Civil War Railroad Papers

City University of New York (CUNY)
CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Graduate Center
2010

Railroads and Economies of Scale and Scope in U.S. Manufacturing Industries: 1850-1880. Chandler Revisited
by Michael Kalson

Graduate Center, City University of New York
This Dissertation is brought to you by CUNY Academic Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects by an authorized administrator of CUNY Academic Works. For more information, please contact [email protected].

ABSTRACT
This study concerns the measurement and quantification of the relationship between railroadization in the United States in the mid-19th century and the subsequent evolution of the modern, large-scale, corporate form of industrial business organization marked by significant economies of scale and scope, as described in various writings by Alfred Chandler. Focusing on American industry as it developed from 1850-1880 using data uniquely suited to empirical analysis of economies of scale and scope, its aim is to determine whether the growth of the American railroad network, as Chandler contended, expanded markets and augmented the American financial sector such that the result was a more concentrated, large-scale mode of industrial organization characterized by extensive and increasing economies of scale and scope in sync with the growth of its extensive railroad system.

Apart from some positive results found in the scope analysis of Chapter 6 showing an ascending scope pattern from 1850-1880 in a few key industries, our findings indicate an overall gloomy prognosis for the empirical validity of the Chandler hypothesis. With the cross-country analyses of Chapters 2 and 3 showing no evidence of a greater expansion of the railroad systems of the United States and Germany at mid-century and resultant vastness thereof with respect to Britain circa the 1870’s as contributing to a more concentrated industrial sector in those countries, and the mixed evidence in support of a rise in efficient scale in American industry from 1860-1880 as shown in Chapters 4 and 5, not to mention the omnipresent dips at 1870 seen in both the scale and scope estimates, our findings reflect poorly upon Chandler’s idea of that date as the benchmark period in which to begin to expect to see the effects of transportation improvements upon scale and scope economies in American industry. Rather, they indicate a far greater impact of the Civil War aftermath shock than Chandler accounted for—perhaps one that persisted on until the 1880’s--and suggest a much later date of the full impact of the railroads upon scale and scope of industry than Chandler bargained for—perhaps 1900 as indicated by Atack (1985).

https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2769&context=gc_etds
1886

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

  • Railroads and Economies of Scale and Scope in U.S. Manufacturing Industries 1850-1880.pdf
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Given recent threads on the TRR / Land Grants / Railroads in general, the one thing that is the underlying theme is money, money, money...reading this paper, this is how you do it...

Accounting Historians Journal
Volume 33
Issue 1 June 2006 Article 11
2006

Early American corporate reporting and European capital markets: The case of the Illinois Central Railroad, 1851-1861
Dale L. Flesher
Gary John Previts
William D. Samson

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Accounting Historians Journal by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information, please contact [email protected].

Abstract
This study of the annual reports of the Illinois Central Railroad (IC) from the 1850s supports a conclusion that the statements, as to form and content, were developed to serve the needs of two classes of investors and to inform the general community of the activities of the company. The need to report to the public as to the success of the company’s role in its “social contract” to develop the state required details of a demographic nature, which were provided by the land commissioner. Operating results provided evidence of the ability to service the debts held by European investors and to inform British venture capitalists of the extent of the company’s operations. This communication with the distant capital providers was a new development in financial reporting as the capital-intensive railroads experienced management and ownership separation on a scale not seen before. In summary, the IC provided annual reports more detailed and informative than those of other corporations of the period because of a need to provide European investors with evidence of management’s activities.


https://egrove.olemiss.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1693&context=aah_journal
1973

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

  • Early American corporate reporting and European capital markets The case of the Illinois Centr...pdf
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Given recent threads on the TRR / Land Grants / Railroads in general, the one thing that is the underlying theme is money, money, money...reading this paper, this is how you do it...

Accounting Historians Journal
Volume 33
Issue 1 June 2006 Article 11
2006

Early American corporate reporting and European capital markets: The case of the Illinois Central Railroad, 1851-1861
Dale L. Flesher
Gary John Previts
William D. Samson

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Accounting Historians Journal by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information, please contact [email protected].

