Who was the better General: Braxton Bragg versus Joseph E. Johnston?

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As it stands, with all the samples available to judge their prowess of leading an army, who was the better General? I think their resume's are comparable, what are your thoughts?

Discuss.
 
We don't know what Johnston would have done had he remained in command of the AOT. But my estimation bets that he withdraws to the Atlanta entrenchments, and preserves his army's fighting capability. Unlike Grant, who maintained secure communication lines in front of Petersburg, Sherman's supply line via the Western and Atlantic RR was very tenuous and made an effective siege of Atlanta more complicated. Atlanta fell to Sherman in early September 1864. Had Johnston been able to defend that place until November 1864, it might well have been the decisive factor in a McClellan victory, thereby breathing new hope into the Confederacy.

I reckon Sherman would've turned Johnston out of Atlanta as he did to Hood. Faced with Sherman's turning Johnston's choices would have been to make a fight or be invested and stand a siege. Seeing as the city fell on September 2nd the notion of a true siege holding out until November is unrealistic.
 
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Speculative as to how Johnston would have handled “Peachtree Creek”... or defended Atlanta. I think we all would agree he wouldn’t have been as ‘rash’ as Hood but unless he’s learned a thing or two since Seven Pines (I believe that was the last offensive battle he supervised but someone with better knowledge of the 1864 campaign correct me if I’m wrong...) there is no guarantee that he does better attacking Sherman either. Keeping in character for him would be blunting Sherman’s moves with good dug-in blocking positions but if he feels there is a chance he could be cut off he would definitely pull out. If he doesn’t do enough to hurt the Federal supply/ replacements line, making it to November is indeed a tall order.
 
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He turned the wrong flank because DH Hill and Polk would not follow his orders to turn the correct flank. Bragg's original plan was to turn Rosecrans left and get between him and his base at Chattanooga.
Partially true.

He gave Longstreet more troops than Polk. Had no council of war on the 19th. 18th either for good measure. Rosecrans continually shifted troops to the north during the night of the 19th. Bragg shifted 1 division, Breckinridge to his right. So a single division, unsupported hit Rosecrans left flank. Would you not put most of your pressure on the flank you are trying to turn? Rosecrans though so. That’s why he was shifting troops to Thomas up until 11am on the 20th. The rest of Polks Corps are out of position. Bragg had 10 days to get between Rosecrans and Chattanooga. Never able to Execute. Again he could of moved forward. Took control or supervised. On the 19th Bragg knew where the Federal Left Flank was. He fought them all day. Bragg could of shifted Longstreet‘s whole Corps to the right, gave Longstreet the right flank. He could of taken over command of his right. At least moved forward personally and supervised subordinates.

You can’t blame it All on somebody else. Bragg didn’t wake up one day and find himself in the AOT. He never had a info stream where he had situational awareness over the whole battlefield. He never could react to what the other guy was doing. He met with Longstreet on the afternoon of the 20th after the Breakthrough. Again, adjusted nothing. Thought he was Whipped.
 
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I reckon Sherman would've turned Johnston out of Atlanta as he did to Hood. Faced with Sherman's turning Johnston's choices would have been to make a fight or be invested and stand a siege. Seeing as the city fell on September 2nd the notion of a true siege holding out until November is unrealistic.

There were no good alternatives. The possibility of Johnston holding out till November may have been a long shot, but under the circumstances, my argument is that it might have been the "least worst" of the available choices.
 
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Think you missed the point. Federals don’t take ATL before the election. Lincoln may well have lost. Lincoln’s political future was much brighter after ATL fell.
McClellan negotiates, Bond Sales sink, the War stops. The South was never going to conquer the North Militarily. Not all Wars end that way. Most probably don’t.
I don’t see any evidence that Hoods military prowess extended the War. Not Sherman’s ending any sooner With his March to the Sea.


