Before The Seven Days - The Advance to the Chickahominy.

1SGDan

Major
Joined
Dec 13, 2009
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New Hampshire
Introduction
The Peninsula Campaign has been subject to much interest among Civil War fans. The design of the campaign and the reaction to it make for an excellent study in command philosophies and military decision making. The armies that fought during this campaign were far from experienced warriors and the commanders, for the most part, had yet to prove themselves. There were mistakes at all levels as the soldiers and their leaders learned the lessons of war the hard way. This training process turned the campaign into one of the bloodiest of the war.

The Seven Days battles and the ascension of Robert E. Lee to command of the Confederate defense of Richmond garners the bulk of the attention for this campaign. Somewhat lost in this focus is the advance of the Army of the Potomac to the Chickahominy River. The two and a half months that led up to the climatic series of battles should not be ignored. The period featured an amphibious operation that brought nearly 100,000 men into enemy territory, a fabulous ruse by a badly outnumbered enemy that delayed the advance while defenders for Richmond could be organized, a siege, a series of small battles, and the second bloodiest battle of the entire campaign at Seven Pines (Fair Oaks). In the end one leader rose to prominence while another fell from grace. It all began in the period of 4 April to 24 June.
 
Designing the Campaign.
The basic premise of MG George McClellan's proposed move into Virginia was that the best way to protect Washington was to force the Confederate troops to defend their own capital. The defense of their capital would lead to one grand battle that would settle the issue of the rebellion. The concept was fundamentally opposed by the administration who feared that Washington was under imminent threat from Confederate hordes emerging from the Shenandoah Valley. They demanded that the capital be defended by large formations of troops. The mention of marching off to Virginia with the bulk of the Union forces originally raised a charge of traitorous from the President, who thought the idea would leave Washington defenseless. The administration felt the only way to get at Richmond was the overland route that would leave the Army of the Potomac interposed between the city and the Confederate army. An irate McClellan proposed that the plan be reviewed by twelve general officers and their recommendations on the plan be given to the President. The meeting of the commanders was held on 7 March,1862 at Army headquarters in Washington. After being given their charge by Chief of Staff Randolph B. Marcy the plan was briefed by McClellan. The men listened intently and formed their opinion of the plan. The final result was four opposed but a solid majority of 8 in favor. There were still many aspects of the plan (transportation availability, logisitics, and security for the capital among the most important) that troubled the commanders but later in the day they presented their vote to the President. Despite the reservations the opportunity to finally get McClellan on the move against the enemy pleased Lincoln. The plan was approved with some provisos and the presidential appointment of Corps commanders to lead the enterprise.

Unfortunately for McClellan, the viabilty of this plan to introduce his troops against the Confederate capital by way of Urbana was destroyed on the same day that it was approved. MG Joseph Johnston, commanding the Confederate forces, withdrew from Manassas and stole away any advantage that might be gained by a move in this area. By moving closer to an available railroad transportation hub there was no chance of stealing a critical march on them. After a short period of pusrsuit McClellan realized the Urbana plan was dead. Undeterred McClellan offered up a new design to enter the Virginia Peninsula. Insisting that the indirect approach of a turning movement would spare unnecessary casualties and catch the enemy off guard the new plan was formulated. They would now enter the Peninsula at the tip from Fort Monroe. Again a council of war was called with the presidentially appointed Corps commanders (Sumner, McDowell, Heitzelman, and Keyes) and the chief engineer (Barnard) to brief the new design. This time in a spirit of cooperation there was no dissent. The plan was approved by the President on 13 March 1862.

The concentration of forces for the campaign at Fort Monroe began immediately. In three weeks the chartered fleet (389 vessels) had staged over 100,000 men, 14,000 animals, 1200 wagons and 44 artillery batteries for the campaign. Waiting for him was Confederate MG John Magruder with about 13,000 troops of the Army of the Peninsula stretched over a 14 mile line. Forward of the main line of defense Magruder created a series of posts that would provide early warning and prevent observation of the main line that ran from the James River north to Yorktown on the the York River.
 
