Britain had recognized the CSA?

Well, not exactly. The coal fields at Nanaimo would have fueled the British squadron based at Esquimalt that would blockade San Francisco while the militia of British Columbia could be reasonably expected to defend the settlements there. The presence of the navy and roughly 600 miles between BC and San Francisco would mean the colony was absolutely secure.



Confederation did not spring into being in a vacuum in 1867. The political maneuvering which began in 1864 played out over years yes, but the fundamental desire to unite the various colonies in one form or another dates back as far as the 1840s. Confederation debates themselves were less about whether the various colonies should unite and about what form of government they ought to take. The biggest concern was always that more populous Canada West (Ontario) would dominate proceedings. Through persuasion, guile and bribery, the Fathers of Confederation got their way. An American invasion would probably speed the process up in truth. In the crazy quilt politics of pre-Confederation Canada, anti American sentiment was one of a few uniting factors.
Those are good points regarding anti-American sentiment but there were substantial parts of "LC" who also weren't jumping at the chance to have a bunch of Redcoats all over the place. There is a stark difference between an American "invasion" and using the Province as a British launching pad. As you note, pre-1867 was a "crazy quilt" and Palmerston would not have been deciding this lightly.
 
Who's using Canada for an attack on the US? What's being mentioned is US attacks on Canada, which we know the reaction to from 1812. The Canadians, neither upper or lower want to be colonised by the US. Not to forget where are the US going to get the forces from for such an invasion?
Then what does the Trent Affair have to do with that? Just curious ....
 
Those are good points regarding anti-American sentiment but there were substantial parts of "LC" who also weren't jumping at the chance to have a bunch of Redcoats all over the place. There is a stark difference between an American "invasion" and using the Province as a British launching pad. As you note, pre-1867 was a "crazy quilt" and Palmerston would not have been deciding this lightly.

Not extremely substantial. I only say this with confidence as during the Trent Affair you had radical Orange Order, loyalist, protestants agreeing with anti-clerical, separatist, republican Francophones that welcoming the British troops and fighting the Americans is the best course of action. The bishops in Quebec and Montreal were quartering troops in their palaces and priests were encouraging habitents to do the same in their homes! It was a very shocking thing considering the animosity these groups shared! The fear of American annexation was very real for all groups in Canada.

Well we do know Palmerston made the decision quite easily. Provincial politics were not necessarily London's concern, and he favored a seaborne attack on Maine so far as we can tell. No springboard from Canada!
 
No it wasn't 1810 any longer. Britain is markedly more powerful and not tied up in a life and death struggle with the greatest power in the western world. The US is stronger than in 1810 but now split with many states in rebellion and other areas dubious about the war.
The US has access to the Great Lakes from the north but going to war with the UK means they can no longer export via the St Lawrence - while at the same time prior to mid 1863 they can't export south via the Mississippi either.

It may have a railway across the Panama isthmus but since that's no use to it once the wider war starts what's the point?

There's a telegraph line to California, when it works. So what? Is Lincoln going to echo the western Roman emperor in 410AD to his British subjects "your on your own now guys"? He can send information along it but not supplies, troops or military equipment. Without a railway its virtually impossible to send any significant forces to the west coast while with control of the seas Britain can. As such 'military control of the west' is a wasting resource for the union.

It may be the largest railway network in the world but given the size of the US that doesn't mean its the densest or most efficient. Its going to be useful as long as its decently maintained but not going to lift the blockade or greatly help in any attack on Canada.

A British blockade would not end union grain exports. Unless Lincoln responded to the conflict by seeking to ban exports to Europe. It will however badly affect it for one reason, that neither British or US flagged ships will be carrying any such trade so new shippers will have to be found. Exports of Canadian grain are unlikely to be affected. There is likely to be shortfalls of grain which will have three basic results:
a) price increases will will prompt
b) available grain will go towards richer countries. Who happens to be the richest country in the world at this point?
c) alternative sources will be found in following seasons in response to the higher prices.

From the start of the USCW the union was stronger than the south, so I'm not sure what your saying here?

The north is a better source of investment and migration for Britons than the south or most other places in the world - as long as it doesn't pick a fight with the UK and then show bitter hostility towards people from those lands.

As I think was said fairly early in the thread if the UK and US go to war then, in the short term at least both loss.

