Burnside Bridge Assault

I agree with that conclusion. I was at the bridge right before the Antietam reenactment in 1997. A few reenactors in uniforms was in the old pits taking aim at the bridge. It looked pretty obvious from standing behind them how the Georgians would pick out single targets on the bridge after a volley or two .
It was much more undergrowth then, than it is now from recent pictures I have seen.
Firing from a height down onto the bridge, especially if lined up near the extended bridge centerline, would greatly increase the hit percentage and casualty totals against closely packed troopers.

Aim at the front soldiers on the bridge from a much higher elevation and high shots may hit troops further back instead of being overhead misses. Lateral misses against one man may hit the adjacent soldier in a dense formation.

Fire buck and ball from on high, and the spread of buck shot around the ball might take out up to four soldiers with one shot (a ball hit and three buck strikes on soldiers adjacent to the ball target, behind or in front).
 
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What has always fascinated me with Burnside’s Bridge is the way in which the ‘controversy’ over why the creek was not forded has built up out of what I consider to be poor analysis by some historians and reliance on some very dubious reports written many years after the event itself to justify an almost pre-ordained conclusion. To me the worst kind of historical analysis. It seems to me that if ‘blame’ was going to be apportioned to anyone (and to me it should not be) it should be at the chief engineers of the Army of the Potomac who deemed the creek unfordable. Secondly, it has always struck me that the Confederates also believed the creek was only crossable at the bridge otherwise they would not have taken up the positions that they did. Therefore, to me there is no controversy and Burnside has been severely criticised for something that was not possible at the time of the battle, decided by the engineers of both sides. It is almost as if some historians wanted Burnside to walk down to the creek and get his boots wet before making a decision to cross at the bridge or wade the creek! Ask yourself would those same historians expect that of General Grant or General Lee if they were in the same position? ‘Nuff said!
 
Actually I believe Burnside's plan was solid and, if I understand it correctly, in accordance with military doctrine. Rodman's division fording the creek and turning the position at the bridge was the key to the operation. The fact that Rodman wandered around for 2 hours looking for Snavely's Ford was a big reason why the bridge wasn't taken until 1:00. Of course Rodman couldn't have done this anyway until Lee sent Walker's division to reinforce the left that morning.
 
My understanding is that the topography indicates a way of taking the bridge directly: get guns on the high ground overlooking it.
There are heights both sides of the river at about a 400 foot elevation above sea level.


A turning movement is a good call as well, of course, but you can do both at the same time - you have four divisions each of two brigades - and each one makes the other more likely to succeed as it further stretches the enemy.

Arguably Burnside was either directly told or should have been able to infer that he was going to have to take the bridge by late on the 16th, so there's ample time to set up guns on the high ground to help command the bridge. Use the guns of the division that's last in the line - you may as well, they won't be urgently needed to advance with the division.
If you're going to be doing a turning move then either get the route recce'd as soon as possible or send the division who are going to be doing it off ASAP as well (if there's daylight for them).
 
Yes, agreed.

Regarding the reconaissance or lack thereof, to me this is one of the Antietam "mysteries." I have read both sides of the argument.

1. McClellan's staff conducted the reconaissance on the 16th, did a poor job, and pointed Rodman to the wrong ford.

2. Burnisde was "sulking" and didnt prpeare as a corps/wing commander should to the orders he surely knew were coming sometime the next morning.

I agree that Burnside should probably have been more active in scouting the terrain -- or Cox as the nominal commander of the 9th Corps should have.

Either way, Rodman seems to have been left pretty much on his own. To me this is the major problem with the assault.
 
2. Burnisde was "sulking" and didnt prpeare as a corps/wing commander should to the orders he surely knew were coming sometime the next morning.
I can see why he might have a motive for it if he did, and the bit about corps/wing commander is exactly why. As far as he was concerned he'd been demoted, albeit by the vagaries of fate splitting up his wing, to a "mere corps commander" instead - IIRC there's an anecdote about how he continued to pointedly act like a wing commander to some extent.

