Confederate victory at Gettysburg, Day 3

Generic Username

Corporal
Joined
May 12, 2019
Location
Yes
I've been having an excellent conversation on the ramifications of a Confederate victory at Gettysburg with Saphroneth, and it's reminded me of one interesting post by 67th Tigers years ago in the Gettysburg forum:

Lee's orders for day (an oblique attack against Cemetary Hill with all 9 divisions) got watered down a lot, and we ended up with Pickett's Charge.

However, in Lee's original concept of operations Hood's and McLaws' Divisions would also step off moving NE up the Emmitsburg Road (as they were ordered to on the 2nd, before Hood was hit and C&C broke down, leading to the attack drifting onto the Round Tops, ground with no significance). Pickett to their left was also to advance NEE. The Heth/Pender composite division was to advance roughly E (hitting where they historically did hit), Rodes' to the SE, Johnson's to the S, Early's the the SWW while Stuart's cavalry "closed the box". Anderson's division was shifted to Longstreet as a reserve, since 1st Corps had the hardest task.

If successful it would have enveloped the Union Right (11th and 12th Corps) and Centre (1st and 2nd), leaving the left (3rd, 5th and 6th) isolated and on poor ground.

Great plan, poorly executed....

I know most people scoff at the idea of a successful Pickett's Charge, but there is an academic basis for such conjecture provided via a study from Michael J. Armstrong of Brock University and Steven E. Sodergren of Norwich University:

Objective. We model Pickett’s Charge at the Battle of Gettysburg to see whether the Confederates could have achieved victory by committing more infantry, executing a better barrage, or facing a weaker defense. Methods. Our mathematical modeling is based on Lanchester equations, calibrated using historical army strengths. We weight the Union artillery and infantry two different ways using two sources of data, and so have four versions of the model. Results. The models estimate that a successful Confederate charge would have required at least 1 to 3 additional brigades. An improved artillery barrage would have reduced these needs by about 1 brigade. A weaker Union defense could have allowed the charge to succeed as executed. Conclusions. The Confederates plausibly had enough troops to take the Union position and alter the battle’s outcome, but likely too few to further exploit such a success.

As the study further points out, the brigades were available and actually did move forward until Longstreet cancelled their movement:

The Confederate assault did not occur in a vacuum; additional units stood by ready, though many had seen high casualties in the previous days of the battle and thus were not assigned to the initial attack. The brigades of Cadmus Wilcox and David Lang were in support on the right and actually advanced later to reinforce the assault, bringing an additional 1400- 1600 men towards the Union line (Stewart, 1959: 172-3 & Sears, 2003: 454). They went in too late to properly support the assault, however, and suffered 360 casualties from Union artillery fire before retreating (Sears, 2003: 454-55).

According to Sears, three additional brigades from Anderson’s division under Wright, Posey and Mahone were “loosely designated” as support on the left for the attack, but never engaged. They contained approximately 3350 men (Sears, 2003: 392). Stewart notes that at least Wright’s brigade was briefly moved forward, but Longstreet recalled it to defend against a potential counterattack (1959: 237). The remainder of Longstreet’s corps also stood in the area, and thus Coddington notes that Lee “anticipated throwing another 10,000 or so infantry into the breach he expected to be made by the assaulting column” (Coddington, 1983: 462).

Another "missed chance" is further elucidated upon later on:
Alexander had originally intended to fire a longer initial barrage, and also make use of several guns from the army’s artillery reserve. Unfortunately, General Pendleton, the Confederate Chief of Artillery, repositioned both the reserve and the ammunition train during the barrage (Sears, 2003: 407), making them unavailable. In his memoirs, Alexander remembers Longstreet’s dismay when told that the barrage would be shorter than planned, even going so far as to suggest that it was doomed to fail as a result (Gallagher, 1989: 261)

So let's say Lee doesn't make the error of placing too much trust into Longstreet that day, and thus exercises slightly more tactical control; as a result, Wilcox, Lang and Wright all have their brigades sent in while Longstreet is able to prevent Pendleton from moving the artillery reserve thanks to having fewer operational concerns. The attack thus successfully breaches the Federal line and Lee is able to commit the second wave to the attack.