Rambling about a war between a slave holding union and an anti-slavery UK is irrelevant.
If these were the arguments made in favor of forced mediation, its not hard to see why PM Palmerston saw it as a trap. There are reasons why he arranged that the meticulous scholar and statesman, George Cornewall Lewis to make the rebuttal to the proposition. Considering the long term interests of Britain, and considering British ties to the German states, the Baronet must have argued that being tied to the smaller part of the US that would survive mediation, and that part hanging on to race based slavery, was going to put Britain on the wrong path.
Its highly probable that intervention into the war in which English speaking people were killing each other was an interest of the monarch, and supported by many high ranking aristocrats who wanted to see the US fail. Although they rarely said so out loud, even the conservatives were reluctant to allow the Queen to interfere in the process of waiting out American developments.
To suggest that Britain could threaten a blockade, institute a blockade, and damage US ports, and the US would continue to export grain to Britain is ludicrous to the point of childishness.
The US was mainly a self contained economy, with the major exception that it exported a large amount of cotton, prior to the Civil War. But the war had already disrupted the main cotton growing areas near the Mississippi River, and its unlikely that Britain was going to force its way into New Orleans. Thus 1863 was going to be a cotton famine year regardless of intervention.
The better solution to the cotton production problem was to grow some in India and find the difficulties. It might provide some income to India, and the cotton was sure to be carried from India to Britain on English ships. It was not a perfect solution, but it was a more reliable solution, at least in the short run.
Intervention was mainly a monarchist position. Queen Victoria was asked to go to Germany. An Baronet Louis, with modest sympathies for the British crown was allowed to give the pro republican, anti-Confederacy position. Things drifted after that until there was trouble on the continent. By July 1863 the US position in the Civil War was even stronger.
 
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If these were the arguments made in favor of forced mediation, its not hard to see why PM Palmerston saw it as a trap. There are reasons why the meticulous scholar and statesman, George Cornewall Lewis to make the rebuttal to the proposition. Considering the long term interests of Britain, and considering British ties to the German states, the Baronet must have argued that being tied to the smaller part of the US that would survive mediation, and that part hanging on to race based slavery, was going to put Britain on the wrong path.
Its highly probable that intervention into the war in which English speaking people were killing each other was an interest of the monarch, and supported by many high ranking aristocrats who wanted to see the US fail. Although they rarely said so out loud, even the conservatives were reluctant to allow the Queen to interfere in the process of waiting out American developments.
To suggest that Britain could threaten a blockade, institute a blockade, and damage US ports, and the US would continue to export grain to Britain is ludicrous to the point childishness.
The US was mainly a self contained economy, with the major exception that it exported a large amount of cotton, prior to the Civil War. But the war had already disrupted the main cotton growing areas near the Mississippi River, and its unlikely that Britain was going to force its way into New Orleans. Thus 1863 was going to be a cotton famine year regardless of intervention.
The better solution to the cotton production problem was to grow some in India and find the difficulties. It might provide some income to India, and the cotton was sure to be carried from India to Britain on English ships. It was not a perfect solution, but it was a more reliable solution, at least in the short run.
Intervention was mainly a monarchist position. Queen Victoria was asked to go to Germany. An Baronet Louis, with modest sympathies for the British crown was allowed to give the pro republican, anti-Confederacy position. Things drifted after that until there was trouble on the continent. By July 1863 the US position in the Civil War was even stronger.

To suggest that Britain would be tied to any one portion of the former United States is to ignore the history of international relations which were always based on common interests between the nations involved.

As to the grain question it is interesting to ask how the US would fund any war without exporting it? Quite apart from the US not being an enclosed economy as 1812, the rather less positive outcomes in 1822, 1828, 1847, 1857*, 1873 and so showed repeatedly. I realise economic history is not sexy but it is worth studying.

*1857 gets a star as the recession resulting from the reduction in European capital is speculated by some historians as a contributory factors to the outbreak of the American Civil War itself.

Also you seem to have some odd notions about the Monarchs constitutional position within the British Crown. The Crown is ostensibly the Monarch and Parliament but it is the Prime Minster who wields the powers reserved to the Sovereign not however odd this may seem, the person with the actual title of King or Queen.
 
So the British would interfere with American affairs for awhile and then go home. The US would still be there and would still be the stronger power. How many times would Britain come in to save the slave republic? History shows that when Britain turned a cold shoulder to autocratic France, Prussia/Germany soundly defeated France.
The US funded the Civil War with taxes, borrowed money and a modest amount of inflation. Foreign earnings from exports was not yet a major part of the northern economy, though they were starting to export manufactured goods.
I am well aware the the monarch's position in England is mainly a symbolic one, so your patronizing addition is futile. The monarch has a persuasive influence among the higher nobility, but as events in Britain during the US Civil War demonstrated, the PM and the foreign secretary have ways to overcome that. In October 1862 Baronet Lewis was called on to deliver the scholarly rebuttal to the pro interference argument. Prince Albert may have deceased, but Lewis effectively espoused the skepticism of the Germans about the French proposal for intervention.
 
