Belfoured
Major
- Joined
- Aug 3, 2019
Agree - BC wouldn't have contributed much to the effort, nor could it.And that is just UC v LC. In the western areas there was indifference to British rule and plenty of pro American sentiment.
Agree - BC wouldn't have contributed much to the effort, nor could it.And that is just UC v LC. In the western areas there was indifference to British rule and plenty of pro American sentiment.
The fact is that the blockade was ineffective regarding trade through New Orleans. The RN also failed to prevent the Americans from seizing Mobile and Pensacola at different points, and couldn't prevent the clear defeat in January 1815.The British Army lost a battle, in which their opponents had fortified their positions and the British army stuffed up the assault against said fortified positions.
I'm not sure how this affects the conclusion around the blockade.
I think the idea that Canada was in any significant sense not a reasonably content component of the British Empire is not really valid. Quite apart from anything else Confederation (i.e. the transition from being the Province of Canada and assorted other colonies to being the Dominion of Canada) was driven by, among other things, the threat posed by the US - in fact, that was the chief external driver.Not quite as simple as we'd like. It's easy to oversimplify the population issues between what had been Upper Canada and Lower Canada in the "Province of Canada", starting with a history of LC's under-representation in the 1840's. By 1861 "UC's" population was just shy of 1.4M. LC's was 1.1M. Those issues in turn implicated the underlying, persistent tensions driven by LC's Francophone leanings, how the Reciprocity Treaty in the 1850's had tied the Province to the US economically, and the 1862 fall of MacDonald's government after his Militia Bill failed passage. In other words, Britain sat atop a "Canada" that was a tricky pony to ride (and was headed towards ridding itself of colonial status, to boot). Using Canada as a base for a British attack on the US was not a decision to take lightly, if that were the plan.
Imagine that, the navy can't prevent a land defeat...The fact is that the blockade was ineffective regarding trade through New Orleans. The RN also failed to prevent the Americans from seizing Mobile and Pensacola at different points, and couldn't prevent the clear defeat in January 1815.
Per Russia - "Access" being an extremely loose term there, given the vast overland distances involved. The Russians have almost no capability to harm Britain, and nothing much to gain from interfering either.Would the US be fighting alone? Russia was cool towards the Confederacy and had an abiding dislike of the French. And the Russians had access to most of Asia. What were the sympathies of Prussia and the German states? They subscribed a small loan to the US and they also harbored a general dislike of anything French.
You gloss over the internal juggling act regarding the actual and perceived differences between "UC" and "LC". Pointing to Confederation following 1867, the Fenians, etc proves diddly about those differences in the British colonial model previously in place. These things are neat to go back and forth on but Power Point slides don't decide realities. The point is that Britain/Palmerston had a number of reasons for not blithely converting "Canada" into a massive launching stage for the British Army.I think the idea that Canada was in any significant sense not a reasonably content component of the British Empire is not really valid. Quite apart from anything else Confederation (i.e. the transition from being the Province of Canada and assorted other colonies to being the Dominion of Canada) was driven by, among other things, the threat posed by the US - in fact, that was the chief external driver.
There is no relevant sense in which Confederation indicates dissatisfaction with the British Empire... and it doesn't change that the population of Canada was still 2.5 million by any reasonable metric.
Similarly, the failure of the Militia Bill was because of how extensive the proposal was in peacetime - a compulsory active militia of 50,000, which is the population-adjusted equivalent of the US maintaining a compulsory peacetime militia in 1860 of about 500,000; subsequently in 1868 upon Confederation an Active Militia of 40,000 was accepted, which is the population-adjusted equivalent of the US maintaining a compulsory peacetime militia of about 250,000.
Not quite as simple as we'd like. It's easy to oversimplify the population issues between what had been Upper Canada and Lower Canada in the "Province of Canada", starting with a history of LC's under-representation in the 1840's. By 1861 "UC's" population was just shy of 1.4M. LC's was 1.1M. Those issues in turn implicated the underlying, persistent tensions driven by LC's Francophone leanings, how the Reciprocity Treaty in the 1850's had tied the Province to the US economically, and the 1862 fall of MacDonald's government after his Militia Bill failed passage. In other words, Britain sat atop a "Canada" that was a tricky pony to ride (and was headed towards ridding itself of colonial status, to boot). Using Canada as a base for a British attack on the US was not a decision to take lightly, if that were the plan.
That's a nice speech you've quoted. Now feel free to explicate the concessions the British got regarding that buffer state they wanted for the tribes in the Old Northwest. As the PM said of the war "We might certainly land in different parts of their coast, and destroy some of their towns, or put them under contribution; but in the present state of the public mind in America it would be in vain to expect any permanent good effects from operations of this nature.” As happened in the AWI, there were also those annoying folks at home who got tired of sending the lads across the Atlantic on these ventures against Jonathon. Of course, the RN also suffered humiliation in several ship-on-ship defeats. The blockade was not a success in the Gulf and did not halt trade through New Orleansa. And - as pointed out - the RN failed to prevent British forces from suffering defeats at installations/ports along the Gulf - Pensacola, Mobile, and ultimately New Orleans in one of the most lop-sided victories in US history.Imagine that, the navy can't prevent a land defeat...
Of course, the British blockade being ineffective regarding trade through New Orleans is a relatively minor detail compared to the British having functionally destroyed US foreign trade and crippled the merchant marine.
US insurance rates from Boston to foreign ports increased 75% during the war. British trade increased by 67.3% between 1811 and 1814 (and the merchant marine increased in size by 5% in the same period) ; US trade dropped by 89% in the same period.
