Burnside and His Bridge (A Matter of Time)

Moe Daoust

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It was while reading James V. Murfin's "The Gleam of Bayonets" that I was struck by a passage dealing with George B. McClellan's September 17, 1862 "9:10 a.m." order to Ambrose Burnside, instructing him to open his attack on the Confederate right. By all accounts, it had taken the dispatch rider fifty or so minutes to deliver that order to Burnside whose headquarters were barely two miles from McClellan's. Murfin tried to explain this inordinate time span but his reasoning wasn't very convincing.

Not satisfied, I went through a few more accounts, none of which provided a logical explanation. Finally, I picked up Stephen W. Sears's "Landscape Turned Red" to see what he had to say on the matter. In that regard, Sears wrote, "Why some forty-five minutes elapsed before the message reached Burnside's headquarters, only two miles from the Pry House as the crow flies, is unclear. In any case, it was in Burnside's hands by ten o'clock . . ." With that, Sears moved on to an unrelated matter. "In any case!" Was that was the best Sears was able to offer on such a critical issue, I remember thinking to myself? Should a historian not make it his business to know such things?

And so it was that I decided to find out precisely why it had taken that rider so long to deliver the order. It would take me several years and a considerable amount of research to uncover the answers to that riddle. To summarize, Burnside claimed that the order to open his attack did not reach him until 10 a.m. The evidence, however, proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Burnside lied about those events and moreover, that the order which prompted him to open his attack reached him at "about 9 o'clock." In fact, the evidence also points to the very strong possibility that Burnside set out to sabotage McClellan's plans at Antietam.

The results of my research were published by Civil War Times Magazine in 2007. Some of you may have read the article but I now offer it for those of you who did not.

It's my sincere hope that many of you will take the time to read the article.

http://www.historynet.com/burnside-bridge
 
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"Sorry dude - didn't get your message..."

Ala Nelson at Copenhagen...

"Sorry dude - didn't see your flags..."?

Cheers sir,
USS ALASKA
 
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Thanks for posting the article. A couple of issues here.

First, McClellan and Burnside were two guys who could be counted on to mess up. Second, men who owned timepieces during the Civil War generally kept said timepieces adjusted to the time at their homes.

It's virtually impossible to account for an hour here or an hour there at any battle for this reason. There's some stuff about the War we will never know and IMO it's best we learn to live with this.
Edited.
 
Thanks for posting the article. A couple of issues here.

First, McClellan and Burnside were two guys who could be counted on to mess up. Second, men who owned timepieces during the Civil War generally kept said timepieces adjusted to the time at their homes.

It's virtually impossible to account for an hour here or an hour there at any battle for this reason. There's some stuff about the War we will never know and IMO it's best we learn to live with this.
Edited.

I encourage you to read the article Drew.
 
As I wrote last time this came up, drawing heavily on Moe's article:

McClellan had issued an order before 0700 to Burnside, the contents of which are unknown. Cox supposed from what Burnside told him it was to be ready to attack. This may make sense as since he'd been ordered to have his corps deployed to attack 20 hours earlier, they still were not in position.

At 0800 Lt Wilson delivered an order for Burnside to attack, and Cox's first attack went in at 0900.

At "around 0900" McClellan noted Burnside still wasn't attacking. He sent Col. Sackett, the inspector general of the army down to him, possibly carrying a repeat of the 0800 order timestamped 0910 (the 0910 order has a description of the positions of other units at 0800), down to Burnside. Burnside stated that Sackett was the "third or fourth" man to bring him this order. Sackett was ordered to stay with Burnside until he was over the bridge.

The "third or fourth" implies that the pre-0700 order was the same as the later orders, to attack rather than a warning order.

Colonel Key was then sent around midday to reiterate Burnside's orders. This time Key had been told by McClellan that Burnside must gain the heights "if it cost 10,000 men". He carried in his pocket a signed order relieving Burnside from duty and placing Morell in command of 9th Corps, which he did not use, as Burnside then gained the bridge. Key then returned to HQ.

Key returned sometime around 1430 or 1500 because 9th Corps still had not moved onto the heights. He managed to get Burnside moving again.
 
We do know what the 7 a.m. order read. This is from the article: "All parties agree on one point at least: At about 7 a.m. on the 17th, Burnside received an order from McClellan to advance the IX Corps to a ridge overlooking Antietam Creek and hold it there in readiness to make the assault." OR, XIX/1, pp. 419, 424 According to John M. Wilson, he then carried an 8 a.m. order to Burnside instructing him to commence his attack (this was most likely a verbal order which was later followed up by a formal written confirmation, i.e. the 9:10 document which was likely carried by Sacket.) Apparently, Burnside ignored the 8 a.m. order (Cox was still attending to his troop dispositions and was not present when Wilson showed up with the 8 a.m. communication.)

