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- Dec 24, 2010
You didn't identify the vet, but this is essentially what Henry Kid Douglas wrote in his war memoir....
Actually....you just did...it was Lt. Douglas...
You didn't identify the vet, but this is essentially what Henry Kid Douglas wrote in his war memoir....
Firing from a height down onto the bridge, especially if lined up near the extended bridge centerline, would greatly increase the hit percentage and casualty totals against closely packed troopers.I agree with that conclusion. I was at the bridge right before the Antietam reenactment in 1997. A few reenactors in uniforms was in the old pits taking aim at the bridge. It looked pretty obvious from standing behind them how the Georgians would pick out single targets on the bridge after a volley or two .
It was much more undergrowth then, than it is now from recent pictures I have seen.
I can see why he might have a motive for it if he did, and the bit about corps/wing commander is exactly why. As far as he was concerned he'd been demoted, albeit by the vagaries of fate splitting up his wing, to a "mere corps commander" instead - IIRC there's an anecdote about how he continued to pointedly act like a wing commander to some extent.2. Burnisde was "sulking" and didnt prpeare as a corps/wing commander should to the orders he surely knew were coming sometime the next morning.
I'm pondering this and looking at the map, and frankly the thing that mystifies me about it is the sheer amount of time elapsed. Sunrise was about 6AM (don't need to look it up, it was the equinox) and even if Burnside had been told to wait until explicit orders before launching his attack there's still scope for some recce work to be done in the hours between sunrise and the attack being launched. Reportedly the route down to the unusable ford was pretty quickly discovered to be untenable once they saw it, so that recce could have saved up to three hours.1. McClellan's staff conducted the reconaissance on the 16th, did a poor job, and pointed Rodman to the wrong ford.
Rodman seems to have been left pretty much on his own. To me this is the major problem with the assault.
As far as I can tell there was a ford half a mile from the Rohrbach Bridge which was untenable for infantry; this was the one which Rodman was actually directed at. It was only discovered to be untenable after Rodman reached it, at which point he then set off for Snavely's.Can never understand this. Knowing that a crossing point (Snavely's Ford) existed and given the importance of crossing Antietam Creek and turning the Confederate position from the south, why wasn't a major effort made to locate and get Rodman's division across ASAP?
As far as I can tell there was a ford half a mile from the Rohrbach Bridge which was untenable for infantry; this was the one which Rodman was actually directed at. It was only discovered to be untenable after Rodman reached it, at which point he then set off for Snavely's.
This could have been prevented by earlier recce work discovering the state of the closer ford. In theory if a recce had happened late on the 16th and found the problem then Rodman could have set off straight for Snavely's at 0630 on the 17th and reached the point of crossing it in force by about 10AM. That's three hours of benefit without requiring a change in the historical bivouacs.
As you say.Not the first or last time that poor recce work resulted in lost opportunities for either side.
Actually I believe Burnside's plan was solid and, if I understand it correctly, in accordance with military doctrine. Rodman's division fording the creek and turning the position at the bridge was the key to the operation. The fact that Rodman wandered around for 2 hours looking for Snavely's Ford was a big reason why the bridge wasn't taken until 1:00. Of course Rodman couldn't have done this anyway until Lee sent Walker's division to reinforce the left that morning.
I wonder if this is Burnside doing a kind of "malicious compliance" thing, where he's been told not to cross the bridge until he gets the "go" order and so he doesn't issue any orders until he considers himself ordered to do so (rather than anticipating what might be needed given what he knows will be happening).In fact there is a flurry of orders at 0900:
From my reading that is not improbable. Similar to drawing straws to decide which division will lead the assault at the Crater after Meade and Grant ruled out Ferraro.I wonder if this is Burnside doing a kind of "malicious compliance" thing, where he's been told not to cross the bridge until he gets the "go" order and so he doesn't issue any orders until he considers himself ordered to do so (rather than anticipating what might be needed given what he knows will be happening).
This is partly interesting because my understanding is that Burnside had been given a "warning order" which told him what he'd be expected to do.
I've of course visited the bridge and made the trek a few times to Snavely's. Where exactly was the "farm ford"?I think things would have been better had Burnside sent Sturgis to the ford instead.
Rodman's division were in position to assault the bridge at dawn. The only one in place. Burnside and Cox had them march away from the bridge, leaving the 11th Connecticut behind to guard the batteries.
Cox was moving them in the early morning, and they started around 0700 or slightly before. This movement provoked an artillery duel between Eubank's rebel battery and Benjamin's and Durell's btys. Rodman's division moved round to behind the high ground that the Federal batteries were on and hunkered down until the artillery duel was won, which was about 0900 (when Eubank withdrew his battery). As a note, Carman places these events at 1030, but the reports from both sides say 0900.
About 0900 the orders are received for Rodman to move to a ford ("farm ford"), and also for Kingsbury to charge the brigade with the 11th Ct. The division occupied the two hills overlooking the ford around 1000 or 1030, and Capt Duane (the chief engineer of the army) goes forward protected by 2 coys of the 8th Connecticut, who drove the skirmishers of the 50th Georgia back over the creek, allowing Duane to examine the ford.
We are not sure why Rodman decided to find another ford. We know the ford was perfectly usable, despite Cox's claims, because Scammon's brigade under Ewing crossed there. However, since the 50th Georgia were still on the hill firing down onto it, it's likely that the problem was tactical.
We know Duane went left, looking for another ford, and at ca. 1200 found Snavely's. Rodman had two of his brigades cross there and the other crossed at Farm Ford.
From the rebel POV, Toombs ordered a withdrawal at around 1100 (he said two hours after Eubanks' battery was forced to withdraw). His reason was that the Federals had brought up enough artillery to gain fire superiority. Hence by the time Rodman crossed the fords (and the twin 51st's crossed the bridge) the Georgians were not opposing the crossings.
On the primary point - had Sturgis or Willcox been ordered to the ford instead of Rodman (neither received any order to move until 0900), then Rodman would have remained in place to assault the bridge.