Alternatives to A.P. Hill at 3rd Corps

I think Jeb Stuart was considered for one of the corps as well and had temporarily commanded II Corps after Jackson fell. However he was thought to be invaluable/unreplaceable in the cavalry. I don´t know how he´d be as permanent commander of infantry, might have been interesting, but I for one think that the more interesting aspect in that development would be Wade Hampton taking command of the cavalry over a year sooner.
GELongstreet has made an excellent point here. I, for one, think that it would be very interesting to see Jeb in the role of a corps commander. In my opinion, he performed great as acting corps commander at Chancellorsville and his overall authority could make others overlook his relatively low seniority (both A.P. Hill and R.H. Anderson ranked him as Major Generals and Stuart took command at Chancelorsville only after Hill was wounded).
The problem was with R.E. Lee who just refused to see this as a viable possibility - he couldn't imagine handling cavalry without his trusted Jeb Stuart until he was forced to by Stuart's mortal wound.

What I think on the main question:
Only viable alternatives without running into seniority problems would be D.H. Hill or Lafayette McLaws. Both have already disappointed R.E. Lee, so their promotion to corps command is something out of the world of fiction.
 
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You hit the nail on the head with this comment.
Yeah, though you have to wonder at what point he became so dashing he was actually detrimental to the success of the army. Grand raids are cool and attention-grabbing, but they're only good sense if they don't interfere with the screen/scout role - and at Gettysburg they most certainly did.
 
Yeah, though you have to wonder at what point he became so dashing he was actually detrimental to the success of the army. Grand raids are cool and attention-grabbing, but they're only good sense if they don't interfere with the screen/scout role - and at Gettysburg they most certainly did.

In all fairness, Stuart was following Lee's orders in the summer of 1863.

Ryan
 
In all fairness, Stuart was following Lee's orders in the summer of 1863.

Ryan
That's a good point, yes. Though I have to wonder how vague the orders were - I'd be surprised (but not disbelieving) if Lee's orders explicitly stated Stuart should take all or most of his cavalry off on the ride.
 
That's a good point, yes. Though I have to wonder how vague the orders were - I'd be surprised (but not disbelieving) if Lee's orders explicitly stated Stuart should take all or most of his cavalry off on the ride.

When I last looked into it several years back I found it was Longstreet whose bright idea it was. If I may just copy-paste, because I haven't time to precise:


Stuart's command of 3 brigades was ordered to screen the right flank of the advance.

Robertson's command of 2 brigades was ordered to screen the rear.

Jenkin's brigade was attached to Ewell's Corps and in the advance guard.

Imboden's brigade was sent over to the left flank of the army's advance.

It's a sensible arrangement, cavalry screening each direction, with the strongest bodies in the direction of the expected threat. The problem was his right flank force wandered off. Lee's orders were:

"HEADQUARTERS, June 22, 1863.

Major General J. E. B. STUART,
Commanding Cavalry:

GENERAL: I have just received your note of 7:45 this morning to General Longstreet. I judge the efforts of the enemy yesterday were to arrest our progress and ascertain our whereabouts. Perhaps he is satisfied. Do you know where he is and what he is doing? I fear he will steal a march on us, and get across the Potomac before we are aware. If you find that he is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland, and take position on General Ewell`s right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy`s movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army. One column of General Ewell`s army will probably move toward the Susquehanna by the Emmitsburg route; another by Chambersburg. Accounts from him last night state that there was no enemy west of Frederick. A cavalry force (about 100) guarded the Monocacy Bridge, which was barricaded. You will, of course, take charge of [A. G.] Jenkins` brigade, and give him necessary instructions. All supplies taken in Maryland must be by authorized staff officers for their respective departments-by no one else. They will be paid for, or receipts for the same given to the owners. I will send you a general order on this subject, which I wish you to see is strictly complied with.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,

General. "

Which was passed through Longstreet (to whom Stuart was attached). Longstreet suggested a "ride around", but suggested it was Lee's idea:

"HEADQUARTERS, June 22, 1863-7. 30 p. m.

General R. E. LEE,
Commanding, &c.:

GENERAL: Yours of 4 o`clock this afternoon is received. I have forwarded your letter to General Stuart, with the suggestion that he pass by the enemy`s if he thinks that he may get through. We have nothing of the enemy to-day.

