Britain had recognized the CSA?

The British Army lost a battle, in which their opponents had fortified their positions and the British army stuffed up the assault against said fortified positions.

I'm not sure how this affects the conclusion around the blockade.
The fact is that the blockade was ineffective regarding trade through New Orleans. The RN also failed to prevent the Americans from seizing Mobile and Pensacola at different points, and couldn't prevent the clear defeat in January 1815.
 
Secondly, after spending 70 years encouraging Spain/Cuba and Portugal/Brazil to end the slave trade and consider ending slavery, jumping into the American contest to preserve the Confederacy sends the clear message that it wasn't slavery at all that was the problem, it was who was practicing it. All that work then has to be done over, as several countries decide that slave importers can operate under their flag.
 
Not quite as simple as we'd like. It's easy to oversimplify the population issues between what had been Upper Canada and Lower Canada in the "Province of Canada", starting with a history of LC's under-representation in the 1840's. By 1861 "UC's" population was just shy of 1.4M. LC's was 1.1M. Those issues in turn implicated the underlying, persistent tensions driven by LC's Francophone leanings, how the Reciprocity Treaty in the 1850's had tied the Province to the US economically, and the 1862 fall of MacDonald's government after his Militia Bill failed passage. In other words, Britain sat atop a "Canada" that was a tricky pony to ride (and was headed towards ridding itself of colonial status, to boot). Using Canada as a base for a British attack on the US was not a decision to take lightly, if that were the plan.
I think the idea that Canada was in any significant sense not a reasonably content component of the British Empire is not really valid. Quite apart from anything else Confederation (i.e. the transition from being the Province of Canada and assorted other colonies to being the Dominion of Canada) was driven by, among other things, the threat posed by the US - in fact, that was the chief external driver.

There is no relevant sense in which Confederation indicates dissatisfaction with the British Empire... and it doesn't change that the population of Canada was still 2.5 million by any reasonable metric.

Similarly, the failure of the Militia Bill was because of how extensive the proposal was in peacetime - a compulsory active militia of 50,000, which is the population-adjusted equivalent of the US maintaining a compulsory peacetime militia in 1860 of about 500,000; subsequently in 1868 upon Confederation an Active Militia of 40,000 was accepted, which is the population-adjusted equivalent of the US maintaining a compulsory peacetime militia of about 250,000.
 
Would the US be fighting alone? Russia was cool towards the Confederacy and had an abiding dislike of the French. And the Russians had access to most of Asia. What were the sympathies of Prussia and the German states? They subscribed a small loan to the US and they also harbored a general dislike of anything French.
 
The fact is that the blockade was ineffective regarding trade through New Orleans. The RN also failed to prevent the Americans from seizing Mobile and Pensacola at different points, and couldn't prevent the clear defeat in January 1815.
Imagine that, the navy can't prevent a land defeat...

Of course, the British blockade being ineffective regarding trade through New Orleans is a relatively minor detail compared to the British having functionally destroyed US foreign trade and crippled the merchant marine.

US insurance rates from Boston to foreign ports increased 75% during the war. British trade increased by 67.3% between 1811 and 1814 (and the merchant marine increased in size by 5% in the same period) ; US trade dropped by 89% in the same period.

'The aggregate total of 1,407 American merchant vessels captured or destroyed by the Royal Navy throughout the war, constituted a much larger proportion of the American merchant navy, about half the size of its British counterpart... The 1,407 merchant vessels reported to the Admiralty as taken or destroyed by the Royal Navy between June 1812 and February 1815, can be usefully compared with the number of American merchant craft still in use for foreign trade by 1814, estimated to have been no more than 420 vessels of average size...'
(from Brian Arthur's thesis 'The Royal Navy and economic warfare in North America, 1812-1815')


If I may quote further:



'If, in the early nineteenth-century, defeat in war lay in the inability to continue fighting while an opponent was able to do so, then, despite its victory at New Orleans in January 1815, the United States was defeated in the Anglo-American War of 1812. The Americans had failed to occupy Canada, either as a bargaining-counter or permanently, as Jefferson, Madison and Gallatin had earlier agreed. Even more importantly, the Royal Navy's economic warfare, in the form of its commercial and naval blockades, had deprived the United States of the financial means to continue fighting beyond the first few months of 1815. By depriving the United States of its imports, the British commercial blockade had so reduced American customs duties, the major source of government revenue until the last year of the war, as to create major budget deficits, and cause American dependence on increasingly unreliable public credit.'

