Book: Last Chance For Victory

Lee has Anderson and 7,000 fresh troops. Anderson was puzzelled as to why Lee did not immediately order him into action.

I think a lot of it goes back to Lee not knowing exactly what was out there. He wasn't going to commit his last reserves present to a major assault without having some knowledge of what lay before him.

R
 
He did have A.P. Hill to use, albeit some brigades bloodied - but Hill said to Lee his men had been used up and needed a break (paraphrase), which wasn't necessarily true - besides which, Hill's men could not have been any more used up then the 1st & 11th Corps of the Union that had fought them, and retreated from them. Why Lee accepted this excuse, is a mystery.

Hill performed so much better under Jackson. I doubt Hill would've even tried that excuse on Jackson.

Lee need Jackson badly. His death left Lee with three Corps commanders to watch after. Jackson was needed to light a fire under Hill and Ewell, then Lee would only have Longstreet to deal with.:unsure:

I love this one:

"...I want you to distinctly understand that you must obey my orders first, and reason about them afterwards. Consider your- self under arrest, sir, and march in the rear of your brigade."
 
Hill performed so much better under Jackson. I doubt Hill would've even tried that excuse on Jackson.

Lee need Jackson badly. His death left Lee with three Corps commanders to watch after. Jackson was needed to light a fire under Hill and Ewell, then Lee would only have Longstreet to deal with.:unsure:

I love this one:

"...I want you to distinctly understand that you must obey my orders first, and reason about them afterwards. Consider your- self under arrest, sir, and march in the rear of your brigade."

(Disclaimer - big fan of Longstreet - but call 'em like I see 'em :wink:). I'll put my neck out on that one - Lee's finest hours and victories was when he had Jackson - and yes, Jackson was not faultless - and the juries still out on the what-if ( which my counterpoint always is - what - if Grant was there, or Thomas etc.). In regards to Ewell - I believe his appointment to Corps command had a lot to do with Jackson, as such was said after his wounding - Ewell must have had something to have that sponsorship. Hill was exceptional as a Division commander - yet, IMO, had weakness as a Corps commander - but - once again, Old Blue Light called out for Hill in his delirium towards the end. Lee's laissez-faire style of command was a weakness at Gettysburg - especially with those two - as you said - they needed a firmer hand guiding them.
 
Hill performed so much better under Jackson. I doubt Hill would've even tried that excuse on Jackson.

Lee need Jackson badly. His death left Lee with three Corps commanders to watch after. Jackson was needed to light a fire under Hill and Ewell, then Lee would only have Longstreet to deal with.:unsure:

I love this one:

"...I want you to distinctly understand that you must obey my orders first, and reason about them afterwards. Consider your- self under arrest, sir, and march in the rear of your brigade."

I think the stress of corps command was Hill's major problem, healthwise. He's basically unwell for the rest of the war and, on several occasions, had to give up his command because of his health. Hill might've been his old self if he'd stayed a division commander. Ewell though, in my opinion, gets a bad rep as a corps commander. Gettysburg is really the only blip on the radar where he seems slow and indecisive (although I think he made the right call on 1 July). Up until Gettysburg he had been doing rather well and performed well afterwards.

In the end, I'm not so sure that Jackson would have performed much better than Ewell at Gettysburg. He had a rather mixed track record tactically.

R
 
(Disclaimer - big fan of Longstreet - but call 'em like I see 'em :wink:). I'll put my neck out on that one - Lee's finest hours and victories was when he had Jackson - and yes, Jackson was not faultless - and the juries still out on the what-if ( which my counterpoint always is - what - if Grant was there, or Thomas etc.). In regards to Ewell - I believe his appointment to Corps command had a lot to do with Jackson, as such was said after his wounding - Ewell must have had something to have that sponsorship. Hill was exceptional as a Division commander - yet, IMO, had weakness as a Corps commander - but - once again, Old Blue Light called out for Hill in his delirium towards the end. Lee's laissez-faire style of command was a weakness at Gettysburg - especially with those two - as you said - they needed a firmer hand guiding them.

No question that Hill was one of the best division commanders the war produced. He just wasn't cut out for the stress of corps command. For much of the war as a corps commander, he was a complete non-entity.

R
 
I think the stress of corps command was Hill's major problem, healthwise. He's basically unwell for the rest of the war and, on several occasions, had to give up his command because of his health. Hill might've been his old self if he'd stayed a division commander. Ewell though, in my opinion, gets a bad rep as a corps commander. Gettysburg is really the only blip on the radar where he seems slow and indecisive (although I think he made the right call on 1 July). Up until Gettysburg he had been doing rather well and performed well afterwards.

In the end, I'm not so sure that Jackson would have performed much better than Ewell at Gettysburg. He had a rather mixed track record tactically.