2nd and 1st Corps get encircled and destroyed, but the rest of the Army of the Potomac is able to retreat though at the cost of much of their equipment and baggage. Lee is too damaged and low on ammunition to force the issue, particularly when Meade goes into the Pipe Creek Line, and thus the campaign comes to an end. Total casualties are around 23,000 for the Confederates to 36,000 Federals (An extra 14,000+ losses from the destruction of the aforementioned Corps), leaving the Army of the Potomac extremely battered and likely incapable of action until the following Spring.
 
Last edited:

Irishtom29

Sergeant Major
Joined
Jul 21, 2008
Location
Comancheria
The Army of the Tennessee comes; Grant is called east. He leaves the 9th and 16th Corps behind and puts the 13th, 15th and 17th on the boats for Cairo and then the cars east. Once in the east Grant, with his three fast moving veteran corps commanded by Ord, Sherman and McPherson and in coordination with Meade and the Potomac army, destroys Lee's army in late 1863.

Meanwhile Bragg, unreinforced by Longstreet, is whipped in Georgia by Rosecrans and the Cumberland army. Rosecrans drives in to the Deep South.

How's that?
 
Last edited:

Generic Username

Corporal
Joined
May 12, 2019
Location
Yes
The Army of the Tennessee comes; Grant is called east. He leaves the 9th and 16th Corps behind and puts the 13th, 15th and 17th on the boats for Cairo and then the cars east. Once in the east Grant, with his three fast moving veteran corps commanded by Ord, Sherman and McPherson and in coordination with Meade and the Potomac army, destroys Lee's army in late 1863.

Meanwhile Bragg, unreinforced by Longstreet, is whipped in Georgia by Rosecrans and the Cumberland army. Rosecrans drives in to the Deep South.

How's that?

I guess the first question is how? Assuming Grant and three Corps are pulled out of the West, by the time they get there Lee has long since retreated into Virginia. The Army of the Potomac has been shattered, and attempting the Overland with just three Corps invites the destruction of Grant's entire Army by Lee, given Lee would have the numbers advantage.

As for the West, Sherman failed to destroy the Army of Tennessee in 1864 despite having 100,000 men to 60,000 under Johnston and Hood; how can Rosecrans do the same with just 60,000 to 45,000 while Bragg has the benefit of terrain well suited to the defense?
 

Irishtom29

Sergeant Major
Joined
Jul 21, 2008
Location
Comancheria
I was going to spell it out but hey, you asked for a fantasy, I gave you mine. I won't argue fantasies, they can always be one upped, once you're counter factual there are no limits. One might as well call on the Kyrellian Armada lurking in the rings of Saturn to intervene.

Tell you what though: keeping in mind Hooker's move to Chattanooga, Grant's Vicksburg Campaign, Rosecrans' Tullahoma Campaign and the recuperative abilities of veteran armies, think it through.
 
Last edited:

Saphroneth

Captain
Joined
Feb 18, 2017
The Army of the Tennessee comes; Grant is called east. He leaves the 9th and 16th Corps behind and puts the 13th, 15th and 17th on the boats for Cairo and then the cars east. Once in the east Grant, with his three fast moving veteran corps commanded by Ord, Sherman and McPherson and in coordination with Meade and the Potomac army, destroys Lee's army in late 1863.

Meanwhile Bragg, unreinforced by Longstreet, is whipped in Georgia by Rosecrans and the Cumberland army. Rosecrans drives in to the Deep South.

How's that?
Well, we do have some sense of how long it would take to move large numbers of reinforcing troops in a fit state to operate, because we have what happened when Hooker's force went the other way.
Hooker moved about 16,000 PFD to Bridgeport,largely the fighting echelon, in about eleven days. However there was then a pause of several weeks while the heavy equipment was pulled together at the other end to allow Hooker to operate; historically the original heavy equipment (trains etc.) was left behind and presumably absorbed into the main Army of the Potomac wagon pool.

As of July 1863 (based on June 30th return):
The 13th Army Corps totals just under 20,000 men PFD; the 15th numbers about 14,500 men PFD; the 17th numbers about 13,500 men PFD. In total these sum to 48,000 men PFD, so about three times the amount of men for Hooker's movement. So the time taken to bring them east by rail is on the order of a month, plus however long it takes them to move to Cairo in the first place.

When they arrive in the East (a process which concludes in early August) they join the Army of the Potomac. Since Hooker hasn't been sent west in this conception he's still with the Army of the Potomac, which is also the case for the July 31 return, meaning the total strength of the Army of the Potomac is now:

86,000 PFD (historical July 31 strength)
- 14,000 (extra Gettysburg casualties)
+48,000 (reinforcements coming with Grant)
for a total of 120,000 PFD.

