General Gillmore's report-continued
For breaching at long distances the James and Parrott projectiles seem to be all that can be desired. The grooves of the James gun must be kept clean at the seat of the shot. This is not only indispensably necessary, but of easy and ready attainment, by using the very simple and effective scraper devised on the principle of the searcher for the pieces we employed against Pulaski. This scraper consists of a number of steel springs or prongs, one for each groove, firmly attached by screws to the cylindrical part of a rammer-head, and flaring like a broom, so as to fit closely into the grooves. About half an inch of the lower end of each prong is bent out at right angles. The prongs being compressed by a ring, to which a lanyard is attached, when entering the bore spring out firmly into the grooves when the ring is removed, and clean them thoroughly as the scraper is drawn out.
The failure of the James shot, as reported on two or three occasions by apparently good authority, is probably due to neglect in this particular. There were no failures in our firing, except as before mentioned, with the 32-pounders (carrying a 64-pound shot), that had been bored too large.
Although the James projectiles are surrounded when first made by greased canvas, there is believed to be an advantage in greasing them again at the moment of loading. This was done in our batteries against Fort Pulaski. As the Parrott projectiles receive their rotary motion from a ring of wrought-iron or brass which surrounds the lower portion of the cylinder, and which does not foul the grooves while engaging them, no special precaution to prevent fouling need be taken with the Parrott guns.
With heavy James or Parrott guns the practicability of breaching the best-constructed brick scarp at 2,300 to 2,500 yards with satisfactory rapidity admits of very little doubt. Had we possessed our present knowledge of their power previous to the bombardment of Fort Pulaski, the eight weeks of laborious preparation for its reduction could have been curtailed to one week, as heavy mortars and columbiads would have been omitted from the armament of the batteries as unsuitable for breaching at long ranges.
t is also true beyond question that the minimum distance, say from 900 to 1,000 yards, at which land batteries have heretofore been considered <ar6_165> practically harmless against exposed masonry, must be at least trebled, now the rifled guns have to be provided against.
The inaccuracy of the fire of the 13-inch mortars has already been adverted to. Not one-tenth of the shells dropped inside of the fort. A few struck the terre-plein over the casemate arches, but, so far as could be observed by subsequent inspection from below, without producing any effect upon the masonry. Whether they penetrated the earth work to the roofing of the arches was not ascertained.
Two or three striking in rapid succession into the same spot over an arch might be expected to injure it seriously, if not fatally. Such an occurrence would, however, be rare indeed. Against all, except very extraordinary casualties, it would be easy for a garrison to provide as they occurred, by repairing with sand bags or loose earth the holes formed in the terre-plein by shells.
We may therefore assume that mortars are unreliable for the reduction of a good casemated work of small area, like most of our sea-coast fortifications.
As auxiliary in silencing a barbette fire, or in the reduction of a work containing wooden buildings and other exposed combustible material, mortars may undoubtedly be made to play an important part.
For the reduction of fortified towns or cities, or extensive fortresses containing large garrisons, there is perhaps no better arm than the mortar, unless it be the rifled gun, firing at high elevations.
To the splinter-proof shelters constructed for the seven advanced batteries I attribute our almost entire exemption from loss of life. We had 1 man killed by a shell from one of the mortar batteries outside the fort, which was the only casualty.
The demoralizing effect of constant and laborious fatigue duty upon the health and discipline of troops, particularly upon such as are unused to the privations of war, like our volunteers, who can but slowly adapt themselves to the stinted comforts of a campaign, is a subject which demands the earnest attention of commanding officers in the field.
Upon regular troops, to whom the drill in their special arm has to a certain extent become a second nature, who are accustomed to the vicissitudes of the field and familiar with expedients and make-shifts to secure comfort, the bad effects of excessive labor and constant interruption of drill are of course less apparent.
With the average of our volunteer regiments every alternate day should be devoted to drill, in order to keep them up to a fair standard of efficiency.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Q. A. GILLMORE,
Major-General Volunteers.