R

I think that we can make the argument that Ewell made a safe decision by not attacking Cemetery Hill on July 1. There is evidence to show that he can be forgiven for that one. But, I think that his biggest blunder on July 1 was not having Johnson to occupy Culps Hill earlier when they had the opportunity. And they did have that opportunity. When Johnson was ordered to scale the heights he discovered that it was too late, the federals were there. Ewell had stopped him earlier to investigate an unknown force east of town (turned out to be some of Gordons men). Ewell ordered Johnson to occupy the foot of the slope. He did this for two reasons: he wanted Johnson to reconnoiter and he was unsure that Johnson should camp on top in case he needed to evacuate. Johnson occupied the foot and stayed there because of a captured note saying that other federals were on the way. By the time Johnson sent up scouts he discovered that the federals had the hill occupied. When Ewell last met with Lee he had told him of the opportunity of occupying Culps Hill. This played a factor in Lee finally determing that Longstreet would attack on the right and he would forgo any thoughts of shifting Ewell to the right. Ewell told Lee that he would occupy the hill but he had lost his opportunity. I think with this blunder the Confederates had lost their best opportunity for victory. The Confederates really messed this one up.
 
I think a lot of it goes back to Lee not knowing exactly what was out there. He wasn't going to commit his last reserves present to a major assault without having some knowledge of what lay before him.

R
Well,that's Lee's error. Lee has Hood and Mclaws coming up,over the same route, that Anderson has,just, travelled. The only chance of taking Cemetary ridge with 43 artillery pieces and 4,000-5,000 defenders is to use Andersons's fresh troops. And.......It's not a very good chance,even at that. Jackson would have hurled Anderson at Cemetary Hill.
 
(Disclaimer - big fan of Longstreet - but call 'em like I see 'em :wink:). I'll put my neck out on that one - Lee's finest hours and victories was when he had Jackson - and yes, Jackson was not faultless - and the juries still out on the what-if ( which my counterpoint always is - what - if Grant was there, or Thomas etc.). In regards to Ewell - I believe his appointment to Corps command had a lot to do with Jackson, as such was said after his wounding - Ewell must have had something to have that sponsorship. Hill was exceptional as a Division commander - yet, IMO, had weakness as a Corps commander - but - once again, Old Blue Light called out for Hill in his delirium towards the end. Lee's laissez-faire style of command was a weakness at Gettysburg - especially with those two - as you said - they needed a firmer hand guiding them.

Oldpete, I'd never figured you to be a Longstreet fan.:D I agree that Jackson wasn't faultless but what he did have was Lee's confidence. You never again see Lee boldly dividing his forces in the presence of superior numbers, after Jackson's death. Never again a Second Manassas or Chancellorsville. I just don't envision a battle at Gettysburg with Jackson along.

As far as Grant and Thomas, well... I've never been thrilled by either's tactical ability. They were great on the defense but Grant showed his tactical weakness at the Wilderness. I think a Lee/Jackson/Longstreet combination would've smashed him there. I just shake my head when I look at how he had his forces arrayed, especially both flanks in the air. At least Hooker only had one in the air when in the same position, plus Hooker had Sedgewick in Lee's rear at Fredericksburg and that was what kept Hooker from having the majority of his army destroyed. Grant didn't have that threat in Lee's rear.
 
Oldpete, I'd never figured you to be a Longstreet fan.:D I agree that Jackson wasn't faultless but what he did have was Lee's confidence. You never again see Lee boldly dividing his forces in the presence of superior numbers, after Jackson's death. Never again a Second Manassas or Chancellorsville. I just don't envision a battle at Gettysburg with Jackson along.

As far as Grant and Thomas, well... I've never been thrilled by either's tactical ability. They were great on the defense but Grant showed his tactical weakness at the Wilderness. I think a Lee/Jackson/Longstreet combination would've smashed him there. I just shake my head when I look at how he had his forces arrayed, especially both flanks in the air. At least Hooker only had one in the air when in the same position, plus Hooker had Sedgewick in Lee's rear at Fredericksburg and that was what kept Hooker from having the majority of his army destroyed. Grant didn't have that threat in Lee's rear.
Agreed. Hooker had a chance to be the "hero" of the Union army - great administrative skills, took care of the army and was willing to brawl - but then he froze up - plus his rising star was always trying to be extinguished by Halleck. IMO - Grant did have a breaking in period - he was used to the Arny of the West, but his tenacity (ala Lee), is what brought him to the forefront. Both Lee & Grant were willing to sacrifice men for the greater good, and that has to be one of the hardest things to do as "the boss" (and it sure doesn't help the guy in the ranks :wink:).
 
"If I had had Stonewall Jackson with me, so far as man can see, I should have won the battle of Gettysburg."
General Robert E. Lee

His words not mine.

Yes. Supposedly spoken years after the war in private to a cousin at a kitchen table. So, it's origin is actually quite speculative.

""Oh, for the presence and inspiration of Old Jack......"
Sandie Pendleton after Ewell had refused Gordon's request to join in with his brigade to take that hill.

And Sandie Pendleton was positive about Ewell after Second Winchester. Remember that Gordon was one of the few Second Corps officers that thought it possible at the time.

