Chickamauga Battle of Chickamauga papers

USS ALASKA

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Mar 16, 2016
Ma'ams / Sirs - found a bunch of the papers on-line about the Battle of Chickamauga. Since we don't have a Chickamauga sub-forum, I figured I'd park them here. A much studied event by military members for advanced degrees...

To start off with...

Title; Staff ride handbook for the Battle of Chickamauga, 18-20 September 1863.
Author; Robertson, William Glenn

Abstract; Visiting Civil War battlefields offers unique insights into military operations, leadership, and men in battle. Fought in the wooded terrain of northwest Georgia in 1863, the battle began with a meeting engagement on 19 September that culminated on 20 September in attempts by the North to create a coordinated defense and by the South to generate a breakthrough. This Staff Ride handbook is designed to place students on the actual terrain of the battle, evoke the conditions experienced by the participants at the time, and provide vignettes and discussion topics to increase their understanding of the battle. Through this process, students will gain an enhanced understanding of Chickamauga. Realizing that in-depth prior study may not always be possible, this handbook is written to be of value to both novices and more serious students of the battle.

Series; Combat Studies Institute Press Publications
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date; Original 1992
Release Statement; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
Title; Longstreet's corps at Chickamauga: lessons in inter-theater deployment.
Author; Eiserman, Frederick A.

Abstract; In September 1863 the Confederate States of America reinforced their Western Theater of Operations by conducting a 950 mile, inter-theater rail movement of two infantry divisions. Within 24 hours of their arrival, almost one-half of these troops found themselves actively engaged in the Battle of Chickamauga. This study is an analysis of the planning and execution of that operation and the role of those troops in the battle, with lessons learned examined in relation to modern contingency missions. Numerous similarities exist between the 1863 operation and modern deployment missions. Fighting outnumbered and with limited transport capability, such factors as surprise, security, logistics and enemy maneuver can easily affect such an operation. Discussion includes the importance of obtaining timely decisions from the National Command Authority and the tremendous need for flexibility in planning and execution. The study concludes that time and technology has not changed basic troop movement procedures as much as one might think. The most important lesson from the 1863 operation is the simple fact that in spite of recent, major defeats, the Confederacy was still able and willing to seize the strategic initiative. Although that initiative was subsequently thrown away by failure to pursue the Federals, that does not reduce the importance of the lessons learned.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date; Original 1985-06-07
Date; Digital 2008
Call number; ADA 164787
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2008-07-08
57

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

  • Longstreet's corps at Chickamauga lessons in inter-theater deployment.pdf
    3.2 MB · Views: 101
Title; Limits of obedience: Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood’s performance during the Battle of Chickamauga.
Author; Manville, Craig J.

Abstract; This thesis is a historical analysis of the order that Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood received from Major General William Rosecrans during the Battle of Chickamauga. There are many questions concerning Wood’s actions on 20 September 1863. Wood’s obedience to this written order created the gap into which Lieutenant General James Longstreet drove his right wing. This thesis will discuss the circumstances surrounding this order and the effect it had on the battle. It will investigate the limits of obedience and disobedience and will seek to determine if Wood should have disobeyed, or at least questioned, this critical order issued by General Rosecrans.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date, Original; 2005-06-17
Date, Digital; 2005-06-17
Call number; ADA 437039
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2005-10-17
128

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USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

  • Limits of obedience Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood’s performance during the Battle of Chicka...pdf
    919.1 KB · Views: 69
Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Daniel Harvey Hill and his contribution to the Battle of Chickamauga.
Author; Maki, Terrence W., Jr.

