Confederate Railroads & Their Management

At the onset, the Confederacy needed everything it couldn't steal. Which would have been more important: Muskets, powder and materiel? Trains, rails and truck assemblies? Ships and port improvements?

Although the lack of rails and rolling stock was a disadvantage and contibuted substantially to Confederate defeat, it was just one of the handicaps burdening the Confederacy.

Ole

The essential issue is one of balancing the priority of needs. This is always difficult, controversial, and contradictory.

The Confederacy starts out in the middle of a war of rebellion. They need to at least survive that war, and hopefully to win it. If they don't, any course they chose would be proven a failure.

At the beginning, they desperately need an Army of trained, armed, and equipped men strong enough to hold off whatever force the Union sends against them. That means guns and ammo, etc. for the troops as quickly as possible.

That's fine if the war is going to be a short one, with a battle or two or three, over in 1861. If the war is going to be a long one, lasting two or three or more years, then the need for manufacturing equipment and heavy industry will become much more crucial. Failure to build up the industrial base to support the troops in the field will inevitably lead towards doom in a long war.

OTOH, if you are spending too many resources in 1861 on importing manufacturing equipment, RR iron, locomotives, etc. in preparation for a long war, then you risk losing quickly on the field of battle. You might starve the troops of exactly what they need to stave the Union off and give you the time to develop.

There is no easy course here, and "the South" does not have a government already set up, experienced, and running to plan and execute this build-up. It is essentially unprecedented in American history, and they are starting from scratch, with next to no resources in existing organizations or funds, a shortage of trained manpower/talent, little industrial or transportation infrastructure, and almost no industrial commodities production.

They did well with what they had, almost amazingly well. We can find individual items they might have done better, but every choice comes with a cost (monetary, political, military, or industrial) that gets too little consideration in discussions like these.

Give "the South" five or ten years of peace to build their government and economy before they plunge into a foreign war and maybe they could have started to accomplish the things the pro-South side argues for in industrial development. But that requires an entirely different Confederacy and an entirely different set of leaders than the ones who rushed to war in April of 1861. Make a change that big for a "what-if" and the reasonable conclusion would be that "the South" would never have seceded in the first place.

Tim
 
The record is clear, fighting a war the way the south did, resulted in complete and utter defeat.
From the record, it woudl seem the only strategic advantage the south possessed was its comparatikvely vast land area and bascet RR system that could, with some effort, be converted into a RR net. to establish a rudimentary, yet unified system of interior lines of communication. It is true that the southern leadership (military and political) were not attuned and, for various reasons, seemed particualrly resistant to taking any sort of really effective use of that advantage, until driven to it by necessity rather than planning.(always a recipe for, too little and too late).
Objectively, that is the answer to what was the best option the south had for a winning formula for winning the war.
But, the problem; no unified planning to take effective advantage of what the south actually possessed, little as it was, was mostly in the failure of leadership, at the top in both its gov'ts and its military.
The south was perfectly capable of the planning and executing of long range strategic movements of troops with a modicum of efficiency, to gain a tactical advantage that resulted in strategic gains.
That the southern RR's and management accomplished as much as they did, in actual fact, in the face of political idealogues and hidebound generals, was all that could have been reasonably expected of them.


P.S. It might be noted that in the East the rivers flowed mostly West-East, while the rivers in the West flowed mostly North-South. In the east the rivers were barriers favoring the defensive, whil in the west the rivers were roads to invasion. Geography itself dictated where offensive and defensive campaigns should be planned. (It was no accident that most Union armies of invasion were named after major rivers forming the axis' of their invasion routes, South.)


P.P.S. Due to my ineptitude with computers in general and the internet in particular, I have returned to this board as OpnOlympic as I could not reenter under my old one of OpnDownfall.(sorry about that)
 
Not offhand, and considered by who?

Also, of course, if you know of a better biography of Hannibal I'd be delighted to see it.

Dodge has a reputation for worshipping at the altar of Hannibal as Early/Freeman/Dowdey have done for Lee. And the ancient historians have a reputation for either inflating numbers or providing highly questionable numbers. I'd much rather trust a modern day source like Adrian Goldsworthy over Dodge who, I believe, wrote his book over a 100 years ago.

Not significantly enough to interfer with Lee spending a month preparing for his next campaign.

