Confederate War Aims

Since your reply "That's it?!" was to @jackt62 's comment that "the District of Columbia Compensated Emancipation Act was signed by Lincoln on April 16, 1862. The federal government paid an average of $300 to roughly 900 slave holders in the District to emancipate their slaves," I simply clarified that the payment to the slave owners was $300 per slave rather than $300 to each slave owner regardless of the amount of slaves each owned.
Ok, that's what I thought, and 300 is actually a decent avg price for a slave even in the deep South in 1860, but my comment is in reference to the fact that he's just referring DC manumission, and we were debating whether Lincoln, let alone the Union gov, ever made a serious offer to do the same to the CSA BEFORE or after the commencement of hostilities. That's all. I didn't mean to be dismissive of your comment. Sorry for the confusion.
 
we were debating whether Lincoln, let alone the Union gov, ever made a serious offer to do the same to the CSA BEFORE or after the commencement of hostilities
Please see my post #659 where I address that issue. Lincoln and the Republican Party platform did not advocate for emancipating slaves in the CSA at the beginning of the secession crisis and the outbreak of war.
 
Whatever cottons importance to export market (which wasn't particularlly large anyway for US at this time?), slavery was nevertheless very important, as the value of the slaves ca 1860 constituted more than ⅓ of the total wealth of the entire country!? and more than ½ of the wealth of the Southern states. Whatever the reason for that value, that value was real and the prospect of having the value TAKEN from the South was enough of an incentive to cause them to fight very, very hard, if w/o success, to keep that loss from happening.

No, slavery was not important to the United States of America macroeconomics, but it was important to the southern microeconomics, there is a difference you know? How in the world did slaves account for 1/3 of the total wealth in the United States when there were slaves only in the southeast and nowhere else, and the value of the slave was not calculated in the national GDP?

The value of a slave was not real value even in the south, but nominal only. Furthermore, slaves were sold and transferred only in the south. Are you saying that once a slave owner sold a slave he or she gave the government the money? Was there a excise tax on slaves when they were sold? I doubt it, but if that were the case it still would not remotely add up to 1/3 of government wealth.

From a classical economic standpoint slaves would not be considered real wealth for a couple of reason(s). First, the slave's value fluctuated in boom and bust cycles that was/is common for a commodity like cotton. In other words, the slave's 1860 value was a result of cotton being in a boom cycle from 1830-1860, but that value would not have held its 1860 worth in a bust cycle. The four decades prior to the CW cotton was in boom cycle, which the demand for it increased every decade and the demand for labor increased along with it. The demand for cotton and the demand for slaves ran parallel, and the value of a cotton slave ran parallel with cotton production. The more cotton that was produced the more value of a slave increased. Conversely, the less amount of cotton production the decrease in the slave's value. That 1860 value never would have stood the test of time in the subsequent cotton bust in the second half of the 1800s. It don't matter anyway, that's because the slave did not hold its value outside the south, period.

The problem is that economists run into is that emancipation hindered a quantitative analysis on the value of the slave during a bust cycle that occurred during the four decades following the CW. Nevertheless, paradigms of cotton demand can easily determine that the slave's value was not remotely as high in a bust cycle than boom cycle. Therefore, the slave was a volatile asset because there were variables that fluctuated the value of a slave, which means it was a risky investment. Moreover, the slave was a non-liquid asset that could not be easily converted to cash. Who was going to buy the slaves at their 1860 value? Assure you nobody outside the south would have bought them, therefore, the slave was an White Elephant investment. Therefore, we can take that $3-4 billion value for slaves with a grain of salt, it was nominal only.

Furthermore, cotton production value has been exaggerated also from the sect of economic historians that double and triple intermediates, even though they have done it—it was an economic impossibility. That type of accounting error has sored cotton's economic value beyond the scope of the actual GDP. Never happened. People think that because cotton exports made up of 80% of the total exports that it was a huge number. No, the reason why it wasn't a big number was because the USA was closed economy and most of the USA GDP stemmed from manufacturing, transportation, banking and food stuff agriculture. The 80% of exports and tricky, because it did make up the majority of exports but it actually was only 5% of the nation's GDP. If we argue that the value of a slave ran parallel with cotton production it still would not exceed the 5% of the GDP, which is not remotely 1/3 of the wealth of the USA.

Slavery was not valuable outside the south. Prove how slaves were valuable to the rest of the USA. Prove how the slave's value was 1/3 of the wealth in the USA.
 
Since your reply "That's it?!" was to @jackt62 's comment that "the District of Columbia Compensated Emancipation Act was signed by Lincoln on April 16, 1862. The federal government paid an average of $300 to roughly 900 slave holders in the District to emancipate their slaves," I simply clarified that the payment to the slave owners was $300 per slave rather than $300 to each slave owner regardless of the amount of slaves each owned.

That might have been worth it. But there was no way that the government was going to pay $4 billion to emancipate every slave for their so-called 1860 value. I don't want to be misunderstood, but the slave was not worth that kind of money outside the south. No way..
 