Granted that defeating Johnston and taking Atlanta would have been much better from the Unionist election Viewpoint, but in the end, Atlanta under siege and inevitable surrender, coupled with the taking of Mobile Harbor and Sheeridans great Valley Victories, would have been proof enough of the falsehood of the Democrats that the war was a failure.

Would McClellan have negotiated on the basis that he would be negotiating with a free and independent Confederacy ?

Hood preserved the AoT, as I have already noted, the Confederacy lived by its Armies. Vicksburg was lost by siege and the South Lost the Mississippi, Petersburg was lost by siege and the war was lost. What would have been lost if Atlanta had been lost by siege?
 
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Hood preserved the AoT, as I have already noted, the Confederacy lived by its Armies. Vicksburg was lost by siege and the South Lost the Mississippi, Petersburg was lost by siege and the war was lost. What would have been lost if Atlanta had been lost by siege?
It is true that Hood preserved the AoT, but it was a pyrrhic victory. Sherman may have failed to destroy the AoT at Atlanta, but the remnants were eventually neutralized by Schofield and Thomas' victories at Franklin and Nashville. Sherman made an appropriate strategic decision when he decided not to continue chasing down the AoT after the fall of Atlanta, by dividing his forces and leaving the fate of the AoT to Schofield and Thomas, while taking his AotT on its march through Georgia. Alternatively, if Atlanta had been lost after being under siege (either under the command of Hood or Johnston), the end result in which the AoT would no longer be an effective fighting force, might have been the same.
 
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He turned the wrong Flank. Missed several attempts to destroy elements of the AOC before Chickamauga. Let Rosecrans get to the top of Lookout Mountain before Bragg knew he had crossed the TN River.

Post Chickamauga he gives it all back at Missionary Ridge. Destroys the AOT in the process. What he did and did not do at Missionary Ridge reverses Anything good he ever did. My opinion.

Excellent observations often missed.

Like most generals, his overall performance has plusses and minuses.
 
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Get your rocks ready. I've put my helmet on to prevent serious brain injury.

I think comparing or asking for a comparison of Bragg and Johnston is comparable to comparing me (70 yrs, 5'6", fat, only sport participation: bowling) to Mohammed Ali or Wilt Chamberlain, or Terry Bradshaw.

I believe that Braxton Bragg did more to insure the defeat of the Confederacy than any other military leader the South had. I'll give him kudos for Perryville, but what real significance did that victory yeild? Having won the battle, what did he immediately do--run headlong back to Tennessee. DO NOT PASS GO. DO NOT COLLECT $500. Do not even look back, the enemy may be gaining on you. I question even his very presence in the state--granted he shared the same fallacy as Lee in assuming as they both did that Ky or Md would rise to join their southern brothers. But Lee could justify his invasion of the North, that so close to DC itself, might influence Great Britain or France on the South's behalf. (Without the mind boggling farce of the Lost Order, it almost certainly would have done so.) Did anyone in England or France even know where Kentucky was?

What does BB's resume apart from Perryville? Shiloh. When he took over for the mortally wounded AS Johnson, he made a series of devastating blunders. First he emphatically the request to send artillery to break through the Sunken Lane. Using artillery to break through that strong point would easily have allowed quicker pursuit and even possibly destruction of Grant's entire army on day one. Furthermore when his men have achieved almost total victory, Grant's army is huddled along the banks of the Tennessee, protected only by the guns of a few gunboats, he stops the attack because of darkness. As a result by the following morning, he is faced not by disorganized remains of Grant's original force, but a Grant reinforced not only by a Corp not participating in the previous days fighting, BUT by an entirely new army. End result---total rout.