Abstract; This study investigates Major General Daniel Harvey Hill's performance during the Chattanooga campaign, focusing specifically on the Battle of Chickamauga. Hill's early life and performance in the Army of Northern Virginia are evaluated for character development. While Hill had proved himself a fearless division commander in the Army of Northern Virginia he nevertheless developed a reputation as an uncompromising, carping and sarcastic subordinate. When Hill arrived at Chattanooga in July 1863, relations between him and Braxton Bragg quickly began to sour. Hill's failure to act promptly at McLemore’s Cove was a result of his distrust in Confederate cavalry and Bragg's situational awareness. After the first day of the Battle of Chickamauga, Bragg decided to change his command structure by creating two Confederate Wing Commanders. James Longstreet would command the Left Wing and Leonidas Polk commanded the Right Wing. Bragg's plan was for Hill's Corps to initiate the Confederate attack at daylight on 20 September. Hill was not informed of the attack until well after daylight. The delay allowed Rosecrans' Army to use precious daylight to fortify its positions. After the battle, Bragg relieved Hill of command. Though Hill's performance at Chickamauga was lackluster it did not warrant his removal.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date, Original; 2001-06-01
Date, Digital; 2001-06-01
Call number; ADA 395384
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2005-12-19
183

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

  • Daniel Harvey Hill and his contribution to the Battle of Chickamauga.pdf
    5.9 MB · Views: 54
Ma'ams / Sirs - found a bunch of the papers on-line about the Battle of Chickamauga. Since we don't have a Chickamauga sub-forum, I figured I'd park them here. A much studied event by military members for advanced degrees...

To start off with...

Title; Staff ride handbook for the Battle of Chickamauga, 18-20 September 1863.
Author; Robertson, William Glenn

Abstract; Visiting Civil War battlefields offers unique insights into military operations, leadership, and men in battle. Fought in the wooded terrain of northwest Georgia in 1863, the battle began with a meeting engagement on 19 September that culminated on 20 September in attempts by the North to create a coordinated defense and by the South to generate a breakthrough. This Staff Ride handbook is designed to place students on the actual terrain of the battle, evoke the conditions experienced by the participants at the time, and provide vignettes and discussion topics to increase their understanding of the battle. Through this process, students will gain an enhanced understanding of Chickamauga. Realizing that in-depth prior study may not always be possible, this handbook is written to be of value to both novices and more serious students of the battle.

Series; Combat Studies Institute Press Publications
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date; Original 1992
Release Statement; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
Sorry but the link won’t open for me!
 
Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Role of Union Cavalry during the Chickamauga campaign.
Author; Londa, John J.

Abstract; This study is a historical analysis of the effectiveness of Union cavalry during the Chickamauga campaign. General William S. Rosecrans' desire to develop Union cavalry in the Army of the Cumberland into an effective counter to superior Confederate cavalry is compared to the results achieved during the Chickamauga campaign. The Chickamauga campaign was the first major test of the consolidated Cavalry Corps in the Army of the Cumberland. The contribution of the cavalry failed to meet expectations in developing intelligence on General Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee and in influencing the outcome of the two day battle. First, this investigation addresses Rosecrans' operation plan for the Chickamauga campaign and what role he envisioned the cavalry would play. Secondly, it describes the state of Union Cavalry in August 1863 in terms of organization, strength, training and leadership. Analysis of operations by the cavalry focuses on how the cavalry were integrated into the campaign, the success of their missions, and strength and weaknesses in their employment. Finally, this study attempts to answer the question "How could the Union cavalry have been better utilized during the campaign?" This study concludes that the improvements in the Union cavalry in terms of arms and equipment were not matched by development of senior cavalry leaders that had a clear vision of how to employ the instrument of their own making, a consolidated Cavalry Corps.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date, Original; 1991-06-07
Date, Digital; 2007
Call number; ADA 241432
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2008-01-08
241

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

  • Role of Union Cavalry during the Chickamauga campaign.pdf
    3.4 MB · Views: 75
Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Major General Joseph J. Reynolds and his division at Chickamauga: a historical analysis.
Author; Kapaun, David M., Jr.