'The aggregate total of 1,407 American merchant vessels captured or destroyed by the Royal Navy throughout the war, constituted a much larger proportion of the American merchant navy, about half the size of its British counterpart... The 1,407 merchant vessels reported to the Admiralty as taken or destroyed by the Royal Navy between June 1812 and February 1815, can be usefully compared with the number of American merchant craft still in use for foreign trade by 1814, estimated to have been no more than 420 vessels of average size...'
(from Brian Arthur's thesis 'The Royal Navy and economic warfare in North America, 1812-1815')
If I may quote further:
'If, in the early nineteenth-century, defeat in war lay in the inability to continue fighting while an opponent was able to do so, then, despite its victory at New Orleans in January 1815, the United States was defeated in the Anglo-American War of 1812. The Americans had failed to occupy Canada, either as a bargaining-counter or permanently, as Jefferson, Madison and Gallatin had earlier agreed. Even more importantly, the Royal Navy's economic warfare, in the form of its commercial and naval blockades, had deprived the United States of the financial means to continue fighting beyond the first few months of 1815. By depriving the United States of its imports, the British commercial blockade had so reduced American customs duties, the major source of government revenue until the last year of the war, as to create major budget deficits, and cause American dependence on increasingly unreliable public credit.'
'The British commercial blockade had over time so far reduced American agricultural exports that newly-introduced taxes were paid from reduced incomes, only with difficulty and evident reluctance. Overland transport intended to replace increasingly blockaded coastal traffic, had become so expensive as to permit farmers to sell either to local markets at prices depressed by glut, or to distant urban consumers at high prices, which effectively reduced demand. Speculators had made the most of real or contrived shortages. Unemployment, especially in ports and other cities had combined with rising prices to contribute to popular unrest. The proliferation of state and local banks with poorly controlled note issues had contributed to severe inflation, and reduced the overall acceptability of paper money. Banknotes, even those held by the government, had become far from universally acceptable, frequently refused or accepted only at a discount. Banks had eventually been forced to suspend payment in precious metals.'
'The American merchant fleet was never again as relatively important to the American economy as it had been before 1812. The relative diversion of investment funds from merchant shipping became permanent. The American government had declared war after seeking to secure a maritime trading advantage during Britain's prolonged war in Europe. For largely commercial reasons, it had interposed itself between Britain and its French enemy, and the American merchant fleet had paid the price.'
'When the Treaty of Ghent ended the war after thirty-two months of fighting, the Americans had gained none of the aims they had hoped for at the outset, and had bankrupted themselves in the process. Between 1812 and the end of 1814, the American government had collected $35.1m in wartime taxes, at the same time spending $86.7m, creating a $51.6m shortfall. Over the same period, it had sought to borrow $62.5m by selling government stock, of which it appears to have received only $42.6m, probably worth less than half that value in specie. The Treasury's short-term loan notes had changed hands only at discount, and calls for loans had fallen short of their targets, even when the securities were sold far below par. Before the negotiated peace of 1815, the government's credit worthiness had collapsed.'
'American awareness that the currently under-employed state of their merchant fleet made it less useful for the United States to retain foreign seamen, may have contributed to American preparedness to forgo insistence on a formal solution to what had earlier been seen as a "crying enormity". The issue of impressment had been abandoned by Madison's cabinet in late June 1814 when it became clear that nothing would come of the administration's penultimate wartime attempt to borrow money, not even enough to maintain current expenditure. Between June and December 1814, Madison had come to understand that during this war with Britain, unlike the last one, no financial, material, or even diplomatic help from France would now be forthcoming. Nor, despite an urgent application, would any financial help come from a country like Holland, recently liberated from the French, but unwilling to lend to a United States unable to defend its foreign trade, maintain overseas communications, or keep the enemy out of its capital. Nor was Russia, itself still in receipt of British loans and subsidies, in any position to offer financial or military help to America, or repeat the offer, earlier rejected by Britain, to mediate between the United States and its enemy in the hope of winning concessions for trading neutrals in wartime.'
'a House of Representatives Committee on Naval Affairs referred to British commercial blockade as long after the Anglo-American war as 1842. At a time when a series of diplomatic incidents made another war with Britain a possibility, the Committee expressed concern over the defencelessness of the southern and Gulf of Mexico ports, vital not only for American international, but also internal trade. Their report, dated 12 May 1842 concluded, "If you desire to measure the hazard to which a maritime war with a formidable naval Power would expose this commerce, you have but to consult the testimony of experience."'
Would the US be fighting alone? Russia was cool towards the Confederacy and had an abiding dislike of the French. And the Russians had access to most of Asia. What were the sympathies of Prussia and the German states? They subscribed a small loan to the US and they also harbored a general dislike of anything French.
The point is that it wasn't 1810 any longer. The US had full access to the Great Lakes, a railroad across the Isthmus of Panama, a telegraph line to California, the largest railroad network in the world, and by October it was clearly the stronger power, with the much larger population, control of virtually all of the cities and in military control of the west.
British interference was not going to quickly restore cotton exports from the key cotton producing areas, but probably would end American exports of grain on railroads in the US and Canada owned in part by British investors. And what would the British gain? All the work done for 70 years to give the British Empire some higher moral purpose than being the largest slave empire the world had ever seen, would be seriously weakened.
The US was the better customer, had more British investments, had more recent Irish and English immigrants, and vastly more prospects for expansion.
Agree - BC wouldn't have contributed much to the effort, nor could it.
You gloss over the internal juggling act regarding the actual and perceived differences between "UC" and "LC". Pointing to Confederation following 1867, the Fenians, etc proves diddly about those differences in the British colonial model previously in place. These things are neat to go back and forth on but Power Point slides don't decide realities. The point is that Britain/Palmerston had a number of reasons for not blithely converting "Canada" into a massive launching stage for the British Army.