Since your reply "That's it?!" was to @jackt62 's comment that "the District of Columbia Compensated Emancipation Act was signed by Lincoln on April 16, 1862. The federal government paid an average of $300 to roughly 900 slave holders in the District to emancipate their slaves," I simply clarified that the payment to the slave owners was $300 per slave rather than $300 to each slave owner regardless of the amount of slaves each owned.
There is a question that I would ask; Could the cotton producers of the South have found white males to work in the cotton fields in the weather of that region? Having worked at picking cotton in my youth ,I think that would not have lasted long ? Now there is a theory that if the plantations had allowed free blacks to work in the fields while supplying them with all the essentials as for housing ,food, and clothing that prehabs that would have eliminated the entire issue regarding that caused for the difficulties between the two sections. But there is one factor that would still have to be dealt with ,one which the Founder apparently did not foresee ,that being the expansion of the union into territories which would come with the Louisiana Purchase and with the wars with Mexico. The Free territories vs the expansion of the cotton producers would be the issue that would have been the issue to have divided the nation. Then there is another issue, being free what would have been the reaction if these blacks had started to move north . A new cheap labor force against an established labor force ,similar to the the Irish in New York. There is one last inquriy if the South would have developed economical different from the way it did some form of industrial verses agriculturally would this have avoided the difficulties between the two sections? IF the British had .,as Jefferson stated in the Declaration, not introduced the slave system to the South what would have been the result? May I suggest a book that deals with a issue that has been overlooked as to bringing on the war; The War Before the War; fugitive salve and the struggle for America's soul from the Revolution to the Civil War; author Andrew Delbanco and for the political I recommend Heirs of the Founders ,the epic rivalry of Henry Clay, John Calhoun, and Daniel Webster; the second generation of American Giants] author H.W. Brands.
 
Whatever cottons importance to export market (which wasn't particularlly large anyway for US at this time?), slavery was nevertheless very important, as the value of the slaves ca 1860 constituted more than ⅓ of the total wealth of the entire country!? and more than ½ of the wealth of the Southern states. Whatever the reason for that value, that value was real and the prospect of having the value TAKEN from the South was enough of an incentive to cause them to fight very, very hard, if w/o success, to keep that loss from happening.

Here's another way you can view it: all the south's capital investment was wrapped in slaves, which they were white elephant investment, and that's why the south fought hard for it. The north's capital investment was invested in the Industrial Revolution, and that's why the USA economy exploded during the Gilded Age. You are totally wrong about slavery being 1/3 of the USA economy, totally wrong. Without the rhetoric, prove how slavery was a 1/3 of the USA economy.
 
Here's another way you can view it: all the south's capital investment was wrapped in slaves, which they were white elephant investment, and that's why the south fought hard for it. The north's capital investment was invested in the Industrial Revolution, and that's why the USA economy exploded during the Gilded Age. You are totally wrong about slavery being 1/3 of the USA economy, totally wrong. Without the rhetoric, prove how slavery was a 1/3 of the USA economy.
What rhetoric are you referring to? I wasn't aware I was relying on persuasive hyperbole. I'm mainly relying on Robert Fogel's Without Consent or Contract, his economic history of slavery in the Western Hemisphere with an emphasis on the US. Fogel got the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1993 for his work on the previously unappreciated significance of the astonishing viability and value of US slavery, as indicated by proxy if one notes that in 1860 slaves were never more valuable, costing an average of $1000 for an able bodied man, ca $250,000 in value relative to today's dollars, despite the fact the many believe a war was imminent. As for "proving" it, may I suggest that proving anything is, by definition, impossible. Maybe you should first "prove" that you're not a bot?! But I can happily provide "evidence" to support my contention, for which, in this case, I rely on the far more qualified Dr Robert Fogel to do the heavy lifting. BTW, much of the North's capital investment prior to the war promoted the Southern slave economy, ironically. Where do you suppose the mills of Mass gotten their cotton? Who owned the ships upon which cotton was exported to the world? Who lent the money to plantation owners that allowed them to buy the vast majority of their slaves, using the slaves as collateral?
 
Lincoln's primary political objective was to maintain the national Union; therefore, his strategic objective was to restore rebelling states to the Union. Although, by his own admission, he was a military novice, he soon correctly recognized the Confederacy's center of gravity was the Confederate armies, rather than territory. One of the problems he faced was that too many of his generals did not understand that their primary focus had be the CSA forces. The significant exceptions were Grant and Sherman. Davis focused on holding territory initially but eventually understood that to win independence, the CSA armies had to focus on Union forces; however, Lee was one of the few Confederate generals who grasp that concept. All of Lee's operations, including the two invasions into Maryland and Pennsylvania, had as their primary objective the engagement and defeat of the Union army.
 
Lincoln's primary political objective was to maintain the national Union; therefore, his strategic objective was to restore rebelling states to the Union. Although, by his own admission, he was a military novice, he soon correctly recognized the Confederacy's center of gravity was the Confederate armies, rather than territory. One of the problems he faced was that too many of his generals did not understand that their primary focus had be the CSA forces. The significant exceptions were Grant and Sherman. Davis focused on holding territory initially but eventually understood that to win independence, the CSA armies had to focus on Union forces; however, Lee was one of the few Confederate generals who grasp that concept. All of Lee's operations, including the two invasions into Maryland and Pennsylvania, had as their primary objective the engagement and defeat of the Union army.
I'm afraid I disagree with most of what you claim, but, so be it. Just as a taste, his primary objective in invading PA was to carry the war to "the North" for the fighting season in order to give the ravaged portions of NE VA that had been the home of the army of N VA for nearly 2 yrs time to actually plant, grow and harvest some crops for the coming winter. Taking on the entire Yankee eastern army 100s of miles from his base of communications was NOT his primary objective. If an opportunity arose to strike a blow, he would of course surely take it, but, judging by the 100s if not 1000s of wagonloads of goods the CSA troops sent South, both from Lee's center and from his cavalry's successe (which was the main cause of Jeb Stuart's delay - he was so delayed b/c he had so much success gathering supplies which he knew, and had been told, were an important reason for the invasion in the first place!! Jeb's rebuke from Lee over the "good news" Jeb gave of the vast # of wagons of supplies only confirms that supplies was an important goal of Lee's entire mission. But that's enough for now, Mr Hodge. Let's agree to disagree.
 
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