Moving on to Stone's River. Both sides adopt the same tactical plan--an enormous and devastating left hook against their opponent. BB manages to attack first and so achieves initial advantage (Rosecrans attack never takes off) Problem is that for whatever reason, poor reconnaissance, bad scouting, whatever, the problem is that the attack takes place not against Rosecrans flank but on unoccupied territory hundreds of yards from the actual postition. The attack fell against dying embers of large fires visible the night before. (Oddly enough Rosecrans never claimed credit for deliberately misleading his opponent by lighting fake fires to confuse his enemy) As a result the flanking attack is much less devastating as it should have been and was intended to be. And finally having thrashed his opponent, forced him back into a defensive perimeter, does BB move past him, cut off his line of supply, dig in, force his opponent to attack or starve, or does he instead make a frontal attack against artillery lined up wheel to wheel in a simple frontal assault. Again he snatches defeat out of the hands of victory.

About Tullahoma let me say just this. Is there a museum somewhere which displays poor BB's drawers which came off when without a shot being fired he evacuates one of the 4 jewels of the Confederacy (New Orleans, Richmond, Chattanooga, and Atlanta)

But wait you say, there's Chickamauga--the only Confederate victory west of the Appalachian Mts. But wait, did he win or did his opponent lose. He ordered a frontal attack against a prepared enemy line. Had his opponent, Rosecrans not fatally weakened his own line despite REPEATED messages from the local commander that it would have been disaster to do so; the initial attack would have been either a minor tactical victory or worse a stalemate. Even then having achieved a tactical victory, does he race toward his stated objective, Chattanooga, blocking the Union retreat, cutting off their supplies, making them either attack his prepared defensive positions or starve. You guessed it.

Finally Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mt. About the first I'll say nothing. You could quibble about minor tactical dispositions, but I'll just give them the victory. But without the mountain its meaningless. I assume you know that following graduation from West Point your assignment was dependent upon your standing in the class. Those ranking at the top were offered positions in the Engineering Corp. Second choice was to be an artilleryman. Followed by infantry and finally cavalry, if you were really mentally deficient.

Guess what?!! Bragg was an artillerist. It was his specility!!!! Now in the actual battle, Grant sent his best, Sherman to attack the Confederate right flank. Sherman can't even attack the right hill. Thomas's poor men, under absolutely gaulling fire unable to respond, in a real panic decide to attack straight up the hill. And realize that their enemies guns cannot be sufficiently depressed to be able to fire on them.

Much has been said about Bragg's personality. I myself have begun to characterize BB as the only military in the history of warfare as the only commander whose men would rather lose under his command than fight and achieve a victory where he would credit. Part of any successful military commander's resume is the ability to inspire their subordinate's to successfully and artfully follow his commands. BB should and could have relieved Polk, Hardee, Longstreet and the other's of their ilk of their commands and given Davis the stark choice to back him or relive him or them. Either way someone will have command knowing that their commands will be promptly and enthusiastically followed.

Looking in the other direction, I firmly believe that the 2nd best commander of the Confederacy was Johnston. I hope someone was able to call 911 and resuscitate you when you read this. I know. But what about Stonewall?????? Well I grant you, look at the Valley campaign. Brilliant. Start to finish. But essentially you have a catfish taking on a minnow in a fishbowl. The effects were entirely disproportionate to the actual events. Had he been given free reign, no opposition would he have been able to anything more than he did. He did not manage events, he got into Lincoln's mind.

In actuality, Stonewall, after the Valley participated in the end of the 7days battles, 2nd Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville. Think about it, the great Stonewall, Lee's great right hand, held an entrenched defensive position (2nd Bull Run) until relieved, held a 2nd entrenched position (Fredericksburg) where his line was broken by his opponent and he managed to avert total disaster by his personal intervention, successfully held a 3rd defensive position (Antietam) in spite of NOT having entrenched his troops.

Prior to his death, I had the privilege of asking questions of Bud Richardson several times when he addressed the Augusta CW Round Table. I specifically asked him about one facet of Stonewall during the Peninsular Campaign and Chancellorsville. During the Peninsular campaign, on succesive days, Stonewall failed to execute his orders. Orders which could and should have resulted in the crushing of McClelland's army. Twice had he simply followed Lee's commands the AoP would have faced a modern Cannae and either have been decisively defeated or forced to capitulate en masse. Similarly at Chancellorsville, Jackson's famous end run around Hooker's flank began hours later than it could/should have. In both cases Jackson overslept and therefore the attacks began much later than they were supposed to.