This is about 24,000 weaker than the army with which Grant crossed the Rapidan in 1864 for the Overland, and of course it's short of the equipment to adequately support this army - loading an extra 48,000 troops onto the logistics train of an army that's lost much of its baggage (i.e. effectively increasing the burden by about 60% on top of what it's already having a little trouble supporting) is not going to leave it without problems.


Meanwhile in the West, Johnston's Army of Relief is effectively unoccupied - the army it was facing has been gutted, with only about 26,000 Union troops PFD remaining in the Vicksburg area (only about 20% larger than Johnston's Army of Relief as it stood at the end of the siege, AFAICT).
 

Generic Username

Corporal
Joined
May 12, 2019
Location
Yes
If Grant's left just two Corps along the Mississippi, that means Johnston can move the Army of Relief (20-30k) to join up with Bragg; you still get a Chickamauga but this time there is no Hooker or Sherman to rescue them at Chattanooga. With regards to the East, with the defeat of Dix, Davis can plausibly pull out 11,000 men from D.H. Hill's command to add to Lee; between recovered wounded, no Longstreet diversion and this reinforcement batch, it's likely Lee could assemble 70-75k men to oppose Grant's movement.

On the other hand, @Saphroneth has suggested Lincoln could recall McClellan to command and attempt a Peninsula Campaign in 1864...
 

Saphroneth

Captain
Joined
Feb 18, 2017
The interesting thing to me is to track how exactly the Army of the Potomac grew so much in size for the initiation of the Overland. Whatever that reinforcement source was that got tapped, it would need to be tapped in this timeline, and I suspect there was a reason it took until 1864 for the strength concentration to be achieved.


In the interests of completeness I should note that I am not actually sure if the definition of PFD involved here is actually consistent, and it may be that pulling those three corps east (along with not removing Hooker) would leave an army close to the size of the one Grant used to cross the Rapidan in 1864 (though the supply issues would still exist).

Functionally what you're probably going to have to do is to do some triage and pull troops from peripheral areas to strengthen the main army; it might actually work better to send Grant to the rescue of Rosecrans (who may well need it) and have the Union adopt a posture of "defensive with some offensive threat" in the West - and along the eastern seaboard - while concentrating all disposable troops in the East.

When push comes to shove the Union can muster one army that is bigger than anything the Confederacy can use to oppose them along that axis - even if at the cost of their offensive concentration elsewhere - but that means a firm commitment that there is going to be one major offensive in spring-summer 1864 and it is going to be here.
 

Generic Username

Corporal
Joined
May 12, 2019
Location
Yes
The interesting thing to me is to track how exactly the Army of the Potomac grew so much in size for the initiation of the Overland. Whatever that reinforcement source was that got tapped, it would need to be tapped in this timeline, and I suspect there was a reason it took until 1864 for the strength concentration to be achieved.


In the interests of completeness I should note that I am not actually sure if the definition of PFD involved here is actually consistent, and it may be that pulling those three corps east (along with not removing Hooker) would leave an army close to the size of the one Grant used to cross the Rapidan in 1864 (though the supply issues would still exist).

Functionally what you're probably going to have to do is to do some triage and pull troops from peripheral areas to strengthen the main army; it might actually work better to send Grant to the rescue of Rosecrans (who may well need it) and have the Union adopt a posture of "defensive with some offensive threat" in the West - and along the eastern seaboard - while concentrating all disposable troops in the East.

When push comes to shove the Union can muster one army that is bigger than anything the Confederacy can use to oppose them along that axis - even if at the cost of their offensive concentration elsewhere - but that means a firm commitment that there is going to be one major offensive in spring-summer 1864 and it is going to be here.

Assuming Grant pulls together a force of 120,000 and Lee gets an Army of 75,000 together, the ATL Wilderness (fixed for Confederate losses of OTL) results in 32,000 Federal losses; right off the bat, Grant needs to empty out the Washington defenses....
 

