Could the fall of Nashville have been prevented?

I am not sure what you are saying here. The Ky-TN-GA Heartland WAS WHERE THE RESOURCES WERE. It was the siphoning off of vital resources to VA that left it vulnerable.
I was referring to your post #37 - but maybe I misunderstood it - I read:

“Geography was against them. Three great rivers sliced TN into un-bridged sections. The RR system & rivers created choke points at Clarksville, Nashville, Chattanooga & Knoxville. The front between the Army of Tennessee & the Army of the Cumberland in June 1863 was about 70 miles east to west.“

- interpreting it as saying that geographical features made any attempt to defend the region extremely difficult.
 
I was referring to your post #37 - but maybe I misunderstood it - I read:

“Geography was against them. Three great rivers sliced TN into un-bridged sections. The RR system & rivers created choke points at Clarksville, Nashville, Chattanooga & Knoxville. The front between the Army of Tennessee & the Army of the Cumberland in June 1863 was about 70 miles east to west.“

- interpreting it as saying that geographical features made any attempt to defend the region extremely difficult.
Because the Atlanta depot was exclusively dedicated to the A of NV, the Army of Tennessee not only competed with purchasing agents from Atlanta, their assigned source of supply did not have a RR connection. The A of TN animals & wagons were worn out by the long hauls. In June, as the Tullahoma Campaign was about to open, the A of T ran completely out of meat. Grudgingly, the Atlanta Depot sent 60,000 pounds of pork to Bragg's army... one day's ration. Starved of resources, the A of TN demonstrably could not rise to the challenge created by TN's geography. Absent the sinkhole in Virginia, there is every reason to believe that commanders in TN could have mounted an effective defense. It would have still been challenging, no question. However, it could have been done. As it was, the lack of resources, poor leadership & geography conspired to give Rosecrans the advantages he needed to run the A of TN out of Tennessee almost without firing a shot.
 
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The A of TN animals & wagons were worn out by the long hauls. In June, as the Tullahoma Campaign was about to open, the A of T ran completely out of meat.
Its interesting you bought this up Rhea.

I remember reading an article quite a while ago that stated the Union main aim in the West was to capture the Mississippi thus denying Texas and Mexican beef to any CSA armies and that it was the Unions number one priority this is the reason why Chattanooga was left until late 1863 before any serious attempts to take it.

Think their is any backbone to that story?.
 
Its interesting you bought this up Rhea.

I remember reading an article quite a while ago that stated the Union main aim in the West was to capture the Mississippi thus denying Texas and Mexican beef to any CSA armies and that it was the Unions number one priority this is the reason why Chattanooga was left until late 1863 before any serious attempts to take it.

Think their is any backbone to that story?.
Of course, severing the CSA’s connection to the Trans-Mississippi was an integral element of the Anaconda Plan.
 
Don’t forget that a flotilla of timber clads raided up the Tennessee as far as Muscle Shoals. They were painted black to be more terrifying. It is hard to credit just how much of an effect they had. Entire regiments of infantry threw down their muskets & scattered in all directions as hard as they could go. The Klingons had landed.
And most of what was left of the Confederate steamboat capacity on the Tennessee River was removed. The steamboats were either removed or burned and even the lumber that would have been used to protect them against rifle fire was taken by the US.
 
Because the Atlanta depot was exclusively dedicated to the A of NV, the Army of Tennessee not only competed with purchasing agents from Atlanta, their assigned source of supply did not have a RR connection. The A of TN animals & wagons were worn out by the long hauls. In June, as the Tullahoma Campaign was about to open, the A of T ran completely out of meat. Grudgingly, the Atlanta Depot sent 60,000 pounds of pork to Bragg's army... one day's ration. Starved of resources, the A of TN demonstrably could not rise to the challenge created by TN's geography. Absent the sinkhole in Virginia, there is every reason to believe that commanders in TN could have mounted an effective defense. It would have still been challenging, no question. However, it could have been done. As it was, the lack of resources, poor leadership & geography conspired to give Rosecrans the advantages he needed to run the A of TN out of Tennessee almost without firing a shot.
I know this is further derailing the thread - but your post I found highly thought-provoking (as generally all of your posts) - and I thought it worth to take a closer look on the matter....

I did now some dilettant research in the US census of 1860 - there the leading manufacturers, their workforce and the invested capital is listed.

If I am adding the figures the numbers are:
Virginia:
- invested capital: about 7.000.000 / workforce: about 14.000
Tennessee and Georgia (combined):
- invested capital about 3.000.000 / workforce: about 3.000

I also read that Richmond and Atlanta both were growing outproportionately during the war - with Richmond outperforming Atlanta regarding absolute numbers.