Again, from the article, "Sometime between 8 and 9 a.m., McClellan sends an unnamed aide out to determine what was happening on the IX Corps’ front. The aide returns with the news that “but little progress had been made.” During this time frame, Cox joins Burnside on the knoll. It is also about then that Lee pulls seven brigades from his relatively quiet right flank and rushes them to his hard-pressed left. It is these troops who will later participate in the West Woods debacle in which Brig. Gen. John Sedgwick’s Division of the II Corps is sent reeling.

Shortly before 9 a.m., McClellan sends the same aide—the man whom Cox identified as “one of McClellan’s staff”—with the second order. This, the communication that finally prompts Burnside to push the IX Corps forward, is delivered at “about 9 a.m.” All of the evidence confirms that the 9th Corps made it's first advance on the bridge at "about 9 a.m." In his official report, Burnside lied when he claimed these events took place at 10 a.m., presumably to cover matters up. McClellan entirely missed Burnside's misdirection while preparing his Preliminary Report and inadvertently repeated Burnside's timeline but did clarify matters somewhat in his Official Report.
 
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We do know what the 7 a.m. order read. This is from the article: "All parties agree on one point at least: At about 7 a.m. on the 17th, Burnside received an order from McClellan to advance the IX Corps to a ridge overlooking Antietam Creek and hold it there in readiness to make the assault." OR, XIX/1, pp. 419, 424

The text of the order is unknown, or even if it was written. Indeed, given the lack of a retained copy it is extremely likely this was an oral order.

Cox was not present when, before 0700, Burnside received said order. His report (pg 424) simply repeats when Burnside told him. Cox was actually moving his force forward into the assault positions at the time, in accordance with orders received the day before. The timing comes from Cox, whose reports says he was told about it on returning to Burnside (at the Rohrbach House one assumes) at about 7 o'clock. Hence it may have been significantly before 0700 that Burnside received it.

For the content, we rely solely on Burnside's report (pg 419).

"About this time I received an order from the general commanding to make my dispositions to carry the stone bridge over the Antietam nearly opposite our center, but to await further orders before making the attack. I accordingly threw my lines forward." - Burnside's Report (link).

It rewind slightly, around 1100 hrs on the 16th McClellan visited Burnside. That evening he found that Burnside was still not in position. Only one division had reached the designated LUP (lying up point). Headquarters sent a rebuke to Burnside (ORA 1, 19(2), 308). Burnside sent his excuses on the 17th (ibid, 314).

Now, if the pre-0700 order said what Burnside said it said, then it was a reiteration of Burnside's previous instructions.

McClellan slept the night of the 16th/17th in bivouac with Skyes' regulars, his HQ wagons having been scattered (see here), and made his command post co-located with Porter overlooking the Middle Bridge. Burnside's HQ was 800 yards south of this, on the same ridge. From here, McClellan would be able to see Sturgis' Division still in bivouac. They were 500 yards from him.

Around 0700 Strother found McClellan giving orders in "the Newcomer House", and around 0720 Sumner started the movement of 2nd Corps, having received them a little earlier.

Now, if the first morning order to Burnside was issued well before 0700 then it would make perfect sense that it was about moving to the line of departure. I can see that.
 
The text of the order is unknown, or even if it was written. Indeed, given the lack of a retained copy it is extremely likely this was an oral order.

Cox was not present when, before 0700, Burnside received said order. His report (pg 424) simply repeats when Burnside told him. Cox was actually moving his force forward into the assault positions at the time, in accordance with orders received the day before. The timing comes from Cox, whose reports says he was told about it on returning to Burnside (at the Rohrbach House one assumes) at about 7 o'clock. Hence it may have been significantly before 0700 that Burnside received it.

I think we are arguing semantics here. Here are Cox's words, "About 7 o'clock orders were received from General Burnside to move forward the corps to the ridge nearest the Antietam, and hold it, in readiness to cross the stream, carrying the bridge and the heights above it by assault. The command was moved forward in column as it had been formed the previous night, and promptly took position as directed, and the light artillery was ordered to cover the movement; McMullin's, Durell's, Clark's, Muhlenberg's, and Cook's batteries being placed on the heights to right and left and somewhat to the front of Benjamin's battery, to which a section of 20 pounders from Simmonds' battery was also temporarily attached. Willcox's division was also brought up and held as a reserve. About 9 o'clock the order was received to cross the stream. Cox also comments on these events in his Battle and Leaders article, Cox, Battles and Leaders, II, p. 633.
 