On the March (Left Column)
While the troops gathered McClellan remained at Alexandria to oversee the final details of the operation. No facet of the campaign was overlooked. Logistical support facilities were established at Fort Monroe, Cheeseman's Creek, and Ship Point. An impressive engineer force complete with 160 Bateaux (wooden boats), canvas boats, portable trestles, and 30 wagons of assorted engineer tools was organized. An intelligence estimate of the enemy situation was formulated. Despite the best efforts of the men assigned to this detail their efforts (including a remarkably accurate estimate of Magruder's strength supplied by a double deserter from Wool's command) McClellan dismissed them as "vague and untrustworthy." This lack of faith and McClellan's tendency to increase these estimates without justification would play a large role in the campaign.

McClellan reported to Fort Monroe on 2 April with a promise that "the grass will not grow under my feet." Good to his word the operation kicked off 36 hours later. At 0600 on 4 April two divisions of BG Erasmus Keyes' IV Corps departed Newport News on the Lee's Mill Road. The lead division, under BG William F. Smith, marched unopposed until they reached Watt's Creek when his "skirmishers frequently encountered the rebel pickets". These pickets were driven back for about two miles when "the country opened and Young's Mill appeared." A reconnaissance of the Confederate defense revealed no heavy guns so Smith deployed three regiments of his 2nd Brigade to advance on the enemy works. After a brief exchange of fire that wounded one soldier of the 5th Vermont the Confederate forces retired. The Union troops occupied the abandoned works, established pickets of their own, and settled in for the night.

On 5 April Smith took up the march again but was slowed when "rain began about 7 o'clock and continued pouring in torrents making the roads well nigh impassable." The struggle through the sodden landscape exhausted the troops and Smith called a short respite at Warwick Court House. After resuming the move the column traveled just a short distance when the "fortifications around and about Lee's Mill's came in sight."

BG John Davidson, 3rd Brigade commander, deployed his men to face the challenge. The 7th Maine was sent forward as pickets while the 33rd New York, 77th New York, and 49th New York hastily formed a line to center the Union position. An artillery battle began in earnest with Wheeler's Battery (1st Pennsylvania ) answering the Confederate guns. To get a better idea of what they were facing Davidson had an aide, LT Long, climb a tree and observe the enemy position. The young LT reported that two regiments of infantry were manuevering against the left flank of their position. The 49th New York was thrown back at "an obtuse angle" to counter the threat. These positions were maintained until 1900 when the Union troops fell back about a mile. The days activities cost Davidson 3 killed and 12 wounded. The pickets of the 7th Maine also suffered two losses. LT Swan of Co A and Bugler Brown of Co D were captured. Magruder reported 1killed, 4 wounded, 1 missing, and 2 deserters for the days encounter.








 
On the March (Right Column)
On the right flank of McClellan's march up the peninsula the III Corps troops of BG Samuel Heitzelman moved west from Hampton on the Yorktown Road without opposition. They soon developed problems of another kind. The intelligence concerning the viability of the roads in the area was seriously flawed. When the rains came the roads turned to quagmires. BG Oliver Howard would later write of the campaign that the roads;

" ...which on our arrival had been beautiful and smooth, without rut or stone, had become miry and treacherous..."

Additionally Heitzelman reported that they were "embarassed by the want of guides and misled by unreliable maps." Nevertheless, his Corps moved "to the front of the rebel batteries at Yorktown." Around the 1000 Heitzelman's artillery, the 10lb Parrots of 5th US Battery D, Battery C of the 1st Rhode Island Light Artillery, and Battery C of the Massachusetts Light Artillery began to trade shots with the enemy gunners. The effectiveness of fire from both sides was questioned by LT Henry Kingsbury, of the 5th US Artillery who stated that because of "the extreme softness of the ground, many of the shells being deeply buried before exploding." The cannonade continued until 1630 without pause. The guns of the Rhode Island battery expended 216 rounds of ammuntiton. The artillerymen of the US battery suffered 2 killed and 3 wounded in the exchange of fire. The Massachusetts Battery also reported the loss of 2 killed and 3 wounded. The Rhode Islanders reported that Private John E. Reynolds was wounded in the thigh and later died from complications of the amputation.

