Alternative Fredericksburg

Crazy Delawares

Sergeant
Joined
Sep 16, 2008
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South Jersey
Hey folks! There seems to be no shortage of "What if" scenarios for Gettysburg. This morning as I was watching a CW series on the history channel about Fredericksburg (I know, pretty amazing, right?), what would've/might have happened if Gen. Burnside had received his pontoon bridges when he wanted them? A repeat of the Peninsular Campaign? Chancellorsville? Or maybe somewhere else?
 
Interesting.

I have one if I may add it...
What if George Meade had gotten the support he needed on Prospect Hill?

Although the battle would not have been won right there it might have changed how the battle was fought, and possibly the outcome.

Even if it was still a defeat for the AoP, it might not have been as costly or decisive?

Were Burnsides’ orders too vauge, or did Franklin just not interpret them correctly? In my opinion, both were in over their heads while in their respective billets of command.
 
Interesting.

I have one if I may add it...
What if George Meade had gotten the support he needed on Prospect Hill?

Although the battle would not have been won right there it might have changed how the battle was fought, and possibly the outcome.

Even if it was still a defeat for the AoP, it might not have been as costly or decisive?

Were Burnsides’ orders too vauge, or did Franklin just not interpret them correctly? In my opinion, both were in over their heads while in their respective billets of command.

That would be my 'what if?' as well... Franklin receives the "one division at least" order, scratches his head and immediately sends back for 'I thought I had a lot of men on this wing for a reason' clarification...

But then again, I am coming to believe Franklin was actually in over his head even more than Burnside. LOL
 
Hi, from my point of view, the main problem was the men in command, not the lack of pontoon bridges at time. Burnside had three "Grand Divisions" under him at Fredericksburg, each one commanded by a senior officer : Sumner, Hooker and Franklin. The "Reserve Grand Division", under Sigel, stayed at the rear and did not participate in the fight. The first one was actually the only one Burnside could trust to execute his orders, while the two others were not. Hooker, a competent officer, wanted to be in full command of the army while Franklin wasn't a bold fighter. Sigel wasn't at his best at the corps level, but he was beloved by his German troops of the 11th Corps.

The plan Burnside chose to manage was made for both trusty and able subordinates. Even if victory was uncertain, the actions would have been led with more efficiency (the advance of Meade's Pennsylvania Reserves showed great promises with the possibility of penetrate Jackson's Second Corps, forcing Lee to fall back).

Having the pontoon bridges earlier may have forced the Army of Northern Virginia to leave the field rather than fight and Burnside would not have scored any grand victory with this configuration of command. I think that even Sigel would have been more trustful than either Hooker or Franklin, despite his generally bad performance on the battlefield (Pea Ridge was an exception in his career).

Hooker should have been left at the rear (switching his role with Sigel) while Franklin should have been replaced by another officer (Couch seems to be a viable option, and his seniority was equal to Franklin's).

This means that, with the advantage of concentrating one month earlier than the historical Fredericksburg, Burnside wouldn't achieve any glory in the area because of this commanding system. He wasn't fit for that level of command, and two of his main subordinates were not willing to execute his orders, creating a lack of trust in the general command. An alternative Fredericksburg in this condition would have the same impact as Seven Pines (an inconclusive battle with no decisive effect on the military situation).

This reflects my personal opinion, I do not pretend to have the best answer available. Some other can consider the situation better or worst for the Army of the Potomac. I really enjoy this kind of discussion, this allows to debate on interesting military situations and lost opportunities, with the possibility of re-evaluating some of our favorite generals.

We can also imagine this scenario :

- November 17-18, Sumner arrives at Falmouth with the 2nd Corps (15,500 men) and the 9th Corps (16,500 men). He began the crossing of the Rappahannock and entrenches in Fredericksburg. The other federal units are on their way to reach him. Longstreet, at Culpeper, is ordered by Lee to delay the progression of Sumner. Jackson is urged to reach the Matapony in order to create a second line of defense. A.P. Hill's Light Division (11,500 men) stays on the Shenandoah Valley to threaten Washington and to prevent the concentration of all the federal army corps at Falmouth.

- November 23-25, Longstreet reaches the Marye's Heights, occupied by the 2nd Corps while Hooker and Franklin cross the Rappahannock. McLaws', Anderson's and Hood's Divisions (totalling 18,000 men) start to fire at the Federals in order to fix them while Pickett's and Ransom's Divisions (13,000 men) are sent on the federal left flank in order to repulse Sumner's Grand Division. This flanking column collides with some units of the 9th Corps and is finally repulsed after the arrival of federal units from the 3rd Corps (20,500 men). The 5th Corps (28,500), 1st Corps (16,000) and 6th Corps (24,000) are deploying on the heights, making any confederate assault suicidal. Burnside, having no information about Jackson's location, sent back the 11th Corps to Harpers Ferry to protect Washington against A.P. Hill's threat.

- November 29-30, Jackson's remaining units (15,000 men) are deploying along of the Matapony while D. H. Hill's Division (10,000 men) is sent on the south bank of the North Anna to prepare entrenchments, assuming that the Army of the Potomac will soon move against the confederate positions. Longstreet's Corps is retreating, having brought enough time to allow the concentration of the confederate troops down south. Hooker and Franklin, fearing too many casualties, do not pursue Longstreet, despite Burnside's orders to move forward.

