Cornith to Shiloh

atlantis

Sergeant Major
Joined
Nov 12, 2016
If I understand correctly the confederates sent all their forces to Shiloh on the same road. Was it possible to send them by more than one road so they could attack in linear formation.
 
This may be of help. It is from the Shiloh issue of Blue & Gray Magazine. Publisher Dave Roth made this map with input from the author of the article, Stacy D. Allen, the Chief Ranger at Shiloh NMP.
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Would it have helped if the confederates had tried to flank by the road headed to owl creek.
 
Would it have helped if the confederates had tried to flank by the road headed to owl creek.
I'm not an expert on Shiloh, I know it's general flow, and principal commanders, but that's the first thing I notice when I look at the map. If Johnston, sends one of his corps on the road to Owl Creek, probably Hardee, as he was the biggest with 3 divisions. That would of allowed Johnston to flank the Union position. They could hit it from the front with 4 divisions (Clark, Cheatham, Ruggles, and Withers) and flank it with the other 3, you would still have Breckinridge's 3 brigades in reserve in that scenario. Again, I'm no expert, but, that seems like a good plan.
 
I'm not an expert on Shiloh, I know it's general flow, and principal commanders, but that's the first thing I notice when I look at the map. If Johnston, sends one of his corps on the road to Owl Creek, probably Hardee, as he was the biggest with 3 divisions. That would of allowed Johnston to flank the Union position. They could hit it from the front with 4 divisions (Clark, Cheatham, Ruggles, and Withers) and flank it with the other 3, you would still have Breckinridge's 3 brigades in reserve in that scenario. Again, I'm no expert, but, that seems like a good plan.
This issue may have been the fact that the Confederate force was so raw and ill-trained that Johnston wanted to keep it all together as best he could. Didn't want to get one corps cut-off from any others for fear that they would break.
 
The Shiloh Plateau is the dominant terrain factor for this battle. Torrential rains prior to the battle caused the Confederates to postpone their attack and played havoc with the marching plans. As mentioned there was one road from Mickey’s to Pittsburg Landing which narrows as it comes between Owl and Lick creeks
The Confederates had poor maps which coupled with the locations of the Union divisions led to Rebels driving the Federals back to their supply base at Pittsburgh Landing
If you ever get the chance visit Corinth and the Corinth Civil War Interpretive Center then Shiloh itself. Driving the 20 miles from Corinth to the park will be an eye opening drive
Regards
David
 
Depends upon the amount of rainfall. April of 1862 had severe rainstorms prior to the battle as well as the night of the 1st day of battle
Grant was described as sitting under a tree Sunday night drenched to the bone. The small cabin near by had been taken over by the Union surgeons operating on the countless wounded of that Bloody Sunday.
Dixie as you know there are steep ravines across the battlefield that drain into the creeks which feed into the Tennessee River and many of the fields have undulations which do become soggy

However I would defer to @TomP who is a Shiloh Ranger for a definitive answer. He has spent far more time than he cared to for I bet being in the park on rainy days!

Shiloh seems to be located along a frequent track of big storms and tornadoes since at least 1911 when a deadly storm hit the park
Regards
David
 
If Johnston, sends one of his corps on the road to Owl Creek, probably Hardee, as he was the biggest with 3 divisions.
O.R. Vol.X (Correspondences) - pp.370-371 : Hardee's command was initially composed of two divisions from the former Army of Central Kentucky (his own and Pillow's) while G.B. Crittenden's division would have formed the Reserve Corps. Therefore, the three divisions you're counting for Hardee were actually split into two different commands = Hardee's Third Corps and Crittenden's Reserve Corps

Army of the Mississippi, March 29, 1862 (organization as intended by Albert S. Johnston) :

Headquarters
- - - Cavalry Reserve Bde : BG James H. Hawes

First Corps : MG Leonidas Polk (from Dept. No.2, Western Div.)
- 1st Div. : BG Charles Clark
- - - Russell's Bde
- - - Stewart's Bde (from McCown's Command, Island No.Ten)
- 2nd Div. : MG Benjamin F. Cheatham
- - - Johnson's Bde
- - - Stephens' Bde

Second Corps : MG Braxton Bragg
- 1st Div. : BG Daniel Ruggles (from Dept. No.1, New Orleans Defenses)
- - - Pond's Bde
- - - Mouton's / Gibson's Bde
- - - Walker's / Anderson's Bde (split from Walker's Div.)
- 2nd Div. : BG Jones M. Withers (from Dept. Ala. & West Fla., Army of Mobile)
- - - Gladden's Bde
- - - Jackson's Bde
- - - Chalmers' Bde (split from Walker's Div.)

