What was the Biggest "Missed Opportunity" of the War?

JeffBrooks

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There are several occasions over the course of the war when, if a commander had made a different decision or had simply had better luck, they might have inflicted a decisive defeat on the opposing forces and, perhaps, changed the course of American history. Sometimes this is due to a lack of boldness, or not having enough information, or sheer exhaustion, or (as Shakespeare would have put it) simply the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune.

What are the biggest missed opportunities of the war?

McClellan at Yorktown or the afternoon of Antietam?
Lee at Glendale?
Meade at Gettysburg on July 4?
Hindman at McLemore's Cove?
Johnston/Hood at Cassville?
Lee at the North Anna River?
Hood at Spring Hill?
Something else?
 
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Yes, major blunders by Johnston, then Sherman, then McPherson. I didn't know that Johnston's engineer was captured. Too bad Johnston couldn't have thought to post a couple of brigades at Snake Creek Gap.

The captured engineer was off to the East of Dalton, the side away from Snake Creek Gap. There may have been another over to the western side.

Joe Wheeler was technically in charge of covering the area around Snake Creek Gap. I am not a Joe Wheeler fan. Brave enough and probably a good-enough guy (Forrest liked him, but did not want to be under him). Wheeler was the sort of commander who got worse the further away from HQ he was. I generally think he should never have been sent more than a day's ride away. Johnston was...
Thomas had been in situations with much more responsibility over a long period of time.
...
The point about McPherson is that in May 1864 he is about to face his first serious test in independent command at a high level.

Perhaps Thomas had, but that is still different than arguing that McPherson "is inexperienced at high command, particularly independent command".

The point about McPherson is that in May 1864 he was experienced and knowledgeable; he personally observed Resaca and probed it with his forces and seeing what he found he pulled back. "inexperience" just simply was not a factor.

The idea that Thomas would have aggressively attacked Resaca seems to me just fantasy based on no actual part of Thomas's service or style. Arguing that Thomas "stressed preparation" may be true but that doesnt explain how things would have gone differently. Would he have have asked Sherman to postpone the campaign for a week while he prepared?
McPherson's lack of cavalry was a real issue and I wonder why Garrard's division was so delayed (which Sherman had instructed to support McPherson). Extra preparation should have been done to have it there on time, but thats on Sherman rather than being a McPherson v Thomas issue.

You bring up Jackson as a what if -- at Harpers Ferry he took a day to position artillery around the town so he could bombard it. McPherson didnt have an extra days and artillery to do that; at Glendale/White Oak Swamp, Jackson took a look at the situation and decided to take a nap.
 
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Perhaps Thomas had, but that is still different than arguing that McPherson "is inexperienced at high command, particularly independent command".

The point about McPherson is that in May 1864 he was experienced and knowledgeable; he personally observed Resaca and probed it with his forces and seeing what he found he pulled back. "inexperience" just simply was not a factor.
I would say it is a strong reason why Sherman should have let Thomas execute Thomas' plan, instead of assigning it to the much less experienced McPherson with insufficient forces. That is why McPherson ends up outside Resaca -- out on a limb with insufficient forces, particularly cavalry, after lucking into a poorly defended Snake Creek Gap.

The whole reason for this is simple. While Sherman was off in Mississippi (back with McPherson) on the Meridian expedition February 3 to March 6), Thomas was in command south of Chattanooga. Thomas advanced with 25,000 men (February 22-27) to find out what Joe Johnston and the AoT (about 40,000) were doing. Johnston had sent 2 divisions off to other areas, so the purpose of this mission is probably to see if the AoT is strong enough to fight, but also to pressure Johnston so he cannot send more troops to act against Sherman in Mississippi (where Forrest was smashing Sooy Smith at West Point(February 21) and Okolona (February 22)).

