Raiding in the rear of an enemy may have been more glamorous, as was the preference of cavalrymen such as Stuart, Wheeler, and Sheridan, but their real purpose should have been the direct protection of the main army.
Raymond, MS: McPherson stripped his command escort companies to form cavalry screens on his flanks. This screen detected the flanking movement of the 10th/30th/50th TN infantry, and a reserve brigade was sent out to check them.How often was cavalry actually used to guard or attack flanks during ACW battles?
Bull Run 1861: cavalry played little role aside from some harassment of the Union rout (more in imagination than reality)
Wilson's Creek: little cavalry present?
Peninsular Campaign & Seven Days: other than Stuart's ride and a failed counterattack at Gaines Mill cavalry was little used
Shiloh: negligible cavalry on either side. Terrain wasn't conductive to cavalry anyway.
Bull Run 1862: Fitz Lee guarded Jackson's left flank. If Pope had used his cavalry to guard his left he wouldn't have been routed.
Antietam: flanks were mostly anchored on the Potomac so cavalry wasn't relevant.
Fredericksburg: Confederate harassment of the Union left.
Perryville: negligible cavalry
Stones River: Cavalry of both sides on the flank farthest from the namesake river. Bragg might have accomplished much with more cavalry on his left hook, but I think much of it was off raiding?
Chancellorsville: Union cavalry mostly raiding, without enough on the open flank. Terrain was unfavorable to cavalry.
Gettysburg: Union cavalry protecting both flanks during parts of the battle.
Chickamauga: Union cavalry and mounted infantry delaying actions, but I don't think much flank activity. Union left could have used some cavalry as Thomas was in danger at one point on the final day. Confederate cavalry was off in its own world.
Chattanooga: cavalry not directly involved in the battle.
Overland Campaign: cavalry mostly between the armies (when not off raiding), not on the flanks.
Atlanta Campaign: cavalry not very relevant; mostly failed Union raids
Petersburg: Union failure to screen their left resulted in the Beefsteak Raid.
Shenandoah 1864: Union cavalry used to turn Confederate flanks.
March to the Sea: Kilpatrick riding on Sherman's flanks, distracting Wheeler.
Yes, there were obviously good examples of raids that obtained important intel as did Stuart when locating the enemy's flanks, but those may more properly be considered as part of the cavalry's valid screening function. Wheeler often performed similar functions when safeguarding the AoT in Kentucky and Tennessee, although some of his forays or raids whose purpose went beyond simply protection were not as successful.In fairness to Stuart, 2 of his 3 big raids were successful (albeit during a time when the AOTP cavalry was poorly organized and use): disruptive, bad for Union morale, brought back useful intelligence, and did not interfere with Lee's operations (because both times the ANV was stationary and on the defensive).
By comparison, General George McClellan kept his calvary together as reserves at Antietam and later in afternoon, he moved them to Right flank to guard against any enemy r movement. In doing this, he blinded his corps from locating river crossings and was surprised by late arrival of Hill’s division on his Southern flank.Raymond, MS: McPherson stripped his command escort companies to form cavalry screens on his flanks.
By comparison, General George McClellan kept his calvary together as reserves at Antietam and later in afternoon, he moved them to Right flank to guard against any enemy r movement. In doing this, he blinded his corps from locating river crossings and was surprised by late arrival of Hill’s division on his Southern flank.
They would likely know the route Hill had to travel. And McClellan kept his cavalry corralled on the North flank.How was McClellan's cavalry supposed to learn of Hill's arrival? The entire Burnside/Cox corps had to cross a single bridge then move uphill toward Sharpsburg.
Cavalry could not be used in the principal line of battle for a couple of reasons... namely (from Gen. Hallecks' textbook for volunteer officers)Why is having cavalry on the flanks preferable to having infantry? Is it because you're more mobile and can redeploy your men to faster to avoid getting hit from the rear?
The actually critical river crossing (the one Hill used) was well in the Confederate rear. Here's a map showing the positions at the end of the day:By comparison, General George McClellan kept his calvary together as reserves at Antietam and later in afternoon, he moved them to Right flank to guard against any enemy r movement. In doing this, he blinded his corps from locating river crossings and was surprised by late arrival of Hill’s division on his Southern flank.
If I am remembering correctly, the Confederates had Col. T.L. Munford's brigade of cavalry (small as it was) posted on their extreme right to cover the fords over the river during the battle.The actually critical river crossing (the one Hill used) was well in the Confederate rear. Here's a map showing the positions at the end of the day:
View attachment 413533
The line of retreat is the same one that Hill used to approach the battlefield. As you can see, for the cavalry to be able to detect Hill's approach it would have to be well behind the main Confederate line of resistance.
As it happens, cavalry on the right flank would have been largely redundant - a signals station saw Hill's approach well ahead of time, and this warning was transmitted to Burnside. Burnside however either ignored the warning or failed to pass it on to his tactical commander (Cox), or if it was passed on Cox failed to react to it.
The problem at Antietam was not a lack of cavalry on the right flank.
The Laurel Brigade which Munford commanded at Antietam was nearly 2,000 strong (in effectives) at the end of the Northern Virginia campaign, so it might not have been as small as all that. Stuart had 5,761 cav PFD (in CS definitions) at the end of the campaign and pretty much exactly the same at the start, so very few casualties - it's quite possible Munford had upwards of 1,500 effectives on the field.If I am remembering correctly, the Confederates had Col. T.L. Munford's brigade of cavalry (small as it was) posted on their extreme right to cover the fords over the river during the battle.
Right but it was a little late.As it happens, cavalry on the left flank would have been largely redundant - a signals station saw Hill's approach well ahead of time*, and this warning was transmitted to Burnside.
The Laurel Brigade which Munford commanded at Antietam was nearly 2,000 strong (in effectives) at the end of the Northern Virginia campaign, so it might not have been as small as all that. Stuart had 5,761 cav PFD (in CS definitions) at the end of the campaign and pretty much exactly the same at the start, so very few casualties - it's quite possible Munford had upwards of 1,500 effectives on the field.
Right but it was a little late.
Snavely’s Ford was further South and around the bend. See Purple added to Map and Rodman in Blue.
Probably because there's only so much cavalry to go around, and because, as Munford's cavalry was out there, there wasn't enough available to overmatch Munford, and because there was that line-of-sight observation of the area rendering it to some extent redundant.Why didnt any cavalry patrols probe closer to the Potomac— as marked in Yellow? Not a flanking attack but get some eyes on Lee’s forces and only route of retreat.