As the activity settled into a stationary fight the marksmen of the 1st US Sharpshooters went to work. The men of this command had been "confined to skirmishing and clearing the woods along the road" during the march. Now under the cover of the artillery fire COL Hiram Berdan's men moved into protected positions in a peach orchard. According to Magruder, at a range of 600 yards they made it "dangerous for our men to expose their persons." Berdan claimed hundreds of casualties created by the fire of his men while Magruder claimed 3 wounded and 5 horses killed. The effort cost Berdan 2 killed and 4 wounded. This sparring continued until sunset when darkness brought an end to operations.
 
Opn Coronet
Exactly when he moved forward I can not tell. The best my research can come up with is that he was somewhere near the front on the 7th. McClellan, for all his popularity was not an at the front leader.
Dan
 
Hancock's Reconnaissance
Contact with Magruder's line of defenders brought the Union advance to a complete stop. Operating under an inflated view of the Confederate strength and unwilling to walk into a poor tactical situation the Federals drew up a line and considered their options. On the 6th BG William F, Smith ordered BG Winfield Scott Hancock to conduct a reconnaissance of the enemy line in the direction of Yorktown to firmly establish the strength of the Confederate position. Hancock was assured that reinforcements would be sent to take advantage if any area of weakness that might be discovered.

Hancock selected the 5th Wisconsin and 6th Maine from his brigade (1st Bde, 2nd Division, IV Corps) to conduct the mission, He also fortified his reconnaissance capability by attaching LT W. E. Merrill of the Engineers and LT Nicolas Bowen of the Topographical Engineers to the patrol. The two regiments moved along the Warwick River occassionally skirmisking with enemy pickets. Charles Clark would report in an 1897 address to Iowa Commandery Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States that during one of these encounters that the 6th Maine "lost our first man, a private in Company E." The river was reported as "a succession of pools formed by damming the river at different points, rendering it, it is understood, unfordable."

The 6th Maine managed to collect four prisoners from the 14th Alabama and through interogation established the strength of that unit (1070 men) guarding a section of the river near a dam. Further investigation revealed that the dam, a dry crossing point of the Warwick River, was between "15 to 20 rods in length and about 12 feet broad" and was loosely guarded on the far side. Colonel Hiram Burnham, regimental commander, sent word back that the site could be forced. It was a claim that Magruder later readily admitted in his report to Richmond. Luck would intervene, however. The Major carrying the message with two escorts was delayed when they ran into a seven man Confederate patrol. The enemy patrol was scared off when the Major called out orders to non-existant support and then opened fire with the available weapons. Deeming themselves to be outnumbered and suffering one man killed in the volley the Confedrate patrol retired. Nevertheless, Hancock did not get the message until later because he was "at the time with the other regiment."

The rest of the line was reported as strongly held. It was of no matter for Smith had been handed a message from McClellan that the town would be put under siege. All operations against the enemy were put on hold while the siege train was brought up. The first great opportunity for rapid development of the campaign went by the wayside. There would be no attack and the original plan for a rapid approach to Richmond via the peninsula was gone, destroyed by the audacity of Magruder's 10,000 men.
 
Siege at Yorktown
Having decided on a siege operation McClellan quickly discovered that the execution of that concept was going to be much more difficult than ordering it. The roads had been reduced by the rains to a point of being incapable of handling the massive weights of the siege artillery. McClellan was forced to seek out the assistance of his engineers before the siege operations could begin. The construction of a transportation infrastructure was tasked to BG John G. Barnard*, Chief Engineer for the Army of the Potomac.

Barnard realized that "extensive preparations" would be required before any artillery could be placed. He examined Wormley's Creek and decided to make this the focal point of these preparations. To shorten the distance the guns would have to travel overland he decided to make the creek the entry point for the arriving siege guns and material. This plan required the construction of 5,000 yards of road, corduroy of all pre-existing roads, numerous crib work bridges to span ravines, the widening of the mill dam, three pontoon bridges, and many other projects. Barnard's engineer assets included Companies A,B,and C of the US Engineer Battalion, the 15th New York Engineers, and the 50th New York Engineers. These men worked nearly non-stop supported by large details from the line companies but it was not until the 17th of April before "it was deemed practicable to commence the construction of batteries."