To the ADJUTANT-GENERAL U.S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.
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O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME 9 [S# 9]
FEBRUARY 8, 1862.--Battle of Roanoke Island, N. C.
No. 6. -- Report of Lieut. C. Cushing Eyre, First New York Marine Artillery.
ROANOKE ISLAND, February 8, 1862.
I have the honor to report the working of the battery of the Ranger during the action at Pork Point Battery on February 7 and 8:
Commenced firing at 12.30 at the distance of 3 miles. As the vessel worked ahead we were several times obliged to wear ship, each time running nearer to the battery. During the afternoon the firing was more effective, owing to the vessel having been brought closer to the enemy's position. During the latter part of the engagement the shell were thrown into the Point battery with accuracy.
Expended during the action, 3 Parrott shell, elevation 17½ °, distance about 3 miles; 6 Parrott shell, elevation 15, distance about 2¾ miles; 3 Parrott shell, elevation 16°, distance about 2¾ to 3 miles; 12 Parrott shell, elevation 12°, distance about 2½ miles; 2 Parrott shell, elevation 13½°, distance about 2 3/5 ° miles.
From Wiard's 12-pounder, expended 20 shell and shot at an elevation of 15° to 17°, distance 2¾ miles; 38 shell and shot at an elevation of 8° to 12°, distance 2½ miles.
About 3.30 p.m., being within range for the 12-pounder boat howitzer, commenced firing with it, and expended 45 shot and shell, very <ar9_91> few of them falling short. This gun was in charge of Lieutenant Dennison, Twenty-seventh Massachusetts Volunteers.
Respectfully,
C. CUSHING EYRE,
First Lieutenant Marine Artillery.
Capt. DANIEL MESSINGER,
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O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME X/1 [S# 10]
MARCH 28-June 18, 1862.--Cumberland Gap (Tenn.) Campaign.
No. 3. -- Report of Capt. Jacob T. Foster, First Wisconsin Battery, Chief of Artillery, of operations June 6-18.
HDQRS. ARTILLERY, SEVENTH DIV., ARMY OF THE OHIO,
Cumberland Gap, June 21, 1862.
DEAR SIR: I have the honor to report that, according to General Orders. No. 39, the line of march was taken up for the attack of Cumberland Gap by the siege battery, consisting of two 20 and two 30 pounder Parrott guns, on Friday, June 6, 1862, under command of Lieutenant Webster, of Foster's First Wisconsin Battery. Preparations were made as extensively as possible in this part of the country, <ar10_65> where it is very difficult to find machinery of any kind, and doubly difficult for the movement of a heavy train and ordnance connected with a siege battery of Parrott rifled guns. Machinery for the movement of this battery over steep ascents and descents consisted of about 800 feet of 1-inch, 100 feet of 1½-inch rope, three large and two small snatch-blocks, one double and one single tackle-block. This was all the tackle of any kind that could be obtained in time to be of any use to move without hinderance to the forces of this division. To move this battery a distance of 40 miles over the Cumberland Mountains and over roads considered impassable by the enemy for light artillery seemed a herculean task, which the heart would almost shrink from undertaking, for many of the ascents would form an angle of 30° with a horizontal plane, and this to be overcome, knowing that we were in many instances to make a corresponding descent.
On the following day Foster's First Wisconsin Battery, under command of Lieut. John D. Anderson, moved forward, and being a light battery, met with but little difficulty the first few miles. The Ninth Ohio Battery, commanded by Lieutenant Barrows, followed upon the succeeding day with similar success. Two hundred men from the infantry were detailed to assist in overcoming the steep ascents and descents, which was to be done by ropes and pulleys. The ropes and pulleys were in constant use or readiness, and the men were obliged to be constantly on the alert, for the ascents were not only steep, but along sideling places, where, were the gun-carriages once overturned, they would have fallen over precipitous rocks varying in height from 100 to 500 feet. In many instances were the turns in the road more than at right-angles, and this up steep sideling ascents, rendering it almost impossible to turn with teams. At many times was the whole force, both of men and horses, used upon the same rope.
