Confederate military build up before Sumter

Prussia didn't adopt much from the Civil War, though. From 1848 to 1870 they had plenty of their own examples closer to home (the 3 Danish wars, the 1866 Austro-Prussian War, the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War). Von Moltke (the man military historians named the "Age of Moltke" after) was just hitting the top of command structure in 1864; he was also an observer in the 1859 French defeat of Austria in Italy. They had the Needle Gun breechloader (in Prussian use since 1848, standard issue after von Moltke hit the top). The Great Prussian General Staff never did a staff study of the Civil War, and after the 1866 and 1870 victories, a wave of "All Things Prussian" swept across the European militaries.
I think it was Ian Kershaw who observed that the Prussians missed many lessons from the Civil War and they paid a price. They apparently regarded the American armies as amateur and unworthy of study ignoring the fact that even volunteers and conscripts can professionalize quickly under intense conditions. The technology of 1865 armies wasn't too different in 1914 when the Germans struck France through Belgium. They found themselves unprepared to logistically sustain a drive of men on foot with horses doing the hauling. Men and animals simply became exhausted trying to maintain the goals set by the general staff. The advance slowed down and the French and British were able to stop them.
 
The French end up looking a bit like the "one Rebel can lick ten Yankess" school of 1860. The had a problem: French population was stagnant, German population was growing rapidly. To match up, they needed to use a higher percentage of their young men (1913, 86% of eligible French boys were drafted for a year, 50% of Germans - in peacetime). They had to outfight the superior numbers, so they believed in aggression, with the attack always preferred, and elan (spirit) conquering all. The problem is they were not listening. Foch was then a major teacher in the military system, responsible for the Elan doctrine -- but he also stressed the responsibility of the officers to be extremely careful and proficient in order to protect the lives of their men from unnecessary casualties, which required a great deal of hard work and responsibility. Somehow it was easier to shout things like "Elan!" and ignore all the difficult stuff Foch was also saying about the deadliness of modern battlefields. Come August 1914, French soldiers died bravely in large piles.
Tim
I read that in 1914 the French did not even have training or plans for retreat or withdrawal. They figured all they had to do was attack and they would prevail. Withdrawal was cowardly. [reminded of a bit of satire: For sale, French army rifles, good condition, fired once, dropped twice.]
 
I read that in 1914 the French did not even have training or plans for retreat or withdrawal. They figured all they had to do was attack and they would prevail. Withdrawal was cowardly. [reminded of a bit of satire: For sale, French army rifles, good condition, fired once, dropped twice.]

Both the French and the Germans had observers at the Russo-Japanese War.

When it was over, the French regarded it as having proved their theories on Elan. After all, heavy artillery, machine guns, indirect fire, barbed wire and all the rest had not stopped the Japanese from taking everything they attacked (eventually) and winning the war. This ignores the horrendous Japanese casualties, of course, but why let the details get in the way of a good theory?

The Germans, observing the same things, went back home and changed their field manual to emphasize digging in and preparing for defense when stopped. They didn't make enough changes, and they didn't dig the trenches deep enough, but at least they had picked up a clue.

The start of the Civil War was about to run into mass technological change with even less warning. There was little to be seen in the Mexican War that wouldn't have been entirely familiar to Napoleon's old soldiers.

Fort Sumter was state-of-the-art for brick and masonry forts, not yet completed in 1860. Beauregard's 36 hour bombardment reduced it to helplessness and nearly destroyed it (fires almost spread to the magazine.) If that had gone up, it would be interesting to measure the effect against The Crater in 1864. A year later, the world would know that brick-and-masonry forts were obsolete when the Yankees took Fort Pulaski outside Savannah.

Tim
 
So by April 13th we have this letter from Pickens to the Virginia secession convention..

CHARLESTON, S. C., April 13th, 1861.

To Governor Letcher:

Received your despatch. It is true that Fort Sumter was bombarded all day yesterday, after refusing to evacuate, and four vessels were off the bar with troops and supplies waiting for the tide to come in, and the Fort was in signal with them.

President Lincoln sent a special messenger, and informed me in writing that supplies would be put in, but asked no reply. Not a man at our batteries was hurt even. The Fort was furious in its fire on us. Our iron battery did great damage to the Fort in the south wall. Our shells fall freely in the Fort; it is not known exactly with what effect, but supposed to be serious, as they are not firing this morning. Our Enfield battery dismounted three of the large Columbiads. We will take the Fort and can keep sixteen ten-inch mortars all the time on it, besides heavy guns which will give no peace, night or day. We can sink the fleet if they attempt to enter the channel. If they land elsewhere we can whip them. I have here, now, nearly seven thousand of the best troops in the world, and a reserve of ten thousand on our railroads. The war is commenced, and we will triumph or perish. This is my answer to you. Please let me know what Virginia will do, as I telegraph to you candidly. F. W. PICKENS.
 
I haven't had the time to get into this like I wanted to. Here are a few comments and questions.

I agree that Fort Sumter was more defensible and the move there would be the common sense thing to do if you had "tangible evidence" of plans to be attacked.

How many cannon were pointed at Fort Moultrie before Anderson made the move on December 26?

Maybe Anderson made the right move to save his command but in so doing sparked a war. I know a soldier should have the right to defend themselves and understand it well. I also know there are times it's a soldiers duty to follow orders at risk of life. Anderson knew not to provoke anything even if he didn't know of the "agreement" of keeping the status quo.

If Anderson risked his command and stayed at Fort Moultrie and wasn't attacked, where or when would war have broke out or would it?

I'm just trying to get a grip on the subject, so please, I don't want to hear the Confederate sympathizer routine, that's not what its about.

dvrmte

Yes, war would have still broke out, soon. Somewhere.
 
Ft. Sumter, in relation to the beginning of the war, points to the fact that the build up of secessionist forces prior to its attack and reduction has many aspects.
But, to me, one of the most important is how it tends to prove the logical assumption that the acts of preparing for war, usually results in war.
I have noted before in other threads, that, to me, that, most, secessionist leaders operated under the assumption that their secession would be resisted, in some form, and their chosen method of dealing with any resistance was to be military force.
The leadership of the South had no recognizable laws or precedents of gov'ts or societies, that could provide any substantial proof a right to secession or independence, except the proof of a successful rebellion that justified itself, by the success of the rebellion itself.
Sumter was the chosen spot of Davis and his Cabinet, with the authority and Assent of the csa Congress, that the legality of secession would initiating an eventual resolution, by waging a successful war of rebellion.
For the same reason Lincoln wanted peace to help short circuit secession, Davis and the csa, needed war to finalize its reality(legality).
 
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