McClellan intended an incredible display of firepower to blast the Confederates from their works. After a joint reconnassaince by Barnard and Chief of Artillery BG William F. Barry it was decided that fourteen batteries (a fifteenth battery was later added) would be constructed. These would house 75 artillery pieces, ranging in size from mammoth 200lb Parrotts to 12lb field pieces, and 29 10'-13" mortars. The work began immediately and was progressed on a vigorous schedule. The staggering pace of work did not impress everyone, however. President Lincoln frustrated by the delays wrote to McClellan that his demand for more heavy artillery "argues indefinite procrastination." BG Oliver O. Howard agreed writing that he experienced "a considerable impatience...because of the slowness of the army" and that "the reasons given for such delay seemed insufficient." McClellan shrugged off the complaints confident that he was pursuing the most effective strategy.

Eventually enough progress was made so that McClellan desiginated May 5th as the day for the grand barrage. Once the enemy guns guarding the river were destroyed the US Navy would add the weight of their guns to the bombardment. McClellan thought two days of this type of pounding would be enough to force a surrender. Magruder had no idea of subjecting his troops to such a beating. On the night of 3 May the Confederate gunners opened a barrage of their own. Under cover of the artillery fire Magruder's forces evacuated the city and the outlying defenses.

The following morning the balloon Intrepid withThaddeus Lowe and BG Samuel Heintzelman aboard ascended to view the Confederate lines. They reported no enemy remaining in sight. The advanced Union forces entered the Confederate works without a fight. Yorktown was won. Left behind were "torpedoes", or land mines, designed by Confederate General Gabriel Rains. PVT John Pruyne, of Co F, 52nd Pennsylvania won the unfortunate distinction of being the first man killed by these devises. The practice was deemed barbaric by McClellan who vowed to have Confederate POW's conduct search and disarming operations.

The great Federal arsenal assembled to humble the Confederate defenders had fired a mere 141 rounds. Magruder's bold stand in the face of long odds had purchased a month for the Confederate high command to organize a defense of Richmond. They did not waste the opportunity. By the end of the 30 day operation the Confederate forces gathered for the fight for the capital nearly equalled those of McClellan. Having thus accomplished the defensive concentration that McClellan feared in an overland advance the value of the indirect approach was lost,.

* Barnard's report of the work accomplished here is one of the most comprehensive and interesting of any I have ever read. See OR's Volume 11, Part 1, Page 316
 
Opn Coronet
Exactly when he moved forward I can not tell. The best my research can come up with is that he was somewhere near the front on the 7th. McClellan, for all his popularity was not an at the front leader.
Dan

Except when he was.

On the 7th there was no movement. A violent storm broke on the evening of the 6th, and didn't abate until the 10th. Wagons could not move, troops could not march, and they didn't (couldn't) get rationed during this period. Using the advantage of the storm for cover, McClellan and Barnard conducted a personal recce of the Warwick River Line on the 7th, forward of the FLOT. Barnard proposed bringing up heavy guns and blasting the position out. McClellan believed they could assault, but ordered the siege train to embark for Ft Monroe. McClellan didn't acquiese to Barnard until the 17th.
 
Battle at Lee's Mill (Dam No. 1)
The tedious pace of the siege preparations was broken on April 16th when McClellan ordered BG William F. Smith to sieze a foothold at Dam No. 1 to prevent further strengthening of the Confederate works there. Confederate BG Howell Cobb was improving his position there with three regiments and McClellan feared that this development might somehow interfer with the progression of work on the siege batteries. This was precisely the spot that Hancock had pinpointed as a soft spot ten days earlier. The Vermont Brigade was selected to "hamper the enemy" but without bringing on a general engagement. It was a tall task with plenty to suggest failure. The early weakness of the Confederate position here was being corrected by Magruder and the defenders were well prepared to receive the attack.

The gathered Division artillery opened fire at 0800 and continued until the opposing Confederate guns apeared to be silenced. LT E. M. Noyes braved the fire and went across the river to conduct a reconnaissance. His report indicated that the Confederates were removing stores and falling back. The apparent withdrawal encouraged the brigade commander BG William Brooks to throw three companies of the 3rd Vermont Infantry across the river just below the dam. The advance was supported by the other regiments of the brigade. The troops waded across the waist deep water and found only a thinly manned picket line. The pickets were driven back and the Vermonters occupied the vacant trenches to gain a foothold on the western bank of the river. The Confederate commander, BG Cobb, called the attack of Brooks' men "a bold advance" and made immediate calls for reinforcement suspecting that they would be followed by a much larger force. Unfortunately for the soggy attackers the trip across the river left many of their cartridges unuseable and they were not reinforced despite their early success. BG Smith had reacted to the growing strength of the enemy by suspending any further advance across river. The men on the western shore were on their own.