When I asked Mr. Robertson, he said that he believed that Stonewall was in fact suffering from PTSD. During the Valley campaign the number of hours he was able to sleep over a period of weeks could be numbered on his two hands. After his first staff conference he was influenced NOT to confide or even reveal his plans to his subordinates even to the point of allowing anyone to be delegated to wake him up. As a result on 2 if not 3 separate occasions Stonewall failed to attack when an almost certain destruction of the Union army might have resulted. On the Peninsula by attacking too late, at Chancellorsville when an earlier attack would not have found him riding around in the dark doing personal recon.

But what about Johnston? Granted, I grew up reviling the name. I marveled at how Lee stepped up to rescue the South from the desperate situation JJ had bequeathed to him. When next he reappears at Vicksburg he allows the fall of such a linchpin location. And finally the Atlanta campaign. Retreat after retreat.

Before you dismiss him out of hand, let me ask a simple question. How many blunders did he make? By my count--zero. He was wounded in his first battle in the Peninsula. Not a very impressive performance. Just like Grant's performance at Belmont, Lee's against McClelland in West Virginia, or Stonewall's first battle in the Valley campaign. Not one of the Civil War commanders on either side had any experience directing troops larger than a regiment, so there was a learning curve.

Lee as great a commander as I think he was destroyed his army in offensive moves where he gambled on a victory that could have won the war, but destroyed his army in the process. Johnston had the opposite problem or really I should say attitude. His attitude was that keeping his army intact was more important than possessing any given position or place.

In the West, Vicksburg in particular he had the option of attacking a Union army several times greater than his own led by a very competent US Grant. I really don't see Grant making any foolish moves to expose himself to disaster. Alternatively, I don't see any Civil War commander foreseeing Grant's actual move of using the navy to bypass Vicksburgs defenses and cause it's surrender.

Perhaps the greatest tragedy of the CW is the tension between Davis and his subordinates. Davis considered himself to be a military guru, given his experience in the Mexican War and his service as Secretary of War--which was admirable. But either he should have firmly resolved the relationship between himself and his subordinates or he should have stepped back and left military affairs to the military. Likewise Johnston should have bluntly told Davis to either fire/relieve him or get out of his way.

I really wish the problem could have been postponed for just a week or two. At least until the Battle of Peachtree Creek had occurred. We would not be having this conversation had Johnston been allowed to conduct the battle. He had found the opportunity to come to battle against a single portion of Sherman's army, isolated from its comrades, seperated by a river barrier. Johnston planned an attack by his whole army, having tactical superiority. Possibly annihilating or forcing the surrender of one of the armies under Sherman's control.

When Hood replaced Johnston, he simply adopted the latter's plan. Unfortunately for the South, their leader could not be bothered to personally supervise his orders. He was in fact not with earshot of the actual battle, much less personally conducting it moves. Had Johnston not been relieved, I believe we would not be having this conversation. I am as close to certain as possible that Johnston would have personally supervised the action and we would know for a fact whether he could act offensively.

In contrast look at his conduct at Bentonville. He had a mere shadow of an army when he faced Sherman and came close to wrecking the portion of the army facing him.

Let me pose another question, what would Sherman have done had Johnston remained in command after he took Atlanta. What would he have done when Johnston swung around north of the city and interdicted his supply line from Chattanooga. Or sent Forrest to ravage the supply lines through Tennessee.

Could he have even contemplated a march through Georgia. Absolutely not. Sherman's march to Savannah encompassed almost all of Ga. On one hand it confused his opponents as to what his actual goal was. But on a deeper level it allowed his army to spread out and supply itself a la Napoleon and live off the land. If it had been faced with a 60-70,000 man army under Johnston, it could not have spread out, it would have been able to forage much, much less. In actual fact when Sherman and his army reached Savannah it/they were starving. What would have been their fate had they reached that state near Macon in the middle of the state. Could Lincoln have lost an entire army who surrendered rather than starve?
You say Braxton Bragg did more to defeat the Confederacy than anyone else. While it is very difficult to argue with that conclusion,
I think Jefferson Davis actually did more harm. Davis kept him in command long after he should have been relieved and sent home to await orders that should never have come.
 
