Any Union attempts to diminish the Confederacy's munitions production?

Going back to the original question: what about Lincoln's lack of communications with McClellan?

McClellan: I think the proper strategy is to accumulate all federal forces in one army and simply steamroll over every city, starting with Richmond. While I wait for the troops to gather, I'll train what I have.

Lincoln: ...

McClellan: ...

Lincoln: ...

McClellan: ...

Lincoln: Why haven't you attacked yet?

Lincoln's "no strategy is the best strategy" approach basically left it up to regional commanders to invent their own strategic plans that were not necessarily coordinated with the departments adjoining nor complimentary in any way. If you're looking for the biggest strategic blunder of the war, not agreeing to a basic strategy for the armies to pursue is probably at the top of the list.
 
Lincoln's "no strategy is the best strategy" approach basically left it up to regional commanders to invent their own strategic plans that were not necessarily coordinated with the departments adjoining nor complimentary in any way. If you're looking for the biggest strategic blunder of the war, not agreeing to a basic strategy for the armies to pursue is probably at the top of the list.

That particular malady affected both sides. :D I might call it less a blunder than a reflection - in 1861 certainly - of neither having much of a clue what Napoleonic-scale modern war entailed for a large democratic republic with a mostly citizen-militia military tradition.
 
Augusta was probably important. But some of these small towns, like Atlanta, GA or Chattanooga, TN, contained switching yards, roundhouses, machine shops and skilled work forces. As the US captured places like that, what remained of the Confederate railroad system collapsed.
Prior to the Savannah expedition by Sherman, the Confederate railroad system was grinding to a halt due to three factors: lack of operable rolling stock, lack of men to repair the rolling stock that existed and build more cars, and lack of materials with which to repair/build the rolling stock. At one point, Sims writes Lee that if he had the skilled men detailed from the army to make and install the needed tires on the locomotives, he could double the number of operating locomotives in Virginia in a few months.

After Sherman got moving, the system added one more area that had to be filled if the railroads were to continue to operate -- rails. Sherman rendered unusable so many rails, that could only be rendered usable by re-rolling them in Richmond, that the utmost basic lines of communication could only be repaired by eliminating entire railroads on a grand scale.

From my prospective -- railroads and logistics -- the war ended when Sherman entered Savannah and Ft. Fisher was taken (ie January, 1865).
 
One of Grant’s first decisions after taking command at Chattanooga was to send cavalry against the copper rolling mills at Cleveland TN. The only source of copper in the South was at Copper Hill east of Chattanooga.
I see where Eli Long's cavalry, "under orders from department headquarters, was sent in rear of General Bragg's army, on a raid to Cleveland" and destroyed the rolling mills. Colonel Long confirmed this by reporting: "On the 24th, receiving orders from Major-General Thomas to march to Cleveland, Tennessee, and destroy as far as possible the enemy's lines of communication in that direction ...."

I may have missed it, but is there a source that indicated how Grant ordered this?
 
After Sherman got moving, the system added one more area that had to be filled if the railroads were to continue to operate -- rails. Sherman rendered unusable so many rails, that could only be rendered usable by re-rolling them in Richmond, that the utmost basic lines of communication could only be repaired by eliminating entire railroads on a grand scale.

Even Sherman's railroad destruction wasn't permanent though. The remnants of the Army of Tennessee were sent from AL to NC largely via rail in early 1865.

Similarly, the failure to get rations to the retreating ANV at Amelia Courthouse in April 1865 was a communication problem far more than a functionality issue.

The Confederate railroad network was in poor condition, operating far below full speed and full capacity, yet stil limping along.
 
Even Sherman's railroad destruction wasn't permanent though. The remnants of the Army of Tennessee were sent from AL to NC largely via rail in early 1865.

Similarly, the failure to get rations to the retreating ANV at Amelia Courthouse in April 1865 was a communication problem far more than a functionality issue.

The Confederate railroad network was in poor condition, operating far below full speed and full capacity, yet stil limping along.
A system that struggled to get 1,000 men a day to Greensboro (marching over 100 miles of the trip) was not a system that could support Richmond or either army. How was corn going to get from SW Georgia to Richmond? Who was going to defend anything south and west of Raleigh? There were so many refugee locomotives and cars south of Charlotte that the Charlotte & South Carolina RR could barely move the handful of men who showed up to ride to Johnston.
 
