Arnhem and Gettysburg

whitworth

2nd Lieutenant
Joined
Jun 18, 2005
Anyone else see any similarity. I watched a Bridge Too Far over the weekend, the movie of the story of the failed attempt to capture Arnhem in WWII.
The book and movie were critical of the British plan, some thirty years after the war.
The British were totally dependent on moving a large corps over 64 miles in a few days. A bridge too far; a narrow road too long.

Lee attempted to move his army over a narrow road; perhaps Gettysburg was - A Town Too Far. Lee chose to move more than two corps some 25 miles over one narrow road through a mountain gap.

I think Lee gets a pass from historians because he got more of his troops to Gettysburg on the first day. But much of his army did not arrive until after dark that first day, such as Johnson's Division, Ewell's reserve artillery and Longstreets entire corps. Pickett would not come up until late on July 2.

Lee's choice of using one road is eerily similar to General Montgomery's use of a single road to Arnhem. Each seem to underestimate the choke points both armies would encounter.
Plus each side had poor intelligence on the defensive ability of the enemy at Gettysburg and Arnhem.

It seems no historian, none I recall, ever faulted Lee for leaving Chambersburg and tying up his two corps and all his wagons and artillery, attempting to pass over the only route to Gettysburg.

I would rank this attempt of General Lee, with Montgomery's failed attempt. Poor attack ingress for both armies, and the supposition that both could occupy towns without much opposition.

Regretable I think from a military tactical standpoint that no history of Gettysburg was ever titled -Gettysburg - A Town too Far. Or no book with which I am aware.
 
Interesting point, Whitworth. But I was under the impression that Lee had people coming in from all over the northwestern quarter of the compass. Somebody correct me if I'm wrong.
 
"Anyone else see any similarity."

Ummm. No.

I think I understand what you're trying to get at. Hill, and then Longstreet, both come down the Chambersburg Pike, but Ewell's Corps is up in Carlisle and headed toward Harrisburg when he gets the word to form up at either Gettysburg or Cashtown. And Early's Division is way to the east in York and headed toward Wrightsville for some mischief on the Susquehanna before he turns back.

So when the meeting engagement that turns out to be Gettysburg takes place, Hill is coming down the Chambersburg Pike from the west, Ewell is coming down the Carlisle Road from the north and Early is on the Harrisburg Road from the northeast.

When they arrive at Gettysburg, it's kind of the perfect Confederate storm that ends up nearly destroying two Union Corps — the 1st and 11th corps — on the first day.

I'd venture to say that Lee came closer to victory at Gettysburg than the allies ever did at Arnhem.
 
I'll add a few theories as to why the two battles aren't often spoken of together:

  • I'm sure that Arnhem could have more meaning in England, since Market Garden was Montgomery's baby. Gettysburg might not be studied as intensively by Britain on the flip side of that.
  • Arnhem did not have a large impact on the final outcome. The defeat of Germany was inevitable at that point. The AoNVA was never the same after Gettysburg.
Remember that Gettysburg wasn't necessarily the preferred spot of the battle for the Confederates either, but Buford was there so...
 
Potsdam

Arnhem only delayed the inevitable. Gettysburg began the inevitable.

True, but the results of Market Garden figure into the Potsdam Conference...ie. who gets what....The strategic initiative also shifts to the Germans who launch the Battle of the Bulge when a successful Market Garden would've toppled Germany in the late fall.
 
Many historians start with the battle. But before the battle, Ewell's Corps was separated from Hill and Longstreet's Corps. Ewell had part of his corps up above Carlisle, with some troops near the Susquehanna River. Further south on the Susquehanna, capturing York and Wrightsville was Jubal Early's division.

Lee was with Hill and Longstreet's Corps in the Chambersburg area, west of South Mountain. Without a good knowledge of where the AoP was really headed, Lee took Hill's and Longstreet's corps over the narrow gap road leading from Chambersburg to Gettysburg. He was joined by Johnson' s Division and Ewell's reserve artillery, which at first notice, left their position near Carlisle and marched south on the Chambersburg-Carlisle Pike. The rest of Ewell's Corps marched by another route, east of South Mountain.
Early initially marched west towards Shippensburg, as I recall. It's just the simple idea of forcing a large army up a narrow road, where time proved essential to the results.

Moving east on the Chambersburg-Carlisle Pike was slow. Lee had no other way to cross South Mountain to get to Cashtown and Gettysburg. Lee also found that he had only one certain egress to the west when he entered Adams County. His supply wagons were backed up on the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike, just as Montgomery's tanks and vehicles were backed up on the sole road to Arnhem.

Both armies, Confederate and British armour, 30th Corps, found themselves delayed in moving over a single road.
Single roads, in both cases, proved complicated.
 
