In reaction to Cole’s post you wrote that Sherman’s part in the battle
did not go “according to plan, or hope, at all. … did not go according to how it was conceived, or designed, in that sector.”
So that had me wondering what was the plan, hope, conception, or design for Sherman. If we know it didnt go according to them we must know what they are.
Grant’s order the night before said to attack where Sherman thought best, with nothing further said about hopes or designs. Grant’s message to Thomas on the 18th doesn’t give much to go on either (“Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy.”)
So I asked. Thats where im going.
The original conception was “to secure the heights from the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel” before Confederate forces could concentrate against the movement. Grant was under the impression that that had been essentially accomplished by nightfall on the 24th. While it is is true that there was very legitimate reason as to why that hadn’t been accomplished and it is also true that Billy Goat Hill was an outstanding artillery position, which would pose serious problems for a Confederate force on, or near Tunnel Hill, that objective had
not been accomplished. The attack had
not taken the position up to “about the railroad Tunnel.” The conception for the 25th was that Sherman’s command would continue the attack southwards from there. However, his forces
weren’t there. They were still separated from the main element of the ridge by two substantial depressions, not just one and they had not reached the tunnel or the rail-line in that sector.
Not only were the attacks which were then launched, not
from about the railroad tunnel, but
towards Tunnel Hill, but if they were not diversionary, then they must have been intended to carry the Confederate positions. Those attacks were then essentially entirely repulsed.
An appropriate analogy, at least in terms of net result, would be like the Confederate attacks from Polk’s Wing of the Army of Tennessee on September 20th at Chickamauga. The end result is the end result, to be sure. The attacks though, looking at them on their own, were, up least until the position was completely turned and the decision was made that it would have to be abandoned, completely repulsed.
Make no mistake, those orders were written out in a general manner, as well. Bragg obviously delivered the attack order to Polk personally at Bragg’s Headquarters. The order which Polk had recorded that night is readily available in the
OR. I am going to post it here.
Again, if the objective had
really been accomplished, why attack? The evidence does not indicate that it was diversionary, so…
How would you portray it all?