Lee didn't interfere with Hooker either. Hooker wasn't sitting around doing nothing and wallowing in self-pity.

Who do Kershaw and Law have brigade wise with them? Jenkins isn't up yet, I remember that much (since when he arrived later he was senior to Law), and I believe Hood's Texans are up.

http://www.civilwarhome.com/chickamaugaaot.htm

Pickett's men are part of Lee's army, not the Richmond defenses. They are part of what Lee has got.

Not letting Lee recollect even the men detached in the not distant (relatively) past is beyond half hearted into actively unsupportive.

This is simply a personal interpretation of what "half-hearted" means. I see no reason to split hairs over this. I have already posted my opinion.

And military units get shifted around from theater to theater. That's how things work. They didn't have a stamp in their pay book that said "Property of RE Lee."

None of Bragg or the others gave Davis were communicative enough in their letters for Davis to have anything to work with from them - nor were they around in person.

Being uncommunicative is not Davis's fault and he could have easily visited these men if he had wanted to.

I really don't see how if Lee can't even get all the troops belonging to his army back that it can be advanced that he could influence grand strategy. Obviously if he had a suggestion Davis would probably listen, but what he would listen to and what he would act on were different.

Yes Davis would listen. There's not many other Confederate generals who can make such a claim.

The difference between the brigades that were trained by the excellent disciplinarians of the ACW and those trained by men who weren't doesn't appear to be that staggering.

The Louisiana Tigers may have been good on the battlefield but off of it, they were an undisciplined rabble. And discipline is more than just battlefield performance. It's maintaining marching formation, taking care of your weaponry, setting up camps properly, using proper camp sanitation techniques, etc. Many men early in the war died of disease simply because officers didn't enforce hygiene practices.

Its generally a good point in their favor, but I can't name the units Bragg trained early on (which were noteworthy for that when they first showed up) as performing better later in the war than those he didn't toughen.

By late in the war, those other units were veterans; they knew what to do. But at the time of Shiloh, Bragg's men were noted for being better able to maintain their marching formation and not uselessly firing off their guns.

That's not a whole lot of troops, though - unless we're looking at the whole Mississippi river operation/s.

The Red River expedition involved a rather large force. And Butler's men who took New Orleans were originally meant to make an incursion into Texas.

Right. Its just a limitation for New Orleans that means taking advantage of what it could potentially do is subject to limitations. If it can build ships but the railroads can't/won't ship the components produced elsewhere there in a timely fashion, that's not nearly as useful as if they did.

Not a unique problem. But it means visions of New Orleans producing ships need to bear it in mind. Boston is well served by railroads, New Orleans isn't.

New Orleans wasn't just about shipping alone. And the CSS Manassas was built in New Orleans.
 
Dodge has a reputation for worshipping at the altar of Hannibal as Early/Freeman/Dowdey have done for Lee. And the ancient historians have a reputation for either inflating numbers or providing highly questionable numbers. I'd much rather trust a modern day source like Adrian Goldsworthy over Dodge who, I believe, wrote his book over a 100 years ago.

Reputation among who? References, please.
And yes, Dodge wrote his book over a century ago.

Lee didn't interfere with Hooker either. Hooker wasn't sitting around doing nothing and wallowing in self-pity.

Probably not. Lee has the excuse that he's busy. Hooker...I'm not sure (as stated, I've studied what Lee was doing in that month more than Hooker). Since Hooker has a fresher army, I would hope he's doing something besides finding scapegoats.



And military units get shifted around from theater to theater. That's how things work. They didn't have a stamp in their pay book that said "Property of RE Lee."

They are part of Lee's army according to the organizational chart. Lee temporally detaching Longstreet was not transfering him or his men to another command.

Being uncommunicative is not Davis's fault and he could have easily visited these men if he had wanted to.

Its not Davis's fault, but it does mean that Davis is left with less to deal with. Who is more likely to have influence with Davis? Someone working closely with him? Or someone with very little communication with him?

Yes Davis would listen. There's not many other Confederate generals who can make such a claim.

There are not very many others who tried to be in a position for that. (Joseph) Johnston's letters are terrible if the goal is to present a persausive, respectful arguement. So if Lee is compared to that, and ignoring any other reasons for Johnston to be unable to influence Davis, it would not take much to get something from ol' Jeff.

Does not list which of these brigades were up in time to take part in the battle.

