Get your rocks ready. I've put my helmet on to prevent serious brain injury.
I think comparing or asking for a comparison of Bragg and Johnston is comparable to comparing me (70 yrs, 5'6", fat, only sport participation: bowling) to Mohammed Ali or Wilt Chamberlain, or Terry Bradshaw.
I believe that Braxton Bragg did more to insure the defeat of the Confederacy than any other military leader the South had. I'll give him kudos for Perryville, but what real significance did that victory yeild? Having won the battle, what did he immediately do--run headlong back to Tennessee. DO NOT PASS GO. DO NOT COLLECT $500. Do not even look back, the enemy may be gaining on you. I question even his very presence in the state--granted he shared the same fallacy as Lee in assuming as they both did that Ky or Md would rise to join their southern brothers. But Lee could justify his invasion of the North, that so close to DC itself, might influence Great Britain or France on the South's behalf. (Without the mind boggling farce of the Lost Order, it almost certainly would have done so.) Did anyone in England or France even know where Kentucky was?
What does BB's resume apart from Perryville? Shiloh. When he took over for the mortally wounded AS Johnson, he made a series of devastating blunders. First he emphatically the request to send artillery to break through the Sunken Lane. Using artillery to break through that strong point would easily have allowed quicker pursuit and even possibly destruction of Grant's entire army on day one. Furthermore when his men have achieved almost total victory, Grant's army is huddled along the banks of the Tennessee, protected only by the guns of a few gunboats, he stops the attack because of darkness. As a result by the following morning, he is faced not by disorganized remains of Grant's original force, but a Grant reinforced not only by a Corp not participating in the previous days fighting, BUT by an entirely new army. End result---total rout.
Moving on to Stone's River. Both sides adopt the same tactical plan--an enormous and devastating left hook against their opponent. BB manages to attack first and so achieves initial advantage (Rosecrans attack never takes off) Problem is that for whatever reason, poor reconnaissance, bad scouting, whatever, the problem is that the attack takes place not against Rosecrans flank but on unoccupied territory hundreds of yards from the actual postition. The attack fell against dying embers of large fires visible the night before. (Oddly enough Rosecrans never claimed credit for deliberately misleading his opponent by lighting fake fires to confuse his enemy) As a result the flanking attack is much less devastating as it should have been and was intended to be. And finally having thrashed his opponent, forced him back into a defensive perimeter, does BB move past him, cut off his line of supply, dig in, force his opponent to attack or starve, or does he instead make a frontal attack against artillery lined up wheel to wheel in a simple frontal assault. Again he snatches defeat out of the hands of victory.
About Tullahoma let me say just this. Is there a museum somewhere which displays poor BB's drawers which came off when without a shot being fired he evacuates one of the 4 jewels of the Confederacy (New Orleans, Richmond, Chattanooga, and Atlanta)
But wait you say, there's Chickamauga--the only Confederate victory west of the Appalachian Mts. But wait, did he win or did his opponent lose. He ordered a frontal attack against a prepared enemy line. Had his opponent, Rosecrans not fatally weakened his own line despite REPEATED messages from the local commander that it would have been disaster to do so; the initial attack would have been either a minor tactical victory or worse a stalemate. Even then having achieved a tactical victory, does he race toward his stated objective, Chattanooga, blocking the Union retreat, cutting off their supplies, making them either attack his prepared defensive positions or starve. You guessed it.
Finally Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mt. About the first I'll say nothing. You could quibble about minor tactical dispositions, but I'll just give them the victory. But without the mountain its meaningless. I assume you know that following graduation from West Point your assignment was dependent upon your standing in the class. Those ranking at the top were offered positions in the Engineering Corp. Second choice was to be an artilleryman. Followed by infantry and finally cavalry, if you were really mentally deficient.
Guess what?!! Bragg was an artillerist. It was his specility!!!! Now in the actual battle, Grant sent his best, Sherman to attack the Confederate right flank. Sherman can't even attack the right hill. Thomas's poor men, under absolutely gaulling fire unable to respond, in a real panic decide to attack straight up the hill. And realize that their enemies guns cannot be sufficiently depressed to be able to fire on them.
Much has been said about Bragg's personality. I myself have begun to characterize BB as the only military in the history of warfare as the only commander whose men would rather lose under his command than fight and achieve a victory where he would credit. Part of any successful military commander's resume is the ability to inspire their subordinate's to successfully and artfully follow his commands. BB should and could have relieved Polk, Hardee, Longstreet and the other's of their ilk of their commands and given Davis the stark choice to back him or relive him or them. Either way someone will have command knowing that their commands will be promptly and enthusiastically followed.
Looking in the other direction, I firmly believe that the 2nd best commander of the Confederacy was Johnston. I hope someone was able to call 911 and resuscitate you when you read this. I know. But what about Stonewall?????? Well I grant you, look at the Valley campaign. Brilliant. Start to finish. But essentially you have a catfish taking on a minnow in a fishbowl. The effects were entirely disproportionate to the actual events. Had he been given free reign, no opposition would he have been able to anything more than he did. He did not manage events, he got into Lincoln's mind.