'The British commercial blockade had over time so far reduced American agricultural exports that newly-introduced taxes were paid from reduced incomes, only with difficulty and evident reluctance. Overland transport intended to replace increasingly blockaded coastal traffic, had become so expensive as to permit farmers to sell either to local markets at prices depressed by glut, or to distant urban consumers at high prices, which effectively reduced demand. Speculators had made the most of real or contrived shortages. Unemployment, especially in ports and other cities had combined with rising prices to contribute to popular unrest. The proliferation of state and local banks with poorly controlled note issues had contributed to severe inflation, and reduced the overall acceptability of paper money. Banknotes, even those held by the government, had become far from universally acceptable, frequently refused or accepted only at a discount. Banks had eventually been forced to suspend payment in precious metals.'

'The American merchant fleet was never again as relatively important to the American economy as it had been before 1812. The relative diversion of investment funds from merchant shipping became permanent. The American government had declared war after seeking to secure a maritime trading advantage during Britain's prolonged war in Europe. For largely commercial reasons, it had interposed itself between Britain and its French enemy, and the American merchant fleet had paid the price.'

'When the Treaty of Ghent ended the war after thirty-two months of fighting, the Americans had gained none of the aims they had hoped for at the outset, and had bankrupted themselves in the process. Between 1812 and the end of 1814, the American government had collected $35.1m in wartime taxes, at the same time spending $86.7m, creating a $51.6m shortfall. Over the same period, it had sought to borrow $62.5m by selling government stock, of which it appears to have received only $42.6m, probably worth less than half that value in specie. The Treasury's short-term loan notes had changed hands only at discount, and calls for loans had fallen short of their targets, even when the securities were sold far below par. Before the negotiated peace of 1815, the government's credit worthiness had collapsed.'

'American awareness that the currently under-employed state of their merchant fleet made it less useful for the United States to retain foreign seamen, may have contributed to American preparedness to forgo insistence on a formal solution to what had earlier been seen as a "crying enormity". The issue of impressment had been abandoned by Madison's cabinet in late June 1814 when it became clear that nothing would come of the administration's penultimate wartime attempt to borrow money, not even enough to maintain current expenditure. Between June and December 1814, Madison had come to understand that during this war with Britain, unlike the last one, no financial, material, or even diplomatic help from France would now be forthcoming. Nor, despite an urgent application, would any financial help come from a country like Holland, recently liberated from the French, but unwilling to lend to a United States unable to defend its foreign trade, maintain overseas communications, or keep the enemy out of its capital. Nor was Russia, itself still in receipt of British loans and subsidies, in any position to offer financial or military help to America, or repeat the offer, earlier rejected by Britain, to mediate between the United States and its enemy in the hope of winning concessions for trading neutrals in wartime.'

'a House of Representatives Committee on Naval Affairs referred to British commercial blockade as long after the Anglo-American war as 1842. At a time when a series of diplomatic incidents made another war with Britain a possibility, the Committee expressed concern over the defencelessness of the southern and Gulf of Mexico ports, vital not only for American international, but also internal trade. Their report, dated 12 May 1842 concluded, "If you desire to measure the hazard to which a maritime war with a formidable naval Power would expose this commerce, you have but to consult the testimony of experience."'
 