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To summarize, Burnside claimed that the order to open his attack did not reach him until 10 a.m. The evidence, however, proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Burnside lied about those events and moreover, that the order which prompted him to open his attack reached him at "about 9 o'clock." In fact, the evidence also points to the very strong possibility that Burnside set out to sabotage McClellan's plans at Antietam.

These are serious charges. After all, a lie is a deliberate falsehood, not something misremembered or offered in honest error. I can easily go with "was incorrect," but to read more into it take s little more doing, although, given the relationship between these two men at the time, I accept that it's quite possible.

Charging Burnside with attempting to sabotage McClellan's plan at Antietam seems a reach to me and does not appear to be supported by the material presented in the article.
 
Without (re)reading your article which I believe I remember from Civil War Times, to which I've subscribed since 1961, and incorporating information from Sears, I would observe that Ambrose wasn't exactly the benign , affable, and easygoing fellow he's usually portrayed. He seems to have been petulant and petty, evident in his foot-dragging here and his initial reluctance if not downright refusal to be subordinated to George Meade in the Overland Campaign, necessitating Grant to tolerate a cumbersome and largely unworkable command structure at the Wilderness and Spotsylvania. Nobody has as yet mentioned that Burn appeared to be sulking at his "demotion" from wing command by his otherwise good buddy Little Mac back to mere corps command. At South Mountain Burnside had been appointed over his own Ninth Corps as well as Hooker's First Corps, but once the army arrived at Antietam Hooker was sent to the far right away from the rest of Burn's "wing." Stupidly, instead of reverting to the obvious and resuming command of his own corps, Burnside continued to act the commander of a non-existent wing, issuing orders to his corps through the inexperienced Cox who remained the supposed commander of the Ninth Corps. This added a totally unnecessary and time-consuming layer of command that only served to add to time needed to relay orders to his divisions and brigades. Note how this is reflected on the signage at the battlefield:

DSC05651.JPG
 
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These are serious charges. After all, a lie is a deliberate falsehood, not something misremembered or offered in honest error. I can easily go with "was incorrect," but to read more into it take s little more doing, although, given the relationship between these two men at the time, I accept that it's quite possible.

Charging Burnside with attempting to sabotage McClellan's plan at Antietam seems a reach to me and does not appear to be supported by the material presented in the article.

I'm not the first to intimate that Burnside may have purposely sabotaged matters on September 17, 1862. William F. Palfrey summed it up best when he wrote, “…it is one of the vexed questions of this battle whether Burnside failed McClellan and virtually lost the battle for him, or rather kept it from being a great victory.”

As for the charge not being supported by the material presented, you are absolutely correct and I made that very clear in the final paragraph of the article when I wrote, "In the final analysis, and even after excluding the issue surrounding an 8 a.m. order, it is clear that Burnside’s failures at Antietam cannot be written off to ineptness or petty insubordination. Uncovering precisely what his true motives may have been on the morning and early afternoon of September 17 is a study in itself–one that will require a dramatic departure from preconceived notions, as well as the posing of some difficult questions. To not seek out those answers, however, would be unfair to both the participants of that great conflict and to posterity."

What should be kept in mind is the fact that my article's primary objective was to debunk the myth whereby it had taken fifty minutes to deliver the "9:10 a.m." order. In that regard, the article has succeeded and then some. As for Burnside sabotaging things that day, all we have is circumstantial evidence. Finding hard evidence would not necessarily be impossible but whether any professional historian would be inclined to go looking for it is doubtful. I'd love to go looking for it but not being a professional historian, I doubt I could obtain sufficient research funding.
 
Poor Cox. He was from accounts I have read an inexperienced but reasonably competent political General who did what was asked of him.

I don't know how we compare him to West Pointers and hold him to the same standard. Mud flows downhill, I guess and that about explains it.
 
Personally I think Cox is probably more to blame than Burnside (as I've argued before). We know it was Cox who ordered 9th Corps to rest when ordered to pursue from South Mountain, and we know that it was Cox who ordered a general retreat at Antietam.

Cox spent much of the remainder of his life defending his poor record of generalship, and with Antietam he is the originator of many misconceptions, such as the "12M" myth.

As one of his brigadiers wrote of him:

"Such imbecility and incompetence was simply criminal, a great deal of which last until the close of the war. It was galling to serve under such people [Cox et al.]. But many of them, by maneuvering in politics and elsewhere, are looked upon by certain people throughout the land as some of our military luminaries."
- George Crooks
 
Personally I think Cox is probably more to blame than Burnside

I don't know enough about Cox to comment on his military qualities but would have to disagree that he is more to blame than Burnside for the fiasco on the Union left that day. Burnside was the overall commander on that front that day.
 