Abstract
This study of the annual reports of the Illinois Central Railroad (IC) from the 1850s supports a conclusion that the statements, as to form and content, were developed to serve the needs of two classes of investors and to inform the general community of the activities of the company. The need to report to the public as to the success of the company’s role in its “social contract” to develop the state required details of a demographic nature, which were provided by the land commissioner. Operating results provided evidence of the ability to service the debts held by European investors and to inform British venture capitalists of the extent of the company’s operations. This communication with the distant capital providers was a new development in financial reporting as the capital-intensive railroads experienced management and ownership separation on a scale not seen before. In summary, the IC provided annual reports more detailed and informative than those of other corporations of the period because of a need to provide European investors with evidence of management’s activities.


https://egrove.olemiss.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1693&context=aah_journal
1973

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

Another great service, Alaska. In my view the IC became a paradigm projected upon the entire American West by any thoughtful thief or legitimate entrepreneur desiring to capitalize on it commercially or politically.

I grew up fewer than 6 small blocks from the IC and it is always a pleasure to read about it.

James
 
The issue is bigger than this.
When the northern areas did not have a railroad network in 1850, they backed down and accepted some compromises.
By 1861 the northern areas not only had a railroad network, they had a railroad industry. They produced their own rails, engines and cars. They had their own managers, engineers and mechanics.
The increase in railroad competency between 1850 and 1860 was revolutionary. The improvements in civil engineering, mechanical engineering and industrial engineering went far beyond anything the Confederates could comprehend.
The momentum of the railroad industry was about to change the structure of time.

And South Carolina and the rest of the Deep South easily recognized the significance of this. That's why Secession was then or never.
 
Iowa State University
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations
2012

Building iron rails to their future: Examination of Davenport, Iowa's antebellum relationship with the Rock Island Line and Mississippi and Missouri railroads
by Chad Allan Hauser

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected].

Traditionally, historians have focused on two major periods in America’s nineteenth century railroad history. The first was the initial state of railroad construction as typified by the 1820s efforts of Baltimore building of the Baltimore and Ohio Rail Road to extend its commercial and banking reach eastward. The second was the concentrated push following the Civil War to establish a true trans-continental railroad to link the western coast of the nation with the eastern half and to standardize rail transportation connecting North and South. In most cases, historians place railroad-connected communities in one of two camps related to the periods covered. This narrow categorization interprets communities as either well established and building railroads to expand their already broad commercial reach to other markets or as largely fledgling municipalities established to either service the railroads themselves as they built to the west or markets established from railroad land grants to provide raw materials to fill the train cars heading back eastward.

Davenport, Iowa however, is a member of a rather unique group of municipalities largely located around the upper Mississippi valley in both Illinois and Iowa. Neither wholly established before undertaking the creation of railroads, nor beholden to railroads for their existence, these communities exerted influence on early nineteenth century railroad development far beyond what population and economic power would have otherwise predicted. Diving into the effort whole-heartedly, Davenport spearheaded a local and national drive to bridge the Mississippi River and link old eastern states to new western territories. These railroad efforts also entangled Davenport in the grand sectional and economic tensions wracking the nation prior to the Civil War. What should have been a simple congressional effort to acquire railroad land grants spawned a four-year long convoluted navigation of local politics, North-South issues brought on by the economic possibilities of the first trans-Mississippi River bridge, and a simmering east vs. west economic conflict, which would erupt into land grant debates and help shape precedents over state sovereignty. By the end of the Civil War, a tired, broke, and largely disillusioned Davenport would cease to tie its whole future to railroads largely outside of its own control, and instead concentrate on finding its next road to prosperity.

https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3710&context=etd
1145

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

A marvelous contribution!!!
 
Iowa State University
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations
2012

Building iron rails to their future: Examination of Davenport, Iowa's antebellum relationship with the Rock Island Line and Mississippi and Missouri railroads
by Chad Allan Hauser

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected].

Traditionally, historians have focused on two major periods in America’s nineteenth century railroad history. The first was the initial state of railroad construction as typified by the 1820s efforts of Baltimore building of the Baltimore and Ohio Rail Road to extend its commercial and banking reach eastward. The second was the concentrated push following the Civil War to establish a true trans-continental railroad to link the western coast of the nation with the eastern half and to standardize rail transportation connecting North and South. In most cases, historians place railroad-connected communities in one of two camps related to the periods covered. This narrow categorization interprets communities as either well established and building railroads to expand their already broad commercial reach to other markets or as largely fledgling municipalities established to either service the railroads themselves as they built to the west or markets established from railroad land grants to provide raw materials to fill the train cars heading back eastward.