1. McClellan's staff conducted the reconaissance on the 16th, did a poor job, and pointed Rodman to the wrong ford.
I'm pondering this and looking at the map, and frankly the thing that mystifies me about it is the sheer amount of time elapsed. Sunrise was about 6AM (don't need to look it up, it was the equinox) and even if Burnside had been told to wait until explicit orders before launching his attack there's still scope for some recce work to be done in the hours between sunrise and the attack being launched. Reportedly the route down to the unusable ford was pretty quickly discovered to be untenable once they saw it, so that recce could have saved up to three hours.
 
Rodman seems to have been left pretty much on his own. To me this is the major problem with the assault.

Can never understand this. Knowing that a crossing point (Snavely's Ford) existed and given the importance of crossing Antietam Creek and turning the Confederate position from the south, why wasn't a major effort made to locate and get Rodman's division across ASAP?
 
Can never understand this. Knowing that a crossing point (Snavely's Ford) existed and given the importance of crossing Antietam Creek and turning the Confederate position from the south, why wasn't a major effort made to locate and get Rodman's division across ASAP?
As far as I can tell there was a ford half a mile from the Rohrbach Bridge which was untenable for infantry; this was the one which Rodman was actually directed at. It was only discovered to be untenable after Rodman reached it, at which point he then set off for Snavely's.

This could have been prevented by earlier recce work discovering the state of the closer ford. In theory if a recce had happened late on the 16th and found the problem then Rodman could have set off straight for Snavely's at 0630 on the 17th and reached the point of crossing it in force by about 10AM. That's three hours of benefit without requiring a change in the historical bivouacs.
 
As far as I can tell there was a ford half a mile from the Rohrbach Bridge which was untenable for infantry; this was the one which Rodman was actually directed at. It was only discovered to be untenable after Rodman reached it, at which point he then set off for Snavely's.

This could have been prevented by earlier recce work discovering the state of the closer ford. In theory if a recce had happened late on the 16th and found the problem then Rodman could have set off straight for Snavely's at 0630 on the 17th and reached the point of crossing it in force by about 10AM. That's three hours of benefit without requiring a change in the historical bivouacs.

Not the first or last time that poor recce work resulted in lost opportunities for either side.
 
Not the first or last time that poor recce work resulted in lost opportunities for either side.
As you say.

I'd have said that it would have helped to have a cavalry regiment attached at the corps level, but there's not really enough cavalry to do that (you lose the army-level scouting).

That being said, it's possible that there was a difference of interpretation. The same riverbank can look practicable to one man and not another.
I also think that the actual strength of the defence at the Burnside Bridge was weak enough that it could have been taken even frontally if there was artillery support - or for that matter better coordination.

(per 67th)
One of the coordination errors was that only one division was actually "up" near the bridge at 8AM, Rodman's - the rest of them were a mile or so to the east in camp. Most of Rodman's division went to the "ford", and only one regiment was left; that regiment (11th CT) was then ordered by Burnside to charge the bridge and did so promptly at 9AM. Naturally they were repulsed.

Two regimental charges from regiments under Sturgis then took place at 10AM and 1030 AM, both repulsed (2nd MD and 6th NH).

The artillery moved up onto the heights at 11AM and had suppressed the Confederate batteries by 1130 AM, but after three regimental charges had been repulsed the rest of the corps was in a state of disruption. Some regimental colonels openly mutinied against the order to advance, and the brigadier (Ferrero) had to bypass them and lead the 51st PA and 51st NY personally; they got stopped-short by a volley from pickets who then bugged out.

It took a bit longer to actually get men to the bridge and they found it unoccupied.


Arguably Burnside could have done these things instead:

1) Have more than one division closed up near the bridge by 9AM - he has three hours to do this prep work.
2) Have Rodman's division go straight for the bridge and the second division to come along go after the ford.
3) Get artillery to the heights over the bridge before 9AM and drive off the guns before attacking.

The individual regimental charges that failed (running into the fire from ~2 regiments and 2 batteries) really created the impression that the bridge was very heavily defended, but I suspect that the defenders would have had more trouble with a concentrated brigade charge.


Pretty much any of these options have a chance of earning several hours. The best case scenario is that the artillery duel starts at 8AM and the Union has won it at 9AM, with 9th Corps ready to march promptly at that point; that's basically four hours of time gained.
 