Would the US be fighting alone? Russia was cool towards the Confederacy and had an abiding dislike of the French. And the Russians had access to most of Asia. What were the sympathies of Prussia and the German states? They subscribed a small loan to the US and they also harbored a general dislike of anything French.
Per Russia - "Access" being an extremely loose term there, given the vast overland distances involved. The Russians have almost no capability to harm Britain, and nothing much to gain from interfering either.

Per Prussia - depending on the time period, Prussia is busy with a serious internal political crisis or a serious external one (the latter being the Second Schleiswig War) and if the whole thing kicks off over Trent specifically then Prussia (along with Austria and Russia) was quite strongly pro-British over the matter.
 
In the US the preliminary report of the 1860 census was published in May of 1862. It not only tabulated population, but also gave an overview of industry, ship building and railroads. There was ample time for British agents in the US to confirm or contradict the statistics of the report. By October of 1862 the British war department had time to not only study the US economy, but also to digest reports from all over the US about the strategic situation in the border states, and in the west. I suspect the War Department was able to understand the size of the undertaking, the preparations the US had made since December of 1861. By October of 1862, the US was by far the much stronger power as compared to the Confederacy. The British, if they had wished to apply enough force, could force an armistice on the US. But then the question remains. How long would the British threat have to continue, and where else would the Yankees contest the issues?
 
In the US the preliminary report of the 1860 census was published in May of 1862. It not only tabulated population, but also gave an overview of industry, ship building and railroads. There was ample time for British agents in the US to confirm or contradict the statistics of the report. By October of 1862 the British war department had time to not only study the US economy, but also to digest reports from all over the US about the strategic situation in the border states, and in the west. I suspect the War Department was able to understand the size of the undertaking, the preparations the US had made since December of 1861. By October of 1862, the US was by far the much stronger power as compared to the Confederacy. The British, if they had wished to apply enough force, could force an armistice on the US. But then the question remains. How long would the British threat have to continue, and where else would the Yankees contest the issues?
 
I think the idea that Canada was in any significant sense not a reasonably content component of the British Empire is not really valid. Quite apart from anything else Confederation (i.e. the transition from being the Province of Canada and assorted other colonies to being the Dominion of Canada) was driven by, among other things, the threat posed by the US - in fact, that was the chief external driver.

There is no relevant sense in which Confederation indicates dissatisfaction with the British Empire... and it doesn't change that the population of Canada was still 2.5 million by any reasonable metric.

Similarly, the failure of the Militia Bill was because of how extensive the proposal was in peacetime - a compulsory active militia of 50,000, which is the population-adjusted equivalent of the US maintaining a compulsory peacetime militia in 1860 of about 500,000; subsequently in 1868 upon Confederation an Active Militia of 40,000 was accepted, which is the population-adjusted equivalent of the US maintaining a compulsory peacetime militia of about 250,000.
You gloss over the internal juggling act regarding the actual and perceived differences between "UC" and "LC". Pointing to Confederation following 1867, the Fenians, etc proves diddly about those differences in the British colonial model previously in place. These things are neat to go back and forth on but Power Point slides don't decide realities. The point is that Britain/Palmerston had a number of reasons for not blithely converting "Canada" into a massive launching stage for the British Army.
 
Not quite as simple as we'd like. It's easy to oversimplify the population issues between what had been Upper Canada and Lower Canada in the "Province of Canada", starting with a history of LC's under-representation in the 1840's. By 1861 "UC's" population was just shy of 1.4M. LC's was 1.1M. Those issues in turn implicated the underlying, persistent tensions driven by LC's Francophone leanings, how the Reciprocity Treaty in the 1850's had tied the Province to the US economically, and the 1862 fall of MacDonald's government after his Militia Bill failed passage. In other words, Britain sat atop a "Canada" that was a tricky pony to ride (and was headed towards ridding itself of colonial status, to boot). Using Canada as a base for a British attack on the US was not a decision to take lightly, if that were the plan.

