Cleburnes Repulse of Sherman at Missionary Ridge

It would appear that your answer to the question I had as to what you see as the hope or intention for Sherman is just an assumption based on a “natural implication” and not anything articulated or expressed by those involved.

And you dont seem to know where I was going with this or what I am wanting to talk about as the rest of the comment is to me a tangent from what we had been talking about.
I see.

Well, I would certainly be interested in where you are going with it. Where are you going with it? I am genuinely interested.

I promise that I am not trying to be caustic here towards you. I apologize if it came across that way. I have too high a regard for you to want that.
 
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Well, I would certainly be interested in where you are going with it. Where are you going with it? I am genuinely interested.
In reaction to Cole’s post you wrote that Sherman’s part in the battle
did not go “according to plan, or hope, at all. … did not go according to how it was conceived, or designed, in that sector.”

So that had me wondering what was the plan, hope, conception, or design for Sherman. If we know it didnt go according to them we must know what they are.

Grant’s order the night before said to attack where Sherman thought best, with nothing further said about hopes or designs. Grant’s message to Thomas on the 18th doesn’t give much to go on either (“Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy.”)

So I asked. Thats where im going.
 
In reaction to Cole’s post you wrote that Sherman’s part in the battle
did not go “according to plan, or hope, at all. … did not go according to how it was conceived, or designed, in that sector.”

So that had me wondering what was the plan, hope, conception, or design for Sherman. If we know it didnt go according to them we must know what they are.

Grant’s order the night before said to attack where Sherman thought best, with nothing further said about hopes or designs. Grant’s message to Thomas on the 18th doesn’t give much to go on either (“Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy.”)

So I asked. Thats where im going.
The original conception was “to secure the heights from the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel” before Confederate forces could concentrate against the movement. Grant was under the impression that that had been essentially accomplished by nightfall on the 24th. While it is is true that there was very legitimate reason as to why that hadn’t been accomplished and it is also true that Billy Goat Hill was an outstanding artillery position, which would pose serious problems for a Confederate force on, or near Tunnel Hill, that objective had not been accomplished. The attack had not taken the position up to “about the railroad Tunnel.” The conception for the 25th was that Sherman’s command would continue the attack southwards from there. However, his forces weren’t there. They were still separated from the main element of the ridge by two substantial depressions, not just one and they had not reached the tunnel or the rail-line in that sector.

Not only were the attacks which were then launched, not from about the railroad tunnel, but towards Tunnel Hill, but if they were not diversionary, then they must have been intended to carry the Confederate positions. Those attacks were then essentially entirely repulsed.

An appropriate analogy, at least in terms of net result, would be like the Confederate attacks from Polk’s Wing of the Army of Tennessee on September 20th at Chickamauga. The end result is the end result, to be sure. The attacks though, looking at them on their own, were, up least until the position was completely turned and the decision was made that it would have to be abandoned, completely repulsed.

Make no mistake, those orders were written out in a general manner, as well. Bragg obviously delivered the attack order to Polk personally at Bragg’s Headquarters. The order which Polk had recorded that night is readily available in the OR. I am going to post it here.

Again, if the objective had really been accomplished, why attack? The evidence does not indicate that it was diversionary, so…

How would you portray it all?

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The original conception was “to secure the heights from the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel” before Confederate forces could concentrate against the movement. Grant was under the impression that that had been essentially accomplished by nightfall on the 24th. While it is is true that there was very legitimate reason as to why that hadn’t been accomplished ..
…Again, if the objective had really been accomplished, why attack?

Based on his message that night, Grant definitely thought Sherman was further down the ridge. But Sherman had secured the heights at the northern extremity and as I wrote before "to about" gives some wiggle room such that it seems to me that the intent of the objectives written on the 18th had been accomplished. By midday on the 25th, these objectives had been further accomplished: his forces crossed the first depression right away in the morning, secured a position on the hill and reached the rail line in the valley.

But set that aside for a minute - If Grant felt that they had been accomplished on the 24th (based on his message as to where he thought Sherman was) what was his intent for the 25th? You ask “why attack”? Well Grant ordered an attack with the assumption that the objectives from the letter of the 18th had already been accomplished. The objective we keep referring to (securing the heights etc) was just a preliminary objective and according to Grant "Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy." So once those first objectives had been accomplished, further operations would follow. Tunnel hill was not the final objective for the battle.

So what was the next objective for Grant that was behind his order for Sherman to attack wherever he felt best? Was it diversionary? penetration? both? neither? You claim that the evidence does not indicate it was diversionary. Which evidence is this?

You ask how I would portray it all. Here are my thoughts:
  • Grant ordered a coordinated several-prong attack -- his orders the night before had wanted Thomas also to move in the morning though this coordinated aspect ran into some difficulty;
  • Bragg had enough men to cover some of Grants moves but not all of them;
  • whether a given prong of Grant's plan was a diversion or penetration depended on what Bragg did since he had to choose to weaken one area to cover another;
  • earlier Wasuabob made a chess analogy - "Sherman put Bragg's queen in danger. Bragg covered that move..."; another analogy that comes to my mind is a dodgeball tactic of having two players target the same opponent - he can only focus on dodging one or the other but not both so one is likely to be a hit though which one depends on what he does
 
Based on his message that night, Grant definitely thought Sherman was further down the ridge. But Sherman had secured the heights at the northern extremity and as I wrote before "to about" gives some wiggle room such that it seems to me that the intent of the objectives written on the 18th had been accomplished. By midday on the 25th, these objectives had been further accomplished: his forces crossed the first depression right away in the morning, secured a position on the hill and reached the rail line in the valley.

But set that aside for a minute - If Grant felt that they had been accomplished on the 24th (based on his message as to where he thought Sherman was) what was his intent for the 25th? You ask “why attack”? Well Grant ordered an attack with the assumption that the objectives from the letter of the 18th had already been accomplished. The objective we keep referring to (securing the heights etc) was just a preliminary objective and according to Grant "Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy." So once those first objectives had been accomplished, further operations would follow. Tunnel hill was not the final objective for the battle.
Right. Now, we are beginning to talk on the same wavelength. I agree with much of this. Not all, but much of it.

Would you rather set very lofty objectives and continuously fail to attain them, but, attain some success and benefit with each movement nonetheless, or set small targets and be content with attaining them? If you aim small, you can only miss small. Whereas if you keep the pressure on, with a superior force, it is alright if many of the individual movements fail to attain the objectives set, as long as you are failing upwards and tightening the noose and tightening the pressure.

The attack which was ordered from the Army of the Cumberland was only intended to carry the rifle pits at the base of the ridge, but it did accomplish that. Grant would have then either ordered an attack via the Army of the Cumberland, or, after considering his options and reading the tea leaves, would have pivoted back to something else. For all of his dogmatism in terms of putting pressure on the enemy, he was very flexible in terms of being able to adapt to situations as they confronted him, I think.

Over time, if you continue to do that and continue to do that and continue to do that, you might even happen to get fortunate at some point, where if you just happen to catch a little bit of luck, something really big could happen. Things played out in a manner which was pretty fortunate on November 25th, but the men of the Army, in lower level commands, carried that attack beyond their orders because there was blood in the water after they carried the rifle pits at the base of the ridge.
 
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