The Louisiana Tigers may have been good on the battlefield but off of it, they were an undisciplined rabble. And discipline is more than just battlefield performance. It's maintaining marching formation, taking care of your weaponry, setting up camps properly, using proper camp sanitation techniques, etc. Many men early in the war died of disease simply because officers didn't enforce hygiene practices.

Agreed. But the Tigers were an noteworthily effective combat unit despite that. I'm not sure if the units Bragg trained were noticably more efficient by mid war than anyone else's.

By late in the war, those other units were veterans; they knew what to do. But at the time of Shiloh, Bragg's men were noted for being better able to maintain their marching formation and not uselessly firing off their guns.

Agreed. But most of the war is after that.

I definately think Bragg deserves kudos for preparing them better - but I'm not sure how much for most of his career (say, Stones River) the difference between the initially well drilled and the not matters.

The Red River expedition involved a rather large force. And Butler's men who took New Orleans were originally meant to make an incursion into Texas.

The Red River expedition is what, thirty thousand men? As compared to Sherman and Grant (counting the AotP and Burnside as "Grant" at the start of the campaign) who have three times that.

Also, its done after the Mississippi has been retaken (by the Union), so after Confederate access is kind of cut off.

Not to sound like I think you're wrong (I don't know one way or another, which is why I'm asking), but what says Butler's New Orleans expedition was supposed to take Texas?

New Orleans wasn't just about shipping alone. And the CSS Manassas was built in New Orleans.

The Manassas is a pretty pitiful excuse for an ironclad. Its a converted tug.

Not that I'd want to underestimate it - it is an ironclad - but its destructive capacities are severely limited.

Manufacturing - how much is really taking place in this period? The Confederates tried to build arsenals and so on wherever they could, but what does New Orleans have developed/built already?
 
New Orleans Manufacture

The C.S.S. Mississippi was complete enough to be placed in the river, awaiting her plating and most other articles made of Iron to be shipped in from Nashville and Richmond. The C.S.S. Louisiana was complete less some steam gauges and control rods for her rather wacky system of propulsion, centrally mounted paddles and screw propellers for steering.
Heavy ordnance had been cast at the firm of Thomas Wolff, much of the available iron in possession of that firm was used to manufacture water pipe on order of General Lovell, slowing work on the howitzers and mortars that were to be shipped east to works surveyed by R.E. Lee before he took over AOP.
As mentioned, the C.S.S. Manassas was completed as a private venture.
The potential was growing, a fact not unknown to Federal war planners. Hence the creation of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron and the attack plan of John Gross Barnard. The train that was due into New Orleans when the city fell contained naval personnel (see John Pegram for first-person information), men who knew how to operate heavy ordnance and skilled workmen from Richmond, as well as their tools.



The following extract from Carlisle Barracks:
It is important to understand that the Mississippi River was not a
barrier to the Union ground forces involved in the Vicksburg
campaign; rather, it was a superhighway. The free movement by river
of both men and materiel was an essential precondition for Grant's
campaign against Vicksburg. Conversely, when the Confederates lost
the use of the rivers, their ability to wage war suffered. The U.S.
Navy's presence along the Mississippi and its tributaries during the
Vicksburg campaign seriously interfered with Confederate attempts to
reinforce and resupply its ground elements opposing Grant. Unable to
utilize water transport, the Confederates were forced to rely on the
substandard roads and railroads. Moreover, the economic life of the
Mississippi valley, and of the Confederacy as a whole, suffered
significantly. Producers of commodities such as sugar and cotton were
largely cut off from their markets in the east and overseas. By 1863,
rather than producing cash crops that could not be transported, planters
increasingly raised corn and hogs to feed themselves, commodities
that they had imported by river before the war.
 
Reputation among who? References, please.
And yes, Dodge wrote his book over a century ago.

Reputation among historians which is why others like Liddell Hart and Adrian Goldsworthy have effectively debunked Dodge's trashing of Scipio.

Hooker...I'm not sure (as stated, I've studied what Lee was doing in that month more than Hooker). Since Hooker has a fresher army, I would hope he's doing something besides finding scapegoats.

Hooker wasn't being lazy but again I feel we are starting to split hairs.

They are part of Lee's army according to the organizational chart. Lee temporally detaching Longstreet was not transfering him or his men to another command.

