Civil War Joint Operations Papers

Naval War College Review
Volume 49
Number 1 Winter Article 4
1996

A Littoral Frustration: The Union Navy and the Siege of Charleston, 1863-1865
by Robert J. Schneller Jr

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected].

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https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3051&context=nwc-review
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USS ALASKA
 

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  • A Littoral Frustration The Union Navy and the Siege of Charleston, 1863-1865.pdf
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Accession Number : ADA602725
Title : Joint Operations in the American Civil War: Blessings and Blunders
Descriptive Note : Master's thesis
Corporate Author : MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLL QUANTICO VA
Personal Author(s) : Jones, Randall K
Report Date : 04 Apr 2012
Pagination or Media Count : 43

Abstract : Although the Union's military did not have a written joint doctrine during the Civil War, the Union's military commanders' unity of effort during their respective campaigns significantly influenced the outcome of battles, as seen in the successful Vicksburg Campaign and in the disastrous Red River Campaign. Therefore, this paper contends that the U.S. military needed to establish a joint doctrine as part of its strategic planning and not leave cooperation between Union commanders to chance. The paper analyzes the joint operations of General Grant's victory during the Vicksburg Campaign and General Nathanial Banks' loss during the Red River Campaign. Specifically, the paper focuses on the Union's military commanders' unity, or lack of effort, during their respective campaigns, which significantly influenced the outcome of both battles. The analysis concludes that in the absence of formal U.S. military joint doctrine as part of its strategic planning, Union victory on the battlefield was determined largely by the amount of cooperation among U.S. commanders. Unity of command is crucial to joint operations and should not hinge on the personality of the commander. The mutually supportive command relationship of Generals Grant and Sherman and Admiral Porter cannot always be guaranteed. A summary of both campaigns emphasizes the strategic importance of joint operations and focuses on the following: (1) command relationships between the Army and Navy; (2) unity, or lack of effort between the commanders at Vicksburg and at Red River; and (3) the commanders' personalities as the driving force between victory and defeat. Valuable lessons learned from both campaigns are addressed and applied to future United States' joint strategic naval and ground operations.

Subject Categories : Humanities and History
Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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USS ALASKA
 

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  • Joint Operations in the American Civil War Blessings and Blunders.pdf
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AU/AWC/127/1999-04
AIR WAR COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY
UNION JOINT OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA DURING THE CIVIL WAR
by Quinn G. Hollomon, GS-15, DOD
A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements
Advisor: Dr. Howard M. Hensel
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
April 1999


Abstract
During the Civil War some of the earliest examples of joint operations in American Military history were undertaken. Except for General Scott’s landing at Veracruz during the War with Mexico, joint undertakings in the form of amphibious operations were rare. Army and navy commanders had little experience dealing with the problems associated with the ideas of jointness. Doctrinal guidance was unavailable and commanders worked together often with mixed results. In eastern North Carolina, the Union attempted several joint operations during the course of the war. Attacks were crudely planned and executed by modern standards. The North appeared not to have drawn lessons from preceding campaigns in any systematic way. Nevertheless, a basic pattern did develop and was improved upon over time as seen by the progressive sophistication of the operations against Hatteras, New Bern, and Fort Fisher. Today, the United States military has certain fundamental principles of joint warfare that it employs. When they are applied to Civil War campaigns certain trends become evident. The success rate increased when careful planning and preparation were present and the modern principles of joint warfare were followed. Where these elements were missing, Union forces often met with defeat. Failure to anticipate and provide for contingencies doomed many Civil War campaigns and would do the same to modern-day joint operations. The principles of joint warfare are a tool; one designed to make the transition to fighting as a team easier. Using them does not guarantee the warfighter success, but can greatly improves his chances.

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a395182.pdf
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USS ALASKA
 

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  • UNION JOINT OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA DURING THE CIVIL WAR.pdf
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Accession Number: ADA20731
Title: Joint Operations in the Civil War: The Mississippi
Corporate Author: ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
Personal Author(s): Hailston, Earl B
Report Date: 15 Mar 1989

Abstract: Successful joint operations must become a common and regular reality for the Armed Forces of the United States. This Nation has engaged in joint operations since the Mexican War, but often it appears that we must relearn many of the same lessons that were taught during a previous military operations. This study seeks to examine joint operations during the Civil War along the Mississippi River, during the Vicksburg Campaign and the Red River Campaign. The purpose of this study is to become familiar with the campaigns and to analyze how well the commanders executed, some thoughts will be proposed that will be applicable to the modern battlefield leader for joint operations today.