Without (re)reading your article which I believe I remember from Civil War Times, to which I've subscribed since 1961, and incorporating information from Sears, I would observe that Ambrose wasn't exactly the benign , affable, and easygoing fellow he's usually portrayed. He seems to have been petulant and petty, evident in his foot-dragging here and his initial reluctance if not downright refusal to be subordinated to George Meade in the Overland Campaign, necessitating Grant to tolerate a cumbersome and largely unworkable command structure at the Wilderness and Spotsylvania. Nobody has as yet mentioned that Burn appeared to be sulking at his "demotion" from wing command by his otherwise good buddy Little Mac back to mere corps command. At South Mountain Burnside had been appointed over his own Ninth Corps as well as Hooker's First Corps, but once the army arrived at Antietam Hooker was sent to the far right away from the rest of Burn's "wing." Stupidly, instead of reverting to the obvious and resuming command of his own corps, Burnside continued to act the commander of a non-existent wing, issuing orders to his corps through the inexperienced Cox who remained the supposed commander of the Ninth Corps. This added a totally unnecessary and time-consuming layer of command that only served to add to time needed to relay orders to his divisions and brigades. Note how this is reflected on the signage at the battlefield:

This will not be the only time when someone in the AoP considers themselves the 'Wing Commander' of a non existent 'Wing'. It happens again at Gettysburg with Slocum devolving command of the 12th Corps to Alpheus Williams and then commanding a wing that composed of... 12th Corps. [Ok on Day 3 a couple of 6th Corps brigades are attached to it (or at least assigned to the area) but they seem to have operationally come under the command of Williams and 12th Corps...]

Does this suggest the AoP has an inherent command weakness in its structure?

Just a thought.
 
Personally I think Cox is probably more to blame than Burnside (as I've argued before). We know it was Cox who ordered 9th Corps to rest when ordered to pursue from South Mountain, and we know that it was Cox who ordered a general retreat at Antietam.

Cox spent much of the remainder of his life defending his poor record of generalship, and with Antietam he is the originator of many misconceptions, such as the "12M" myth.

As one of his brigadiers wrote of him:

"Such imbecility and incompetence was simply criminal, a great deal of which last until the close of the war. It was galling to serve under such people [Cox et al.]. But many of them, by maneuvering in politics and elsewhere, are looked upon by certain people throughout the land as some of our military luminaries."
- George Crooks

From Citizen General: Jacob Dolson Cox and the Civil War Era, by Eugene Schmiel:

"Given these difflculties, Burnside determined that getting across a ford downstream was to be the primary approach, while others in the 9th AC would attempt to cross the bridge. However, the plan went awry on several fronts. First, Isaac Rodman, the division commander responsible for crossing the creek to the south, discovered that the ford McClellan's engineers had pinpointed was unusable. He found another ford but did not get across until around 1 p.m.The second problem came when Cox ordered the 11th Connecticut to provide cover for an attempt to storm the bridge directly, but the attack was quickly forced back under withering fire. Third, Crook, who was ordered to move on the bridge from the north, took several hours to advance. He later alleged that he had not been briefed about the conditions he would face, although that appears to have been an attempt to cover over his own mistakes. When he finally did advance, he averred, "l had to get a good many men killed in acquiring the information which should have been supplied to me by division headquarters.... Such imbecility and incompetency was simply criminal." Crook eventually reached the creek three hundred yards north of the bridge. He was able to get across using a ford he discovered near there at the same time that the bridge was finally taken, around 1 p.m.
...
Crook's and Ewing's complaints about Cox's failures at Antietam ring true to some extent, though Crook's were somewhat self-serving."

Crook's opinion needs to be considered in context.
 
I don't know enough about Cox to comment on his military qualities but would have to disagree that he is more to blame than Burnside for the fiasco on the Union left that day. Burnside was the overall commander on that front that day.

I see your point and essentially agree with you. He was "the man" on paper and should shoulder responsibility.

However, I'd contend that Burnside and Cox made a terrible double act. Burnside spent the whole day at the Rohrbach House. Cox was on horseback and executed actual command.

One question that remains unanswered is why Burnside didn't forward the information AP Hill's arrival to Cox. Burnside had 1.5 hours warning of Hill's approach, but Cox was completely surprised. He of course panicked and ordered a general retreat against the will of his division commanders.
 
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