Cobb formed the 2nd Louisiana, the 15th North Carolina, 16th Georgia, 11th Georgia, and Cobb's Legion into a new line and prepared to challenge the Union foray. The members of the 3rd Vermont held on for about an hour until they became critically short of ammunition. At that very moment the 15th North Carolina spearheaded an attack on the isolated Federals. Overwhelmed by numbers and without sufficient means to fight there was little for the Vermonters to do but retreat. The retreat turned into a disaster as they were caught in the water and decimated by the Confederate fire. CPT Fernando Harrington of Company D, 3rd Vermont, reported that of the 192 men that began the operation across the river, 82 were either killed, wounded or missing.

The survivors of the ordeal did not forget their wounded comrades that were left on the other side of the river or in the water. A youth of under 16, Julian Scott, made repeated trips into the river under severe fire to rescue wounded soldiers. Seventeen year old John Harrington went back to the abandoned rifle pits on the far side to retrieve another wounded man. Valor was the order of the day and three Medals of Honor were awarded for the ill-concieved operation. The death of one soldier should be noted here. PVT William Scott, Co. K. had been convicted to death by firing squad for falling asleep on guard duty. His sentence was overturned by President Lincoln and a grateful Scott vowed that he would show the President that he was not afraid to die for his country. The wound he received here killed him and fulfilled that promise.
 
An oft told tale of the AoP(and particdularly McClellan) never attack full force and never reinforce success.
 
The Union forces were gaining their objectives, but in a manner contrary to the demands of the campaign. The original goal was to beat the Confederate defense to Richmond by side-stepping their main line of defense. Every day wasted in siege or faltering in front of lesser forces gave away this idea by allowing time for reinforcements to be brought to bear against the main effort on the Peninsula. Timidity in these early phases of the campaign would definately come back to haunt McClellan.
 
The Union forces were gaining their objectives, but in a manner contrary to the demands of the campaign. The original goal was to beat the Confederate defense to Richmond by side-stepping their main line of defense. Every day wasted in siege or faltering in front of lesser forces gave away this idea by allowing time for reinforcements to be brought to bear against the main effort on the Peninsula. Timidity in these early phases of the campaign would definately come back to haunt McClellan.

Not quite. The 45,000 men of 3rd and 4th Corps were to fix Magruder (and Johnston) and reinforcements in position, followed by another amphibious desant on White House Landing behind them, cut them off and allowed them to bag the field army.

The navy then refused to run ships past Yorktown and Gloucester Point, and Lincoln removed the only Corps trained to make assault landings (1st, well specifically Franklin's Division of the first).
 
67th
These will be discussed in upcoming posts. But the bypass effort was abandoned when troops were withheld from the original design. The eventual bypass would included only a division. Only enough to threaten the rear guards and the retreating trains.
Dan
 
Retreat and Pursuit
The Confederate retreat from the Yorktown/Warwick River line was perfectly timed and very well executed. More than 50,000 soldiers were removed from under the Union guns in one night. The withdrawal started at Lee's Mill at dusk and progressed toward Yorktown throughout the night. Magruder followed by Longstreet on the Warwick Road then D. H. Hill followed by the reserve division commanded by MG Gustavus Smith using the Yorktown Road. The Cavalry Brigade, under BG J. E. B. Stuart, would cover the movement from the trenches until dawn and then burn bridges during their move back. The heavy artillery would send out covering fire until midnight and then spike their guns and join the main movement. The destination for the retreating forces was Williamsburg.

The night march gave the Confederates a taste of the conditions that hounded the Union advance. They struggled with the mud as the passing columns turned the roads into muddy slop. Wagons and artillery pieces had to be manhandled through the worst spots. The thirteen mile march took all night. As the first to leave Magruder entered Williamsburg just before dawn and were sent west to clear the way for the rest of the Confederate columns. D.H. Hill was next to arrive at sunrise. The last units did not arrive until around noon and the exhausted condition of the men forced Johnston to alter his plan. Originally he intended to move back as far as Richmond but the men and animals needed rest.