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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USS ALASKA
 

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  • Joint Operations in the Civil War The Mississippi.pdf
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Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1984

"They Fought Splendidly!": the Struggle for Port Hudson
by Lawrence Lee Hewitt

Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected].

ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the Confederate occupation of Port Hudson, Louisiana, and the Union efforts to capture the bastion during the period August 1862-Juiy 1863. Though it recounts the garrison life of the soldiers, it emphasizes the strategic importance the village held for the opposing governments. Throughout the period under consideration, the Confederate government’s objective in garrisoning Port Hudson and Vicksburg was to maintain the vital Red River supply-line. That waterway facilitated the east-west flow of manpower, munitions and foodstuffs between the heart of the confederacy and the Trans—Mississippi. The United States government recognized the importance of this supply-line and made control of the Mississippi River one of its primary goals shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. Furthermore, this study discusses the monumental impact the struggle for Port Hudson, especially the Union assault of May 27, had on the course of the Civil War. Within the framework set forth above, this study explores the events which brought about the Confederate occupation and fortification of Port Hudson; the relationship between the Confederacy's twin bastions of Port Hudson and Vicksburg, Mississippi; the unsuccessful efforts ot Union Admiral David G. Farragut and Major General Nathaniel P. Banks to circumvent the importance of the garrison by controlling the mouth of the Red River and thereby to force the Confederates to evacuate the village due to hunger without the necessity of a costly siege; and the consequences wrought by the Confederates surprisingly successful defense of Port Hudson when finally besieged. The evidence for these matters includes judgments expressed by the opposing commanders, their subordinates of every rank, civilians, and both contemporary and modern historians. Primary sources, including military orders and reports, diaries and letters, and newspapers, provided the bulk of the material consulted in my work. I have supplemented these items with memoirs of participants and regimental histories.


https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5016&context=gradschool_disstheses
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USS ALASKA
 

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  • They Fought Splendidly! The Struggle for Port Hudson.pdf
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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

JOINT OPERATIONS DURING THE CAMPAIGN OF 1862 ON THE TENNESSEE AND CUMBERLAND RIVERS
BY Lieutenant Colonel Douglas E. Cox

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT Approved for public release distribution is unlimited

Abstract
The Civil War campaign for Forts Henry and Donelson is illustrative of joint Army-Navy operations. It provides an excellent vehicle to study elements of joint efforts. This study is based on historical accounts and data obtained from Official Records and publications of first hand accounts of the events and personalities associated with the campaign. In addition to providing a strategic and tactical account of the campaign, the study highlights three key points of joint operations: planning, cooperation, and mutual support. It also spans three organizational levels: departmental, theater, and tactical.


https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a208654.pdf
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USS ALASKA
 

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  • JOINT OPERATIONS DURING THE CAMPAIGN OF 1862 ON THE TENNESSEE AND CUMBERLAND RIVERS.pdf
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Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1980

The Confederate Defense of Mobile, 1861-1865. (Volumes I-Ii).
by Arthur William Bergeron Jr

Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected].