Gettysburg was not Lee's objective. He was going for Harrisburg and Buford and other circumstances not in his control made Cashtown the place he chose to concentrate his army. Where as Montgomery planned Market Garden with Arnhem as one of his objectives. He knew before the campaign started about the long narrow road. Maybe he too, like Lee over estimated the limits of his troops.

Mike T.
 
gettysburg/arnhem

Yes, he's aiming his army at Harrisburg, but prior to the campaign he points at the map and anticipates a meeting engagement at Gettysburg....

Just to add to that, Coddington writes: "According to Colonel (later General) A.L. Long, his one-time military secretary, Lee foresaw the possibility of being forced to give battle somewhere near Chambersburg, York or Gettysburg. Should that occur, he would prefer fighting it out in the vicinity of Gettysburg as 'much to the point,' since it was less distant from his base on the Potomac and close to the passes of South Mountain, which he would have to hold in order to safeguard his lines of communication to Virginia."

But I'm not certain that was ever the plan Lee actually decided upon. Rather, Long's quote seems to describe to me more of a gut feeling Lee had as opposed to a well-defined operational goal.

And a point of quibble: I don't think Lee foresaw a "meeting engagement," which by definition is more or less an accidental or unexpected encounter with the enemy. It would speak unflattering volumes of Lee's generalship if he depended on a meeting engagement to bring out Hooker/Meade.

Anyway, I've never really been certain how detailed Lee's plans were for Pennsylvania. I'm pretty sure Gettysburg was not the primary objective. Sears writes: "Matters had advanced well enough by June 22, the day after the cavalry fight at Upperville, that Lee started the Second Corps into Pennsylvania. Ewell's primary function would be to collect supplies for the army, and while he did so Lee intended to occupy Hooker's attention — 'should we be able to detain General Hooker's army from following you,' he explained to Ewell, 'you would be able to accomplish as much, unmolested, as the whole army could perform with General Hooker in its front.' Ewell was to advance his three divisions fan-wise toward the Susquehanna. They would cross the Pennsylvania line, marching in parallel columns, and enter the Cumberland Valley, the extension of the Shenandoah Valley. Throughout they would be shielded on the east by South Mountain, the extension of Virginia's Blue Ridge. Rodes and Johnson would continue north by east through Greencastle and Chambersburg and Carlisle toward Harrisburg, the state capital. 'If Harrisburg comes within your means,' Ewell was told, 'capture it.' Early's division would be assigned to turn off through South Mountain in a more easterly direction to Gettysburg and on to York."

It seems to me Lee is pretty much operating this incursion on the fly. It keeps him flexible, to be sure, but also deepens the risk. Once again, his army is divided, and this time he's in enemy territory. How audacious is that?

I'm still not quite buying the single road theory a la Arnhem. When Lee reconstitutes his forces (Ewell is upset that he has to abandon his plans to invest Harrisburg) in Cashtown and Gettysburg, the ANV is ultilizing any number of roads to concentrate. Even the Chambersburg Road is not really a hindrance. By the end of the first day, Lee has more troops on the field than do the Federals. Does that imply, then, that the Federals had problems with the roads as well? I don't think the roads at Gettysburg played any more, or any less of a part than they usually do in getting an army to its destination.

In Operation Market-Garden, by contrast, Hell's Highway is a single road — basically a road on top of a dike — with nowhere to go. Can't even back up safely. Lee's infantry at least had the option of marching off road if there was too much congestion.

Even during Lee's retreat, Lee's taking all kinds of roads out of town — Chambersburg, Fairfield, Hagerstown — so they're still not a real issue, even as congested as they become.
I think if the roads were a problem in Lee's conduct of the campaign, we would have specifically read about them in history books long ago.

To me, roads is not an issue, but maybe Rodes should be. Where was he on the second and third days? (Uh-oh. New thread alert!)
 
Roads were important

"Should that occur, he would prefer fighting it out in the vicinity of Gettysburg as 'much to the point,' since it was less distant from his base on the Potomac and close to the passes of South Mountain, which he would have to hold in order to safeguard his lines of communication to Virginia."

Gettysburg is further away from Lee's Potomac crossing near Falling Waters, Virginia (now West Virginia), than it was from Chambersburg. Plus it was all flat land from Chambersburg to the Potomac.



Anyway, I've never really been certain how detailed Lee's plans were for Pennsylvania. I'm pretty sure Gettysburg was not the primary objective."

Gettysburg wasn't the objective, because Stuart, Ewell, and Early had no idea that Gettysburg was an objective, until informed by Lee from Chambersburg. There was no real logistical reason to move to Gettysburg.



