Candid Reflections on Robert E. Lee, Before and After Gettysburg, by his Soldiers

Tom Elmore

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Before:

I really believe our troops generally are more anxious to fight now than they ever were. All soldiers seem to confide strongest in their generals and all the army impose the utmost confidence in our hero [Robert E. Lee]. (June 11 letter of Captain T. J. Blackwell, Company I, 8th Georgia, “My Dear Wife from Your Devoted Husband,” Letters from a Rebel Soldier to His Wife, by H. Candler Thaxton, Warrington, FL, 1968)

Our army is strong and in fine spirits, and has the most implicit confidence in Gen’l Lee. (June 26 letter of 1st Corporal Taliaferro N. Simpson, Company A, 3rd South Carolina, to his sister Mary Simpson, The Wartime Letters of Dick and Tally Simpson, Third South Carolina Volunteers, ed. by Guy R. Everson and Edward H. Simpson, Jr., NY: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 249)

We hear nothing of Hooker’s army at all, but General Lee knows what he is about. This is certainly a grand move of his, and if any man can carry it out successfully he can, for he is cautious as well as bold. (June 28 letter of Surgeon Spencer Glasgow Welch, 13th South Carolina, to his wife)

After:

It seemed like madness in Lee to have attempted to storm such a position. He came very close near losing his whole army by it. (July 9 letter of Private Rufus K. Felder, Company E, 5th Texas, Brake Collection, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, Pa.)

But in an unfortunate hour and under disadvantageous circumstances, he [Lee] attacked the enemy, and [though] he gained the advantage and held possession of the battlefield and even destroyed more of the foe than he lost himself, still the Army of the Potomac [he refers to an old name for the Army of Northern Virginia] lost heavily and is now in a poor condition for offensive operations. (July 18 letter of 1st Corporal Taliaferro N. Simpson, Company A, 3rd South Carolina to Virginia Miller, The Wartime Letters of Dick and Tally Simpson, Third South Carolina Volunteers, ed. by Guy R. Everson and Edward H. Simpson, Jr., NY: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 257)

It will learn Gen. Lee a lesson, he had too much confidence in his army. He thought there was no place but he could take it, but the mountains of Gettysburg was rather too much for him. (August 7 letter of Sergeant James B. Suddath, Company E, 7th South Carolina, to his brother, South Carolina Historical Magazine, April 1962, vol. 63, no. 2, Charleston: The South Carolina Historical Society)

I think Gen. Lee did not sustain his high reputation which he had acquired on previous occasions. (Letters of Surgeon Abram S. Miller, 25th Virginia, The Handley Library, Winchester, Virginia)

General Lee was too confident in his men, expecting them to overcome difficulties too great. … My opinion is that if General Lee had taken a position and allowed himself to be attacked, he would have been victorious. (July 12 letter of Surgeon Caspar C. Henkel, 37th Virginia, to his cousin, Confederate Veteran magazine, vol. 16 (1908), p. 407)
 
I credit the ANV for its fighting spirit, its morale-soaring faith in its general, and its confidence from repeatedly seeing the AOP retreat.

The reactions above are great stuff, and don't surprise me at all given the ANV's performance to that point in the war.
 
The soldier engages in wishful thinking. General Meade and his army did not need to attack the Confederates in Pennsylvania. Vicksburg was going to fall to the US Army and the forces under Rosecrans and Thomas were making steady progress in Tennessee as long as the Confederates were not reinforced. After June 17, the US was willing to have General Lee's army go as far north as it cared to go.
 
General Lee gave them the fight to attempt to win the war, which is what the all wanted. By July 1863, it could not be done in that way. The soldiers wanted a fight and he gave them one.
 
If Gen. Lee had withdrawn without the final attempt, I believe it would have demoralized his troops, and much more criticism would have been thrust upon him. I am sure of it.
Lubliner.
This is all speculation, of course, but if Lee had withdrawn after July 2 to a stronger position, a mountain gap perhaps, he would have preserved a major portion of his army, and would not Meade have followed him then? That would have allowed Lee to fight on ground of his choosing and the Union would have to make the bloody assaults, not the Confederates. But I believe you are right, psychologically it was impossible. The Confederate assumptions of superiority (which seemed evident from numerous previous battles) would not allow any kind of retreat.
 
On July 1 Anderson's unengaged brigades watched from Herr's Ridge. They waited in line of battle for almost two hours.
"The query was in our minds, Why are we not put in? And we answered ourselves by saying, if we were needed Marse Bob would have us there."
Lt Col Hilary Herbert 8th Alabama
Anderson and Hill were both about nonexistent the entire battle. Even on Day 2 as the echelon attack moves north and Anderson's men begin to engage, where was Anderson to ensure his entire command goes in. In fact he is invisible, and because of this Posey's brigade gets tied up with skirmishers and Mahone never moves off. This leads to Pender moving to find out why the attack is stalling to his right and in doing so gets mortally wounded by artillery fire. Pender had two very fresh brigades in Lane and Thomas, on top of Mahone and Posey doing almost nothing. If these 4 brigades make the attack, around the same time as Gordon and Avery are making their assault, if would have been hard for the Union to hold Cemetary Ridge, as most reinforcements had been sent south.
 