Saphroneth

Captain
Joined
Feb 18, 2017
Assuming Grant pulls together a force of 120,000 and Lee gets an Army of 75,000 together, the ATL Wilderness (fixed for Confederate losses of OTL) results in 32,000 Federal losses; right off the bat, Grant needs to empty out the Washington defenses....
I think the single most important factor in Grant getting over the Rapidan is probably luck related, in that it happened that Lee was cantoned too far west and couldn't get in front of him; however, in the historical Wilderness (where Lee had 66,000 PFD) Lee nearly managed to knock the 2nd Corps behind the Wilderness Run, and if he'd managed to do that then he could have blocked Grant off by getting in front of him that way. Add an extra 9,000 men to Lee's force without giving Grant anything stronger, and even with the same cantonments Lee may well be able to block Grant; if Lee doesn't make that mistake, then blocking him is easier.
 

Generic Username

Corporal
Joined
May 12, 2019
Location
Yes
I think the single most important factor in Grant getting over the Rapidan is probably luck related, in that it happened that Lee was cantoned too far west and couldn't get in front of him; however, in the historical Wilderness (where Lee had 66,000 PFD) Lee nearly managed to knock the 2nd Corps behind the Wilderness Run, and if he'd managed to do that then he could have blocked Grant off by getting in front of him that way. Add an extra 9,000 men to Lee's force without giving Grant anything stronger, and even with the same cantonments Lee may well be able to block Grant; if Lee doesn't make that mistake, then blocking him is easier.

Meanwhile Johnston adds 20-30k to Bragg.....

Alternatively, Johnston leaves 10,000 behind to defend Mississippi against the two Corps Grant left behind, while taking 20,000 men into Paducah. Such would compel a Federal withdraw out of Tennessee by severing their supply lines on the Tennessee River, but such a retreat would be hard to accomplish with Bragg shadowing Rosecrans.
 
Last edited:

Generic Username

Corporal
Joined
May 12, 2019
Location
Yes
Foreign Recognition is an angle that needs to be considered, particularly if the Confederates are able to expand upon their success in the West. The UK effort had come to a collapse due to the failure of the Roebuck Motion but France was still very much in the "game" so to speak. While France could not contribute troops, she could send her Navy to break the blockade and compel a Federal withdraw from coastal holdings in the South, freeing up large numbers of Confederate troops and resources.
 

steve59p

Sergeant
Joined
Oct 21, 2016
Foreign Recognition is an angle that needs to be considered, particularly if the Confederates are able to expand upon their success in the West. The UK effort had come to a collapse due to the failure of the Roebuck Motion but France was still very much in the "game" so to speak. While France could not contribute troops, she could send her Navy to break the blockade and compel a Federal withdraw from coastal holdings in the South, freeing up large numbers of Confederate troops and resources.

I wouldn't say France can't contribute troops, given Napoleon III's adventurism. Not to mention he can make reference to history having intervened in the previous civil war in the 1770's. Albeit that others can point out that played a part in the collapse of the Bourbon dynasty. :wink:

However once France recognised the south the north has two problems.
a) It has threatened to declare war on anyone who did so. If it carried through on this that would mean a much larger war with union interests and trade around the world vulnerable to French pressure as well as the issues of direct French support to the south. If it doesn't it looks weak.
b) If it doesn't declare war then what happens when French flagged ships, possibly with naval escorts start sailing into southern ports? Which is another way of either widening the war substantially or the north loses the ability to blockade foreign trade at least for the south.

Of course once France recognises Richmond as an independent state that gives a precedent for other nations to do so and an incentive if France starts gaining an economic edge in trading with the south.
 

Saphroneth

Captain
Joined
Feb 18, 2017
b) If it doesn't declare war then what happens when French flagged ships, possibly with naval escorts start sailing into southern ports? Which is another way of either widening the war substantially or the north loses the ability to blockade foreign trade at least for the south.
Without escorts, they just get stopped by the blockade. That much is established. (Though it could be fun if the French start making a big fuss about shipping in something that isn't contraband, or otherwise fussing about the legality of the blockade.)

With escorts, that's basically a French DoW.
 

Generic Username

Corporal
Joined
May 12, 2019
Location
Yes
Been reading some of Coddington's work and Troy Harman's Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg, which has lead me to the belief it's highly likely XI Corps would be destroyed too or so cut up as to be non-functional; Rodes would be hitting them from the front while Hood and McLaws hit them in the flank while they had already taken a 42% casualty rate (Worse than Sickles!).
 