Thomas came through Dug Gap (which was unguarded), leading to a little thing called the First Battle of Dalton (really a series of skirmishes). Thomas took about 300 casualties, Johnston about 140-150. Thomas saw that this position was too tough to come at head-on. He also discovered there was a route through Villanow and Snake Creek Gap (also unguarded) to get around Dalton/Rocky Face Ridge) and advance on Resaca to cut Johnston's LOC/RR.

A choice has to be made between Sherman and Thomas to command the Atlanta campaign. Sherman and Thomas were friends and West Point room-mates; Thomas is senior to Sherman as a Major General by a week; Grant likes and trusts Sherman; Grant doesn't like Thomas. Grant appoints Sherman to the command (Thomas also out-ranked Rosecrans in late 1862, but Stanton back-dated his commission to bypass Thomas). This is the situation when Thomas submits his plan to Sherman and Sherman decides to use McPherson and his understrength force to execute it.

McPherson ends up with a too-small force and not enough cavalry, in an unfamiliar area, trying to pull off someone else's plan. He does OK, but he also ends up in a position with a lot of uncertainty. He has decent reasons for not being too aggressive. History just looks at what-might-have-been at Resaca if he had plunged ahead and says he missed an opportunity. If he did, he did it by being prudent. I see Sherman's comment about the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity McPherson missed as at least partially a deflection from responsibility for Sherman. He should have sent Thomas, or he should have given McPherson more to work with.
 
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... While Sherman was off in Mississippi (back with McPherson) on the Meridian expedition February 3 to March 6), Thomas was in command south of Chattanooga. Thomas advanced with 25,000 men (February 22-27) to find out what Joe Johnston and the AoT (about 40,000) were doing. ...
Thomas was in command at Chattanooga but did not himself advance; Palmer did.
After delays brought annoyed messages from Grant, Thomas replied that he was too sick to go, so Palmer was given command of the expedition. Palmer did bring back the intel you refer to.

Given the road constraints, the size of force that could be moved through the gap in a single day was limited. Based on Sherman's instructions to move quickly through, break the railroad, and fall back to be ready to hit the enemy's flank when he retreated, it seems to be that all a larger force would do would be to clog up the road back through the gap that day.

The lack of cavalry was a significant problem. But McPherson's experience level or decision making was not what led to the lack of cavalry. McPherson ended up without cavalry because Sherman (and maybe Thomas since Garrard was part of his command) didnt make sure it was in the right place at the right time.
 
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McClellan at Yorktown or the afternoon of Antietam?
Lee at Glendale?
Meade at Gettysburg on July 4?
Hindman at McLemore's Cove?
Johnston/Hood at Cassville?
Lee at the North Anna River?
Hood at Spring Hill?
Something else?

Hmm...I'd rule out any result that would require commanders to act differently than normal (even after the opportunity was taken). So I'd rule out Antietam, Cassville and North Anna. I think Meade missed an opportunity after GB, but I'm not certain he could have coordinated and pushed the pursuit as effectively as some believe. Spring Hill is too late in the war.

So I'd lean toward Glendale or McLemore's Cove.
On McClellan at Yorktown or the afternoon of Antietam?
  • Yorktown he might have done better earlier, but even if he does it is not a war-winner. It would lead to another pursuit up the Peninsula and Richmond. What happens then will decide the fate of this: another Seven Days? Does Richmond fall?
  • Just a bit more success at Antietam (by just about any Union general) might lead to a decisive Union victory here. If Lee is driven back into the Potomac, it is hard to see how the Confederacy would survive the coming defeats at Perryville, Iuka, Corinth, etc.
On Lee at Glendale?
  • I find I don't have a strong opinion.
Meade at Gettysburg on July 4?
  • I absolutely think Meade would have been justified in risking more, and the possibility of smashing Lee north of the Potomac is worth a lot of risk. I just don't see where there is a lot he can do that looks like a sure-fire thing. The pursuit is actually a good, solid aggressive pursuit. I just wish it had ended with a better result.
Hindman at McLemore's Cove?
One of the many blown opportunities in and around Chickamauga. Changing just about any of them probably wins the biggest Confederate victory of the war, but most of the problems are caused by the Bragg/AoT command-and-control feud/mess. Other than luck, I can't see how to expect this to be much different.​
Johnston/Hood at Cassville?
  • Too hard to say. The whole thing looks sloppy (where was the cavalry that would have made the Union positions clear?), why did Hood just abandon the mission? Could Johnston have just ridden forward and ordered Hood in? Would the attack have actually worked if it had been launched?
Lee at the North Anna River?
  • I think he could have hurt Grant, but I don't think it would have changed the campaign or the war too much.
Hood at Spring Hill?
  • Probably too late in the war. Schofield might have been chopped up, but Thomas could have stood a siege in Nashville if he wanted to do so. Smith's Corps was arriving in the city on the day of the Battle of Franklin.
 