Most respectfully,

JAMES LONGSTREET,

Lieutenant-General, Commanding. "

"
HEADQUARTERS, Millwood, June 22, 1863-7 p. m.

Major General J. E. B. STUART,
Commanding Cavalry:

GENERAL: General Lee has inclosed to me this letter for you, * to be forwarded to you, provided you can be spared from my front, and provided I think that you can move across the Potomac without disclosing our plans. He speaks of your leaving, via Hopewell Gap, and passing by the rear of the enemy. If you can get through by that route, I think that you will be less likely to indicate what our plans are than if you should cross by passing to our rear. I forward the letter of instructions with these suggestions.

Please advise me of the condition of affairs before you leave, and order General Hampton-whom I suppose you will leave here in command-to report to me at Millwood, either by letter or in person, as may be most agreeable to him.

Most respectfully,

JAMES LONGSTREET,

Lieutenant-General.

N. B. -I think that your passage of the Potomac by our rear at the present moment will, in a measure, disclose our plans. You had better not leave us, therefore, unless you can take the proposed route in rear of the enemy. "

and hence afterwards Lee allows it if it won't compromise his primary mission:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, June 23, 1863-5 p. m.

Major General J. E. B. STUART,
Commanding Cavalry:

GENERAL: Your notes of 9 and 10. 30 a. m. to-day have just been received. As regards the purchase of tobacco for your men, supposing that Confederate money will not be taken, I am willing for your commissaries or quartermasters to purchase this tobacco and let the men get it from them, but I can have nothing seized by the men.

If General Hooker`s army remains inactive, you can leave two brigades to watch him, and withdraw with the three others, but should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountain to-morrow night, cross at Shepherdstown next day, and move over to Fredericktown.

You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army, without hinderance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell`s troops, collecting information, provisions, &c.

Give instructions to the commander of the brigades left behind, to watch the flank and rear of the army, and (in the event of the enemy leaving their front) retire from the mountains west of the Shenandoah, leaving sufficient pickets to guard the passes, and bringing everything clean along the Valley, Closing upon the rear of the army. As regards the movements of the two brigades of the enemy moving toward Warrenton, the commander of the brigades to be left in the mountains must do what he can to counteract them, but I think the sooner you cross into Maryland, after to-morrow, the better.

The movements of Ewell`s corps are as stated in my former letter. Hill`s first division will reach the Potomac to-day, and Longstreet will follow to-morrow.

Be watchful and circumspect in all your movements.

I am, very respectfully and truly, yours,

R. E. LEE,

General. "

Stuart failed to perform his primary mission. Lee allowed Stuart to follow Longstreet's suggestion if it didn't compromise the main effort. It did but he did it anyway. Now you might make the case Lee should not have allowed any latitude, but if Stuart was perceived to be that unreliable then that speaks of something else...
 
Yeah, though you have to wonder at what point he became so dashing he was actually detrimental to the success of the army. Grand raids are cool and attention-grabbing, but they're only good sense if they don't interfere with the screen/scout role - and at Gettysburg they most certainly did.


So what failures had Stuart had before Gettysburg? I would argue up til then, Stuart was batting 1.000
 
That's a good point, yes. Though I have to wonder how vague the orders were - I'd be surprised (but not disbelieving) if Lee's orders explicitly stated Stuart should take all or most of his cavalry off on the ride.

They were vague but gave Stuart the latitude to make his ride. Frankly, Stuart was in a no-win situation when he ran up against the Union army on the move. He could continue around the Union force and hope to meet up with Ewell around York or Harrisburg or he could turn back and rejoin the rest of the army on the march. But both options presented problems. If he returned, he would be at the tail end of the column and would not be guarding the left flank like Lee wanted or he could continue on his course and hope that extenuating circumstances did not delay him or change Ewell's situation.

Where Stuart can be blamed, it was in taking his best commanders with him on his ride, leaving Lee with the weaker officers. Many of Jenkins' men were considered little better than guerrillas, as were Imboden's (not to mention that Lee knew nothing of Imboden and wouldn't rely on him which is why he was sent on a raid to the northwest around McConnellsburg). Robertson was commanding his and Jones' brigades in the rear and Robertson was arguably the poorest cavalry commander in the army. He mismanaged his troops and didn't arrive until after most of the fighting ended on July 3rd. Stuart should have left a reliable commander with the army but, owing to personality conflicts and wanting his best troops with him, he did not do so.