If Gen. Lee had withdrawn without the final attempt, I believe it would have demoralized his troops, and much more criticism would have been thrust upon him. I am sure of it.
Lubliner.
Three points
1. The attempt, if it needed to be made, did not have to be a suicidal headlong dash across a mile of open fields. As EPA said, it seems Lee picked the worst possible place to attack.
2. I don't think Lee cared much about public criticism.
3. Given the troops abiding faith in Marse Robert, I am not so sure they would have been demoralized, and I certainly think they would have been less demoralized than they were after making the attack, and failing,
 
Posey got tangled up in the Bliss farm. The Union skirmish line there was pretty strong and not willing to give ground willingly. Any advance by Lane was subject to flanking fire from that position. There were 35 guns sighted on the Long Lane so as soon as Lane and Thomas stepped off they would be under these guns with a clear field of fire on them.
 
Posey got tangled up in the Bliss farm. The Union skirmish line there was pretty strong and not willing to give ground willingly. Any advance by Lane was subject to flanking fire from that position. There were 35 guns sighted on the Long Lane so as soon as Lane and Thomas stepped off they would be under these guns with a clear field of fire on them.
Going to agree to disagree. Posey should have never fed extra regiments into bliss farm attack. His number one objective was to protect Wrights left flank. On top of that Mahones 1500 men would have been moving towards cemetary ridge / hill. Them couple with Lane and Thomas would have been a powerful strike force and besides the federal canons there wasn't much left to defend the position. Again it didn't happen and we don't need to make a back and forth of it. Having said that we can both agree they would of had a better chance of taking it then, then on day 3. Also don't forget that Avery and Hays would be beginning their assaults on the other side of the hill at this time. I firmly believe it was a definite missed opportunity. 5 brigades all striking around the same time.
 
This is all speculation, of course, but if Lee had withdrawn after July 2 to a stronger position, a mountain gap perhaps, he would have preserved a major portion of his army, and would not Meade have followed him then? That would have allowed Lee to fight on ground of his choosing and the Union would have to make the bloody assaults, not the Confederates. But I believe you are right, psychologically it was impossible. The Confederate assumptions of superiority (which seemed evident from numerous previous battles) would not allow any kind of retreat.
Again, on speculation if Lee had fallen back along the Cashtown Road and taken position at the gap there, where Heth fist came through, then what do you think General Ewell's orders would be? If General Lee had fallen back with some sort of withdrawal with Ewell's Corps to the north, would Meade really attack Lee or Ewell? Unless pushed by Washington, I think Meade would again call a conference to decide to hold the line and strengthen it. Will a hook chase the bait northward or westward, or both? Lee can't wait, he is low on supplies with a battle at his front.
Lubliner.
 
Again, on speculation if Lee had fallen back along the Cashtown Road and taken position at the gap there, where Heth fist came through, then what do you think General Ewell's orders would be? If General Lee had fallen back with some sort of withdrawal with Ewell's Corps to the north, would Meade really attack Lee or Ewell? Unless pushed by Washington, I think Meade would again call a conference to decide to hold the line and strengthen it. Will a hook chase the bait northward or westward, or both? Lee can't wait, he is low on supplies with a battle at his front.
Lubliner.
Hmmm. Good points. If Lee falls back to the Cashtown Gap on the night of July 2, let's say Ewell goes with him. I tend to think there would have been tremendous pressure from Washington and the Northern public for Meade to attack. If he had resisted doing that, while Lee sat on Northern soil, raiding for supplies, etc. I believe he would have been relieved of command. Political considerations couldn't stand for it. I just don't see how psychologically Meade could not attack in this case, much as you say Lee had to attack on July 3.

As far as Lee being encumbered with prisoners and wounded, this picks up on a theme of mine I've used on another thread. Lee had so many advantages when he conducted his fights on friendly territory that helped turn the tide in his favor and burnished his reputation for being a brilliant General (which he often was). This time though, Lee was the one trying to get his wounded out of enemy territory, dealing with unfriendly natives who will not give him accurate information, and feeling his way around terrain that doesn't always look the way it is depicted in maps. So yes, that is a large consideration, no doubt, for his decision to stay and fight it out on July 3.
 
Hmmm. Good points. If Lee falls back to the Cashtown Gap on the night of July 2, let's say Ewell goes with him. I tend to think there would have been tremendous pressure from Washington and the Northern public for Meade to attack. If he had resisted doing that, while Lee sat on Northern soil, raiding for supplies, etc. I believe he would have been relieved of command. Political considerations couldn't stand for it. I just don't see how psychologically Meade could not attack in this case, much as you say Lee had to attack on July 3.

As far as Lee being encumbered with prisoners and wounded, this picks up on a theme of mine I've used on another thread. Lee had so many advantages when he conducted his fights on friendly territory that helped turn the tide in his favor and burnished his reputation for being a brilliant General (which he often was). This time though, Lee was the one trying to get his wounded out of enemy territory, dealing with unfriendly natives who will not give him accurate information, and feeling his way around terrain that doesn't always look the way it is depicted in maps. So yes, that is a large consideration, no doubt, for his decision to stay and fight it out on July 3.
There would have been no pressure on General Meade's army until Vicksburg and Port Hudson had fallen. All Meade had to do was stay between Lee and Washington, D.C. If General Lee had to concentrate his army and fight a battle, so much the better. The Pennsylvania railroad system was reaching the AoftheP. Lee did not have that type of support. Time was on Meade's side.
Both the US and Britain were anticipating the fall of Vicksburg and the US gaining full use of the Mississippi River.
 
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