Actually I believe Burnside's plan was solid and, if I understand it correctly, in accordance with military doctrine. Rodman's division fording the creek and turning the position at the bridge was the key to the operation. The fact that Rodman wandered around for 2 hours looking for Snavely's Ford was a big reason why the bridge wasn't taken until 1:00. Of course Rodman couldn't have done this anyway until Lee sent Walker's division to reinforce the left that morning.

I think things would have been better had Burnside sent Sturgis to the ford instead.

Rodman's division were in position to assault the bridge at dawn. The only one in place. Burnside and Cox had them march away from the bridge, leaving the 11th Connecticut behind to guard the batteries.

Cox was moving them in the early morning, and they started around 0700 or slightly before. This movement provoked an artillery duel between Eubank's rebel battery and Benjamin's and Durell's btys. Rodman's division moved round to behind the high ground that the Federal batteries were on and hunkered down until the artillery duel was won, which was about 0900 (when Eubank withdrew his battery). As a note, Carman places these events at 1030, but the reports from both sides say 0900.

About 0900 the orders are received for Rodman to move to a ford ("farm ford"), and also for Kingsbury to charge the brigade with the 11th Ct. The division occupied the two hills overlooking the ford around 1000 or 1030, and Capt Duane (the chief engineer of the army) goes forward protected by 2 coys of the 8th Connecticut, who drove the skirmishers of the 50th Georgia back over the creek, allowing Duane to examine the ford.

We are not sure why Rodman decided to find another ford. We know the ford was perfectly usable, despite Cox's claims, because Scammon's brigade under Ewing crossed there. However, since the 50th Georgia were still on the hill firing down onto it, it's likely that the problem was tactical.

We know Duane went left, looking for another ford, and at ca. 1200 found Snavely's. Rodman had two of his brigades cross there and the other crossed at Farm Ford.

From the rebel POV, Toombs ordered a withdrawal at around 1100 (he said two hours after Eubanks' battery was forced to withdraw). His reason was that the Federals had brought up enough artillery to gain fire superiority. Hence by the time Rodman crossed the fords (and the twin 51st's crossed the bridge) the Georgians were not opposing the crossings.

On the primary point - had Sturgis or Willcox been ordered to the ford instead of Rodman (neither received any order to move until 0900), then Rodman would have remained in place to assault the bridge.
 
The point about the ford being usable but defended seems to make sense. This would indicate that there was a problem with the turning movement itself, though it could also (arguably) be used to advantage because of the "four divisions in the corps" thing.

Assuming a reveille at 6AM and no orders to actually take the bridge until 9AM:

Rodman remains by the bridge, his artillery is moved up onto the high ground
Sturgis moves to Farm Ford and pushes back the skirmishers around 8AM to allow examination of the ford (ed: and his artillery accompanies him to help drive off or suppress defenders of the ford; the goal here is that Toombs gets stretched further as he only has so many guns and men)
Willcox moves further left to seek another ford (the motive here is gaining a vector for a more comprehensive turning movement, assuming it takes 2 hours to find then Snavely's is localized about 10AM), his artillery is also moved up onto the high ground to support Rodman's batteries

At 9AM there are 4+ Federal batteries firing on the Rebel ones, and the artillery duel is won quickly. A major push by Rodman's and Sturgis' divisions might well take Farm Ford or the bridge now, but if that's not enough then Willcox begins crossing Snavely's Ford ca. 1030 AM and turns Toombs.


None of this strictly requires hindsight - it all results from doing the prep work so that when the order is given to take the bridge it's ready to go straight off (instead of "wasting" several hours of daylight).
 
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We know Sturgis and Willcox received their orders to move at 0900. In fact there is a flurry of orders at 0900:

1. Rodman to move on the ford is around 0900
2. Crook's Bde and the 11th Connecticut to assault immediately is at 0900
3. Sturgis to move forward to be ready to assault
4. Willcox to move forward and relieve Sturgis

Sturgis' first regimental assault on the bridge was at 1000 (2nd Maryland assault) and then another at 1030 (6th NH).