I repeat Mr. Lipsey's table 3:
1627472356160.png

See page 8. https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w4710/w4710.pdf
Except for cotton, the US was not an import/export economy in 1860. Except for a few military supplies in the early going, the US was not dependent on exports.
Foreign investment in the US was very important, and the US was a net debtor nation for a long time. However, foreign investment is a captive asset. If a conflict starts between Britain and US there might not be much new investment in the US, but what already exists is controlled by the US and payments on the investments are dependent on the health of the US economy.
 
At any rate by October 1862 the US was preparing for British intervention. McClellan's army was not in eastern Virginia any longer, and the US had purchased and imported as much nitre as the could get. With the Mississippi River in US control below Memphis and US control of the far west achieved, the US administration could agree to participate in forced mediation and go into a stall to make sure the mediation did not achieve anything.
 
Hence, 13% of the US economy in 1860 was directly from foreign trade. You do understand just how much damage the loss of 13% of an economy in a few months could do?
 
Hence, 13% of the US economy in 1860 was directly from foreign trade. You do understand just how much damage the loss of 13% of an economy in a few months could do?
More to the point, it's not 13% of government revenue. In 1862-3 the total US government revenue was $111M, of which Customs formed $69 million - which is 62% of the total. Indeed, with 58% of US trade volumes being with Britain then Britain simply ceasing to trade with the US it would cut US government income by 36% (without imposition of new taxes).

Note in addition that this does not factor in the effect of the loss of the coasting trade. This was around 2.6 million tons of shipping in the Civil War period, all engaged in moving goods from US port to US port by ship, and the loss of this capacity will tend to cause economic damage - especially since so much of the iron used to manufacture rails happened to be sourced from Britain, around half during the Civil War.
 
While I've enjoyed reading many of the posts in this thread - kudos to all - if we stick to the OP's topic, it was not a discussion of why (or why not) the British would support the CSA, it postulated that they decided (for whatever reason) to do so.

I generally agree with the arguments of those posters who, true to the historic pattern, said Britain would not do so. But that was not the postulation of the OP.

IF Britain DID...

I'd be interested in how people think that might actually have played out.
 
Hence, 13% of the US economy in 1860 was directly from foreign trade. You do understand just how much damage the loss of 13% of an economy in a few months could do?
And most of it was cotton exports and southerners buying iron and luxuries from foreign suppliers. The northern states were even retreating from the merchant services trade.
 
I'd be interested in how people think that might actually have played out.
If we assume that the British are intervening in any significant way, that is that they are trying to actually win the war for the Confederates (without losing Canada in the process) I think the following assumptions can be made:

- Much of the available British Army will be deployed to Canada, with Canadian troops in support.
- Assuming the planned first Canadian militia callout is fully subscribed to, as expected, and that the second callout is not fully subscribed to, then combined with volunteers there will be upwards of 60,000 troops generated from the Province of Canada and another 12,000-15,000 from the Maritimes.
- This is in addition to a likely minimum of 50,000 British troops to Canada.
- The amount of force this represents will prevent the US from taking Canada easily. It will mean the US has to fully commit to an attempt to take Canada, and thus strip significant troops from the fighting front against the Confederacy to do so; even if the US does not commit to this they will have to send several divisions to the Canadian border.

- There will be a blockade. It will be sizeable. It will cut off much of US foreign trade (imports and exports) and much of the domestic coasting trade.
- US imports of rifles, gun iron, steel, railroad iron, saltpetre, lead, sulphur and other war-fighting materiel will suffer. In some cases it will be completely cut off and the US will have to make do with existing stocks and sometimes-inadequate local production.
- US exports of grain will suffer. If the US continues to sell grain to third-party shipping this will probably be allowed to continue and the disruption relatively small, but if the US passes an Embargo Act then the export market will collapse and there will be a lot of unhappy farmers.

- The Royal Navy will concentrate multiple ironclads and gunboats to attack US ports, in order to disrupt and destroy US building capacity.
- This will also serve to act as a third "pull" factor for US warfighting capacity, away from the fighting front against Canada and away from the fighting front against the Confederacy.
- To aid this the British will concentrate a sizeable sea-mobile force (in at least division strength, i.e. 2x 3-battalion brigades) which can support these raids and provide limited inland striking capability.

