Johnson was wounded at Seven Pines. Never had a field command until Dalton, winter of 63-64. It was a little late to turn things around by the spring of 64. Especially when the President thought you were disloyal and his personal advisor, Bragg, had every intention of undermining you. Longstreet favored Johnson’s military philosophy of fighting on the Defensive. Using offensive movements when you had an advantage. That would of probably worked in 62 and 63.
Bragg’s organizational skills and discipline didn’t create military success. Wasn’t all his fault. Davis protected him because he was loyal. Also protected Polk because he was loyal. Tickles me because Bragg retreated from KY, lost a military advantage at Stones River and retreated, got maneuvered out of Tullahoma and ultimately left Chattanooga in fear of being Sieged. Bragg did a lot of Backing Up.
By this time his subordinates weren’t obeying him. Had no confidence in him. Bragg’s plans failed for many reasons in the run up to Chickamauga. He lost his side of the Battle at Chickamauga. The Right portion of the AOT got whooped. Charged continuous into fortified positions on the 20th. Longstreet ignored Bragg’s orders, and with some luck, occasionally winners get lucky, turned the Federal right flank.
Then the finality of Bragg’s field command. Chattanooga and Missionary Ridge. After his only military Victory. He demoralized his Army. Split his Army during a crucial time. Had a huge geographic advantage, which he wasted. Sat for months and didn’t fortify positions. Never thought he would be attacked. Debacle at Missionary Ridge was like no other.