But it was within Davis' perogative as, more or less, commander in chief to have ordered Longstreet's men to stay around Suffolk if he had desired such a thing.

Who is more likely to have influence with Davis? Someone working closely with him? Or someone with very little communication with him?

Which supports my point that Davis trusted Lee more so than other Confederate generals.

Does not list which of these brigades were up in time to take part in the battle.

Look at an atlas or Cozzens' book on Chickamauga. There were eight brigades in Longstreet's column compared to three for Stewart.

The Red River expedition is what, thirty thousand men?

For something that supposedly isn't a major problem, 30,000 men is a rather large amount.

Not to sound like I think you're wrong (I don't know one way or another, which is why I'm asking), but what says Butler's New Orleans expedition was supposed to take Texas?

It's referenced in Ludwell Johnson's Red River Campaign.

The Manassas is a pretty pitiful excuse for an ironclad. Its a converted tug.

Not that I'd want to underestimate it - it is an ironclad - but its destructive capacities are severely limited.

What Confederate ironclad didn't have limited capacity? Most of them were more ram than anything else. But New Orleans still managed to build one regardless of how pathetic it was. And they were actually in the process of building others when the city was captured.

Manufacturing - how much is really taking place in this period? The Confederates tried to build arsenals and so on wherever they could, but what does New Orleans have developed/built already?

"It meant the loss to the South of the Leeds Foundry and other New Orleans machine shops which had been converted to war work. JW Mallett, Confederate ordnance expert, later declared that losing the Leeds Foundry, which with the Tredegar Works in Richmond constituted the Confederacy's only first class foundries, 'was one of the sorest consequences of the fall of that city." -The Night the War Was Lost page 337
 
Reputation among historians which is why others like Liddell Hart and Adrian Goldsworthy have effectively debunked Dodge's trashing of Scipio.

I'm going to have to reread, but I didn't get the impression Scipio was being "trashed".

Hooker wasn't being lazy but again I feel we are starting to split hairs.

Probably. I think we both agree that Hooker was a non(immediate) issue for a month. Lee took advantage of that. Lee being able to do so and willing to do so (after a major and costly battle) is something not found in enough generals.

But it was within Davis' perogative as, more or less, commander in chief to have ordered Longstreet's men to stay around Suffolk if he had desired such a thing.

Yes - but I don't think anyone argues that Breckinridge's division (when sent to Johnston in late May) wasn't a part of Bragg's army that was detached, for instance - same situation here.

Which supports my point that Davis trusted Lee more so than other Confederate generals.

But not necessarily that Lee had any ability to make Davis do something. Surely if Lee had major influence over Confederate strategy he would have been able to influence Davis to support him more fully than he did - Lee was counting on having Pickett's other two brigades and Ransom, so that he was unable to get them - whether we count them as belonging or not - just doesn't sound influential enough to shape broader strategy to me.

Look at an atlas or Cozzens' book on Chickamauga. There were eight brigades in Longstreet's column compared to three for Stewart.

Cozzens's book is on my to-get list, sadly the bookstores around here have a poor Civil War selection.

And alright, eight versus three.

For something that supposedly isn't a major problem, 30,000 men is a rather large amount.

There's no sign that I'm aware of (admitedly my reading on the Red River Campaign specifically is mostly from the "what are the Confederates doing?" side) that shipments from Texas were a big deal.

There were other things in Texas worth getting, but it doesn't seem to have been a major Confederate asset.

It's referenced in Ludwell Johnson's Red River Campaign.

Understood.

What Confederate ironclad didn't have limited capacity? Most of them were more ram than anything else. But New Orleans still managed to build one regardless of how pathetic it was. And they were actually in the process of building others when the city was captured.

Most of them were at least able to do a reasonable amount of damage - that is, they had the capacity to. The Manassas, not so much.

I think it was a gallant little thing, but it was still a little thing.

And the others in building had issues (not atypical issues - the usual ones, in fact - but its not inspiring confidence that holding New Orleans would mean blockade breaking ironclads, as one historian has argued).

It meant the loss to the South of the Leeds Foundry and other New Orleans machine shops which had been converted to war work. JW Mallett, Confederate ordnance expert, later declared that losing the Leeds Foundry, which with the Tredegar Works in Richmond constituted the Confederacy's only first class foundries, 'was one of the sorest consequences of the fall of that city." -The Night the War Was Lost page 337

A good book, but I think it advances the case of New Orleans's importance too highly.