Davenport, Iowa however, is a member of a rather unique group of municipalities largely located around the upper Mississippi valley in both Illinois and Iowa. Neither wholly established before undertaking the creation of railroads, nor beholden to railroads for their existence, these communities exerted influence on early nineteenth century railroad development far beyond what population and economic power would have otherwise predicted. Diving into the effort whole-heartedly, Davenport spearheaded a local and national drive to bridge the Mississippi River and link old eastern states to new western territories. These railroad efforts also entangled Davenport in the grand sectional and economic tensions wracking the nation prior to the Civil War. What should have been a simple congressional effort to acquire railroad land grants spawned a four-year long convoluted navigation of local politics, North-South issues brought on by the economic possibilities of the first trans-Mississippi River bridge, and a simmering east vs. west economic conflict, which would erupt into land grant debates and help shape precedents over state sovereignty. By the end of the Civil War, a tired, broke, and largely disillusioned Davenport would cease to tie its whole future to railroads largely outside of its own control, and instead concentrate on finding its next road to prosperity.

https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3710&context=etd
1145

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

This is what I write about in chapter one of my book. A great addition!
 
Virginia Commonwealth University
VCU Scholars Compass
Theses and Dissertations Graduate School
2014

Legislating the Danville Connection, 1847-1862: Railroads and Regionalism versus Nationalism in the Confederate States of America
by Philip Stanley

Virginia Commonwealth University
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at VCU Scholars Compass. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of VCU Scholars Compass. For more information, please contact [email protected].

This thesis examines the effect regionalism had upon North Carolina and Virginia during the 1847-1862 legislative battles over the Danville, Virginia, to Greensboro, North Carolina, railroad connection. The first chapter examines the rivalry between eastern and western North Carolina for internal improvement legislation, namely westerners’ wish to connect with Virginia and easterners’ desire to remain economically relevant. The second chapter investigates the Tidewater region of Virginia and its battle against the Southside to create a rail connection with North Carolina. The third chapter examines the legislation for the Danville Connection during the American Civil War in the Virginia, North Carolina, and Confederate legislatures. Through an examination of voting patterns and public opinion, this thesis finds that, despite Confederate President Jefferson Davis’s designation of the Danville connection as a military necessity,
regionalism overcame Confederate nationalism during this instance.


https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4497&context=etd
1198

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

A great citation that echoes Charleston's early competition with Savannah!

From 1830 forward, cities and regions and ultimately sections of America competed to be railroad termini. This is just one illustration of it. When the extension of slavery became an issue, the battlefield changed from legislative halls to the very land itself.

I can use this. I will. Thank you!
 
City University of New York (CUNY)
CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Graduate Center
2010

Railroads and Economies of Scale and Scope in U.S. Manufacturing Industries: 1850-1880. Chandler Revisited
by Michael Kalson

Graduate Center, City University of New York
This Dissertation is brought to you by CUNY Academic Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects by an authorized administrator of CUNY Academic Works. For more information, please contact [email protected].

ABSTRACT
This study concerns the measurement and quantification of the relationship between railroadization in the United States in the mid-19th century and the subsequent evolution of the modern, large-scale, corporate form of industrial business organization marked by significant economies of scale and scope, as described in various writings by Alfred Chandler. Focusing on American industry as it developed from 1850-1880 using data uniquely suited to empirical analysis of economies of scale and scope, its aim is to determine whether the growth of the American railroad network, as Chandler contended, expanded markets and augmented the American financial sector such that the result was a more concentrated, large-scale mode of industrial organization characterized by extensive and increasing economies of scale and scope in sync with the growth of its extensive railroad system.

Apart from some positive results found in the scope analysis of Chapter 6 showing an ascending scope pattern from 1850-1880 in a few key industries, our findings indicate an overall gloomy prognosis for the empirical validity of the Chandler hypothesis. With the cross-country analyses of Chapters 2 and 3 showing no evidence of a greater expansion of the railroad systems of the United States and Germany at mid-century and resultant vastness thereof with respect to Britain circa the 1870’s as contributing to a more concentrated industrial sector in those countries, and the mixed evidence in support of a rise in efficient scale in American industry from 1860-1880 as shown in Chapters 4 and 5, not to mention the omnipresent dips at 1870 seen in both the scale and scope estimates, our findings reflect poorly upon Chandler’s idea of that date as the benchmark period in which to begin to expect to see the effects of transportation improvements upon scale and scope economies in American industry. Rather, they indicate a far greater impact of the Civil War aftermath shock than Chandler accounted for—perhaps one that persisted on until the 1880’s--and suggest a much later date of the full impact of the railroads upon scale and scope of industry than Chandler bargained for—perhaps 1900 as indicated by Atack (1985).

https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2769&context=gc_etds
1886

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

I can't say anything without reading this except to say that I found Chandler's book on railroads as America's first big business to be revolutionary.
 