Who's using Canada for an attack on the US? What's being mentioned is US attacks on Canada, which we know the reaction to from 1812. The Canadians, neither upper or lower want to be colonised by the US. Not to forget where are the US going to get the forces from for such an invasion?
 
Imagine that, the navy can't prevent a land defeat...

Of course, the British blockade being ineffective regarding trade through New Orleans is a relatively minor detail compared to the British having functionally destroyed US foreign trade and crippled the merchant marine.

US insurance rates from Boston to foreign ports increased 75% during the war. British trade increased by 67.3% between 1811 and 1814 (and the merchant marine increased in size by 5% in the same period) ; US trade dropped by 89% in the same period.

'The aggregate total of 1,407 American merchant vessels captured or destroyed by the Royal Navy throughout the war, constituted a much larger proportion of the American merchant navy, about half the size of its British counterpart... The 1,407 merchant vessels reported to the Admiralty as taken or destroyed by the Royal Navy between June 1812 and February 1815, can be usefully compared with the number of American merchant craft still in use for foreign trade by 1814, estimated to have been no more than 420 vessels of average size...'
(from Brian Arthur's thesis 'The Royal Navy and economic warfare in North America, 1812-1815')


If I may quote further:



'If, in the early nineteenth-century, defeat in war lay in the inability to continue fighting while an opponent was able to do so, then, despite its victory at New Orleans in January 1815, the United States was defeated in the Anglo-American War of 1812. The Americans had failed to occupy Canada, either as a bargaining-counter or permanently, as Jefferson, Madison and Gallatin had earlier agreed. Even more importantly, the Royal Navy's economic warfare, in the form of its commercial and naval blockades, had deprived the United States of the financial means to continue fighting beyond the first few months of 1815. By depriving the United States of its imports, the British commercial blockade had so reduced American customs duties, the major source of government revenue until the last year of the war, as to create major budget deficits, and cause American dependence on increasingly unreliable public credit.'

'The British commercial blockade had over time so far reduced American agricultural exports that newly-introduced taxes were paid from reduced incomes, only with difficulty and evident reluctance. Overland transport intended to replace increasingly blockaded coastal traffic, had become so expensive as to permit farmers to sell either to local markets at prices depressed by glut, or to distant urban consumers at high prices, which effectively reduced demand. Speculators had made the most of real or contrived shortages. Unemployment, especially in ports and other cities had combined with rising prices to contribute to popular unrest. The proliferation of state and local banks with poorly controlled note issues had contributed to severe inflation, and reduced the overall acceptability of paper money. Banknotes, even those held by the government, had become far from universally acceptable, frequently refused or accepted only at a discount. Banks had eventually been forced to suspend payment in precious metals.'

'The American merchant fleet was never again as relatively important to the American economy as it had been before 1812. The relative diversion of investment funds from merchant shipping became permanent. The American government had declared war after seeking to secure a maritime trading advantage during Britain's prolonged war in Europe. For largely commercial reasons, it had interposed itself between Britain and its French enemy, and the American merchant fleet had paid the price.'

'When the Treaty of Ghent ended the war after thirty-two months of fighting, the Americans had gained none of the aims they had hoped for at the outset, and had bankrupted themselves in the process. Between 1812 and the end of 1814, the American government had collected $35.1m in wartime taxes, at the same time spending $86.7m, creating a $51.6m shortfall. Over the same period, it had sought to borrow $62.5m by selling government stock, of which it appears to have received only $42.6m, probably worth less than half that value in specie. The Treasury's short-term loan notes had changed hands only at discount, and calls for loans had fallen short of their targets, even when the securities were sold far below par. Before the negotiated peace of 1815, the government's credit worthiness had collapsed.'