That being said, it was a city of the type (commercial and industrial) that the Confederacy had too few of.

So it was definately a major blow.
 
Cozzens's book is on my to-get list, sadly the bookstores around here have a poor Civil War selection.

Do you like books heavy with tactical detail? If you don't, I say just find a cheap used copy somewhere. It's heavy reading; you will need to find a nice quiet place without distractions.

There were other things in Texas worth getting, but it doesn't seem to have been a major Confederate asset.

It meant the loss of the South of Texas beef and Louisiana salt, which had recently been discovered in solid form at Avery Island, about 150 miles wet of New Orleans. Both were vital factors in the Confederacy's capacity to exist during the war. -The Night the War Was Lost page 336

And the others in building had issues (not atypical issues - the usual ones, in fact - but its not inspiring confidence that holding New Orleans would mean blockade breaking ironclads, as one historian has argued).

Breaking the blockade was a pipe dream that would have required more capacity than the Confederacy possessed. But New Orleans did produce ships even if they were less than stellar.

That being said, it was a city of the type (commercial and industrial) that the Confederacy had too few of.

So it was definately a major blow.

Agreed.
 
Do you like books heavy with tactical detail? If you don't, I say just find a cheap used copy somewhere. It's heavy reading; you will need to find a nice quiet place without distractions.

As long as I can follow what's going on. I enjoyed reading Cozzens' book on Stones River and his book on Iuka and Corinth, so I think its worth getting.

It meant the loss of the South of Texas beef and Louisiana salt, which had recently been discovered in solid form at Avery Island, about 150 miles wet of New Orleans. Both were vital factors in the Confederacy's capacity to exist during the war. -The Night the War Was Lost page 336

The problem is, how much of that really reached the (rest of the) Confederacy before it became a virtual nonoption due to Union advances?

Breaking the blockade was a pipe dream that would have required more capacity than the Confederacy possessed. But New Orleans did produce ships even if they were less than stellar.

Yeah. I'm not sure how much of an asset that would work out to be without the ability to at least hinder the blockade.

Potential value - that is, the value if we were assigning point values (for want of a better method) to different areas at the start of the war - is quite high. But how much that would actually mean in practice seems much lower.

Out of curiosity, did you take a look at the What If thread (link posted in an earlier post) on reinforcing Tennessee in May of 1863?


All in all, the Confederacy seems to have faced two major problems.

1) Not enough resources (men, materials, leadership) to go around. Its not just East vs. West, its the AoNVA vs. North Carolina and the Atlantic coast, Tennessee vs. Mississippi, etc.

2) Nowhere that can safely be cut off without causing problems.

In a very real way, size was a disadvantage to the Confederacy accordingly.
 
The problem is, how much of that really reached the (rest of the) Confederacy before it became a virtual nonoption due to Union advances?

To have a more definitive answer, that would require examining the proper documentation and tallying the information. I don't even know where you would go to find such information.

Out of curiosity, did you take a look at the What If thread (link posted in an earlier post) on reinforcing Tennessee in May of 1863?

I think I did but since we were discussing much of the same topics on this thread I thought it would be redundant.
 
To have a more definitive answer, that would require examining the proper documentation and tallying the information. I don't even know where you would go to find such information.

Neither do I. As best as I can tell, what got there was valued - but judging by, for instance, the AoT (or what would become it, I should say) - the amount getting east doesn't sound all that great.

I think I did but since we were discussing much of the same topics on this thread I thought it would be redundant.

True enough. Main reason for pointing it out is Trice's explainations on what would have to be done with a reinforcing force to Tennessee in order for it to be any good, and the difficulties of that.

The Confederacy is fine as of the spring of 1861 - or as fine as its ever going to be.

1862, there's no possibility of reinforcing the West from the East. Not until fall, at least. Virginia's defenders are already too busy.

1863...well, that thread covers it.

And after that, we get into the fact most of the West has been lost.
 
Once again, southern RR's and their managers, performed Two strategic movement of significant numbers of troops over long distances. Each resulting in tactical or strategic success'.
If there is a question of the abilities of western generals, then perhaps Lee to Tn or Ms? (assuming, of course, Lee was willing to put the fate of the confederacy before than of Va.).
 
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