Might it be correctly concluded that during the war Virginia was (regarding industrial production and manufacture) still more important to the Confederacy than Tennessee and Georgia combined - or did I overlook or oversimplify some things?
 
I know this is further derailing the thread - but your post I found highly thought-provoking (as generally all of your posts) - and I thought it worth to take a closer look on the matter....

I did now some dilettant research in the US census of 1860 - there the leading manufacturers, their workforce and the invested capital is listed.

If I am adding the figures the numbers are:
Virginia:
- invested capital: about 7.000.000 / workforce: about 14.000
Tennessee and Georgia (combined):
- invested capital about 3.000.000 / workforce: about 3.000

I also read that Richmond and Atlanta both were growing outproportionately during the war - with Richmond outperforming Atlanta regarding absolute numbers.

Might it be correctly concluded that during the war Virginia was (regarding industrial production and manufacture) still more important to the Confederacy than Tennessee and Georgia combined - or did I overlook or oversimplify some things?
The war in Virginia was important to Virginia. Trains leaving the Dalton GA depot for Virginia deadheaded, I.e., returned empty. All that increase in Atlanta’s population was in response to the flow of supplies to Virginia, not literally of course, but floors enough.

You might be surprised that North Carolina lost almost as many men in Virginia as that state did. The wartime journals of young women in Clarksville TN reflect the the fighting in Virginia. Their cohort of available husbands was buried there. Apart from Longstreet’s brief appearance, Virginia contributed nothing to the defense of its lifeline in the CSA Heartland. It was strictly a one way street.

Any rational strategy involving a weaker power vs a much stronger one demands a very cold eyed evaluation of what is absolutely essential & what is not. There were certain irreplaceable assets in what was left of Virginia after Lee lost the western half of the state. The salt works were one of very few operating in the entire CSA, for example. Of course, the real reason for holding onto what was left of Virginia had nothing to do with economic choke points.

The fact was that when the CSA lost control of a territory, de facto emancipation took place. Incalculable dollar value & productivity simply got up & walked away. Davis had to hold everything everywhere or else. The whole point of secession was to guarantee the right of white men to hold other human beings as property as God intended forever.

In effect, every one of the robust men in the prime of life in the 25th Corps that took Richmond was $40 to $50,000.00 that the CSA had contributed to its own defeat. All the blah-blah about how vital Virginia was never includes the one essential thing that Virginia actually contributed to the rest of the South.

It was the steady flow of “extras” from Virginia that made Nathan Bedford Forrest’s fortune. Absent the steady flow of replacements, the Deep South faced a labor shortage. Absent the high valued export of human beings, the Virginia planters went broke.

As the 25th Corps exemplified, Lee’s campaigns did little or nothing to maintain the absolutely essential flow of extras to the Deep South. In Richmond CO North Carolina virtually every man & boy my relatives & their neighbors owned ran off. At great, unsupportable cost of blood & treasure, Lee’s army could not protect the very asset that the whole war was meant to guarantee.
 
The fall of Nashville could not have been prevented. The US controlled the steamboat building capacity on the internal rivers, and by the end of February 1862 controlled almost all of the existing steamboats. That was an enormous advantage. The existing history grossly under values the advantage the US possessed based on control of the Ohio River, the central part of the Mississippi and the Missouri River.
Tactically, Grant and Foote figured out how to make an unopposed landing and then threaten a Confederate fort both by land and by water. It wasn't done correctly every time, but it was attempted repeatedly and usually produced success. By the time the US had access to the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, Nashville was vulnerable to the same tactics.
As in Kentucky, the amount of opposition to secession in Tennessee was significant. The populist segment of the Democratic party, represented by Andrew Jackson, Sam Houston and Andrew Johnson, was opposed to secession, while they also opposed the Republican party's plans to abolish slavery. Secession in Tennessee was slow and completed late, and the opposition never disappeared. It did not take very much US presence to make Nashville ungovernable by the Confederates. By 1863 federal money was pouring into Nashville. The state even got a new rail line connecting Nashville to the Tennessee River at a new town called Johnsonville, I believe.
The US was determined to take Nashville and they had both the resources and the tactical capacity to do it.
 
Andrew Johnson was a very effective unionist. While the US Civil War was going on, he was an important part of the US effort. But he was also a Southern Democrat, which led to his later struggles with the Republican party. The struggles have concealed how important were his efforts on behalf of the US.
 