I see where Eli Long's cavalry, "under orders from department headquarters, was sent in rear of General Bragg's army, on a raid to Cleveland" and destroyed the rolling mills. Colonel Long confirmed this by reporting: "On the 24th, receiving orders from Major-General Thomas to march to Cleveland, Tennessee, and destroy as far as possible the enemy's lines of communication in that direction ...."

I may have missed it, but is there a source that indicated how Grant ordered this?
Thomas was following Grant's orders. This is 6 days before:

Head Quarters, Mil. Div. of the Miss.​
Chattanooga Ten. Nov. 18th 1863.​
Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman,​
Comd.g Dept. & Army of the Ten. General,​
Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to Maj. Gen. Thomas. You having been over the ground, in person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions will not be necessary for you.​

It is particularly desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton and Longstreet thus cut off from communication with the South, but being confronted by a large force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is to be effected until the result of our first effort is known. I will add however what is not shown in my instructions to Gen. Thomas that one Brigade of Cavalry has been ordered here which, if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee, above Chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or thereabouts.​
I am Gen. Very respectfully​
your obt. svt.​
U. S. Grant​
Maj. Gen. Comd.g​
Papers of US Grant, vol 9, pg 410​
 
Even Sherman's railroad destruction wasn't permanent though. The remnants of the Army of Tennessee were sent from AL to NC largely via rail in early 1865.

Similarly, the failure to get rations to the retreating ANV at Amelia Courthouse in April 1865 was a communication problem far more than a functionality issue.

The Confederate railroad network was in poor condition, operating far below full speed and full capacity, yet stil limping along.
And if those AoT remnants could reach North Carolina, then it stands to reason that Augusta gunpowder could have reached there as well.

The Confederate ability to skirt broken sections of railroad was demonstrated further north after Grant's army broke the Weldon Railroad.
 
I see where Eli Long's cavalry, "under orders from department headquarters, was sent in rear of General Bragg's army, on a raid to Cleveland" and destroyed the rolling mills. Colonel Long confirmed this by reporting: "On the 24th, receiving orders from Major-General Thomas to march to Cleveland, Tennessee, and destroy as far as possible the enemy's lines of communication in that direction ...."

I may have missed it, but is there a source that indicated how Grant ordered this?
On Nov 18th, Grant mentions to Sherman a verbal order issued to Thomas to send a brigade of cavalry against Cleveland.

Edit: Dang, Dan beat me to it.
 
I see where Eli Long's cavalry, "under orders from department headquarters, was sent in rear of General Bragg's army, on a raid to Cleveland" and destroyed the rolling mills. Colonel Long confirmed this by reporting: "On the 24th, receiving orders from Major-General Thomas to march to Cleveland, Tennessee, and destroy as far as possible the enemy's lines of communication in that direction ...."

I may have missed it, but is there a source that indicated how Grant ordered this?
Grant was in command of every soldier west of the Allegheny Mountains. He did not personally give a command to Long. He ordered the commander of the Department of the Cumberland (Thomas) to order Long to attack Cleveland. At the same time, Grant was giving orders to Burnside in Knoxville.

At last, the jerky-jerky uncoordinated departmental commands were firmly under the command of one man. Thomas, Sherman, Burnside & other western departmental commanders reported directly to Grant.

Hooker reported to Thomas as commander of the Department of the Cumberland. Grant gave orders to Hooker via Thomas’ HQ. Grant gave orders directly to Thomas as both Commander of the Department of the Cumberland & as commander of the Army of the Cumberland.

In that way, Grant sent orders all the way up the supply line to Cincinnati. He also gave tactical orders directly to Thomas such as taking Orchard Knob or the advance up the rail line toward Knoxville.

Bottom line is that everybody worked for Grant during the battle for Chattanooga. At the same from his HQ in Chattanooga, Grant was also doing the preliminary planning for his next move, the capture of Mobile. The riverine & logistical planning for that operation was centered in Vicksburg. Grant’s promotion to General on Command put a stop to that operation.

After he got his fourth star, everybody everywhere worked for Grant.
 