Abstract; This thesis is a historical analysis of Major General Joseph J. Reynolds and his division during the Battle of Chickamauga. Chickamauga was the division's first major engagement. Arriving on the battlefield the first day, amidst a fierce Confederate offensive, the division was separated into brigades and regiments. The various units were piecemealed into battle, operating independently of their division commander's control. Division experiences included a desperate charge and the crushing route of an entire brigade. On the second day, the division withstood an initial Confederate onslaught in which the Union line was cut in half. After an attack south of the division position, the division was forced back, and eventually withdrew. The day ended with another charge, attacking a threat to the retreating Union army. The division's performance varied during the two-day battle, its reputation neither enhanced or scorned. General Reynolds did not distinguish himself at Chickamauga. Although not a subject of official inquiry, he was never again to command troops in the field during the Civil War. This study analyzes Reynolds and his division at the Battle of Chickamauga and draws conclusions as to the proximate causes of the performance. These causes include division disposition, division control, and a focus on Reynolds' leadership and decisions.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date, Original; 1999-06-04
Date, Digital; 1999-06-04
Call number; ADA 367709
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2005-11-22
300

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

  • Major General Joseph J. Reynolds and his division at Chickamauga a historical analysis..pdf
    5.6 MB · Views: 29
Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Major General Philip H. Sheridan and the employment of his division during the Battle of Chickamauga.
Author; Sarat, Paul S., Jr.

Abstract; This thesis is a historical analysis of Major General Philip H. Sheridan and his division during the Battle of Chickamauga. Sheridan led an experienced division onto the battlefield on 19 September 1863 after completing a march of over one hundred miles over mountainous terrain the previous seventeen days. The division was deployed by brigade to protect the Union right flank. One brigade took heavy casualties the first day, when attacking to repel an enemy advance. On the second day, while moving to reinforce Major General Thomas’ corps, the division was routed when Confederate forces attacked through a gap in the Union defense. Sheridan rallied his men, but inexplicably left the battlefield instead of returning to reinforce Thomas’ right flank as ordered. Sheridan later moved to reinforce Thomas’ left flank, after the battle was over. Sheridan’s performance was uncharacteristic for him, particularly his decision to leave the battlefield. Sheridan was not the subject of an official inquiry after the battle, although his actions were similar to other officers who were. Based on the analysis of the division’s actions, this study draws conclusions to determine the causes for the unit’s poor performance at Chickamauga: poor decision making, fatigue, and piecemeal employment.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date, Original; 2001-06-01
Date, Digital; 2001-06-01
Call number; ADA 406646
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2005-12-22
329

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

  • Major General Philip H. Sheridan and the employment of his division during the Battle of Chick...pdf
    435.5 KB · Views: 36
Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Alexander P. Stewart and the tactical employment of his division at the Battle of Chickamauga.
Author; Barnett, Luke J., III.

Abstract; This thesis is a historical analysis of Stewart's Division during the Battle of Chickamauga. It determines what tactical formations Stewart and his brigades employed, how this affected casualty totals and their significance to the outcome of the engagements in Stewart's sector. This thesis includes a brief description of the evolution of Civil War Tactics with a primary focus on infantry offensive doctrine. This is followed by a brief overview of the Chickamauga Campaign and Battle, and a description of Stewart and his unit. Thereafter, the focus will be on Stewart's actions from the crossing of Thedford's Ford on 18 September 1863, to the closing shots of the battle on the evening of the Twentieth. This will include the initial action at the ford site on the eighteenth and Stewart's numerous attacks on the afternoon of the nineteenth. Also included is his attack on the morning of the twentieth and his final attack later that evening. Conclusions will summarize the significance of Stewart's tactics and insights applicable to current doctrine. The results of this thesis conclude that Stewart and his brigade commanders did not deviate from the published doctrine of the time. Except for a minor modification in timing, Stewart's attacks complied with the manuals. The decision to attack on the nineteenth, with a column of brigades, was more a result of limited frontage and restrictive terrain than a deliberate desire to add depth to his attack. However, this formation proved very effective and contributed to Stewart's success that day. Stewart's morning assault on the twentieth failed due to the collapse of an adjacent unit coupled with the fact that he was frontally assaulting prepared defenses with his flank exposed. This thesis concludes that Stewart's tactical formations contributed to his success on the nineteenth. Stewart's failure on the twentieth was more the responsibility of a higher echelon commander. In the final analysis Stewart's leadership abilities were more a contributor to the success of the division than the tactics that he employed.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date, Original; 1989-06-02
Date, Digital; 2008
Call number; ADB 136021
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2008-10-17