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Johnson was wounded at Seven Pines. Never had a field command until Dalton, winter of 63-64. It was a little late to turn things around by the spring of 64. Especially when the President thought you were disloyal and his personal advisor, Bragg, had every intention of undermining you. Longstreet favored Johnson’s military philosophy of fighting on the Defensive. Using offensive movements when you had an advantage. That would of probably worked in 62 and 63.

Bragg’s organizational skills and discipline didn’t create military success. Wasn’t all his fault. Davis protected him because he was loyal. Also protected Polk because he was loyal. Tickles me because Bragg retreated from KY, lost a military advantage at Stones River and retreated, got maneuvered out of Tullahoma and ultimately left Chattanooga in fear of being Sieged. Bragg did a lot of Backing Up.

By this time his subordinates weren’t obeying him. Had no confidence in him. Bragg’s plans failed for many reasons in the run up to Chickamauga. He lost his side of the Battle at Chickamauga. The Right portion of the AOT got whooped. Charged continuous into fortified positions on the 20th. Longstreet ignored Bragg’s orders, and with some luck, occasionally winners get lucky, turned the Federal right flank.

Then the finality of Bragg’s field command. Chattanooga and Missionary Ridge. After his only military Victory. He demoralized his Army. Split his Army during a crucial time. Had a huge geographic advantage, which he wasted. Sat for months and didn’t fortify positions. Never thought he would be attacked. Debacle at Missionary Ridge was like no other.
longstreet didnt just get lucky. he had lined his men up and charged in column,not battlefront. so his troops hit a more specific area and kept comin line after line after line instead of a broad 2 0r three ranks. thus applying maximum pressure at a specific area. plus, ol' pete don't/didnt quit.
 
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Johnston put up a good stand at Kennesaw. I still think if he had held on to Atlanta by entrenched position, Sherman would have supported the movement to the east of the city, and developed his right wing to eventually encircle the city. I can't see Johnston being decisive enough to finalize and launch the plans made for Peachtree Creek in time to do what a desperate Hood did. No telling what Bragg's opportunities would have been if he had remained in control at Dalton. Without his replacement, a whole new situation could be analyzed.
Lubliner.
 
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longstreet didnt just get lucky. he had lined his men up and charged in column,not battlefront. so his troops hit a more specific area and kept comin line after line after line instead of a broad 2 0r three ranks. thus applying maximum pressure at a specific area. plus, ol' pete don't/didnt quit.
Column assaults don’t usually work. His worked at Chickamauga because there was limited resistance in front of him. 2 Brigades moved out of line shortly before he attacked. So, there was a Division width of open space.

Longstreet got to the battlefield at 11pm before planned step off at day dawn. Everyone but Kershaw and Humphreys were already there. Fought on the 19th. So he formed his troops the best he could. He had limited space. Limited time. Used it as best he could. Yep, after it was all over, it was his grand intention. His intention was to let Hood lead. Bushrod Johnson’s troops were the closest to Lafayette-Ringgold road. So Bushrod stepped off first. He didn’t have time to realign 12k troops.
 
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Pemberton or Kirby Smith should have been promoted to full general and replaced Bragg at Dalton not Johnston. Such a critical posting called for a competent officer on good terms with Davis.

Pemberton had already been declared "persona non grata" by almost every southerner except Davis after the loss of Vicksburg and the Army of Mississippi. Don't have a real opinion about Kirby Smith; his reputation seems to be based mostly on his administrative control of the trans-Mississippi region.
 