Thomas was following Grant's orders. This is 6 days before:

Head Quarters, Mil. Div. of the Miss.​
Chattanooga Ten. Nov. 18th 1863.​
Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman,​
Comd.g Dept. & Army of the Ten. General,​
Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to Maj. Gen. Thomas. You having been over the ground, in person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions will not be necessary for you.​

It is particularly desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton and Longstreet thus cut off from communication with the South, but being confronted by a large force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is to be effected until the result of our first effort is known. I will add however what is not shown in my instructions to Gen. Thomas that one Brigade of Cavalry has been ordered here which, if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee, above Chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or thereabouts.​
I am Gen. Very respectfully​
your obt. svt.​
U. S. Grant​
Maj. Gen. Comd.g​
Papers of US Grant, vol 9, pg 410​
Those verbal orders can really screw with the history books. Pretty much every book that mentions the Battle of Big Black River Bridge claims Lawler's charge was spontaneous, even though Eugene A. Carr mentions receiving a verbal order on Champion Hill placing him in direct command of the pursuit, and two regiments from Osterhaus' Division mention being ordered to fill the gap between Benton and Lawler when Lawler re-positioned.
 
The excellent posts that are in this thread leave out the overall picture. Tying them all together is the fact that while at Chattanooga, Grant was also commanding the forces at Knoxville. From his point of view, Knoxville was his left flank & Chattanooga his right flank.

The CSA forces in the Sequache Valley & Longstreet were supplied via the depot in Dalton GA. By ordering the interdiction of the rail line, Grant was preventing potential reinforcements from Virginia via Knoxville from descending on Chattanooga as well as cutting off Longstreet from his base.

It is not often understood that Longstreet’s Valley Forge like winter after Knoxville was supplied from Dalton. The torturous 500 mile rail connection continuously broke down due to the extraordinary cold.

Grant’s Chattanooga/Knoxville campaign was on a continental scale.
 
Augusta was probably important. But some of these small towns, like Atlanta, GA or Chattanooga, TN, contained switching yards, roundhouses, machine shops and skilled work forces. As the US captured places like that, what remained of the Confederate railroad system collapsed.
What Sherman did was actually brilliant. He had no intention of taking & holding a square inch of Northern GA, Augusta included. Like Lee, Sherman only had a very limited supply of ammunition. Unlike Lee, Sherman had no intention of expending it in a large battle in the middle of nowhere. By feinting at Augusta, he forced the CSA command to concentrate & defend an asset he had no intention to attack.

Augusta, like Richmond was far more valuable as a point to fix CSA forces on than any advantage that could be gained from capturing it. The forces guarding Augusta were left dangling far to his rear when he advanced up onto SC. That move also broke Augusta’s communications with Lee, removing it from the board without firing a shot. Very clever, very clever indeed.
 
And if those AoT remnants could reach North Carolina, then it stands to reason that Augusta gunpowder could have reached there as well.

The Confederate ability to skirt broken sections of railroad was demonstrated further north after Grant's army broke the Weldon Railroad.
I think what is missing is the fact that there were enough engines & rolling stock to do one, but not both.
 
The problem was not engines and rolling stock, it was destroyed rails. When Sherman was finished, there was no usable rail from just east of Augusta to the South/North Carolina border.
And the same holds true for Charleston. A rebel army could not stay there once the railroads of South Carolina were wrecked. The pattern supports the inference that railroad intelligence, routes, schedules and number of trains running, was vital information to Grant. When he knew which railroads the Confederacy was committed to maintaining, he had a good picture of what he was going to damage.
 
As to the feasibility of capturing Augusta, both Grant and Sherman stated that it could be done.
As to the feasibility of reaching Charleston, Sherman stated that it could be done.
Sherman knew that Augusta had "the only powder mills and factories remaining in the South"

That being the case, there seems little reason not to blame them for not destroying this vital munitions source in 1864.
 
As to the feasibility of capturing Augusta, both Grant and Sherman stated that it could be done.
As to the feasibility of reaching Charleston, Sherman stated that it could be done.
Sherman knew that Augusta had "the only powder mills and factories remaining in the South"

That being the case, there seems little reason not to blame them for not destroying this vital munitions source in 1864.
I think you are putting the cart before the horse. When Sherman captured Savannah & then Charleston fell, Augusta could produce cannon powder six days a week, but there was no where to ship large grain cannon powder. With Sherman marching north through the Carolinas, the Augusta’s powder had nowhere to go.

What had happened when Grant & Sherman decided not to occupy North Georgia, Augusta included, was akin to Island Hoping in WWII. From Atlanta to the sea, not a single a Union soldier was wasted as part of an occupying force. Not a single boxcar if rations was dispatched from Cincinnati to North Georgia.

Sherman quite rightly left Augusta & the rest of Northern Georgia to wither on the vine. Victory without firing a shot was a brilliant solution.
 
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