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Thomas was in command at Chattanooga but did not himself advance; Palmer did.
After delays brought annoyed messages from Grant, Thomas replied that he was too sick to go, so Palmer was given command of the expedition. Palmer did bring back the intel you refer to.

Given the road constraints, the size of force that could be moved through the gap in a single day was limited. Based on Sherman's instructions to move quickly through, break the railroad, and fall back to be ready to hit the enemy's flank when he retreated, it seems to be that all a larger force would do would be to clog up the road back through the gap that day.
The lack of cavalry was a significant problem. But McPherson's experience level or decision making was not what led to the lack of cavalry. McPherson ended up without cavalry because Sherman (and maybe Thomas since Garrard was part of his command) didnt make sure it was in the right place at the right time.


Look, I am not sure why you object so strongly to any positive mention of Thomas. if this is what happened, it happened -- and Thomas concluded attacking through Dalton was a bad idea. He developed a different plan in March (IOW, after the First Battle of Dalton), probably because he did not like smacking his head into prepared defenses like Rocky Face Ridge and had all the reports from this recon. By early April, Sherman has received Thomas plan and decided to send McPherson on a wider movement instead. That one becomes a non-starter because Sherman can't get all the troops he wanted for McPherson up in time (he wanted McPherson to have 9 divisions). So Sherman revives Thomas' plan, giving it to McPherson. If McPherson doesn't have enough strength to go on a wide-ranging mission away from the main armies -- why think he has enough strength to pull off a close-in strike into the enemy rear, where he might run into forces too heavy for him to resist?

I have no idea why you are harping on this 'force that could be moved through the gap in a single day" issue. I have not said a word about it. I am talking about sending a stronger force down that route, with more preparations to improve the road and bring forward more troops and supplies. I have not said McPherson was responsible for the lack of cavalry -- I have said Sherman should have reinforced him and sent more cavalry to him. We would normally expect cavalry at the front of an expedition like this -- but it isn't there in any large force. On the 9th, McPherson wrote "If I could have had a division of good cavalry I could have broken the railroad at some point." McPherson writes at 5 PM on the 10th that Kilpatrick has just arrived and he expects Garrard soon. He needed them (or some good part of them) leading the way through Snake Creek Gap on the 9th.

One company of mounted men got to the RR, but inflicted no damage and retreated. McPherson decides in this situation he should pull back and prepare a defensive position because:
  1. His left flank is too exposed to attack from reinforcements coming from Dalton (six good roads)
  2. He is out of provisions, needs rest, has no cavalry except 1 regiment, and needs an infantry division from Hooker.
That might be prudent or cautious -- but generally it could have been discussed and resolved before McPherson started. An attack by reinforcements coming from Dalton is not hard to predict. Requests for cavalry could have been handled in April and early May, as could the need for an extra division of infantry. Preparations for supplies and roadwork can be arranged before you start, although unexpected difficulties will crop up in any plan. Having your advance troops out of food three days into a planned deep penetration move is puzzling.