Ryan
 
Jeff Davis was a stickler for seniority.

In October '62 Lee was asked to recommend officers for promotion to Lt Gen and Corps Command. He replied that his best generals were Longstreet, Jackson and AP Hill. Given a free choice he's have made three corps under those generals. The problem was DH Hill ranked AP Hill, and Davis would not have him passed over.

But isn't that exactly what happened? I mean, wasn't D.H. Hill passed over (and transferred out of ANV) at the end of 1862?
 
But isn't that exactly what happened? I mean, wasn't D.H. Hill passed over (and transferred out of ANV) at the end of 1862?

He wasn't passed over but Lee had made it clear that he wanted A.P. Hill as a possible new corps commander which would have passed over D.H. Hill. Lee and Harvey Hill did not get along and in the spring, Hill was sent to North Carolina and away from the Army of Northern Virginia.

Ryan
 
Frankly, Stuart was in a no-win situation when he ran up against the Union army on the move. He could continue around the Union force and hope to meet up with Ewell around York or Harrisburg or he could turn back and rejoin the rest of the army on the march.
Is there any reason he can't pull back a little to operate between the two armies? They weren't exactly in contact, after all.
 
GELongstreet has made an excellent point here. I, for one, think that it would be very interesting to see Jeb in the role of a corps commander. In my opinion, he performed great as acting corps commander at Chancellorsville and his overall authority could make others overlook his relatively low seniority (both A.P. Hill and R.H. Anderson ranked him as Major Generals and Stuart took command at Chancelorsville only after Hill was wounded).
The problem was with R.E. Lee who just refused to see this as a viable possibility - he couldn't imagine handling cavalry without his trusted Jeb Stuart until he was forced to by Stuart's mortal wound.

What I think on the main question:
Only viable alternatives without running into seniority problems would be D.H. Hill or Lafayette McLaws. Both have already disappointed R.E. Lee, so their promotion to corps command is something out of the world of fiction.

Refresh my memory, please. What did DH Hill do that disappointed Lee?

Most of what I read about Lee's complaints about DH Hill seems focused on Hill's disagreeable personality and its disruptive effects among the senior staff.
 
Hill did not perform well at South Mountain. He put too much responsibility on Ripley and did not do as much as he should have as division commander. Lee soured on him at that point, and you add in his personality issues.
 
He wasn't passed over but Lee had made it clear that he wanted A.P. Hill as a possible new corps commander which would have passed over D.H. Hill. Lee and Harvey Hill did not get along and in the spring, Hill was sent to North Carolina and away from the Army of Northern Virginia.

Ryan

Isn't that a distinction without a difference? I mean, being detached from the ANV and sent to the backwater of Kinston, N.C., was pretty unmistakable as a demotion.

Didn't Hill view it that way? And become the cause of a lot of the ill will between DH Hill and Davis?
 
Refresh my memory, please. What did DH Hill do that disappointed Lee?
Poor manner of expression from me, I apologize.
I was meaning exactly D.H. Hill's personality issues that got him on the R.E. Lee bad side. Also kind of disappointment, but of a very different sort than, for example, McLaws' performance at Salem Church,
 
But isn't that exactly what happened? I mean, wasn't D.H. Hill passed over (and transferred out of ANV) at the end of 1862?

It was April 63 that DR Hill was transferred. Lee seemed to start preparing to move to three corps before Chancellorville. If Jackson hadn't been hit I think Lee would have gone with his preferred Longstreet-Jackson-AP Hill structure.
 
Hill did not perform well at South Mountain. He put too much responsibility on Ripley and did not do as much as he should have as division commander. Lee soured on him at that point, and you add in his personality issues.

I must confess a continuing confusion on how to interpret the events of South Mountain.

Hill wrote after the war that the sole purpose of the battle was to delay the advance of the Union army so that the ANV trains could escape danger and that the ANV infantry forces could mass effectively at Sharpsburg. This, according to all sources that I know of, was accomplished. Hill even wrote that the battle should be considered a big victory.

Furthermore, many writers have remarked that Hill was so massively outnumbered that there was no chance of any success except a brief delaying action. If that's true, why would Lee or any of the other generals hold it against him?

We talked a little on a similar thread recently about who was to blame for the Lost Order. Is it possible that Lee and others blamed DH Hill for the Lost Order and that was the biggest reason that Lee canned him?
 
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