An adjunct to @trice 's posts of https://civilwartalk.com/threads/land-grants-and-railroad-development.159854/ and https://civilwartalk.com/threads/why-the-south-did-not-get-a-railroad-to-the-pacific.159206/ and James Lutzweiler 's TRR posts...

Wesleyan University
The Honors College

Wayward Child of the State: The Union Pacific Railroad and the Challenge of Mixed Enterprise, 1862-1879
by Jared Robert Fineberg
Class of 2017

A thesis submitted to the faculty of Wesleyan University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Departmental Honors in History
Middletown, CT April 2017

The Union Pacific Railroad’s westward push from Omaha across the Great American Desert to the mythical joining of the rails at Promontory Summit is the stuff of American lore. Many recognize the Credit Mobilier, the Union Pacific’s infamous construction company that came to exemplify the graft of the Gilded Age and the pernicious influence of railroad lobbies in the late nineteenth century. But beneath these morsels of popular history of the first transcontinental railroad lies the story of an audacious public-private partnership: a heavily-subsidized railroad, federally chartered amid the national crisis of the Civil War for the national purpose of binding the Pacific states to the Union and alleviating the possibility of their secession. The Civil War ended four years before the Union Pacific met the Central Pacific in Utah, which leads one to wonder: if the Union Pacific Railroad, chartered in an act of central state authority for the purposes of national defense, did not tether the western states to the Union in time to make a difference in the Civil War, what was the nature of the mixed enterprise’s relationship with the federal government?

https://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2819&context=etd_hon_theses

File too large to attach please see above link
2100

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
An interesting paper with historical information on the Reading...

Historic Resource Survey Form
PENNSYLVANIA HISTORICAL AND MUSEUM COMMISSION
Bureau for Historic Preservation

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

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Founder of Lehigh University...

Asa Packer A Perspective
by W. Ross Yates


Packer urged the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company to adopt a steam railway as a coal carrier, but the project was not then considered feasible. In 1851, he became the major stockholder of the Delaware, Lehigh, Schuylkill & Susquehanna Railroad Company, which became the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company in January 1853, and they built a railway line from Mauch Chunk to Easton between November 1852 and September 1855. Construction commenced on the Mauch Chunk-Easton line just as Packer's five year charter was to expire. He built railways connecting the main line with coal mines in Luzerne and Schuylkill counties, and he planned and built the extension of the line into the Susquehanna Valley and thence into New York state to connect at Waverly with the Erie Railroad.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asa_Packer

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

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Thank you very much for sharing these resources you found some papers that will be of great help in our project on the City Point Army Line that ran from City Point to the front lines of the Federal forces at Petersburg in 1864-65. I just posted a small notice and will share more as there is time.

 
Thank you very much for sharing these resources you found some papers that will be of great help in our project on the City Point Army Line that ran from City Point to the front lines of the Federal forces at Petersburg in 1864-65.

Not a problem sir! Glad you found some things of value to support your project! Please invite any of your fellow project folks to join us. We can always use knowledgeable and interested posters.

In the future, if you could post your project's updates on the Railroads & Steam Locomotives forum, you'll get more eyes-on from the railroad and logistics fans.

Thanks again!
USS ALASKA
 
Another paper to add to our threads about the Transcontinental Railroad...

East Texas Historical Journal
Volume 25 | Issue 2 Article 10
10-1987

East Texas and the Transcontinental Railroad
Emilia G. Means

Part of the United States History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by SFA ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in East Texas Historical Journal by an authorized administrator of SFA ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected].