NFB22

Sergeant Major
Joined
Jun 21, 2012
Location
Louisville, KY
With the Army of the Potomac more or less rendered combat ineffective from a massive pounding in an alternate Battle of Gettysburg, wouldn't a real question be how quickly could they throw up some kind of opposition force to keep Lee and the ANV from marching on Washington? What Union forces were defending Washington in mid-late July? The city in a tactical sense really doesn't mean anything as we saw during the War of 1812 but it was still the seat of power and I would think many politicians would be in a panic if no army stood between them and a major Confederate force.

I wouldn't think he would need to actually even take the city as I'm sure in that type of situation the political pressure on Lincoln would have been immense with a very strong call to make a deal with Richmond.
 

jackt62

1st Lieutenant
Joined
Jul 28, 2015
Location
New York City
Lee said something to the effect that the Day 3 assault failed because (I'm paraphrasing from memory) "it was not supported in the way it should have been, for reasons that have not been understood." It's already been noted in these posts that the Pickett-Pettirgrew-Trimble assault against the Union center was not to have been the sole attack that day. Portions of Longstreet's, Hill's, and Ewell's Corps assaulting the Union flanks, and Stuart's cavalry action towards the Union rear, were all part of the larger scheme that went awry for "reasons that have not been understood."
 

Saphroneth

Captain
Joined
Feb 18, 2017
Lee said something to the effect that the Day 3 assault failed because (I'm paraphrasing from memory) "it was not supported in the way it should have been, for reasons that have not been understood." It's already been noted in these posts that the Pickett-Pettirgrew-Trimble assault against the Union center was not to have been the sole attack that day. Portions of Longstreet's, Hill's, and Ewell's Corps assaulting the Union flanks, and Stuart's cavalry action towards the Union rear, were all part of the larger scheme that went awry for "reasons that have not been understood."
I suspect that what Lee meant was partly "...and I could blame Longstreet for some of those, but I'm not going to throw him under the train."
 

Generic Username

Corporal
Joined
May 12, 2019
Location
Yes
With the Army of the Potomac more or less rendered combat ineffective from a massive pounding in an alternate Battle of Gettysburg, wouldn't a real question be how quickly could they throw up some kind of opposition force to keep Lee and the ANV from marching on Washington? What Union forces were defending Washington in mid-late July? The city in a tactical sense really doesn't mean anything as we saw during the War of 1812 but it was still the seat of power and I would think many politicians would be in a panic if no army stood between them and a major Confederate force.

I wouldn't think he would need to actually even take the city as I'm sure in that type of situation the political pressure on Lincoln would have been immense with a very strong call to make a deal with Richmond.

Lee is pretty wounded and only has enough ammunition for one more battle, maybe less. He'll pull back into Virginia soon enough, I'd expect.
 

NFB22

Sergeant Major
Joined
Jun 21, 2012
Location
Louisville, KY
Lee is pretty wounded and only has enough ammunition for one more battle, maybe less. He'll pull back into Virginia soon enough, I'd expect.

That's why I said if he even feigned a troop movement in that direction I would think the political pressure would be massive. Also, how much intelligence would Union forces have had on him. Would they know his exact manpower, ammunition and supply numbers following such a large engagement.

Always interesting when dealing with the what-ifs but at the end of the day. It's not what happened and unless someone figures out how to time travel....
 

Generic Username

Corporal
Joined
May 12, 2019
Location
Yes
Took me a few days, but I decided to make a timeline on this:

July 3, 1863 – The brigades of Wilcox, Lang and Wright are committed to the Confederate attack against Hancock’s 2nd​ Corps, providing flank protection for Pickett’s Division and enabling the first wave of Pickett’s Charge to pierce the Federal defenses. The divisions of Hood and McLaws are then deployed into the breech, conducting a left oblique that rolls up 1st​ Corps, 11th​ Corps, and destroys the remainder of 2nd​ Corps. The other half of Pender’s Division, along with Rodes’, are used to pin the Union 11th​ Corps in place for the flanking attack coming up from the South.

July 4, 1863 – The Union route from Gettysburg is complete, with 12th​ Corps racing down the Baltimore Pike to its namesake city while 3rd​, 5th​ and 6th​ Corps withdraw down the Taneytown Road to the Pipe Creek Line, where they assume a defensive posture. Low on ammunition, and his own forces battered, Lee declines to follow and prepares for a withdraw into Virginia. Federal losses have been a staggering 42,000 men killed, wounded or captured, leaving the Army of the Potomac all but destroyed as a functional entity. Lee has also been wounded, sustaining 23,000 casualties of his own.