Third Corps : MG William J. Hardee (from Dept. No.2, Army of Central Kentucky)
- - - Reserve (Breckinridge's) Bde
- 1st Div. : BG Thomas C. Hindman
- - - Hindman's Bde
- - - Cleburne's Bde
- 2nd Div. : BG Gideon J. Pillow
- - - Bowen's Bde
- - - Wood's Bde

Infantry Reserve : MG George B. Crittenden (from Dept. No.2, District of East Tenn.)
- - - Carroll's Bde
- - - Statham's Bde

The goal was to create three huge infantry corps, each one supported by cavalry and artillery detachments, and a small reserve division under the least senior Major-General ("a division of not less than two brigades") in order to provide extra punch without depriving any of the main corps.

Unfortunately for Hardee, his corps was nonetheless reduced during the advance preparations on Shiloh and the Reserve was augmented by the transfer of Bowen's Bde and the dissolution of Pillow's Division.

Instead of deploying three infantry corps supported by an infantry division at Shiloh, the Confederates fought as an unbalanced structure of two corps and two divisions (Polk's 8,500 / Bragg's 12,500 / Hardee's 6,500 / Breckinridge's 5,500) while Carroll's Bde and soon-to-be Trapier's Bde were guarding Corinth.

They could hit it from the front with 4 divisions (Clark, Cheatham, Ruggles, and Withers) and flank it with the other 3, you would still have Breckinridge's 3 brigades in reserve in that scenario.
If Hardee had kept control of the whole Army of Central Kentucky, thence his corps would have been composed of three average-to-small divisions while the reserve would consist only of one brigade, under Breckinridge. And Carroll's Bde was left behind to perform garrison duty.

In this case, Hardee's forces are less than ideal to control : three subordinates instead of two may lead to more communication and logistic problems. Moreover, one of these three divisions must leave a brigade at Corinth, while Breckinridge's Bde replaces it and deprives the army of an independent infantry reserve.

My opinion is that the command organization evolved too much between March 5 and April 3, with several disbanded or rearranged formations, which ruined the effectiveness of the army. According to the initial Confederate plans (three-corps structure), I propose below an alternate OOB which might allow the success of such a flanking attack you described :

Army of the Mississippi : Gen. A.S. Johnston = 35,450 INF + 3,000 CAV
Second-in-Command : Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard (could be put in command of an informal wing composed of First and Second Corps)

*First Corps : Maj.-Gen. Polk = 10,000 INF

- 1st Div. : Brig.-Gen. Clark = 4,400 INF
- - - Russell's Bde = 2,100 INF
- - - Stewart's Bde (transferred from McCown's Command) = 2,300 INF
- 2nd Div. : Maj.-Gen. Cheatham = 5,600 INF
- - - B.R. Johnson's Bde = 1,950 INF
- - - Stephens' Bde = 2,200 INF
- - - J.P. Anderson's Bde (transferred from Second Corps) = 1,450 INF

*Second Corps : Maj.-Gen. Bragg = 11,150 INF

- 1st Div. : Brig.-Gen. Ruggles = 4,900 INF
- - - Gibson's Bde = 2,350 INF
- - - Pond's Bde = 2,550 INF
- 2nd Div. : Brig.-Gen. Withers = 6,250 INF
- - - Gladden's Bde = 2,100 INF
- - - J.K. Jackson's Bde = 2,000 INF
- - - Chalmers' Bde = 2,150 INF