The departure of the Confederate army allowed McClellan to claim possession of Yorktown but probably frustated him by denying him a great victory he had expected. He reported the capture of the city and promised to push the retreating "enemy to the wall." By 0700 CPT William Chambliss and his squadron of the 5th US Cavalry was over the Warwick River and scouting for the enemy columns. He encountered the enemy rear guard (Stuart's cavalry) and manuevered against them until they reached the intersection of Williamsburg Road. Here his advance was stopped while infantry support was called up.

Using the information he received from Chambliss, McClellan developed a plan to trap the enemy rear guard. BG Stoneman would form the advance with all the available cavalry followed by a division of infantry from III Corps (Hooker) and IV Corps (Smith). The cavalry would attempt to cut off the enemy while the infantry would move in to overpower them. Again the weather interevened to alter the plan. The infantry got off to a late start and struggled to make progress in the mud and crowded roads. The troopers of Stoneman's cavalry were left on their own.

About eight miles out from Yorktown they ran into the first major delaying action by Stuart's men. LTC Wickham's with two companies of the 4th Virginia Cavalry had constructed a roadblock on a mill dam across King's Creek. A few rounds from a section of artillery, directed by LT Fuller, at 300 yards range pushed the Confederates away from the obstacle before a charge could be made upon them. Stoneman then seperated his command sending BG William Emory off on a side road to get behind the main Confederate force. This decision offered the Federal troopers their first big chance at success.
 
Retreat and Pursuit
The Confederate retreat from the Yorktown/Warwick River line was perfectly timed and very well executed. More than 50,000 soldiers were removed from under the Union guns in one night. The withdrawal started at Lee's Mill at dusk and progressed toward Yorktown throughout the night. Magruder followed by Longstreet on the Warwick Road then D. H. Hill followed by the reserve division commanded by MG Gustavus Smith using the Yorktown Road. The Cavalry Brigade, under BG J. E. B. Stuart, would cover the movement from the trenches until dawn and then burn bridges during their move back. The heavy artillery would send out covering fire until midnight and then spike their guns and join the main movement. The destination for the retreating forces was Williamsburg.

The night march gave the Confederates a taste of the conditions that hounded the Union advance. They struggled with the mud as the passing columns turned the roads into muddy slop. Wagons and artillery pieces had to be manhandled through the worst spots. The thirteen mile march took all night. As the first to leave Magruder entered Williamsburg just before dawn and were sent west to clear the way for the rest of the Confederate columns. D.H. Hill was next to arrive at sunrise. The last units did not arrive until around noon and the exhausted condition of the men forced Johnston to alter his plan. Originally he intended to move back as far as Richmond but the men and animals needed rest.

What I read in Steven Newton's book "Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond" has a slightly different version.

For a start Newton says that G.W. Smith's division was kept in reserve so that it could be deployed quickly to the rear and move to block any attempt by the Federals to land behind the Coonfederate Army and trap them on the Peninsula. This division was the first, according to Newton, to march away from Yorktown and they were joined by Magruder's division, the first Viriginia Cavalry and part of the reserve artillery. All this was so that G.W. Smith would be able to contain, if not throw back, any attempt by the Federals to land on the Peninsula via the York River.

And Newton contends that Johnston's intent was to retreat as far back as the Pamunkey and Chickahominey rivers and wait for McClellan between them, not to go as far back as Richmond. Johnston. according to Newton, believed a position between those two rivers to be good a defensive spot ad was prepared to stay there so long as his right flank was secure but a growing concern over the security of the position at Drewry's Bluff force him to pull back behind the Chickahominey.
 
Johnston could always find a good reason to retreat.

Hardly fair. Wellington and Napoleon would have found good reason to retreat from Yorktown. It was a position that offered the Confederates few benefits against an attack from the east and a position that could be easilly outflanked and turned by any opponant with Naval superiority. They had no heavy guns capable of contesting the front with the Federals, let alone knock out the enemies artillery or disrupt the Federal capabilities to build up or attack them. Williamsburg offered similarly few advantages to the Confederates.

I'll paraphraze Steven Newton here, dont judge Joseph E. Johnston of 1862 by Joseph E. Johnston of 1864. They are very different.
 
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