An 1862 Overland Campaign...

You don’t have to screw up to lose a battle. Assuming Lee would be in command might be convenient to the assembly of your model but it may not have been the case.
Okay, so you feel that Johnston would lose a battle without screwing up, correct? How would this happen, when "screwing up" in this case is e.g. "loses a winnable battle" or "suffers a poor casualty ratio"?
 
Well in the spirit of "what if." What if Lee or grant got killed or wounded and no longer could command.
 
In the opinion of statistics. Grant's performance in the Overland battles is awful (CEVs in the region of 0.16 or less), McClellan's performance in his own offensive battles is good (0.64 for South Mountain, 0.7 for Antietam).


I asked you to prove a positive. The position I asked you to prove was "a viable supply route exists".
And I have agreed but stated that one could be created but since it was never attempted we can’t make any decisions on its viability.

Casualties are not the score card for military success, victory is.
 
Well in the spirit of "what if." What if Lee or grant got killed or wounded and no longer could command.
Well, if Lee got killed or wounded while in command of the AoNV in an 1862 Overland, then command would devolve onto the next most senior commander.
If Johnston had been removed from command for cause (wounded or otherwise) then it would probably be Huger or Magruder; otherwise, Johnston. (Of course, anyone could be appointed.)

If Grant got killed or wounded in an 1862 Overland, assuming Grant has been appointed as MG(R) and thus gained command of the AotP, the next ranking MG would take command. (Possibly McClellan, if McClellan is GiC; otherwise to some extent it depends on who is MG(V).)
 
We can’t assume anything about battles that were never fought.
So your position, to be clear, is that we can't assume an 1862 Overland would fail because we can't assume the battles would go the same.

Specifically, you assert the following sequence of events is plausible:

JE Johnston remains in command.
He loses a battle instead of winning it.
But he doesn't lose his position for this, because he lost the battle without screwing up in the eyes of high command.

But you refuse to specify how someone can lose a battle without screwing up in the eyes of high command.

Why are you even in this forum, Dan? This whole forum deals with hypothetical events, but you appear to refuse to analyze anything even slightly different from the historical course of events.

Agreed. This is the one problem that this question has. It's a what if.
This is the what-if forum!
 
And I have agreed but stated that one could be created but since it was never attempted we can’t make any decisions on its viability.
By saying "one could be created" you have made a positive assertion. Justify it or withdraw it.

As for viability, simple - in early 1862 the Army of the Potomac could not operate more than a day's march from a supply base (as per the French Princes). A day's march is 15 miles, so that's your viability test.
If you want a more permissive test, let's go with three days' march (45 road miles).
 
And I have agreed but stated that one could be created but since it was never attempted we can’t make any decisions on its viability.

Casualties are not the score card for military success, victory is.
I made the same point in another thread. Battlefield casualties have an affect on strategic outcomes. But so do deaths due to disease and malnutrition. Caloric sufficiency had an affect in the Civil War, which stretched out over years. The ability to go home and visit or vote, and eat regular food, had an affect. The United States army in the Civil War was mainly literate. The soldiers were keenly aware of the political dissent.
If McClellan had chosen an Overland route in 1862 he might have been sustained politically in an entirely different way. Or he might have turned around and retreated to Washington after the discouraging sight of a the first truly big battle.
 
In a Civil War, body counts are counterproductive. The dead are potential reunited citizens.
In a Civil War a desirable object is to convince the opponent to give up, in mass, or one by one.
 
You can lose a battle without screwing up. Everything in your plan could go off exactly as you wished the enemy’s plan might just be better.

I have justified how it would be done. It is you that are assuming away the use of the engineer force under their command and the availability of some of the best railroad and bridge mechanics. They are an asset.
 
Hypotheticals can go in more than one direction. In your hypothetical a 1862 Overland campaign is impossible. In my hypothetical any number of factors can change your projected outcome.Military operations are notorious for unpredictability and can not be held to assumptions and statistics.
 
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Spring an summer 1862 the rebel army in Virginia is as close to parity in numbers as they will ever get and even more importantly they get Robert E. Lee. IMO changing leaders in the union army or changing attack angles probably wouldn't have changed outcomes much.
Would the union government in 1862 be willing to accept the mass causalities that they were willing to accept in 1864? I doubt it.
 
Your forgetting the most important thing. Lincoln's reelection. In 1862, the Dems won seats not the majority. 1864, the oval office was at stake. I doubt if in 1862, Lincoln would have approved the horrific losses that Grant had in 1864.
 
Your forgetting the most important thing. Lincoln's reelection. In 1862, the Dems won seats not the majority. 1864, the oval office was at stake. I doubt if in 1862, Lincoln would have approved the horrific losses that Grant had in 1864.
Never thought of that.
 
Let's step back to 1862 and ask a couple important questions about McClellan that can be more than mere speculation.

1. If Mcclellan's original Urbanna plan had gone forward what route did he propose to follow to Richmond?

2. After the Urbanna plan was scrapped due to Johnston falling back from Manassas where did Johnston position his army? (This dictates where McClellan could/should cross the Rappahannock if going overland.

3. Did McClellan have any backup overland plan if Lincoln vetoed the Peninsular Campaign?

4. Assuming Johnston defends the Rappahannock line was it reasonably possible for McClellan to feint with part of his army overland then land the rest at Urbanna or somewhere similar? Did McClellan ever consider this option?

5. What route was McDowell supposed to follow overland with the I Corps to join McClellan? The railroad from Fredericksburg?
 
Well, if Lee got killed or wounded while in command of the AoNV in an 1862 Overland, then command would devolve onto the next most senior commander.
If Johnston had been removed from command for cause (wounded or otherwise) then it would probably be Huger or Magruder; otherwise, Johnston. (Of course, anyone could be appointed.)

If Grant got killed or wounded in an 1862 Overland, assuming Grant has been appointed as MG(R) and thus gained command of the AotP, the next ranking MG would take command. (Possibly McClellan, if McClellan is GiC; otherwise to some extent it depends on who is MG(V).)

Banks (5th Corps) would be 2nd, McDowell (1st Corps) 3rd, and Sumner (2nd Corps) 4th as senior BG(R).
 
Hypotheticals can go in more than one direction. In your hypothetical a 1862 Overland campaign is impossible. In my hypothetical any number of factors can change your projected outcome.Military operations are notorious for unpredictability and can not be held to assumptions and statistics.

Indeed, but geography is one constant. The inability to create an MSR out of thin air is an obvious issue. I await your attempt to actually solve this one...
 
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