If Burnside had issued the order at ca. 0600, roughly when he decided to move Rodman, then Sturgis could have moved around and been at the ford at 0800-0900.
 
In fact there is a flurry of orders at 0900:
I wonder if this is Burnside doing a kind of "malicious compliance" thing, where he's been told not to cross the bridge until he gets the "go" order and so he doesn't issue any orders until he considers himself ordered to do so (rather than anticipating what might be needed given what he knows will be happening).

This is partly interesting because my understanding is that Burnside had been given a "warning order" which told him what he'd be expected to do.
 
I wonder if this is Burnside doing a kind of "malicious compliance" thing, where he's been told not to cross the bridge until he gets the "go" order and so he doesn't issue any orders until he considers himself ordered to do so (rather than anticipating what might be needed given what he knows will be happening).

This is partly interesting because my understanding is that Burnside had been given a "warning order" which told him what he'd be expected to do.
From my reading that is not improbable. Similar to drawing straws to decide which division will lead the assault at the Crater after Meade and Grant ruled out Ferraro.
 
I think things would have been better had Burnside sent Sturgis to the ford instead.

Rodman's division were in position to assault the bridge at dawn. The only one in place. Burnside and Cox had them march away from the bridge, leaving the 11th Connecticut behind to guard the batteries.

Cox was moving them in the early morning, and they started around 0700 or slightly before. This movement provoked an artillery duel between Eubank's rebel battery and Benjamin's and Durell's btys. Rodman's division moved round to behind the high ground that the Federal batteries were on and hunkered down until the artillery duel was won, which was about 0900 (when Eubank withdrew his battery). As a note, Carman places these events at 1030, but the reports from both sides say 0900.

About 0900 the orders are received for Rodman to move to a ford ("farm ford"), and also for Kingsbury to charge the brigade with the 11th Ct. The division occupied the two hills overlooking the ford around 1000 or 1030, and Capt Duane (the chief engineer of the army) goes forward protected by 2 coys of the 8th Connecticut, who drove the skirmishers of the 50th Georgia back over the creek, allowing Duane to examine the ford.

We are not sure why Rodman decided to find another ford. We know the ford was perfectly usable, despite Cox's claims, because Scammon's brigade under Ewing crossed there. However, since the 50th Georgia were still on the hill firing down onto it, it's likely that the problem was tactical.

We know Duane went left, looking for another ford, and at ca. 1200 found Snavely's. Rodman had two of his brigades cross there and the other crossed at Farm Ford.

From the rebel POV, Toombs ordered a withdrawal at around 1100 (he said two hours after Eubanks' battery was forced to withdraw). His reason was that the Federals had brought up enough artillery to gain fire superiority. Hence by the time Rodman crossed the fords (and the twin 51st's crossed the bridge) the Georgians were not opposing the crossings.

On the primary point - had Sturgis or Willcox been ordered to the ford instead of Rodman (neither received any order to move until 0900), then Rodman would have remained in place to assault the bridge.
I've of course visited the bridge and made the trek a few times to Snavely's. Where exactly was the "farm ford"?

Was it where the dam is now?
 
It's the one east of Snavely's. Here is the Carman 1215 map, with Rodman's division arrayed looking down on it.

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So here's a thought with regard to the difficulty of getting troops over the Antietam.

Would it have been usefully productive for McClellan to order Franklin's 6th Corps along the northern bank of the Potomac (i.e. heading for the bridge at the mouth of the Antietam)?

As far as I can tell the risk of this is that it means that during the earlier version of the crisis on the right McClellan has to commit every single reserve brigade he has (i.e. all of Morell), and possibly his reserve battery, to do the job that Franklin historically did of stabilizing the line - but the reward could be that you'd get troops over the Antietam further south even than Snavely's Ford, and compel a reaction by Lee.

Would AP Hill's corps be able to deal with both stopping Franklin and stopping Burnside? (Not sure.) Would Lee be able to shift reserves or troops pulled out of the line southwards without the pressure caused by the brigade attack of Irwin? (Not sure.) Would Lee have been able to mount a counterattack on the shattered line of 1st, 2nd and 12th Corps if they only had one division to shield them instead of two? (ditto)
 
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