The war in Virginia was important to Virginia. Trains leaving the Dalton GA depot for Virginia deadheaded, I.e., returned empty. All that increase in Atlanta’s population was in response to the flow of supplies to Virginia, not literally of course, but floors enough.

You might be surprised that North Carolina lost almost as many men in Virginia as that state did. The wartime journals of young women in Clarksville TN reflect the the fighting in Virginia. Their cohort of available husbands was buried there. Apart from Longstreet’s brief appearance, Virginia contributed nothing to the defense of its lifeline in the CSA Heartland. It was strictly a one way street.

Any rational strategy involving a weaker power vs a much stronger one demands a very cold eyed evaluation of what is absolutely essential & what is not. There were certain irreplaceable assets in what was left of Virginia after Lee lost the western half of the state. The salt works were one of very few operating in the entire CSA, for example. Of course, the real reason for holding onto what was left of Virginia had nothing to do with economic choke points.

The fact was that when the CSA lost control of a territory, de facto emancipation took place. Incalculable dollar value & productivity simply got up & walked away. Davis had to hold everything everywhere or else. The whole point of secession was to guarantee the right of white men to hold other human beings as property as God intended forever.

In effect, every one of the robust men in the prime of life in the 25th Corps that took Richmond was $40 to $50,000.00 that the CSA had contributed to its own defeat. All the blah-blah about how vital Virginia was never includes the one essential thing that Virginia actually contributed to the rest of the South.

It was the steady flow of “extras” from Virginia that made Nathan Bedford Forrest’s fortune. Absent the steady flow of replacements, the Deep South faced a labor shortage. Absent the high valued export of human beings, the Virginia planters went broke.

As the 25th Corps exemplified, Lee’s campaigns did little or nothing to maintain the absolutely essential flow of extras to the Deep South. In Richmond CO North Carolina virtually every man & boy my relatives & their neighbors owned ran off. At great, unsupportable cost of blood & treasure, Lee’s army could not protect the very asset that the whole war was meant to guarantee.
Highly interesting and intriguing I ´d say - I will try to delve a bit deeper into the matter with opening up a new thread.
 
I think one thing that would really have helped would be getting Johnston and Gilmer to persuade Governor Harris to force the "Nashville Gods" to allow their slaves to be used to actually construct the defenses Gilmer had planned.

This may require Johnston to actually withdraw from Bowling Green to Nashville in fall of 1861 - he had suggested doing so historically, in reaction to an advance that failed to materialize.

The important point is having Nashville be a viable point from which to give battle. It would be even better for Johnston to allow Floyd to pull back from Donelson to Nashville. If he can do this, and get Davis to release the Gulf troops, he can then have over 50,000 men to face Grant and Buell.
 
I think one thing that would really have helped would be getting Johnston and Gilmer to persuade Governor Harris to force the "Nashville Gods" to allow their slaves to be used to actually construct the defenses Gilmer had planned.

This may require Johnston to actually withdraw from Bowling Green to Nashville in fall of 1861 - he had suggested doing so historically, in reaction to an advance that failed to materialize.

The important point is having Nashville be a viable point from which to give battle. It would be even better for Johnston to allow Floyd to pull back from Donelson to Nashville. If he can do this, and get Davis to release the Gulf troops, he can then have over 50,000 men to face Grant and Buell.
Interesting idea, what were the 50,000 troops going to eat? The N&CRR’s rails were failing under the stress of existing traffic. The light British made rails were literally fully apart. The Atlanta Depot was supporting the Army of Northern VA, so there would not have been any supplies from Georgia. Johnston withdrew to Corinth because that was the closest supply point that could support his army.

There were no CSA riverine assets that could challenge the Mississippi Flotilla & timber clads on the Tennessee. Cumberland & Mississippi River Systems. There was no hope of transport or supply from the rivers.

As the tragic news of the loss of life due to flash flooding near Nashville this weekend demonstrates vividly, just keeping the RR & riverine supply routes open required thousands of support troops. The 45,000 man Army of the Cumberland was supported by the 240,000 man Department of the Cumberland. Where were the support elements of the 50,000 man Army of the Gulf going to come from?

My point is that even a military genius, which Johnston clearly was not, would have required thousands of men & assets to support every musket toting man forwarded to his command. The logistical & transportation assets to support 50,000 men at Nashville did not exist in 1862.
 