- If the US does not deploy sufficient troops in any of those potential coastal targets to prevent greater British offensive action, then the British will exploit this lack.
- If the US does not deploy sufficient troops along the Canadian border to prevent British offensive action then this lack will also be exploited.

- The Confederacy will recieve a sizeable upgrade in terms of weapons (small arms and artillery), ammunition (saltpetre) and possibly warships as well.
- They may also recieve the benefit of British musketry instruction, and even the deployment of a British corps (12 battalions in two binary divisons), probably to the eastern theatre.

- The British are likely to deploy a small expeditionary force out of Indian Establishment against San Francisco, and to blockade the port.
- This force is likely to include both British and Indian battalions.

- If the war continues or seems likely to continue for a significant period of time, the British will raise new battalions of troops.
- These will mostly consist of regularized militia infantry and Volunteers (i.e. already partly trained capable second-line home defence units) which will then be further trained to a higher level before being deployed.
- The British will also likely build new ships specifically for the war.
- These will consist of:
-- gunboats and gunvessels upon the Crimean pattern, mass produced ships with a few medium to heavy guns.
-- ironclads upon the Crimean pattern, quick to build and heavily armoured with heavy guns but low engine power.
-- Mortar vessels for coastal attack.

It is extremely difficult for me to see how the US could do damage sufficient to knock the British out of the war. The minimum required is probably an invasion of Canada, but there is no point in the Civil War when the US has sufficient capacity lying around uncommitted to allow for an invasion of a defended Canada while also defending the coastline. The US will have to make compromises.
 
More to the point, it's not 13% of government revenue. In 1862-3 the total US government revenue was $111M, of which Customs formed $69 million - which is 62% of the total. Indeed, with 58% of US trade volumes being with Britain then Britain simply ceasing to trade with the US it would cut US government income by 36% (without imposition of new taxes).

Note in addition that this does not factor in the effect of the loss of the coasting trade. This was around 2.6 million tons of shipping in the Civil War period, all engaged in moving goods from US port to US port by ship, and the loss of this capacity will tend to cause economic damage - especially since so much of the iron used to manufacture rails happened to be sourced from Britain, around half during the Civil War.
The US never relied primarily on tax collections to finance the Civil War. And when the did they added an income tax based on the British model.
See Ransom's Figure 3:
1627486712090.png

https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-economics-of-the-civil-war/
 
And most of it was cotton exports and southerners buying iron and luxuries from foreign suppliers. The northern states were even retreating from the merchant services trade.
In 1862-3, US total exports of $306m included $121m (39.5%) to Britain, and her total imports of $253m included $113m (44.7%) from Britain. However, this includes imports only from mainland Britain: when we add imports from British colonies, including the West Indies and British North America, Britain actually controlled $147m (58%) of Union imports.
 
The US never relied primarily on tax collections to finance the Civil War. And when the did they added an income tax based on the British model.
Of course the US relied primarily on debt, this is normal for any government.
But there is a difference between the debt you can effectively float during a period when you are also taking in a reasonable amount of government income and the debt you can effectively float in the absence of that government income - the difference being that in the latter case you have significant inflation and devaluation. It's why we're discussing economic damage at all in terms of the impact it has on the governments involved.

Similarly, an income tax for the Union is going to produce a lot less money in the event of a British blockade, because less exporting is going on and because industries that previously relied on British imports (of iron, for example) are now no longer able to function at full efficiency. The lack of exports means that the income of farmers (for example) is less, and it means that the amount of income tax that could be garnered from taxing their income is less, as the income is smaller.

The fact is that in 1862-3 the US government's portfolio of revenue was almost entirely focused on customs and internal duties. In that year the US raised $69 million from Customs and $37.6 million from Internal Duties, as against $1.5 million from Direct Tax and $3 million from Miscellaneous.
 
In 1862-3, US total exports of $306m included $121m (39.5%) to Britain, and her total imports of $253m included $113m (44.7%) from Britain. However, this includes imports only from mainland Britain: when we add imports from British colonies, including the West Indies and British North America, Britain actually controlled $147m (58%) of Union imports.
Absolutely, so the blockade is a knife that cuts both ways, and effectively ruins the ability of the US to pay premiums on municipal and transportation bonds owned by British subjects. As I have written before, the economies and the populations were intertwined after 1844-46, and Britain would be engaged in a economic war with a part of its own population if it blockaded the US. The British liberals might suffer the most in that economic war, but they were unlikely to suffer quietly.
 
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