During the 1850s, railway promoters, both North and South, projected many drawing-board routes to the Pacific Coast. However, the cost of a railroad would be so great that for a time there could be only one line. Location of the terminus thus became a subject of debate. Would it be North or South? The South, knowing that the favored section would reap rich rewards in wealth, population, and influence, and that it was losing the economic race with the North, was eager to extend a railroad through adjacent Southwestern territory to California. Jefferson Davis, as Secretary of War, arranged to have James Gadsden, prominent South Caroline railroad man, appointed Minister to Mexico. Finding Mexico in need of money, Gadsden negotiated a treaty in 1853 which ceded to the United States the Gadsden Purchase area for $10,000,000.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

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My profuse apologies to @DaveBrt for not finding this sooner so he wouldn't have to buy it...

https://civilwartalk.com/threads/civil-war-railroad-books.139935/page-5#post-1788116

'The Effects of Southern Railroads on the Interior Lines'

'The purpose of this book is to study the effects of the Southern railroad system on interior lines during the Civil War and determine whether or not the South enjoyed the advantage of interior lines. The use of railroads during this conflict placed an enormous physical strain upon the limited industrial resources of the Confederacy, and a great strain upon the intellectual agility of the Confederate High Command. Based upon the evidence studied, and the time-space comparisons of both Northern and Southern railway operations, several conclusions can be drawn: the South entered the war with a rail system that was unable to meet the demands of modern war; the Confederate leadership understood the importance of the railroad and its importance to strategic operations early in the war, but were unwilling to adopt a course of action that best utilized their scarce assets; Southern railroad speeds decreased dramatically by 1863 due to the inability of Southern railroads owners to perform needed maintenance on their railroad equipment; tactical reverses on the field of battle, especially the losses of both Corinth in Kay of 1862 and Knoxville in September of 1863 increased the distances that re-enforcements would have to travel to fight a mobile intra-theater war; Union control, maintenance, and organization of its railway assets ensured that it would be able to move large numbers of troops at the strategic level efficiently from early 1863 to the end of the war. Based on these conclusions, the Confederacy lost the ability to shift troops on the strategic level more rapidly than the Union by 1863. This was a result of its physically weakened railroad system and military setbacks which caused Southern railroads to move forces over longer distances.'

PDF can be read here -http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a253873.pdf
448

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
This result should be contrasted with the US railroad system. That system was overburdened with a rapid increase in traffic during 1861.
But this reference suggests that by October 1861 freight rates peaked. Despite price inflation due to rapid circulation of greenback currency, freight rates remained stable or fell. See p. 270
By 1863, the railroads proved they could manage a rapid theater exchange of troops.
By 1864, the locomotive companies of Philadelphia were able to supply 150 locomotives to the Tennessee/Georgia.
So while the Confederate railroads were wearing down, the US railroads were hiring and buy locomotives.
Page cvxxxiv of the fourth section of the introduction to 1864 to the 1860 census gives the story in stark terms. https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1860/manufactures/1860c-05.pdf?# If factories in Richmond were dedicate to other purposes, there was probably no other place in the Confederacy that had the labor force required to build a locomotive, as noted elsewhere by Dr. Grabel.
 
Youall might find this of some interest.


This booklet, the Reminiscences of an Old-Timer, though unpretentious, is a worthwhile production,
particularly in its depiction of the construction and the beginning of the operation of railroads in East
Tennessee, as well as of the use made of such lines of communication by the Union and Confederate
forces during the Civil War.

 
Accession Number : ADA407560
Title : The Influence of Confederate Railroad Policy (1861-1864) on the Outcome of the Civil War
Descriptive Note : Student research paper
Corporate Author : MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLL QUANTICO VA
Personal Author(s) : Pollitt, Ian R
Report Date : Jul 2002

Abstract : More efficient management of the Southern rail transportation system would have increased the Confederacy's chances for a favorable negotiated settlement to end the American Civil War. Lackluster strategic direction of railroad policy by the Confederate Executive Legislative branches doomed the railroads to a slow death. As the railroads literally and figuratively ran out of gas, so, too, did the hopes of the Confederacy for lasting independence.

Subject Categories : Humanities and History, Logistics, Military Facilities and Supplies
Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
969

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
Pollitt wrote an interesting paper.
 
An interesting paper written almost 100 years ago...what they thought they knew then...what we think we know now.

My apologies for being a thread necromancer...I cannot help myself...

The Northern Railroads and the Civil War
Author: Hermon King Murphey
Source: The Mississippi Valley Historical Review , Dec., 1918, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Dec., 1918), pp. 324-338
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of Organization of American Historian

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1888813.pdf

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

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1628802179270.png

This page indicates the scale of railroad operations in Pennsylvania. By the end of the US Civil War there more engines in the PA railroads then there had been in the entire Confederate system at the start of the war. @DaveBrt counted about 1400 engines in the Confederacy at the start of the war.
 
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