Interesting idea, what were the 50,000 troops going to eat? The N&CRR’s rails were failing under the stress of existing traffic. The light British made rails were literally fully apart. The Atlanta Depot was supporting the Army of Northern VA, so there would not have been any supplies from Georgia. Johnston withdrew to Corinth because that was the closest supply point that could support his army.
Could Johnston use the Nashville-Decatur railroad to draw supply from northern Alabama? If not, Johnston may have to just pray the N&C can hold out.
There were no CSA riverine assets that could challenge the Mississippi Flotilla & timber clads on the Tennessee. Cumberland & Mississippi River Systems. There was no hope of transport or supply from the rivers.
That's a fascinating idea - have someone energetic like Isaac Newton Brown assigned to Nashville to put together a motley crew of cottonclads and converted steamboats. It won't be very good, but it's better than nothing.
 
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Could Johnston use the Nashville-Decatur railroad to draw supply from northern Alabama? If not, Johnston may have to just pray the N&C can hold out.

That's a fascinating idea - have someone energetic like Isaac Newton Brown assigned to Nashville to put together a motley crew of cottonclads and converted steamboats. It won't be very good, but it's better than nothing.
The Nashville & Decatur was wrecked by both man & nature. Bragg did not even attempt to repair it. Rail roading in Middle TN required constant repair of washed out track, culverts & bridges.

The first years of the ACW were El Niño periods. Hot, extremely dry summers were followed by extraordinarily cold winters. You might recall the fights over puddles at Perryville. Above Nashville at Pennington Bend, people crossed the Cumberland by wading knee deep. When the Yankees took Nashville one of their first acts was to restart the construction of the Nashville & North Western RR. The line was went west to where it touched on the Tennessee River at Johnsonville TN. That was the means for connecting Nashville to river traffic during low water. For good reason, the US gunboats came up river during the high water of winter. For most of the year, there wasn’t enough water to float gunboats based in Nashville.
 
Yes it could have been prevented. Johnston could have redeployed around Nashville and put his troops to work building defense works. The complaint that slave owners wouldn't supply labor doesn't excuse a army commander from using his own men.
 
No, I think @Rhea Cole and @wausaubob have made the points: after the serious mistake of tossing Kentucky into the Union camp in 1861, it is hard to see how Nashville is successfully defended with too few resources and the military nightmare the regional geography represented to the side without a navy.

In post #4, Rhea came down pretty hard on A. S. Johnston’s ‘myopic’ tendencies - but not without justification. Yes, the situation was close to impossible but fixating on Bowling Green (or any other one position when the security of all depended on each) was an error in strategic thinking.
(Playing regimental commander at Shiloh was also a kind of myopia… we all know how that went.)
 
Here's my best shot at a realistic strategy for ASJ:
- Either order the Nashville gods to allow their slaves to be used to construct the defenses for Nashville and Clarksville, or send enough troops to do the work.
- Beg Davis to send you the Gulf troops (ASJ did this historically with no result until Donelson had fallen, but we'll say Davis relents).
- Assuming Clarksville's defenses have been built, send a brigade or two to that point.
- Send the Gulf troops and Floyd's forces to Donelson, and take command yourself there.
- Try to set up an ambush for Grant on the road between Henry and Donelson, and hope for the best.
 
No matter how difficult the task, Nashville had to be defended for these reasons 1 a transport and manufacturing hub and 2nd it was a state capital. Walking away without a fight made it so much more difficult to retain Tennessee. 3rd the effect on army morale, from Kentucky to Cornith is a long way to retreat without a major engagement.
 
No argument that the city was important for political and economic reasons - the question is do you lose an army along with the city with no adequate defenses in place, no adequate means to sustain a defensive force with the existing lines of communication, and no way to prevent the enemy from operating in your front and against your supplies on the rivers well behind you.

This is why keeping Kentucky a neutral buffer zone as long as possible was so crucial... Once Forts Henry and Donelson fell - once it became clear that the Union could threaten the Mississippi (Island No. 10), operate gunboats along the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, and come straight down the rail line from Louisville in force - concentrating near Corinth is a very smart move. Halleck, Grant, and Buell would have loved for A Johnston to make his stand at Nashville; to his credit he didn't try.
 
Here's my best shot at a realistic strategy for ASJ:
- Either order the Nashville gods to allow their slaves to be used to construct the defenses for Nashville and Clarksville, or send enough troops to do the work.
- Beg Davis to send you the Gulf troops (ASJ did this historically with no result until Donelson had fallen, but we'll say Davis relents).
- Assuming Clarksville's defenses have been built, send a brigade or two to that point.
- Send the Gulf troops and Floyd's forces to Donelson, and take command yourself there.
- Try to set up an ambush for Grant on the road between Henry and Donelson, and hope for the best.

Interesting that you would put the theater commander at the point where, if lost, the whole 'line' is compromised.

(In other words, I agree... :D)
 
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