six months to train a raw recruit into an acceptable infantryman; 12-18 months for a cavalryman -- 24 months if the cavalryman was a lancer; about 12 months for an artilleryman. That is for armies with a large and experienced organization, used to turning raw recruits into soldiers. The US Army of 1861 is not that. They are only about 16,000 strong on January 1; some 1100 are interned in Texas at the start of the war; about 30% of the officers resign or leave to "go South" when the war comes. Almost all of them are between the Mississippi and the Pacific, and so out-of-reach for months. Experienced officers and men are scattered about to try to get the raw men into some kind of shape, to build organizations, to put the Army together.

Without all the preparation and training, without the support organization, without the experience, a raw army can fall apart and lose a large part of its' strength simply making an unopposed march. Men become sick or crippled up; horses break down and become worthless; troops starve within a few miles of food; ammo is never near when you need it.

That, in a nutshell, is why we see so little in the way of combat in 1861. The armies are training up and organizing. Any attempt at fighting is disjointed and falls into disarray (see 1st Bull Run).

They are still disjointed and mistake prone in early 1862, but much better than in 1861. The early battles show brave men learning the trade in battle -- always a bloody and painful experience (Mill Springs, Henry & Donelson, Shiloh, Seven Pines, the Seven Days, Pea Ridge ...). By the second half, Lee and McClellan have the troops up to better standards and the mistakes start to become battlefield leadership instead of organizational incompetency (Pope and McDowell at 2nd Bull Run, McClellan at Antietam, Burnisde at Fredericksburg, etc.)

In 1863, actual organizationally-competent armies have appeared, often with not-only-brave-but-competent leadership. Now we see battles of operational and tactical skill fought by worthy opponents: Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Stones River, Tullahoma, the Vicksburg Campaign, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Mine Run ... Somewhere in here the last real chance for the Confederacy to win disappeared, probably between the moment when Grant crossed the Mississippi and when Bragg failed to do something with his victory at Chickamauga.

After that, the South can only hope for a war-weary North to throw in the towel and stop trying to win. The 1864 campaigns are all about that: can the South hold on long enough to defeat Lincoln at the polls and get a Democrat in committed to ending the fighting (I don't think McClellan would have, but they could hope.)

But in late 1862 or early 1863, it is possible to picture some grand Confederate victory that would have broken the Union spirit: a better Chancellorsville, a smarter Pemberton, a Bragg-led force that actually does something victorious in Kentucky or smashes Rosecran at Murfreesborough, a luckier Lee who does something great in Maryland in September 1862. It just didn't come off. By late 1863 the sheer weight of the Union resources (men and material), organized and applied with skill, was beginning to become too much.

Tim


Very good analysis.

I vote should have, with all the territory and no union forces on it. Politics, economics and military leadership was not up to the task. Military for the reasons mentioned above.


The political as well, Davis could not afford to lose major cities or states in purely defensive military strategy where space is traded for time to cut the Union supply lines and harass the invading columns. The secession process was not sufficiently supported to lose large chunks of territory and expect unquestioned civilian support.

There is slavery, the basis for the Southern economy. What happens as the Union armies advance, is that the economic units of production run off. Like a neutron bomb, the plantations are left standing, but without a labor force. If the political impetus was slavery then the destruction of slavery is fatal to the politics.
 
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