Traffic management on the road would be McPherson's responsibility (probably through delegation) and the arrangements for that would be resolved before the march started.
 
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Irvin McDowell for making the first battle of the war to complicated for green troops to carry out.

Lee / Longstreet at Gettysburg - After the first day they should have moved to a defensive position at Emmitsburg forcing Meade to attack them. On July 2 Longstreet had the opportunity to take Big Round Top to mount some artillery to strike the length of Cemetery Ridge.

McLellan / Couch's Division 4th Corps, moving to the sound of battle and hitting Lee from the far left.

Meade / Burnside not using the USCT at the "Crater" to exploit the breakthrough (which they were trained to do).

Protecting Jackson at Chancellorsville, Sedgwick understanding that you don't need to be an elephant to be shot, Albert Sidney Johnston should have used his tourniquet...
 
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Grant when he crossed the James could have walked into Petersburg with very little opposition. The war in the east would have likely been over in 1864.
McClellan the morning (or all day) at Sharpsburg. He knew Lee was greatly outnumbered (especially in the morning) and his forces were divided and still could not deliver anything close to a knockout blow.
 
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I'm not a big "what if'er" however, I do like this....

I looked through all three pages and don't think anyone mentioned Jubal Early at Cedar Creek...that is a big one for me. Although I agree with Gary Gallagher that both Early and Gordon should carry some blame for not routing Wright in the morning, I think that might have effected the election? Or at least effected Meade (Grant) at Petersburg? I just think that was a huge miss...

And I am not up on the Western Theater, but what about Beauregard on the first day of Shiloh? I know the Hornet's Nest was probably decisive, but was there a way he could have defeated Grant before ole Don Carlos arrived? I don't know.

And no one has mentioned Lee not listening to Longstreet at Gettysburg. I have to agree with Sears that Longstreet is the one Corps commander Lee should have listened to and didn't? I'm not saying the flank attack around the Roundtops would have worked with Sedgwick arriving, but I do believe pulling out and finding high ground of their own would have been the right move. I think it was in D. S. Freeman's account that I read about the exchange between Lee and Longstreet arguing on the first day as they arrived at Gettysburg...made famous in the movie...where Lee disagrees with Longstreet's suggestion to find ground of their own choosing and says, "If the enemy is there tomorrow, we must attack him.." I realize that "old soldier" accounts muddle actual history, and what actually happened is debatable, I just think Lee should have known better then to have attacked on the 2nd and 3rd? Jeffrey Wert wrote an excellent article about this issue and I believe he concluded that Longstreet did deserve some criticism for his sloth, but was ultimately right and Lee should have listened.

And, again I am not big on the Western theater, but shouldn't Johnston at Jackson, MS and Pemberton at Vicksburg, MS been able to somehow defeat Grant? Or was Grant just that good, which is what I believe.

Fun thread....
 
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There are several occasions over the course of the war when, if a commander had made a different decision or had simply had better luck, they might have inflicted a decisive defeat on the opposing forces and, perhaps, changed the course of American history.
Well, based off of your opening sentence that has two possible outcomes, I would certainly say that Spring Hill could have resulted in a decisive defeat of Schofield's force by the Army of Tennessee.
 
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Hmmm...maybe. If Butler had been more successful in May 1864 wouldn't that have just meant the siege of Richmond would have begun earlier than it did? If very,very successful, Butler would shortened the war by, what, six months?
A successful Butler would have taken Petersburg. When Grant arrived, it would have been to attack Richmond, not Petersburg. With Grant's army around Richmond, it would have been easy to break the railroad supply lines into the city. Lee would have to abandon Richmond quickly or loose the city and his army by the end of the summer.
 
