I think it was Ian Kershaw who observed that the Prussians missed many lessons from the Civil War and they paid a price. They apparently regarded the American armies as amateur and unworthy of study ignoring the fact that even volunteers and conscripts can professionalize quickly under intense conditions. The technology of 1865 armies wasn't too different in 1914 when the Germans struck France through Belgium. They found themselves unprepared to logistically sustain a drive of men on foot with horses doing the hauling. Men and animals simply became exhausted trying to maintain the goals set by the general staff. The advance slowed down and the French and British were able to stop them.Prussia didn't adopt much from the Civil War, though. From 1848 to 1870 they had plenty of their own examples closer to home (the 3 Danish wars, the 1866 Austro-Prussian War, the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War). Von Moltke (the man military historians named the "Age of Moltke" after) was just hitting the top of command structure in 1864; he was also an observer in the 1859 French defeat of Austria in Italy. They had the Needle Gun breechloader (in Prussian use since 1848, standard issue after von Moltke hit the top). The Great Prussian General Staff never did a staff study of the Civil War, and after the 1866 and 1870 victories, a wave of "All Things Prussian" swept across the European militaries.
I read that in 1914 the French did not even have training or plans for retreat or withdrawal. They figured all they had to do was attack and they would prevail. Withdrawal was cowardly. [reminded of a bit of satire: For sale, French army rifles, good condition, fired once, dropped twice.]The French end up looking a bit like the "one Rebel can lick ten Yankess" school of 1860. The had a problem: French population was stagnant, German population was growing rapidly. To match up, they needed to use a higher percentage of their young men (1913, 86% of eligible French boys were drafted for a year, 50% of Germans - in peacetime). They had to outfight the superior numbers, so they believed in aggression, with the attack always preferred, and elan (spirit) conquering all. The problem is they were not listening. Foch was then a major teacher in the military system, responsible for the Elan doctrine -- but he also stressed the responsibility of the officers to be extremely careful and proficient in order to protect the lives of their men from unnecessary casualties, which required a great deal of hard work and responsibility. Somehow it was easier to shout things like "Elan!" and ignore all the difficult stuff Foch was also saying about the deadliness of modern battlefields. Come August 1914, French soldiers died bravely in large piles.
Tim
I read that in 1914 the French did not even have training or plans for retreat or withdrawal. They figured all they had to do was attack and they would prevail. Withdrawal was cowardly. [reminded of a bit of satire: For sale, French army rifles, good condition, fired once, dropped twice.]
I haven't had the time to get into this like I wanted to. Here are a few comments and questions.
I agree that Fort Sumter was more defensible and the move there would be the common sense thing to do if you had "tangible evidence" of plans to be attacked.
How many cannon were pointed at Fort Moultrie before Anderson made the move on December 26?
Maybe Anderson made the right move to save his command but in so doing sparked a war. I know a soldier should have the right to defend themselves and understand it well. I also know there are times it's a soldiers duty to follow orders at risk of life. Anderson knew not to provoke anything even if he didn't know of the "agreement" of keeping the status quo.
If Anderson risked his command and stayed at Fort Moultrie and wasn't attacked, where or when would war have broke out or would it?
I'm just trying to get a grip on the subject, so please, I don't want to hear the Confederate sympathizer routine, that's not what its about.
dvrmte