'American awareness that the currently under-employed state of their merchant fleet made it less useful for the United States to retain foreign seamen, may have contributed to American preparedness to forgo insistence on a formal solution to what had earlier been seen as a "crying enormity". The issue of impressment had been abandoned by Madison's cabinet in late June 1814 when it became clear that nothing would come of the administration's penultimate wartime attempt to borrow money, not even enough to maintain current expenditure. Between June and December 1814, Madison had come to understand that during this war with Britain, unlike the last one, no financial, material, or even diplomatic help from France would now be forthcoming. Nor, despite an urgent application, would any financial help come from a country like Holland, recently liberated from the French, but unwilling to lend to a United States unable to defend its foreign trade, maintain overseas communications, or keep the enemy out of its capital. Nor was Russia, itself still in receipt of British loans and subsidies, in any position to offer financial or military help to America, or repeat the offer, earlier rejected by Britain, to mediate between the United States and its enemy in the hope of winning concessions for trading neutrals in wartime.'

'a House of Representatives Committee on Naval Affairs referred to British commercial blockade as long after the Anglo-American war as 1842. At a time when a series of diplomatic incidents made another war with Britain a possibility, the Committee expressed concern over the defencelessness of the southern and Gulf of Mexico ports, vital not only for American international, but also internal trade. Their report, dated 12 May 1842 concluded, "If you desire to measure the hazard to which a maritime war with a formidable naval Power would expose this commerce, you have but to consult the testimony of experience."'
That's a nice speech you've quoted. Now feel free to explicate the concessions the British got regarding that buffer state they wanted for the tribes in the Old Northwest. As the PM said of the war "We might certainly land in different parts of their coast, and destroy some of their towns, or put them under contribution; but in the present state of the public mind in America it would be in vain to expect any permanent good effects from operations of this nature.” As happened in the AWI, there were also those annoying folks at home who got tired of sending the lads across the Atlantic on these ventures against Jonathon. Of course, the RN also suffered humiliation in several ship-on-ship defeats. The blockade was not a success in the Gulf and did not halt trade through New Orleansa. And - as pointed out - the RN failed to prevent British forces from suffering defeats at installations/ports along the Gulf - Pensacola, Mobile, and ultimately New Orleans in one of the most lop-sided victories in US history.
 
Would the US be fighting alone? Russia was cool towards the Confederacy and had an abiding dislike of the French. And the Russians had access to most of Asia. What were the sympathies of Prussia and the German states? They subscribed a small loan to the US and they also harbored a general dislike of anything French.

The obvious answer to that is a resounding yes. Russia is in no condition to fight anyway, at least not a major power. It struggled to defeat the Polish revolt OTL. Furthermore even if it was insane enough to decide on another war in view of its economy. How are several hundred thousand Russian soldiers going to swim the channel? Or march overland to India which I suspect is what your hinting at.

Similarly why would Prussia, busy with its own aims for expansion in German seek to pick a fight at this stage with Britain or France?
 
The point is that it wasn't 1810 any longer. The US had full access to the Great Lakes, a railroad across the Isthmus of Panama, a telegraph line to California, the largest railroad network in the world, and by October it was clearly the stronger power relative to the Confederacy, with the much larger population, control of virtually all of the cities and in military control of the west.
British interference was not going to quickly restore cotton exports from the key cotton producing areas, but probably would end American exports of grain on railroads in the US and Canada owned in part by British investors. And what would the British gain? All the work done for 70 years to give the British Empire some higher moral purpose than being the largest slave empire the world had ever seen, would be seriously weakened.
The US was the better customer, had more British investments, had more recent Irish and English immigrants, and vastly more prospects for expansion.
 
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The War Department and PM Palmerston lost interest in the endeavor during October 1862. Our experts on British history refuse to comment on the effect of death of Prince Albert, the withdrawal of the Queen into a period of mourning, and a lengthy visit by Queen Victoria to her German friends. It may have been that the pressure from the monarch to do something about the US war was relaxed and the PM felt more comfortable waiting for further developments.
As noted above, by August 1863, the Confederate mission to London was withdrawn, and in several more weeks, the British consulate officers were expelled from the Confederacy.
 