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An attack by reinforcements coming from Dalton is not hard to predict. Requests for cavalry could have been handled in April and early May, as could the need for an extra division of infantry. Preparations for supplies and roadwork can be arranged before you start, although unexpected difficulties will crop up in any plan. Having your advance troops out of food three days into a planned deep penetration move is puzzling.
Prior intel did not fully identify all the roads between Dalton and the Resaca/Sugar Valley area including the fact that Johnston had improved these roads such that he could move forces more readily between the two. As such, the extent of a possible attack from Dalton was hard to predict until the roads were seen

Requests for cavalry could have been handled earlier but were not. For whatever reason Sherman did not have the cavalry available for McPherson when he arrived, so McPherson had to press out without it. Swapping McPherson for a different commander wouldnt rectify this -- the change needed to come from Sherman etal earlier.

Extra infantry and supplies all require road capacity. You commented earlier that you "have no idea why you are harping on this 'force that could be moved through the gap in a single day'". I do that becuase it relates to the size of force and the movement of supplies. At dawn on the 9th, McPherson had the 16th Corps in the gap and the 15th Corps on the west side of the gap. As the day begins the front of the 16th exists the gap and moves toward Resaca and the 15th enters the western end of the gap. Its about 12 miles from the western end of the gap to the outskirts of Resaca with only a single road to follow - parallel tracks are not an option. As such the number of men who could be moved in a single day is critical. Stacking another infantry division (or several) at the back of the line wont get within miles of Resaca on the first day. And putting supply wagons earlier in the column might bring supplies to the front units sooner but it would create more space between the front units and the rear units. Stopping to do roadwork helps units moving later (which was done to prepare for the rest of the army to arrive) but wont change the movement of the first units, other than to add delays by stopping. And there was no opportunity to improve the road through the gap prior to the campaign. So the throughput of the road the first day is a constraint
 
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Prior intel did not fully identify all the roads between Dalton and the Resaca/Sugar Valley area including the fact that Johnston had improved these roads such that he could move forces more readily between the two. As such, the extent of a possible attack from Dalton was hard to predict until the roads were seen
Surely the Yankees knew there were roads between those two places as well, even if they had not identified all of them in advance. If they did not know that Johnston had improved his roads, they surely should have suspected that he might have. Many of the remedies that Johnston took to improve his logistics that Winter are identical to the measures Sherman took to improve his logistics -- because they had both graduated from West Point, both served in the same Army, and both been supply officers during their careers.

Joe Johnston also had complete control of the Western & Atlantic RR in that area. He can move troops by rail from Dalton to Resaca very quickly. Johnston could also use the W&A to move troops from Dalton by rail through Resaca and Calhoun to Rome rapidly, in case Sherman had been able to send McPherson towards Rome (Sherman's initial plan, foiled because 4 divisions Sherman was planning on did not arrive).

When Johnston hears that Yankees have shown up at Resaca, he has just returned to his HQ at 9 PM; Hood has returned with him. Johnston orders Hood to Resaca with 3 divisions (2 from Hardee). The next morning, Hood is in Resaca, messaging Johnston that the Yankees have pulled back and there is no problem there. By afternoon, Hood is back in Dalton and the division that went to Resaca is returning to Dalton; the other two were stopped on the way at Tilton.

Sherman, McPherson and their staffs would be incompetently dense if they did not think about Confederate reinforcements moving down from Dalton quickly while they were planning this operation. It was probably a major reason Sherman's instructions envisioned McPherson breaking the RR and then pulling back. As a reason to suddenly be concerned once McPherson arrives at Resaca, it is a smokescreen.
Requests for cavalry could have been handled earlier but were not. For whatever reason Sherman did not have the cavalry available for McPherson when he arrived, so McPherson had to press out without it. Swapping McPherson for a different commander wouldnt rectify this -- the change needed to come from Sherman etal earlier.
The time for ***McPherson*** to bring it up is in late April -- not in a message from the battlefield on May 9.

