Franklin Could one say Hood won at Franklin?

I get it that Hood reported that number, but that number was very wrong. We just showed that Foard's numbers were way off, and Hood likely was reporting the numbers that Foard gave him to the War Department. Not necessarily lying, but reporting numbers that were way under-reported to him.
@gunny would certainly know better than most. And I have to agree. Even using Livermore's numbers...and I know everyone has "nits to pick" with Livermore's methodology, but let's take his numbers to use as a basis of comparison. At least he was consistent in how he applied his calculations and in examining units that may have been in the area but could have had no impact on the actual battle, etc. Being lazy, I've taken the liberty of taking some jpg snippets of Livermore's Franklin numbers below, including the appropriate footnotes:

If you use the gross overall Civil War statistical killed to wounded ratio from Colonel Trevor Dupuy and apply it to the numbers at Franklin (4.55 to 1), for the Federals we get, using Livermore's killed number of 189, we would expect approximately 860 wounded compared to his number of 1033, or within 20% of the expected wounded on the high side. Not too bad.

For the Army of Tennessee, Livermore has 1750 KIA'd. That would give an estimated number of wounded at 7963 for a total killed and wounded casualty estimate of 9713. Livermore lists Confederate wounded at 3800, or some 52% too low based on Dupuy's statistical averages if the KIA'd number is actually 1750. Of the wounded, Dupuy's analysis for the Civil War says you can expect, of the total wounded, that the ratio that will survive their wounds to those later dying to be 2.38 to 1. So of Livermore's number of 3800 Confederate wounded, some 1124 would be expected to later die, while 2676 would survive their wounds. So on the low end, expected Confederate killed and mortally wounded should be 2874. If based on Dupuy's higher wounded estimate, the mortally wounded would come to 2356 with 5607 recovering. So total Confederate casualties at Franklin would be 4106 killed and mortally wounded, primarily from the 23,000 infantry involved in the assault, or a staggering 18% of the attacking force killed or mortally wounded. On the lower (3800 wounded) end the number would be 12.5%. Of course we can play games and finagle the numbers all day and prove anything we want, but in agreement with @gunny , Hood's initial report on casualties was way too low...

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...or roughly 1900

Confederate reports of the number of casualties at Franklin
Division
Johnson 587
Loring 876
Walthall 580
Bate 319
French 652
Total 3014
No reports for Brown's or Cleburne's Divisions

Foard's report of killed and wounded- 4220
Schofield's report of prisoners- 702
Total 4922

4922-3014 = 1908

Based on the field returns, Brown's Division alone lost more than 1,000 men and Cleburne suffered even higher losses (General George Gordon stated that Cleburne's Division lost more than 50% of its men which comes to around 1,500).

Ryan
 
...or roughly 1900

Confederate reports of the number of casualties at Franklin
Division
Johnson 587
Loring 876
Walthall 580
Bate 319
French 652
Total 3014
No reports for Brown's or Cleburne's Divisions

Foard's report of killed and wounded- 4220
Schofield's report of prisoners- 702
Total 4922

4922-3014 = 1908
I have seen these numbers, which sound reasonable to me. Unfortunately, the hard cold analytical eye of the historian require rigorous documentation, which I understand does not exist. Personally, I am satisfied that it was a slaughter & the exact numbers are just accounting. Recently, I sent images of the Union dead from Franklin to a thread on this forum. The number of unknowns...well... I have been in the cemetery at Stones River hundreds of times, never once has it not moved me.

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Southeast corner Stones River National Cemetery. Photo by the author.

All of these small blocks are unknowns, many of them from Franklin. Stones River National Battlefield. Gathered by 111th USCTI. As I understand it, the Confederate dead were unceremoniously stacked in the ditch in front of the Union works & the wall pushed down over them. That would account for the extraordinary number of unknowns at Carnton in Franklin.

It says much about the soldiers on both sides that the Confederates trapped in the hideous ditch of death in front of the Union works, a literal hell on earth, were allowed to come into Union lines; treated with dignity & compassion.