"Even the Chambersburg Road is not really a hindrance. By the end of the first day, Lee has more troops on the field than do the Federals. Does that imply, then, that the Federals had problems with the roads as well? I don't think the roads at Gettysburg played any more, or any less of a part than they usually do in getting an army to its destination."

There was only one way from Chambersburg to Gettysburg. That was over only one road through the gaps of South Mountain. Hill arrived near Gettysburg in time. Ewell's corps was only partially represented. Longstreet did not arrive until late on the first day of July. Some units came up even later. Johnson's Division, Ewell's Corps did not arrive until after dark on July 1. Same with Ewell's reserve artillery. Both these latter units crossed over the same route with Hill's Corps -the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike.
Pickett came up late for the battle, because his division were guarding wagons on the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike. The road did delay part of Lee's army, though Lee had more troops on the field for the battle of July 1. But what if Lee had his entire army on the field for the first of July. The delay of his army on the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike did delay the Army of Northern Virginia.



"I think if the roads were a problem in Lee's conduct of the campaign, we would have specifically read about them in history books long ago."

My serious disagreement with the historians is they ignored R.E. Lee's Gettysburg report. And I doubt any ever studied even a topographical map to study the ingress of more than two corps from Chambersburg over the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike through South Mountain.
Lee recognized on July 1 that he could not withdraw, "to withdraw through the mountains with our extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous."

Difficult and dangerous to withdraw over the road they had used to come to Adams County from Chambersburg, a narrow road through the gaps of a mountain.


". . .It had not been intended to deliver a general battle so far from our base unless attacked, but coming unexpectedly upon the whole Federal Army, to withdraw throngh the mountains with our extensive
trains would have been difficult and dangerous. At the same time
we were unable to await an attack, as the country was unfavorable
for collecting supplies in the presence of the enemy, who could re-
strain our foraging parties by holding the mountain passes with local
and other troops. A battle had, therefore, become in a measure un-
avoidable, and the success already gained gave hope of a favorable
issue..."

Respectfully submitted.
R. E. LEE,
General.

p318 Series 1 - Volume 27 (Part II)
 
Forgive me if I repeat others' sentiments, but IMO:

Market Garden - a deep penetration into opposing territory with clear strategic goals. Planned in painstaking detail (not always with correct assumptions, but impressive staff work by volume if not by accuracy)

Gettysburg - I really really want there to have been a plan, but The myth and pathos of Lee really take a beating here.
I'm far from an expert on the Gettysburg campaign, but the only things I've heard were 1) to give northern VA a rest and move the action into Union territory (to what end, though? Garner support from France or England?) or 2) to scare the north by taking Harrisburg for a couple days, and try to create some opportunity out of the resulting panic.

It seems an act of desperation. (expletive), even the Battle of the Bulge had a clear set of objectives.
 
Dear List Members;

According to Col. Walter H. Taylor; AGG to General Grant; in his book Four Years with General Lee; Chapter VIII, pg. 90-91--He says this:

Paragraph#2- Nevertheless, in the judgement of General Lee, it was a part of a true defensive policy to take the aggressive when good opportunity offere; and by delivering an effective blow to the enemy, not only to inflict upon him serious loss, but at the same time to thwart his designs of invasion derange the plan of campaign contemplated by him, and thus prolong the conflict.

The Federal army, under General Hooker, had now reoccupied the heights opposite Fredericksburg, where it could not be attacked except at a disadvantage. Instead of quietly awaiting the pleasure of the Federal commander in designing and putting into execution some new plan of campaign, General Lee determined to manouver to draw him from his impregnable position and if possible to remove the scene of hostilities beyond the Potomac. His design was to free the State of Virginia, for a time at least, from the presence of the enemy, to transfer the theatre of war to Northern soil, and by selecting a favorable time and place in which to receive the attack which his adversary would be compelled to make on him in a pitched battle; knowing full well that to obtain such an advantage there would place him in a position to attain far more decisive results than could be hoped for from a like advantage gained in Virginia. But even unable to attain the valuable results which might be expected to follow a decided advantage gained over the enemy in Maryland or Pennsylvania, it was thought that the movement would at least so far disturb the Federal plan for the summer campaign a to prevent its execution during the season for active operations.

In pursuance of this design, early in the month of June, General Lee moved his armmy northward by the way of Culpeper, and thence to and down the Valley of Virginia to Winchester. [End of copy word for word of the book by Taylor]

So, to me, Lee had plans--it wasn't a 'on the fly' disorganized trial and error movement.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
 
How about this:
Market Garden was a deeply planned, highly coordinated, very specific tactical fight with clear strategic ramifications.

The Gettysburg campaign was a strategic operation with little planning given to tactical considerations.
 