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It is true that Hood preserved the AoT, but it was a pyrrhic victory. Sherman may have failed to destroy the AoT at Atlanta, but the remnants were eventually neutralized by Schofield and Thomas' victories at Franklin and Nashville. Sherman made an appropriate strategic decision when he decided not to continue chasing down the AoT after the fall of Atlanta, by dividing his forces and leaving the fate of the AoT to Schofield and Thomas, while taking his AotT on its march through Georgia. Alternatively, if Atlanta had been lost after being under siege (either under the command of Hood or Johnston), the end result in which the AoT would no longer be an effective fighting force, might have been the same.



Very true and what that says to me is, defending or giving up Atlanta, were no-win choices for the confederacy.

The war was on the downhill slide and without more men and supplies for whomever commanded the AoT the West was lost and we know historically, Davis had already sent the last of what he could spare, without sacrificing some other part of the confederacy, when he sent Longstreet West from the ANV. After that, Davis could only change commanders , when what the army needed was new muscle.
 
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Very true and what that says to me is, defending or giving up Atlanta, were no-win choices for the confederacy.

The war was on the downhill slide and without more men and supplies for whomever commanded the AoT the West was lost and we know historically, Davis had already sent the last of what he could spare, without sacrificing some other part of the confederacy, when he sent Longstreet West from the ANV. After that, Davis could only change commanders , when what the army needed was new muscle.

I think it comes down to Timing, rather than Victory. Could a delay of the inevitable have changed the election, and thus the fortunes, of the CSA?

I still say Johnston offered a better chance for that - speculation and opinion only, of course.
 
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I think it comes down to Timing, rather than Victory. Could a delay of the inevitable have changed the election, and thus the fortunes, of the CSA?

I still say Johnston offered a better chance for that - speculation and opinion only, of course.

The fall of Atlanta in September 1864 was the critical moment after which Lincoln's re-election was almost guaranteed. So if Atlanta could have been held to at least right after the November election, there is some possibility that the result might have been different. We know that the Hood strategy did not succeed. Whether or not Johnston in command would have done any better is pure speculation, but it could have offered some glimmer of hope for the Confederacy.
 
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I'm astonished that i couldn't find one post that noted Bragg commanded the CSA army during its single largest and most spectacular victory of the war, at Chickamauga (!), forcing Rosecrans back to Chattanooga from N GA and forcing Lincoln to rush Sherman's army from Vicksburg and Hooker's corps from VA to rescue the 60K Yanks trapped by Bragg's partial investment of Chattanooga. This victory delayed the occupation of Atlanta by nearly a year, forced Meade to stay on the defensive, de facto for the rest of the year, and having followed Morgan's Raid of the North from Illinois to Ohio with 3000 cavalry, left the Union and Lincoln in a state of shock. It also put Knoxville and Burnside in dire straits, a fact which caused Lincoln fits, b/c he'd be trying so hard for 2 yrs to rescue the pro-Union area from CSA control. But for Longstreet's insubordination and/or incompetence, Knoxville and Chatt would have fallen as well, Grant or no Grant.

All great points. I remember you posting the paper you wrote on the Knoxville campaign. I have tried to study that aspect of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga Campaigns. Along with Longstreet in the West. Actually started at Niota and did that part of the Campaign with a group on Saturday.

Bragg called Longstreet insubordinate because of his actions in Lookout Valley. This is after Davis came to Chattanooga and having his infamous staff meeting with Bragg and his subordinates. All of those subordinates were cashiered but Longstreet. Cheatham stays but loses his TN Troops.

So, why did Bragg send Longstreet? Longstreet is on the extreme left. Carter Stevenson was already south of the TN River. Bragg thinks Longstreet is incompetent and insubordinate. He then says, we will see what Longstreet can do on his own. Then latter sent Bushrod Johnson and had Cleuburn heading that way, but recalled. All seems curious to me.

I understand the military importance of Knoxville. Your paper did a great job explaining it. Probability should of sent Longstreet there in September before N Ga. Longstreet or someboby else, early in October.

Thanks
 
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