ABSTRACT
The people of Mobile, Alabama, supported the secession of their state from the Union in January 1861, and thousands of her able-bodied men served in the Confederate army from 1861 to 1865. Recognizing the city's strategic importance as a port and major railroad center connecting the eastern and western sections of the new nation, the Confederate government moved quickly to provide adequate defenses for Mobile. Confederate soldiers occupied and began to strengthen Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines, which guarded the main channels leading into Mobile Bay. The Confederate Navy Department converted several steamers into gunboats and began construction of four ironclads, all designed to support the land defenses of Mobile. As the war progressed, Union land and naval forces moved into the Gulf of Mexico, and the Confederate authorities realized that Mobile required more defensive works than the two forts at the mouth of the bay. Engineers, using slave labor, designed and constructed earthern forts along the bay shore near the city and on various islands at the mouths of the rivers which emptied into the bay. They intended all of these batteries to protect the water approaches to Mobile in the event of an enemy naval force running past Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines. To protect the city from a land attack, the engineers erected a series of earthen redoubts connected by infantry entrenchments around Mobile. By war's end, three separate lines of forts and trenches surrounded the city. Mobile undoubtedly possessed fortifications as extensive and strong as almost any city in the Confederacy. Confederate President Jefferson Davis personally chose for assignment as commanding general at Mobile men whom he knew had the qualifications needed to push the construction of all of these defensive works and whom he could rely on to conduct a successful defense against an enemy attack. Confederate brigades, regiments, and artillery batteries moved in and out of the city throughout the war. Although the garrison at times shrank in size to levels which alarmed its commanders, the Confederate military authorities in Richmond made a commitment to see that enough men manned the fortifications to put up a stiff resistance to an actual enemy attack. The War Department also always made sure that the territorial command to which Mobile belonged, whether a department or a district, had the defense of the city as its objective. The Union high command did not seriously contemplate an attack against the Mobile defenses until relatively late in the war. While strategic objectives in other areas caused the Union military authorities to delay a move against Mobile, the strength of the defenses around the city played a part in the decision. A naval demonstration against an earthen fort at Grant's Pass in February 1864 resulted in little damage to that work. Admiral David G. Farragut successfully led a squadron of monitors and wooden gunboats past Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines in August 1864 and captured the lower bay defenses. The commitment of land forces elsewhere prevented the Union navy from proceeding at that time in a campaign against Mobile itself. Such a campaign finally got under way in March 1865, but it had defensive works on the eastern shore as its primary objective. After brief sieges, these Confederate fortifications fell. Faced by overwhelming numbers, Mobile's commander evacuated the city on April 12, 1865, and the city's governmental authorities surrendered Mobile to the enemy that same day.

https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4510&context=gradschool_disstheses

File too large to attach, please see above link.
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USS ALASKA
 
Thank you very much for assembling this fine collection of research papers. Many are very cogent to our project as we plan to include the joint operations on the James River in our project, and are actively now developing digital models and supporting assets from both sides. It is clear that the naval aspect of the situation at City Point and the region were very important, and that there was by then understanding at the highest level of the Union Army of the importance of the naval element. Thank you again and your sharing of these papers is of great help to our efforts.
Chris Gerlach
Project Director
City Point Army USMRR Line Project 1865
 
The University of Southern Mississippi
The Aquila Digital Community
Master's Theses
Summer 8-2018

Cornerstone of Union Victory: Officer Partnerships in Joint Operations in the West
Aderian Partain
University of Southern Mississippi

This Masters Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by The Aquila Digital Community. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of The Aquila Digital Community. For more information, please contact [email protected].

ABSTRACT
The American Civil War included one of the pivotal naval contests of the nineteenth century. A topic of considerable importance is the joint operations on the western waters that brought about a string of crucial victories in the conflict for the Union. The effective cooperation of the naval river fleet and the western armies was a major cornerstone of Union victory. Scholars have written biographies of the more noted admirals and narratives of the flotilla have been detailed. What has not been accomplished is an exploration of the Union officers' professional partnerships between the Mississippi Squadron commanders and their corresponding army counterparts. The Naval-Army joint missions in the riverine operations impacted the overall operational effectiveness of the Union forces and are significant to understanding the outcome of the war. This study is grounded in the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion and the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, as well as key combatants' memoirs and postwar writings. These reveal the successes and failures in Army-Navy cooperation and their significance to the larger war effort. The complexities of these professional relationships underscore the challenges of combined operations and offer insight for modern military leaders and scholars examining the significance of the Western Theater of operations on the Union's ultimate victory in the American Civil War.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

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  • Cornerstone of Union Victory_ Officer Partnerships in Joint Opera.pdf
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In the absence of doctrine, how would these command relationships be organized? As I am reading McPherson's book about naval operations during the US Civil War, the question occurs to me. While the army is on the water, it seems the naval officer out to be in command. As soon as the army lands, it is at risk and ought to be able to demand naval support. The other option would be to assign rank equivalencies and let rank and date of rank control who is in command.
 
In the absence of doctrine, how would these command relationships be organized?