Dear Baggage Handler #2;

I'll agree to the lack of tactical considerations, as Lee wasn't operating on proper intelligence to which General JEB Stuart was to have supplied.
In Four Years with General Lee; Colonel Taylor really did not hold back with the fact that Stuart did not do what he was asked to do and if it wasn't for a paid scout of Longstreet; Lee's entire army could have been destroyed in detail.

That said, it is in the "Official Records of the Rebellion", that seven months prior; General JEB Stuart had come into Pennsylvania and scouted as well as took notes and returned back to Lee's army. I like to think that Lee's preliminary tactical considerations would have been formed by the previous raid and skirmishes with the Union by Stuart.

And, perhaps due to this prior movement by General Stuart, is why General Buford attempted to stop Lee's retreat after the big battle at Gettysburg in July; using Stuart's previous retreat route. Except for manpower; Buford was 'spot on' in regard to the route of the retreat.

Perhaps this is what frustrated Lincoln --was that Stuart's modus operandi was known from the October raid into Pennsylvania near Gettysburg; and this time was allowed due to lack of numbers--to demolish Lee's army at last.

I also think between Gettysburg Campaign, which is not just the Battle at Gettysburg but, Brandy Station and on through and beyond the retreat after Gettysburg; has much to do with the entire campaign. A five day chase by the Union forces--Buford was a flanking patrol and 'happened' upon the Confederate troops.

I also think the span between Gettysburg and Market Garden; military tactics, weaponry and transportation; to include communications--had improved by then by leaps and bounds--Correct?

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
 
...

I also think the span between Gettysburg and Market Garden; military tactics, weaponry and transportation; to include communications--had improved by then by leaps and bounds--Correct?

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
Oh absolutely.
But I don't think the technology available changes anything in this case. No clear military goals vs very clear military objectives, that's the diff between the two IMO.
 
"Market Garden was a deeply planned, highly coordinated, very specific tactical fight with clear strategic ramifications.

The Gettysburg campaign was a strategic operation with little planning given to tactical considerations."


Precisely my point. There's nothing like an economy of words to make a clear argument. Wished I said that. Thanks, BH2.

It's also why I suggested the campaign was done on the fly. Clearly, the campaign had purpose, but the execution of that purpose was done on a day by day basis. That's why Gettysburg was a meeting engagement. Nobody truly planned for it.

'But what if Lee had his entire army on the field for the first of July. The delay of his army on the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike did delay the Army of Northern Virginia.'

Uh-oh. A what if. And it still doesn't negate the fact that Lee had superior forces in the field on the first day.

'Difficult and dangerous to withdraw over the road they had used to come to Adams County from Chambersburg, a narrow road through the gaps of a mountain.'

E.P. Alexander kind of addresses this, although he is speaking primarily of why the ANV stayed in Gettysburg as long as it did. But it works for me:

"Now when it is remembered that we stayed for three days longer on that very ground, two of them days of desperate battle...& then successfully withdrew all of our trains & most of the wounded through the mountains..." They did it in the rain, too. Roads, including the Chambersburg Pike, must have been good enough.

Whitworth, you make some excellent points. But I still can't draw a real comparison between Gettysburg and Arnhem. A slightly similar comparison, perhaps. But for me, not a direct comparison.
 
One Road

Montgomery's plan was to move his armor some 64 miles over one road to Arnhem. Lee's plan was to move two corps, Longstreet's and Hill's over one road to Gettysburg, the Gettysburg-Chambersburg Pike.

Both generals thought they could move quickly enough over one road. My idea is about the plan and the one road.

When Buford's cavalry engaged part of Hill's Corps, most of it was backed up on the Gettysburg-Chambersburg Pike. Longstreet's Corps was so backed up on that Pike that his first brigade only arrived near Gettysburg on the night of July 1. Pickett's division had to guard the trains far back on that pike until July 2.

Granted, Lee had more troops near Gettysburg on July 1, mainly because Ewell had come from Carlisle by another route. This superiority in numbers certainly wasn't because Lee had moved his troops rapidly over the ROAD, the Gettysburg-Chambersburg Pike.

While the delays of both armies was not the same, the use of the single road by both the British and the Confederate army caused delay.

Because Lee chose to take two corps over one narrow road through a mountain, plus an entire division and reserve artillery of Ewell's, Meade never had to face the entire Confederate army on any of the days. Meade remained on the defensive fighting Confederate units, piecemeal.

By selecting one road, the German army was able to fight both the British Airborne at Arnhem and the American 82nd Airborne further south, with the British 30th Armour delayed even further south, on one road.

Lee too had only one road to reach Gettysburg with Hill's and Longstreet's Corps. Did Lee overreach attempting to move over one road. I think Lee did, as Montgomery did.
 
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