On arriving at the top of the Cumberland Mountains the men and horses seemed nearly exhausted, many of the horses being entirely broken down, and will be worthless hereafter. Both men and horses had been upon short rations and forage, and it was impossible for subsistence and forage trains to follow close upon the troops over such terribly rugged roads. Many of my command have been the overland route to California, and all concede there was nothing to compare with these steep ascents and descents on the route.
About 12 m. of June 10 the siege battery commenced the ascent of the mountain on the northern side, via Rogers' Gap road, which had been blockaded by Zollicoffer's troops, and was cut out before us by command of Colonel De Courcy, commanding the Twenty-sixth Brigade. This road was a mere bridle-path, and much credit is due the troops under Colonel De Courcy for their hard labor in removing the blockade and constructing the road.
The Ninth Ohio Battery, Captain Wetmore, followed immediately in rear of the siege battery, and had much difficulty in ascending the steep declivity of this mountain, for it can be considered nothing else, although called a "gap."
At 6 p.m. the first piece of the siege battery arrived on the top of the mountain, and there halted for the closing up of the remaining pieces. After halting until late in the evening all were closed up, and Wetmore's Ninth Ohio Battery allowed to pass and make the descent in advance. The 30-pounder guns being so heavy, weighing 8,000 pounds, were left at the top of the mountain, as the descent was too difficult to think for one moment of moving them down in the night. «5 R R--VOL X» <ar10_66> The 20-pounders, being more nearly allied to light artillery, were moved down the mountain into Powell's Valley during the night, but not without difficulty, for in many instances would they have been whirled down the rocks but for the constant care and tugging at the ropes by all the men we had.
Foster's First Wisconsin Battery, which had been obliged to wait for an ammunition train to precede it up the mountain, started at 5 p.m., and after working hard through the night, without one moment's rest, and part of the time in almost total darkness (the moon being eclipsed), without rations or forage for the last eighteen hours, arrived in Powell's Valley without serious injury, only overturning a battery wagon and breaking its trail, at 3.30 o'clock a.m. on the 12th of June, 1862. This was the most difficult part of the mountain to overcome that we had encountered. The road was winding, narrow, very stony, and steep, and all the entire descent very sideling, so much so that we were constantly in imminent danger of being precipitated down the almost perpendicular banks over jagged rocks for several hundred feet, in which case it would have been sure death to man or beast.
At 1.30 o'clock a.m., June 18, Foster's battery and the siege battery took up line of march with the Twenty-sixth Brigade, under command of Colonel De Courcy; Wetmore's battery, with the Twenty-seventh Brigade, under command of Brigadier-General Baird, and Lanphere's battery, with the Twenty-fourth Brigade, under command of Brigadier-General Carter, for the purpose of marching on the enemy, who were encamped about 8 miles up Powell's Valley from Rogers' Gap, where they were said to be in considerable force, but upon our arriving there found they had fled with great rapidity. We then marched to Cumberland Gap (which had been evacuated but a few hours previously) with Colonel De Courcy, and there Foster's battery saluted the Stars and Stripes with thirty-four guns.
I cannot close my report without bringing to your favorable notice as officers of special merit Lieutenant Anderson and C. B. Kimball, of Foster's First Wisconsin Battery, and Lieutenant Webster, of same battery, commanding the siege battery, Lieutenant Barrows, commanding the Ninth Ohio Battery, and Captain Lanphere, of the Michigan battery, without whose valuable services but little of this arduous march of artillery could have been accomplished. Although we all would have gladly entered an encounter with the enemy, we, as officers of the artillery of this division, believe that more good results will be derived from this bloodless victory than with an encounter, and acknowledge that strategy displays more military skill than fields stained with blood.
Hoping we may always be victorious in the support of our country, I am, most respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. T. FOSTER,
Captain, First Wisconsin Battery,
Chief of Artillery, Seventh Division, Army of the Ohio.
Capt. CHARLES O. JOLINE,
A. A. G.
Continued....