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

  • Alexander P. Stewart and the tactical employment of his division at the Battle of Chickamauga.pdf
    5.4 MB · Views: 31
It is a good read. As well as Dr Robertson’s first of two books about Chickamauga, River of Death. Looking forward to the second one to Drop!
Agree on Robertson Vol. 1. The obvious additions to the list are the excellent Powell trilogy on the battle itself, Powell's Maps book, his Failure in the Saddle about Wheeler/Forrest in the campaign, and the excellent Wittenberg book Holding the Line on the River pf Death (Minty and Wilder's cavalry on the first day). .
 
In honor of the battle anniversary today...

Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Rosecrans' staff at Chickamauga: the significance of Major General William S. Rosecrans' staff on the outcome of the Chickamauga Campaign.
Author; Richardson, Robert D.

Abstract; Probably the moat unpredictable variable in the "Fog of War" next to leadership, is the command and control process, comprised of three components: organizations, process, and facilities. Organizations include the formulation of staffs by the commander to accomplish the mission. Incorporated in the organization of the staffs are the roles, responsibilities, and functions. Large Civil War armies like the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Tennessee required significant numbers of staff officers to support the armies logistically and to maneuver them operationally. During the Campaign and Battle of Chickamauga, these staff officers often played major roles and were instrumental in determining the outcome of the battle. The roles and functions performed by these staff officers evolved through the history of conflict. This study is an analysis of the roles, responsibilities, and functions of General Rosecrans' staff prior to and during the Chickamauga campaign, using lessons learned in comparison to current Army doctrine on command and control. Primary sources for staff information on the Army of the Cumberland are the Official Records and actual telegrams from the staffs during this period. Doctrinal manuals on senior level staffs did not exist; therefore, these staffs were composites of regimental and War Department staff positions and ad hoc positions. The study uses evolving doctrine from Command and General Staff College that defines an outstanding staff as one that informs, anticipates, coordinates and executes the commander's guidance with enthusiasm and innovation. This study concludes that Rosecrans' staff was significant to the outcome of the Battle of Chickamauga. Although none of the staff functions developed critical deficiencies during the campaign, their inability to relieve the commander of administrative burdens compelled him to abandon the battlefield.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date, Original; 1989-06-02
Date, Digital; 2008
Call number; ADA 211801
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2008-04-09

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

  • Rosecrans' staff at Chickamauga the significance of Major General William S. Rosecrans' staff ...pdf
    5.6 MB · Views: 50
Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Command and control mechanisms in the Chickamauga Campaign: the Union experience.
Author; Baker, Philip J., Jr.

Abstract; This thesis analyzes how Major General William S. Rosecrans, commander of the Army of the Cumberland, employed the command and control mechanisms available to him as he maneuvered his army from Tullahoma, Tennessee toward Chattanooga, Tennessee in August-September, 1863. It also analyzes how these mechanisms were employed during the battle of Chickamauga itself, on 19-20 September, 1863. General Rosecrans possessed three mechanisms for commanding and controlling his army. The first was the military telegraph, provided by the quasi-military U.S. Military Telegraph service. Next were the assets of the fledgling U.S. Signal Corps, which consisted of signal flags and torches, and a portable version of the telegraph. Finally, there were couriers, who were usually mounted, and were provided by subordinate unit details, or by units specifically formed for courier duty. The thesis concludes that General Rosecrans did not use his command and control mechanisms effectively. Rosecrans relied too heavily on couriers to carry messages over densely wooded, cross-compartmented terrain in order to send orders to his widely dispersed subordinates and receive information from them. While Rosecrans made wide use of the military telegraph, to include using it during the battle itself, he did not effectively use his Signal Corps assets. These assets were used essentially as static observation posts, and only to a limited degree as a means for effecting command and control. The thesis further concludes, however, that General Rosecrans’ use of command and control assets was not a decisive factor in the outcome of the campaign or battle. While his reliance upon courier assets added significantly to the time required to obtain Information and send orders, it was not the reason for the Union defeat at Chickamauga.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date, Original; 1989-06-02
Date, Digital; 2008
Call number; ADA 212246
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2008-04-08