In actuality, Stonewall, after the Valley participated in the end of the 7days battles, 2nd Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville. Think about it, the great Stonewall, Lee's great right hand, held an entrenched defensive position (2nd Bull Run) until relieved, held a 2nd entrenched position (Fredericksburg) where his line was broken by his opponent and he managed to avert total disaster by his personal intervention, successfully held a 3rd defensive position (Antietam) in spite of NOT having entrenched his troops.
Prior to his death, I had the privilege of asking questions of Bud Richardson several times when he addressed the Augusta CW Round Table. I specifically asked him about one facet of Stonewall during the Peninsular Campaign and Chancellorsville. During the Peninsular campaign, on succesive days, Stonewall failed to execute his orders. Orders which could and should have resulted in the crushing of McClelland's army. Twice had he simply followed Lee's commands the AoP would have faced a modern Cannae and either have been decisively defeated or forced to capitulate en masse. Similarly at Chancellorsville, Jackson's famous end run around Hooker's flank began hours later than it could/should have. In both cases Jackson overslept and therefore the attacks began much later than they were supposed to.
When I asked Mr. Robertson, he said that he believed that Stonewall was in fact suffering from PTSD. During the Valley campaign the number of hours he was able to sleep over a period of weeks could be numbered on his two hands. After his first staff conference he was influenced NOT to confide or even reveal his plans to his subordinates even to the point of allowing anyone to be delegated to wake him up. As a result on 2 if not 3 separate occasions Stonewall failed to attack when an almost certain destruction of the Union army might have resulted. On the Peninsula by attacking too late, at Chancellorsville when an earlier attack would not have found him riding around in the dark doing personal recon.
But what about Johnston? Granted, I grew up reviling the name. I marveled at how Lee stepped up to rescue the South from the desperate situation JJ had bequeathed to him. When next he reappears at Vicksburg he allows the fall of such a linchpin location. And finally the Atlanta campaign. Retreat after retreat.
Before you dismiss him out of hand, let me ask a simple question. How many blunders did he make? By my count--zero. He was wounded in his first battle in the Peninsula. Not a very impressive performance. Just like Grant's performance at Belmont, Lee's against McClelland in West Virginia, or Stonewall's first battle in the Valley campaign. Not one of the Civil War commanders on either side had any experience directing troops larger than a regiment, so there was a learning curve.
Lee as great a commander as I think he was destroyed his army in offensive moves where he gambled on a victory that could have won the war, but destroyed his army in the process. Johnston had the opposite problem or really I should say attitude. His attitude was that keeping his army intact was more important than possessing any given position or place.
In the West, Vicksburg in particular he had the option of attacking a Union army several times greater than his own led by a very competent US Grant. I really don't see Grant making any foolish moves to expose himself to disaster. Alternatively, I don't see any Civil War commander foreseeing Grant's actual move of using the navy to bypass Vicksburgs defenses and cause it's surrender.
Perhaps the greatest tragedy of the CW is the tension between Davis and his subordinates. Davis considered himself to be a military guru, given his experience in the Mexican War and his service as Secretary of War--which was admirable. But either he should have firmly resolved the relationship between himself and his subordinates or he should have stepped back and left military affairs to the military. Likewise Johnston should have bluntly told Davis to either fire/relieve him or get out of his way.
I really wish the problem could have been postponed for just a week or two. At least until the Battle of Peachtree Creek had occurred. We would not be having this conversation had Johnston been allowed to conduct the battle. He had found the opportunity to come to battle against a single portion of Sherman's army, isolated from its comrades, seperated by a river barrier. Johnston planned an attack by his whole army, having tactical superiority. Possibly annihilating or forcing the surrender of one of the armies under Sherman's control.
When Hood replaced Johnston, he simply adopted the latter's plan. Unfortunately for the South, their leader could not be bothered to personally supervise his orders. He was in fact not with earshot of the actual battle, much less personally conducting it moves. Had Johnston not been relieved, I believe we would not be having this conversation. I am as close to certain as possible that Johnston would have personally supervised the action and we would know for a fact whether he could act offensively.
In contrast look at his conduct at Bentonville. He had a mere shadow of an army when he faced Sherman and came close to wrecking the portion of the army facing him.
Let me pose another question, what would Sherman have done had Johnston remained in command after he took Atlanta. What would he have done when Johnston swung around north of the city and interdicted his supply line from Chattanooga. Or sent Forrest to ravage the supply lines through Tennessee.
Could he have even contemplated a march through Georgia. Absolutely not. Sherman's march to Savannah encompassed almost all of Ga. On one hand it confused his opponents as to what his actual goal was. But on a deeper level it allowed his army to spread out and supply itself a la Napoleon and live off the land. If it had been faced with a 60-70,000 man army under Johnston, it could not have spread out, it would have been able to forage much, much less. In actual fact when Sherman and his army reached Savannah it/they were starving. What would have been their fate had they reached that state near Macon in the middle of the state. Could Lincoln have lost an entire army who surrendered rather than starve?