Sherman had taken control of the cavalry for himself. He has four divisions of it. The cavalry was dispersed for the Winter, just as Wheeler's cavalry was (supposedly 10,000 strong, but only about 2,500 with their horses; the horses were moved to valleys south of the main army for logistics reasons). Two of those four divisions were not ready to move promptly at the start of the campaign -- just as four divisions of infantry were not for other reasons (Smith's 2 held up by Banks; Blair's 2 up in IL-IN-OH recruiting/resting).

McPherson is responsible for his own actions. He is commanding at the army level now. If he thought he needed cavalry, he should have made a strong effort to get it before he started. If he did not think he needed more than a regiment of cavalry as he led his army deep into the enemy rear, he was missing quite a bit. Once again, telling Sherman he should have had more cavalry on May 9 is way too late; telling Sherman he needed a brigade or a division back in April is what McPherson needed to do.
 
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Sherman, McPherson and their staffs would be incompetently dense if they did not think about Confederate reinforcements moving down from Dalton quickly while they were planning this operation.
So this could be just as expected if the move was led by Thomas (whose staff was responsible for a lot of the intel and planning), undercutting your original argument

The time for ***McPherson*** to bring it up is in late April -- not in a message from the battlefield on May 9.
How could he bring up in April the fact that Garrard would be late in May? Are you saying he should be psychic now too? Sherman only told McPherson the new plan at the start of May, a plan that included Garrard's cavalry division meeting him to support the move, so again blaming McPherson for not discussing the plan back in April when it had even been presented to him yet is just silly.
So much effort just to blame McPherson.
 
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So this could be just as expected if the move was led by Thomas (whose staff was responsible for a lot of the intel and planning), undercutting your original argument

Yes. So what? Sherman is making the plan and McPherson is executing it. If they did not make these normal deductions, Sherman and McPherson are responsible for it. Why do you feel this need to blame Thomas for anything you can while white-washing McPherson of all responsibility for his normal tasks?

How could he bring up in April the fact that Garrard would be late in May? Are you saying he should be psychic now too? Sherman only told McPherson the new plan at the start of May, a plan that included Garrard's cavalry division meeting him to support the move, so again blaming McPherson for not discussing the plan back in April when it had even been presented to him yet is just silly.
So much effort just to blame McPherson.

In April, McPherson needs to be discussing the situation with Sherman at every chance he can find. In April, the plan is for McPherson to move on Rome. McPherson would have still needed cavalry for that mission. McPherson still needed to be advocating for cavalry in April.

When Sherman changes that plan, because the rest of his Army of the Tennessee will not be arriving in time to start the campaign, McPherson has ***another*** opportunity to press for more cavalry if he has not done so already. If McPherson needs cavalry he does not have, this is when Garrard needs to be asking for it.

On April 30, Garrard was in Columbia, TN when he receives the order to move to join the army at Dalton. He leaves immediately with his available troopers (Long's brigade is left behind). His route is through Bridgeport, then over Sand and Lookout Mountains, to Lafayette, joining the army at Villanow on May 10. McPherson must have been aware of this. Did he wait for Garrard? Did he protest starting without him to Sherman? Or did he simply head off on his mission without the cavalry he later says he needed?

Again, why does McPherson bear no responsibility for his own actions? Are you saying he only figures out he needs cavalry when he gets to Resaca?
 