*Third Corps : Maj.-Gen. Hardee = 8,150 INF + 3,000 CAV
- - - Hawes' Cavalry Bde = 3,000 CAV
- 1st Div. : Brig.-Gen. Hindman = 4,650 INF
- - - Hindman's Bde = 2,100 INF
- - - Cleburne's Bde = 2,550 INF
- 2nd Div. : Brig.-Gen. Wood = 3,500 INF
- - - Wood's Bde = 1,900 INF
- - - Bowen's Bde = 1,600 INF

*Reserve Division : Brig.-Gen. Breckinridge = 6,150 INF
- - - Carroll's Bde = 2,000 INF (left behind to Corinth)
- - - Statham's Bde = 2,000 INF
- - - Breckinridge's Bde = 2,150 INF

This way, Breckinridge leaves one brigade at Corinth and can support either Polk, Bragg or Hardee during the assault. Hardee's flanking manoeuver can be secured by attaching Hawes' Cavalry Bde to the Third Corps. We now have three corps of approximately 10,000 men each with a smaller reserve of approximately 6,000 men (2,000 of them securing the supply base).

Sidney Johnston could form a three-columns attack with Hardee's troops pushing on the extreme left prededed by a strong cavalry vanguard and flanking both Sherman's Fifth and McClernand First Divisions. Breckinridge can either be deployed behind Hardee to follow early success or behind Bragg to cover the Confederate right. Polk, at the center, will move forward, facing directly the Union positions. However, I'm not sure that these tactical actions can be taken without many difficulties, considering the "terrain" where the units are moving.
 
Depends upon the amount of rainfall. April of 1862 had severe rainstorms prior to the battle as well as the night of the 1st day of battle
Grant was described as sitting under a tree Sunday night drenched to the bone. The small cabin near by had been taken over by the Union surgeons operating on the countless wounded of that Bloody Sunday.
Dixie as you know there are steep ravines across the battlefield that drain into the creeks which feed into the Tennessee River and many of the fields have undulations which do become soggy

However I would defer to @TomP who is a Shiloh Ranger for a definitive answer. He has spent far more time than he cared to for I bet being in the park on rainy days!

Shiloh seems to be located along a frequent track of big storms and tornadoes since at least 1911 when a deadly storm hit the park
Regards
David
Excellent points by you. Other than a good topographical map, looking at a map for options is unlikely to be useful. I like Tim Smith's "simplified" map of the overall topography in his 2014 book. It gives a good idea of the practical constraints on the attack.
 
They started along multiple roads but once you get closer there is only really 1 road for the final approach
Excellent points by you. Other than a good topographical map, looking at a map for options is unlikely to be useful. I like Tim Smith's "simplified" map of the overall topography in his 2014 book. It gives a good idea of the practical constraints on the attack.
I was reading Winston Grooms' Shiloh 1862, and the first couple of chapter's mention moccasin infested creeks, "deep" ravines, uneven terrain, tangled forest's (treacherous landscape)... Interesting stuff...
 
@Belfoured i would recommend that anyone who seriously wants to study the Battle of Shiloh has to secure a Trailhead Graphic map of Shiloh.

It provides the location of all regiment tablets, camp sites, monuments, creeks and contour lines of the Park.
Regards
David
 
@Belfoured i would recommend that anyone who seriously wants to study the Battle of Shiloh has to secure a Trailhead Graphic map of Shiloh.

It provides the location of all regiment tablets, camp sites, monuments, creeks and contour lines of the Park.
Regards
David
Thanks. One interesting point about all that rain in April '62 was that the river was still in a slight flood stage (although falling), which actually helped the gunboats to manipulate shells from the Dill's Branch area at Beauregard's army well inland the night of April 6-7. IIRC, Joiner did an essay on this some time back.
 
Hi, DixieRifles - I'm a couple hrs. north of you, on Reelfoot Lake; that black one probably is a cottonmouth... nasty piece of work; aggressive and will ATTACK at the least provocation! The brown one, we up here think, is just a plain ol' non-poisonous water moccasin... HE will fall out of cypress trees into your fishing boat and scare the bejesus out of you... make you hurt yourself!
 
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