Sir, without the existence of a codified, tested, practiced, trusted, and institutionally accepted doctrinal solutions to the issues that presented themselves, my guess would be that mostly pre-war personal and professional relationships, for good or for ill, drove many of these ad Hoc command structures.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
In the absence of doctrine, how would these command relationships be organized? As I am reading McPherson's book about naval operations during the US Civil War, the question occurs to me. While the army is on the water, it seems the naval officer out to be in command. As soon as the army lands, it is at risk and ought to be able to demand naval support. The other option would be to assign rank equivalencies and let rank and date of rank control who is in command.
While at sea, the navy is in charge of the safe movement of the troops. The big question is when does the command transfer to the army. Without doctrine, this was decided by mutual agreement or orders from above.

On the river, the naval support could have been viewed as another element of the army's forces -- like the cavalry. Enemy naval threat was too small to be a serious problem and the army would frequently not have more than a portion of its force on ships at one time. Without doctrine, the command relations ships would be decided from above.

Present doctrine defines those relationships and they are "always" stated in the operation order.
 
While at sea, the navy is in charge of the safe movement of the troops. The big question is when does the command transfer to the army. Without doctrine, this was decided by mutual agreement or orders from above.

On the river, the naval support could have been viewed as another element of the army's forces -- like the cavalry. Enemy naval threat was too small to be a serious problem and the army would frequently not have more than a portion of its force on ships at one time. Without doctrine, the command relations ships would be decided from above.

Present doctrine defines those relationships and they are "always" stated in the operation order.
The decisions seem to drift upward to Welles and Lincoln. Ellert was eventually made subordinate to the navy. But at Mobile Bay, Farragut must have been in command. Granger lacked seniority. Butler thought he was in command at Fort Fisher, but Grant thought otherwise. Alfred Terry seemed to understand that it was Porter's operation.
The tricky operation was Vicksburg, because both Grant and Porter could claim rank of some degree. Welles settled that by informing Porter he needed to support Grant's attempt to cross the Mississippi below Vicksburg. The President was in favor of the attempt.
 
A Brit once said there are only two types of people in the military - the PBI and everyone that supports the PBI, (and I am guessing mud Marines also fall into that exulted category). Yes my background is wing-nut-esque but in all honesty, there is a great deal of truth to that statement.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
Pages 25 to 45...

Collection; School of Advanced Military Studies Monographs
Title; Army-Navy integration and the pivot to the west: a new joint concept.
Author; Sowers, Kirk A.
Branch/Country; United States Navy

Abstract
In a period of budget and personnel reductions, the U.S. military's separate services often develop new doctrinal concepts in an effort to secure a greater share of scarce defense dollars. It appears the Department of Defense is entering another such period. Currently, the Army and Navy lack the necessary joint operational concept required for further doctrinal development and training that support the President's strategic guidance for the pivot to the West. The analysis that follows focuses on land and sea force integration for future joint operations by demonstrating such operations' importance in historical case studies from the Civil War. The research presented here fits into one of two categories: military service requirements for operational concept development related to the 2010 NSS and 2012 DSG, and the mediating factors that either support or impede DOD concept development. This study suggests that the Army and Navy presently lack the necessary joint operational concept required to guide doctrinal development and training to support the strategic guidance in the 2010 NSS and 2012 DSG -- a shortfall that the services' concept and doctrine developers should correct.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC), School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) Monograph
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date, Original; 2014-05-22
Date, Digital; 2014-05-22
Release statement; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2014-10-27


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

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  • Army-Navy integration and the pivot to the west a new joint concept.pdf
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Pages 25 to 45...

Collection; School of Advanced Military Studies Monographs
Title; Army-Navy integration and the pivot to the west: a new joint concept.
Author; Sowers, Kirk A.
Branch/Country; United States Navy

Abstract
In a period of budget and personnel reductions, the U.S. military's separate services often develop new doctrinal concepts in an effort to secure a greater share of scarce defense dollars. It appears the Department of Defense is entering another such period. Currently, the Army and Navy lack the necessary joint operational concept required for further doctrinal development and training that support the President's strategic guidance for the pivot to the West. The analysis that follows focuses on land and sea force integration for future joint operations by demonstrating such operations' importance in historical case studies from the Civil War. The research presented here fits into one of two categories: military service requirements for operational concept development related to the 2010 NSS and 2012 DSG, and the mediating factors that either support or impede DOD concept development. This study suggests that the Army and Navy presently lack the necessary joint operational concept required to guide doctrinal development and training to support the strategic guidance in the 2010 NSS and 2012 DSG -- a shortfall that the services' concept and doctrine developers should correct.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC), School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) Monograph
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date, Original; 2014-05-22
Date, Digital; 2014-05-22
Release statement; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2014-10-27