In one of the extraordinaryly grotesque episodes the Civil War had to offer, the entangled bodies of attackers & defenders alike on the pike in front of the Carter House were dragged aside. Hood's men advanced toward Nashville through a gap in the bodies; raked up windrows of violent death. What must the shattered survivors of the fighting from the day before have thought? Is it any wonder that thousands of them left the ranks, exaggerated their infirmities or threw down their arms & ran a few days later when Thomas attacked? The human psyche can only take so much. When they retreated back through Franklin, constant rain had left arms & heads of the dead exposed to the retreating troops. This is something beyond the foulest of nightmares. No wonder the I.G. who reported on the state of the remnant of Hood's army after it crossed the Tennessee was nothing but an unarmed mob destitute of all that was necessary to subsist in the icy winter conditions?
 
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No wonder the I.G. who reported on the state of the remnant of Hood's army after it crossed the Tennessee was nothing but an unarmed mob destitute of all that was necessary to subsist in the icy winter conditions?
Perhaps even more remarkable was the determination and fortitude of the contingent of the Army of Tennessee that made its way to Johnston's army and smashed into Slocum at Bentonville. But, I digress...
 
Perhaps even more remarkable was the determination and fortitude of the contingent of the Army of Tennessee that made its way to Johnston's army and smashed into Slocum at Bentonville. But, I digress...
Honestly, I have always viewed that as a criminal waste of life. It was long past the time when the leadership should have had compassion for the men still in the ranks & called it a deal. As it was, of course, those men all but disappeared by the 1870 census. They had been used up.
 
Sorry you are having to travel in this miserable weather. Driving in a hard rain is no fun.
A book on Franklin that you should have is William Lee White's Let Us Die Like Men, The Battle of Franklin, November 30, 1864. Lee's book is written using a format that allows you to drive to the place where the events of the chapter occurred. It was published in 2019, so contains the recent improvements.

Unfortunately, Hood had no intelligence or scouting reports to base his actions on. Apparently, Hood thought that Schofield's force was a major part of the Nashville garrison. There was a dearth of information about what awaited him in Nashville. As far as his thinking can be understood, Hood expected the population of Nashville to come into the streets & help him drive the Yankees out. Following his triumphant entry into the city, forces from the Trans-Mississippi were to join him. This combined force was going to march across Kentucky & Virginia where it would combine with the Army of Northern Virginia & destroy the Army of the Potomac. That was his stated goal. That was his definition of victory.

All Schofield wanted to do was get a long convoy of supply wagons, artillery & supply troops across the Harpeth & on to Nashville. It was the time lost in repairing bridges that forced him to dig in & await Hood's next move. Nobody on the Union side expected anything as foolish as a frontal assault across three miles of open ground. Victory for Schofield would come when his rearguard passed through the outer works at Nashville. That he achieved after a ferocious defensive battle.

The only victory that Hood could have claimed at Franklin was the destruction in detail of an element of Thomas' army. Schofield, with the exception of one regiment, had veteran Western soldiers on his line. The annihilation of Cheatham's Missouri regiments "like ice melting in the sun". "In less than half a minute half of them went down." makes any attempt to depict Franklin as some kind of Southern victory a waste of breath. All of that loss of life did not keep Schofield form doing what he intended to do all along, cross the Harpeth & go to Nashville. That is all that defines victory & defeat at the Battle of Franklin.
If one were to evaluate Hood's strategy {if he had any} at Franklin with his performance at previous battles would one be correct in stating that these would indicate his level of command .In what battle did he ever not sacrifice soldiers in the hope of immortality on his part? His Texans were the only division that spoke honorably of him.Then when you take into consideration where other generals have sacrificed soldiers ,then Hood should not be evaluated so.Lee at Gettysburg.Grant at Cold Harbor,and the cost at the Seven Days battle. .
 
So can Hood be considered the victor at the Battle of Franklin? Well I guess I will have to read the books about the Battle of Franklin to know for sure.
Without reading all four pages of commentary so far, I will say the answer is an unequivocal YES according to a primary military definition of victory: The enemy retreated, leaving Hood in control of the battlefield. Of course this was what was also called a Pyrrhic victory, one that effectively destroyed his own army or at least its ability to attack.
 
