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I've been having an excellent conversation on the ramifications of a Confederate victory at Gettysburg with Saphroneth, and it's reminded me of one interesting post by 67th Tigers years ago in the Gettysburg forum:
I know most people scoff at the idea of a successful Pickett's Charge, but there is an academic basis for such conjecture provided via a study from Michael J. Armstrong of Brock University and Steven E. Sodergren of Norwich University:
As the study further points out, the brigades were available and actually did move forward until Longstreet cancelled their movement:
Another "missed chance" is further elucidated upon later on:
So let's say Lee doesn't make the error of placing too much trust into Longstreet that day, and thus exercises slightly more tactical control; as a result, Wilcox, Lang and Wright all have their brigades sent in while Longstreet is able to prevent Pendleton from moving the artillery reserve thanks to having fewer operational concerns. The attack thus successfully breaches the Federal line and Lee is able to commit the second wave to the attack.
2nd and 1st Corps get encircled and destroyed, but the rest of the Army of the Potomac is able to retreat though at the cost of much of their equipment and baggage. Lee is too damaged and low on ammunition to force the issue, particularly when Meade goes into the Pipe Creek Line, and thus the campaign comes to an end. Total casualties are around 23,000 for the Confederates to 36,000 Federals (An extra 14,000+ losses from the destruction of the aforementioned Corps), leaving the Army of the Potomac extremely battered and likely incapable of action until the following Spring.
Lee's orders for day (an oblique attack against Cemetary Hill with all 9 divisions) got watered down a lot, and we ended up with Pickett's Charge.
However, in Lee's original concept of operations Hood's and McLaws' Divisions would also step off moving NE up the Emmitsburg Road (as they were ordered to on the 2nd, before Hood was hit and C&C broke down, leading to the attack drifting onto the Round Tops, ground with no significance). Pickett to their left was also to advance NEE. The Heth/Pender composite division was to advance roughly E (hitting where they historically did hit), Rodes' to the SE, Johnson's to the S, Early's the the SWW while Stuart's cavalry "closed the box". Anderson's division was shifted to Longstreet as a reserve, since 1st Corps had the hardest task.
If successful it would have enveloped the Union Right (11th and 12th Corps) and Centre (1st and 2nd), leaving the left (3rd, 5th and 6th) isolated and on poor ground.
Great plan, poorly executed....
I know most people scoff at the idea of a successful Pickett's Charge, but there is an academic basis for such conjecture provided via a study from Michael J. Armstrong of Brock University and Steven E. Sodergren of Norwich University:
Objective. We model Pickett’s Charge at the Battle of Gettysburg to see whether the Confederates could have achieved victory by committing more infantry, executing a better barrage, or facing a weaker defense. Methods. Our mathematical modeling is based on Lanchester equations, calibrated using historical army strengths. We weight the Union artillery and infantry two different ways using two sources of data, and so have four versions of the model. Results. The models estimate that a successful Confederate charge would have required at least 1 to 3 additional brigades. An improved artillery barrage would have reduced these needs by about 1 brigade. A weaker Union defense could have allowed the charge to succeed as executed. Conclusions. The Confederates plausibly had enough troops to take the Union position and alter the battle’s outcome, but likely too few to further exploit such a success.
As the study further points out, the brigades were available and actually did move forward until Longstreet cancelled their movement:
The Confederate assault did not occur in a vacuum; additional units stood by ready, though many had seen high casualties in the previous days of the battle and thus were not assigned to the initial attack. The brigades of Cadmus Wilcox and David Lang were in support on the right and actually advanced later to reinforce the assault, bringing an additional 1400- 1600 men towards the Union line (Stewart, 1959: 172-3 & Sears, 2003: 454). They went in too late to properly support the assault, however, and suffered 360 casualties from Union artillery fire before retreating (Sears, 2003: 454-55).
According to Sears, three additional brigades from Anderson’s division under Wright, Posey and Mahone were “loosely designated” as support on the left for the attack, but never engaged. They contained approximately 3350 men (Sears, 2003: 392). Stewart notes that at least Wright’s brigade was briefly moved forward, but Longstreet recalled it to defend against a potential counterattack (1959: 237). The remainder of Longstreet’s corps also stood in the area, and thus Coddington notes that Lee “anticipated throwing another 10,000 or so infantry into the breach he expected to be made by the assaulting column” (Coddington, 1983: 462).
Another "missed chance" is further elucidated upon later on:
Alexander had originally intended to fire a longer initial barrage, and also make use of several guns from the army’s artillery reserve. Unfortunately, General Pendleton, the Confederate Chief of Artillery, repositioned both the reserve and the ammunition train during the barrage (Sears, 2003: 407), making them unavailable. In his memoirs, Alexander remembers Longstreet’s dismay when told that the barrage would be shorter than planned, even going so far as to suggest that it was doomed to fail as a result (Gallagher, 1989: 261)
So let's say Lee doesn't make the error of placing too much trust into Longstreet that day, and thus exercises slightly more tactical control; as a result, Wilcox, Lang and Wright all have their brigades sent in while Longstreet is able to prevent Pendleton from moving the artillery reserve thanks to having fewer operational concerns. The attack thus successfully breaches the Federal line and Lee is able to commit the second wave to the attack.
2nd and 1st Corps get encircled and destroyed, but the rest of the Army of the Potomac is able to retreat though at the cost of much of their equipment and baggage. Lee is too damaged and low on ammunition to force the issue, particularly when Meade goes into the Pipe Creek Line, and thus the campaign comes to an end. Total casualties are around 23,000 for the Confederates to 36,000 Federals (An extra 14,000+ losses from the destruction of the aforementioned Corps), leaving the Army of the Potomac extremely battered and likely incapable of action until the following Spring.
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