The point is that it wasn't 1810 any longer. The US had full access to the Great Lakes, a railroad across the Isthmus of Panama, a telegraph line to California, the largest railroad network in the world, and by October it was clearly the stronger power, with the much larger population, control of virtually all of the cities and in military control of the west.
British interference was not going to quickly restore cotton exports from the key cotton producing areas, but probably would end American exports of grain on railroads in the US and Canada owned in part by British investors. And what would the British gain? All the work done for 70 years to give the British Empire some higher moral purpose than being the largest slave empire the world had ever seen, would be seriously weakened.
The US was the better customer, had more British investments, had more recent Irish and English immigrants, and vastly more prospects for expansion.

No it wasn't 1810 any longer. Britain is markedly more powerful and not tied up in a life and death struggle with the greatest power in the western world. The US is stronger than in 1810 but now split with many states in rebellion and other areas dubious about the war.
The US has access to the Great Lakes from the north but going to war with the UK means they can no longer export via the St Lawrence - while at the same time prior to mid 1863 they can't export south via the Mississippi either.

It may have a railway across the Panama isthmus but since that's no use to it once the wider war starts what's the point?

There's a telegraph line to California, when it works. So what? Is Lincoln going to echo the western Roman emperor in 410AD to his British subjects "your on your own now guys"? He can send information along it but not supplies, troops or military equipment. Without a railway its virtually impossible to send any significant forces to the west coast while with control of the seas Britain can. As such 'military control of the west' is a wasting resource for the union.

It may be the largest railway network in the world but given the size of the US that doesn't mean its the densest or most efficient. Its going to be useful as long as its decently maintained but not going to lift the blockade or greatly help in any attack on Canada.

A British blockade would not end union grain exports. Unless Lincoln responded to the conflict by seeking to ban exports to Europe. It will however badly affect it for one reason, that neither British or US flagged ships will be carrying any such trade so new shippers will have to be found. Exports of Canadian grain are unlikely to be affected. There is likely to be shortfalls of grain which will have three basic results:
a) price increases will will prompt
b) available grain will go towards richer countries. Who happens to be the richest country in the world at this point?
c) alternative sources will be found in following seasons in response to the higher prices.

From the start of the USCW the union was stronger than the south, so I'm not sure what your saying here?

The north is a better source of investment and migration for Britons than the south or most other places in the world - as long as it doesn't pick a fight with the UK and then show bitter hostility towards people from those lands.

As I think was said fairly early in the thread if the UK and US go to war then, in the short term at least both loss.

Rambling about a war between a slave holding union and an anti-slavery UK is irrelevant.
 
Agree - BC wouldn't have contributed much to the effort, nor could it.

Well, not exactly. The coal fields at Nanaimo would have fueled the British squadron based at Esquimalt that would blockade San Francisco while the militia of British Columbia could be reasonably expected to defend the settlements there. The presence of the navy and roughly 600 miles between BC and San Francisco would mean the colony was absolutely secure.

You gloss over the internal juggling act regarding the actual and perceived differences between "UC" and "LC". Pointing to Confederation following 1867, the Fenians, etc proves diddly about those differences in the British colonial model previously in place. These things are neat to go back and forth on but Power Point slides don't decide realities. The point is that Britain/Palmerston had a number of reasons for not blithely converting "Canada" into a massive launching stage for the British Army.

Confederation did not spring into being in a vacuum in 1867. The political maneuvering which began in 1864 played out over years yes, but the fundamental desire to unite the various colonies in one form or another dates back as far as the 1840s. Confederation debates themselves were less about whether the various colonies should unite and about what form of government they ought to take. The biggest concern was always that more populous Canada West (Ontario) would dominate proceedings. Through persuasion, guile and bribery, the Fathers of Confederation got their way. An American invasion would probably speed the process up in truth. In the crazy quilt politics of pre-Confederation Canada, anti American sentiment was one of a few uniting factors.
 
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