Cheers,
USS ALASKAg
Good paper. But he missed a couple of things relevant to his purpose.
At Vicksburg. Grant was clearly in control. The pressure applied by the navy on Porter was substantial.
Also, in the Mississippi campaign, Farragut and Grant were in communication and Grant helped Farragut with the navy's need for coal. Then Farragut withdrew from Mississippi, leaving behind his ship, and that encouraged Porter by putting him in control if he made it below Vicksburg.
As a side note, Porter's management of the run below Vicksburg was darn effective. Running the ironclads as close to shore the east bank as possible turned out to be the right move.
In the second attempt to conquer Fort Fisher Grant's instructions to Terry were that he was to co-operate fully with Porter. I don't think Grant could put an army commander under a navy admiral, but the orders amounted to the same thing. Grant was anticipating the Pacific theater in WW 2.
This author suggests that Butler's powder ship could have been more effective if the navy had taken it seriously. Would it have been possible to use an ironclad to push the powder ship closer to the fort? Could there have been a dingy use to quickly evacuate a two man crew used to light the fuse? I think when the powder ship finally blew up, there may have a chain explosion instead of a simultaneous explosion, but I wasn't there.
 
Last edited:
Pages 25 to 45...

Collection; School of Advanced Military Studies Monographs
Title; Army-Navy integration and the pivot to the west: a new joint concept.
Author; Sowers, Kirk A.
Branch/Country; United States Navy

Abstract
In a period of budget and personnel reductions, the U.S. military's separate services often develop new doctrinal concepts in an effort to secure a greater share of scarce defense dollars. It appears the Department of Defense is entering another such period. Currently, the Army and Navy lack the necessary joint operational concept required for further doctrinal development and training that support the President's strategic guidance for the pivot to the West. The analysis that follows focuses on land and sea force integration for future joint operations by demonstrating such operations' importance in historical case studies from the Civil War. The research presented here fits into one of two categories: military service requirements for operational concept development related to the 2010 NSS and 2012 DSG, and the mediating factors that either support or impede DOD concept development. This study suggests that the Army and Navy presently lack the necessary joint operational concept required to guide doctrinal development and training to support the strategic guidance in the 2010 NSS and 2012 DSG -- a shortfall that the services' concept and doctrine developers should correct.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC), School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) Monograph
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date, Original; 2014-05-22
Date, Digital; 2014-05-22
Release statement; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2014-10-27


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
We don't know how Grant understood how Farragut's operation at New Orleans had succeeded, and what improvements were required. But at Vicksburg Porter did not stop and slug it out with Confederate batteries. The river crossing, essentially an amphibious landing, took place well away from the Confederate fortified positions. Once the crossing was successful Grant complied with one of Farragut's favorite words: celerity. Grant expanded his river bank enclave quickly and his indirect route forced the Confederates to evacuate Grand Gulf. There was a good deal happening that seems essential to a successful combined arms operation. Reading each others reports might be part of it.
 
JOINT OPERATIONS IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
Scott W. Stucky
March 1993
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
OMB No. 0704-0188
National War College
Fort Lesley J. McNair
Washington, DC
DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

The American Civil War has almost certainly been the subject of more books than any other event in U.S. history. An avalanche of print shows no sign of stopping; indeed, it has increased in recent years. These books run the gamut from supermarket novels of the John Jakes ilk to microscopic examinations of a single action or day like Harry Pfanz's G-Gettysburg: The Second Day. At the same time, the United States military has embraced the doctrines of joint and combined operations with a fervor never before seen. Prodded by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the regret of Viet Nam, and the embarrassment of affairs like Grenada, joint operations now permeate official U.S. strategy, and are taught to officers at all levels of professional military education. Interestingly, however, the flood of Civil War monographs and the official frenzy over jointness seem to have remained almost totally separate phenomena. There is, to my knowledge, only one book which purports to treat Civil War joint operations as an integrated whole. This is Rowena Reed's Combined Operations in the Civil War, which, while provocative, draws some very dubious conclusions and is over 15 years old.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

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