Now I have the ORs to cite for you:


O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]

JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.No. 506.--Report of Maj. Gen. R. E. Rodes, U.S. Army, commanding division.

In the pursuit, the division captured about 2,500 prisoners--so many as to embarrass its movements materially.

The troops, being greatly exhausted by their march and somewhat disorganized by the hot engagement and rapid pursuit, were halted and prepared for further action. I did not change their position materially, nor order another attack, for the following reasons: 1st, in the midst of the engagement just described, the corps commander informed me, through one of his officers, that the general commanding did not wish a general engagement brought on, and hence, had it been possible to do so then, I would have stopped the attack at once; but this, of course, it was impossible to do then; 2d, before the completion of his defeat before the town, the enemy had begun to establish a line of battle on the heights back of the town, and by the time my line was in a condition to renew the attack, he displayed quite a formidable line of infantry and artillery immediately in my front, extending smartly to my right, and as far as I could see to my left, in front of Early. To have attacked this line with my division alone, diminished as it had been by a loss of 2,500 men, would have been absurd. Seeing no Confederate troops at all on my right; finding that General Early, whom I encountered in the streets of the town within thirty minutes after its occupation by our forces, was awaiting further instructions, and, receiving no orders to advance, though my superiors were upon the ground, I concluded that the order not to bring on a general engagement was still in force, and hence placed my lines and skirmishers in a defensive attitude, and determined to await orders or further movements either on the part of Early or of the troops on my right.



O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]

JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.No. 467.--Report of Lieut. Gen. Richard S. Ewell, C. S. Army, commanding Second Army Corps.

General Gordon mentions that 300 of the enemy's dead were left on the ground passed over by his brigade. The enemy had entirely abandoned the north end of the town, and Early entering by the York Railroad at the same time that Rodes came in on the Cashtown road, they together captured over 4,000 prisoners and three pieces of artillery, two of which fell into the hands of Early's division. So far as I can learn, no other troops than those of this corps entered the town at all. My loss on this day was less than 2,900 killed, wounded, and missing.

The enemy had fallen back to a commanding position known as Cemetery Hill, south of Gettysburg, and quickly showed a formidable front there. On entering the town, I received a message from the commanding general to attack this hill, if I could do so to advantage. I could not bring artillery to bear on it, and all the troops with me were jaded by twelve hours' marching and fighting, and I was notified that General Johnson's division (the only one of my corps that had not been engaged) was close to the town.

Cemetery Hill was not assailable from the town, and I determined, with Johnson's division, to take possession of a wooded hill to my left, on a line with and commanding Cemetery Hill. Before Johnson got up, the enemy was reported moving to outflank our extreme left, and I could see that seemed to be his skirmishers in that direction. Before this report could be investigated by Lieut. T. T. Turner, aide-de-camp of my staff, and Lieut. Robert D. Early, sent for that purpose, and Johnson placed in position, the night was far advanced.





O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]

JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.No. 426.--Reports of General Robert E. Lee, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Northern Virginia.

It was ascertained from the prisoners that we had been engaged with two corps of the army formerly commanded by General Hooker, and that the remainder of that army, under General Meade, was approaching Gettysburg. Without information as to its proximity, the strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened and exhausted by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops. General Ewell was, therefore, instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were ordered to hasten forward. He decided to await Johnson's division, which had marched from Carlisle by the road west of the mountains to guard the trains of his corps, and consequently did not reach Gettysburg until a late hour.
 
Yes. Supposedly spoken years after the war in private to a cousin at a kitchen table. So, it's origin is actually quite speculative.



And Sandie Pendleton was positive about Ewell after Second Winchester. Remember that Gordon was one of the few Second Corps officers that thought it possible at the time.

Now I have the ORs to cite for you:



Thank you for your posts. Very informative. The debate and information available in this thread has been outstanding.
 
Thank you for your posts. Very informative. The debate and information available in this thread has been outstanding.

I also truly appreciate the insight I'm gaining on this thread from all - whether agreeing or disagreeing - learn more from the esteemed members viewpoints than most of the printed books. Your critiques and stances are just as vaild as any historical author - and gives an oppurtunity to question those points - the books are silent :wink:
 
I also truly appreciate the insight I'm gaining on this thread from all - whether agreeing or disagreeing - learn more from the esteemed members viewpoints than most of the printed books. Your critiques and stances are just as vaild as any historical author - and gives an oppurtunity to question those points - the books are silent :wink:

I totally agree Oldpete. Isn't it amazing what you can learn when the debate is civil and common courtesy is shown? You may not agree with all viewpoints or analysis, but you can do it in without namecalling and showing other members respect. I just love threads like this.:thumbsup:
 
I totally agree Oldpete. Isn't it amazing what you can learn when the debate is civil and common courtesy is shown? You may not agree with all viewpoints or analysis, but you can do it in without namecalling and showing other members respect. I just love threads like this.:thumbsup:
Amen to that !! A breath of fresh air in a sea of controversy :wink:
 
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