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

  • Command and control mechanisms in the Chickamauga Campaign the Union experience..pdf
    3.6 MB · Views: 40
Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Command and control mechanisms in the Chickamauga Campaign: the Union experience.
Author; Baker, Philip J., Jr.

Abstract; This thesis analyzes how Major General William S. Rosecrans, commander of the Army of the Cumberland, employed the command and control mechanisms available to him as he maneuvered his army from Tullahoma, Tennessee toward Chattanooga, Tennessee in August-September, 1863. It also analyzes how these mechanisms were employed during the battle of Chickamauga itself, on 19-20 September, 1863. General Rosecrans possessed three mechanisms for commanding and controlling his army. The first was the military telegraph, provided by the quasi-military U.S. Military Telegraph service. Next were the assets of the fledgling U.S. Signal Corps, which consisted of signal flags and torches, and a portable version of the telegraph. Finally, there were couriers, who were usually mounted, and were provided by subordinate unit details, or by units specifically formed for courier duty. The thesis concludes that General Rosecrans did not use his command and control mechanisms effectively. Rosecrans relied too heavily on couriers to carry messages over densely wooded, cross-compartmented terrain in order to send orders to his widely dispersed subordinates and receive information from them. While Rosecrans made wide use of the military telegraph, to include using it during the battle itself, he did not effectively use his Signal Corps assets. These assets were used essentially as static observation posts, and only to a limited degree as a means for effecting command and control. The thesis further concludes, however, that General Rosecrans’ use of command and control assets was not a decisive factor in the outcome of the campaign or battle. While his reliance upon courier assets added significantly to the time required to obtain Information and send orders, it was not the reason for the Union defeat at Chickamauga.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date, Original; 1989-06-02
Date, Digital; 2008
Call number; ADA 212246
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2008-04-08

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
Thanks for linking these.
 
Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Role of ordnance logistics in the Chickamauga campaign.
Author; Davis, Michael J.

Abstract
This study is a historical analysis of the Chickamauga Campaign from the perspective of ordnance logistics. It focuses on the two major arms used on the Civil War battlefields, namely shoulder-fired arms and field artillery. First, this investigation addresses the strategic capabilities of the respective forces in terms of the status of ordnance resources at the start of the war and the efforts to produce and obtain shoulder-fired arms, field artillery pieces, and ammunition for those systems. Secondly, it estimates the status of the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of Tennessee by applying logistical requirements, capabilities, and analysis to those armies. Finally, it examines ordnance operations in the Chickamauga Campaign in terms of today's logistical imperatives. This study concludes the Army of Tennessee overcame strategic and operational logistical difficulties to enjoy effective and efficient ordnance operations during the campaign. Due to the tactical operations, they completed the campaign in a more advantageous logistical stance than they started. The Army of the Cumberland faced different challenges, long lines of communication, distribution difficulties due to the terrain, and their internal organization. Their ordnance system was not as efficient as the Confederates and contributed to their defeat.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date, Original; 1995-06-02
Date, Digital; 2007
Call number; ADA 299358
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2007-06-26


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

  • Role of ordnance logistics in the Chickamauga campaign.pdf
    4.2 MB · Views: 22
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