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Extra infantry and supplies all require road capacity. You commented earlier that you "have no idea why you are harping on this 'force that could be moved through the gap in a single day'". I do that becuase it relates to the size of force and the movement of supplies. At dawn on the 9th, McPherson had the 16th Corps in the gap and the 15th Corps on the west side of the gap. As the day begins the front of the 16th exists the gap and moves toward Resaca and the 15th enters the western end of the gap. Its about 12 miles from the western end of the gap to the outskirts of Resaca with only a single road to follow - parallel tracks are not an option. As such the number of men who could be moved in a single day is critical. Stacking another infantry division (or several) at the back of the line wont get within miles of Resaca on the first day. And putting supply wagons earlier in the column might bring supplies to the front units sooner but it would create more space between the front units and the rear units. Stopping to do roadwork helps units moving later (which was done to prepare for the rest of the army to arrive) but wont change the movement of the first units, other than to add delays by stopping. And there was no opportunity to improve the road through the gap prior to the campaign. So the throughput of the road the first day is a constraint
Please note that immediately after McPherson pulls back, Sherman moves Thomas AoC down this same road through Snake Creek Gap to attack Resaca. Obviously it was possible to move very large numbers of troops over these roads in the same time period. If the mission had been launched with more support at the start, he would not have needed to suddenly ask for a division of Hooker's late on the 9th -- it could have already been on the road, right behind McPherson's own troops.

If he needed additional pioneers to improve the roads, he needed to ask Sherman for them (do not talk about Thomas -- Sherman had already taken the AoC's 1500 strong Pioneer Brigade away for his own purposes). In fact, McPherson's men have the best pioneer force available because Grant had organized it back in 1862.

On roadwork, of course the advance does not follow behind the road crews. However you want the roadcrews improving the roads as soon as you can, you organize in advance and you push them forward, because the quicker you improve the road, the quicker you will get the supplies and reinforcements you need.

McPherson's immediate problem is not a lack of infantry. More than anything, he is reacting to the uncertainty of his position. He has no cavalry to speak of -- which means he is stopping his infantry columns and sending infantry patrols out in place of the cavalry -- which slows his movement. He cannot post cavalry to screen his left against the Confederate reinforcements that might come. He cannot send a strong cavalry force ahead to push the Confederates. He cannot send a strong cavalry force to the right to get around Resaca. The reason is he only has a single regiment of troopers. The solution to this was to push for the cavalry before he started, not to lament their lack when he was deep in enemy territory.

We know McPherson knew about these issues because he wrote to Sherman about them from the battlefield. What did he do about them before he started?
 
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Please note that immediately after McPherson pulls back, Sherman moves Thomas AoC down this same road through Snake Creek Gap to attack Resaca. Obviously it was possible to move very large numbers of troops over these roads in the same time period.
First, McPherson's men improved the road through the gap after they went through so its capacity got better, but more importantly the volume of men per day that were moved on a given road segment was not larger than the volume of men that McPherson had moved on the first day; there were just more days of movement. Given more days, of course a larger force could cover the same ground.


We know McPherson knew about these issues because he wrote to Sherman about them from the battlefield. What did he do about them before he started?

In April, Sherman wrote to Grant "McPherson has no cavalry, but I have taken one of Thomas's divisions, viz., Garrard's, six thousand strong, which is now at Colombia, mounting, equipping, and preparing. I design this division to operate on McPherson's right, rear, or front, according as the enemy appears."
On May 4th he tells Garrard he will report to McPherson.
On May 5th he tells McPherson of the plan to move through Snake Creek Gap and tells him that Garrard will join him before he moves through it.
May 8 McPherson is approaching west side of gap and expresses concern to Sherman that there is no news from Garrard; Sherman write to Garrard to hurry up
Early on the May 9 McPherson makes his move through the gap and writes Sherman that again he has not heard from Garrard. Sherman wrote back that Garrard would "surely be with you to-day", but he was not.
Late on the 9th McPherson writes Sherman that if he had a division of cavalry he could have done more but Garrard still hasnt shown up and is reportedly resting a days march away, meanwhile Kilpatrick with his cavalry would like to make a try at the railroad and McPherson can move forward again especially if Hooker will hold the gap so he can move more men.
May 10th Sherman wrote him back that "Garrard has moved so slow that I doubt if he has the dash we need in a cavalry officer" and that McPherson should stay put for a day or so.

Are you saying he should have waited for Garrard to show up instead of executing his mission as instructed by Sherman with the resources he has available? How does that show more aggressive action (which was your original criticism, before goalposts were moved)?
 
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