Cavalry in the Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862: effective, but inefficient

USS ALASKA

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Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Cavalry in Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862: effective, but inefficient.
Author; Lynch, Michael S.

Abstract; This study is an analysis of Confederate cavalry operations in the Valley Campaign-5 November 1861 through 10 June 1862. In a campaign dominated by the leadership of Major General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson and his “foot cavalry,” what role did his mounted arm play in the campaign? This study begins with a brief review of the historical evolution of American cavalry, explaining the differences between American and European cavalry. The study also includes background information on key issues of the campaign's cavalry leadership, organization, logistics, and tactics. The majority of the thesis discussion concerns the campaign's cavalry operations, including an evaluation of the cavalry's performance. The conclusion of the thesis is that Jackson’s cavalry arm significantly contributed to the Confederate success in the campaign. Cavalry contributions were strongest at the operational level of war. Despite their contributions, the cavalry was inefficient. Organizational turmoil, poor logistical support, high operations tempo, and limited training worked in concert to reduce efficiency. Although completed over one hundred years ago, the cavalry operations of Shenandoah Valley Campaign has some particular lessons-learned that still apply today. Among these are support for the soldier in the field, innovation and improvisation, combat leadership, leadership development, and training.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date; Original 2000-06-02
Date; Digital 2000-06-02
Call number; ADA 384163
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2006-02-23

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  • Cavalry in Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862 effective, but inefficient.pdf
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James Madison University
JMU Scholarly Commons
Masters Theses
The Graduate School
Spring 2015

The struggle in the Shenandoah: The relationship between tactics and attrition in the Shenandoah Valley Campaigns of 1864
Joseph A. D'Arezzo
James Madison University

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the The Graduate School at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]

Abstract
This research seeks to inform on the relationship between tactics and attrition during the 1864 campaigns in the Shenandoah Valley. Many studies have broadly examined these campaigns but have not focused their analysis on the relationship between tactics and attrition. By doing this it allows this examination to gain a deeper understanding of how particular engagements were decided, and ultimately the fate of the Shenandoah Valley. This research utilizes a chronological approach and relies on numerous primary sources from officers that provide an accurate appraisal of troop strengths and tactics employed. Various sources such as letters, diaries, and correspondence have been used to support these findings. Official reports have also proven to be quite useful as they provide thorough and comprehensive information on the progression of many engagements. Memoirs and post war manuscripts also provide
valuable insight into the role of attrition and the relationship with tactics. This study demonstrates how attrition and tactics were closely related. It exposes that tactics often dictated how extensive attrition would be in a given engagement. Additionally it demonstrates how attrition, or the prospect of it, would dictate to the commanders what tactics could be used. It is also evident that the army that best marshaled their resources to mitigate or accentuate numerical disparities would be most successful. The field would benefit from an incorporation of this type of analysis, as it would provide a clearer explanation of how individual battles were decided. This type of analysis distills the sometimes overly complex nuances of many works and provides a clear and concise appraisal of how battles were decided.



Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

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  • The struggle in the Shenandoah_ The relationship between tactics.pdf
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