The enemy retreated, leaving Hood in control of the battlefield.

Technically, that was a correct understanding about the victor maintaining control over the battlefield. But in the case of Franklin, I would argue that there was no reason for Schofield's Army of the Ohio to remain in its entrenchments any longer after basically blunting Hood's assault. Schofield's major objective was to reinforce General Thomas' patchwork command in Nashville, which is exactly what happened.
 
LOL. Ok, so everyone living in 1864 knew what you know. Ergo, everything that went wrong for Confederates was pre-determined by 21st Century hindsight. Equally, everything that went right for the Union Army was determined by 21-Century hindsight.

Gothcha
The massive amount of Confederate deserters by the summer of 1864 seemed to know the future.
Leftyhunter
 
Hood is the poster boy for the Peter Principle.
Not sure about that. Hood had a good record before commanding the AoT. As it's been discussed in previous threads after Atlanta fell Hood was arguably the least bad option to command the AoT. Not sure if Davis really could stich with Johnston has the surrender of Atlanta was demoralizing to the Confederacy.
Leftyhunter
 
Thomas to Schofield, Nov. 30, 1864: "Do you think you can hold Hood at Franklin for three days longer?"

Schofield to Thomas, 3 p.m., Nov. 30, 1864: "I do not believe I can. I can doubtless hold him one day, but will hazard something in doing that."

I think it was about six hours. Hood was at Nashville the next day. Wasn't that his key objective?
Loosing one third of ones army while inflicting minor damage to the enemy does not victory make.
Leftyhunter
 
...but the Union high command didn't want Hood to reach Nashville.

In theory, perhaps. When Sherman cut loose to march through Georgia, Thomas was left behind to take care of any potential threat from Hoods' AOT. Hood did manage to cross the Tennessee River and pursue Schofield's AOTO, but Hood's army failed to catch Schofield at Spring Hill and then suffered one of its worst battle losses at Franklin in another futile attempt to catch the AOTO. So by the time Hood actually reached Nashville his options were extremely limited. Hood in fact, assumed a defensive posture in front of Nashville, but was not able to overcome Thomas's assault. That basically ended the fighting capability of the AOT.
 
Without reading all four pages of commentary so far, I will say the answer is an unequivocal YES according to a primary military definition of victory: The enemy retreated, leaving Hood in control of the battlefield. Of course this was what was also called a Pyrrhic victory, one that effectively destroyed his own army or at least its ability to attack.

Hood initiated the battle so we must consider Hood's intention in doing so. I assume his intention was to carry the Federal position and destroy the Federal army. He failed to do either so it's reasonable to think he lost his battle.
 
I have been rereading Barbara Tuchman's A Distant Mirror about the calamitous 14th Century in Europe. Back then, neutral heralds were appointed by both sides. They observed the fighting. Afterward they agreed on the name of the battle & who won. That way it was all set out & agreed upon leaving no room for misunderstanding. That was when the holding the ground after the fight rule came into being. So, following the 14th Century rulebook, Hood won. Unofficially, they also recognized Pyrrhic victories, which fits the results of Hood's Franklin battle to a T.
 
Hood initiated the battle so we must consider Hood's intention in doing so. I assume his intention was to carry the Federal position and destroy the Federal army. He failed to do either so it's reasonable to think he lost his battle.
I have been rereading Barbara Tuchman's A Distant Mirror about the calamitous 14th Century in Europe. Back then, neutral heralds were appointed by both sides. They observed the fighting. Afterward they agreed on the name of the battle & who won. That way it was all set out & agreed upon leaving no room for misunderstanding. That was when the holding the ground after the fight rule came into being. So, following the 14th Century rulebook, Hood won. Unofficially, they also recognized Pyrrhic victories, which fits the results of Hood's Franklin battle to a T.
Make no mistake - I'm not arguing that Franklin was much of a "victory"; however, according to these strict and very limited age-old definitions it WAS both a victory and a Pyrrhic one at that!
 
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