Summer, 1863 – Lee conducts a further week of foraging before using the South Mountain passes to cross the Potomac, re-entering Virginia with ample foodstuffs to feed his Army for the remainder of the year and having scored a major victory on Northern soil, helping to offset the disaster of Vicksburg in the Western Theater. Much celebration is had throughout the South over the immense victory, and in Europe the major powers take note; none more so than the Emperor Napoleon III of France, who is increasingly entertained by his designs in North America.

For the Union, meanwhile, it is a time of disorder. The initial panic sees what is left of the Army of the Potomac desperately guarding Washington City and Baltimore, with the fear only abating once it becomes clear Lee is withdrawing into Virginia. As a response to the disaster, and with Vicksburg recently secured, the Lincoln Administration pulls General Grant from Mississippi, along with 13th​, 15th​, and 17th​ Corps; 9th​ and 16th​ are left to garrison the area. Such is a risk, as it largely frees up the Confederate “Army of Relief” under Joe Johnston at Jackson, but the peril in the East is simply too great.

Fall, 1863 – By early September, the original surviving units of the Army of the Potomac (3rd​, 5th​, 6th​ and 12th​ Corps) have been sufficiently rebuilt and the new ones (Grant’s transfers) integrated that Grant feels comfortable taking the offense. This is done in tandem with Rosecrans and his Army of the Cumberland moving into Georgia, in a coordinated attack designed to overwhelm their Confederate opponents. This plan, however, comes undone almost from the beginning.

In the East, Grant attempts to force the Rappahannock in the Wilderness, in a repetition of Hooker’s effort earlier in the year. Moving with 105,000 men, Grant is opposed by Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, with 75,000 men. Although he initially achieves surprise, Lee quickly responds with concentric attacks, with the main thrust coming from Longstreet’s Corps moving up from Orange Springs and Jackson’s Shop cutting the Brock Road off from use by Grant. With no ability to maneuver, Grant is forced into costly frontal assaults that fail and the Army of the Potomac is compelled to withdraw back across the river and ending the campaign season. Lee suffers 11,000 casualties to 25,000 for Grant.

In the West, Rosecrans meets with success and advances into Northern Georgia, as Bragg refuses to give battle outside of delaying, rearguard actions. Once word of Grant’s reverse in the East arrives, however, Rosecrans is forced to halt and this proves fatal. Johnston’s Army of Relief-now formally titled the Army of Mississippi-has moved to join Bragg with 20,000 men after leaving 10,000 men in two divisions behind to guard Jackson. Now with the numbers on his side, Bragg forces a battle at Chickamauga Creek, while Johnston commits a flanking attack that shatters the Army of the Cumberland.

Forced into a disastrous retreat all the way into Chattanooga, the remnants of Rosecrans’ force is placed under siege. With Lee demonstrating against Washington and Grant damaged, there is no suitable force at hand to provide relief, resulting in the surrender of the 40,000 surviving soldiers of Army of the Cumberland in early November. Burnside’s own Corps, then operating in East Tennessee, is compelled to retreat to Nashville in an effort to protect the city, enabling the Confederate Department of Southern Virginia to reopen the railway line to Chattanooga, greatly aiding Confederate logistics in the region and allowing Johnston (installed into command over Bragg) to place Nashville under siege.

November, 1863 – The wide ranging Federal defeats throughout the year have served to break Union morale, with widespread armed resistance to the draft and continuation of the war; Copperhead Democrats are elected in Gubernatorial races in both Ohio and Pennsylvania in that years election, signifying the depth of the Northern despair. Having saw the continued success of Confederate arms and with clear political indications to a break between the Northern populace and the Lincoln Administration, the Emperor Napoleon III officially recognizes the Confederacy late in the month and extends an ultimatum for peace negotiations which President Lincoln is compelled to accept.

May, 1864 – The Treaty of Hampton Roads is signed between the United States and the Confederate States, whose official independence is formally granted by the former under French pressure. The 11 States of the Confederacy, as well as the Indian Territory, are formally recognized as the national territory of the latter, with the Confederacy likewise forced to concede its claims to the Border States, the Arizona Territory and the newly created U.S. State of West Virginia. Freedom of navigation on the Mississippi is bestowed upon the United States, free of duties to encourage the resumption of commerce and remove a potential flash point for future conflicts.
 
Last edited:
Top