- Etc. Winter Quarters, no major campaigns, except feints and skirmishes between the two armies south of the Rappahannock. The Federals establish a supply base at Fredericksburg while the Confederates develop their entrenchment system along the North Anna.
 
To begin with, unlike McClellan at the Peninsula and Hooker at Chancellorsville, Burnside failed to get his army across the river crossing speedily and stealthily, thereby allowing the ANV enough time to assume a strong defensive position by Longstreet at Mayre's Heights and more flexible defensive positions by Jackson at points south of the city. The next big mistake was the failure by Franklin to press and commit fully his Grand Division and Hooker's reserve to turn Jackson's flank at Hamilton Crossing. Compounding that problem, the third major error was in the mounting by Sumner's Grand Division, of successive and futile frontal attacks against Longstreet, instead of a simple demonstration to keep the Confederate left flank occupied.
 
- November 17-18, Sumner arrives at Falmouth with the 2nd Corps (15,500 men) and the 9th Corps (16,500 men). He began the crossing of the Rappahannock and entrenches in Fredericksburg

In fact, Sumner advocated this action upon his arrival at Falmouth. Sumner wanted to cross the Rappahannock by ford and establish a bridgehead on the Fredericksburg side before the ANV had a chance to concentrate. But Burnside put the kabosh on that idea.
 
- November 17-18, Sumner arrives at Falmouth with the 2nd Corps (15,500 men) and the 9th Corps (16,500 men). He began the crossing of the Rappahannock and entrenches in Fredericksburg. The other federal units are on their way to reach him. Longstreet, at Culpeper, is ordered by Lee to delay the progression of Sumner. Jackson is urged to reach the Matapony in order to create a second line of defense. A.P. Hill's Light Division (11,500 men) stays on the Shenandoah Valley to threaten Washington and to prevent the concentration of all the federal army corps at Falmouth.

- November 23-25, Longstreet reaches the Marye's Heights, occupied by the 2nd Corps while Hooker and Franklin cross the Rappahannock. McLaws', Anderson's and Hood's Divisions (totalling 18,000 men) start to fire at the Federals

That is, that the Federals occupy Fredericksburg and sit there for a week without even moving up Marye's Heights? Troops crossing a river would advance at least far enough to keep hostile fire from the crossing points.
 
Interesting.

I have one if I may add it...
What if George Meade had gotten the support he needed on Prospect Hill?

Although the battle would not have been won right there it might have changed how the battle was fought, and possibly the outcome.

Even if it was still a defeat for the AoP, it might not have been as costly or decisive?

Were Burnsides’ orders too vauge, or did Franklin just not interpret them correctly? In my opinion, both were in over their heads while in their respective billets of command.

In regards to your last question yes on both counts. Burnside's orders were not specific, and Franklin knew the written order he received did not match the discussion he had with Burnside about what his plan had been of the attack. In the end I blame Franklin more so because he had been informed verbally, he had an entire Grand Division at his disposal, and even when he saw the success, he still didn't commit to the level that was expected of him.
 
Interesting.

I have one if I may add it...
What if George Meade had gotten the support he needed on Prospect Hill?

Although the battle would not have been won right there it might have changed how the battle was fought, and possibly the outcome.

Even if it was still a defeat for the AoP, it might not have been as costly or decisive?

Were Burnsides’ orders too vauge, or did Franklin just not interpret them correctly? In my opinion, both were in over their heads while in their respective billets of command.

Burnside's written orders were not as clear as his previous verbal instructions, but if Franklin had committed the greater part of his Grand Division to exploiting Meade's breakthrough through a gap in AP Hill's line, there was a real possibility of turning Jackson's right flank. This of course, was supposed to be the major effort to attain victory at Fredericksburg. What ended up happening was that a planned demonstration against Longstreet at Mayre's Heights to distract from Franklin's main assault, ended up being a day long series of futile and senseless frontal assaults.
 
More importantly, "What If" . . . . . Burnside allowed Lowe's balloons to go aloft and report enemy disposition PRIOR to his troops crossing the Rappahannock on December 13?!?

Burnside refused to let the balloons ascend prior to the attack because he did not want the enemy to "know his intentions" . . . . .

Respectfully Summitted,

TSC Lowe, Aeronaut
Civil War Balloon Corps Living History
 
My understanding is that, if Burnside had got the bridges on schedule (or pushed troops over the fords ahead of time) the net result would have been that Lee would be at the North Anna - this was in fact his original plan and he only moved to Fredericksburg when he saw that Burnside had not crossed yet.


If we assume that the pontoon bridge delays had all been caught, they would arrive almost nine days earlier (up to six days quicker with faster order transmission as the order went by barge to Berlin, and another few days for missing a major storm). Then the construction is quicker because there's no enemy troops present.



Lee responded to Burnside's movement on the 18th by sending Fitz Lee's Cavalry brigade to recce Fredericksburg, supported by McLaws' division sent to Chancellorsville, and ordered Ransom's division to march from Madison Ct Hse to Hanover Junction via Orange Ct Hse. The orders for the other divisions aren't in the OR, but diaries etc. show that the other divisions marched SSW from Culpeper to Orange Ct Hse with orders to proceed to Hanover Junction. At 1630 that afternoon orders are sent to McLaws to continue on to Fredericksburg, and to Ransom to divert to Guinea Station (14 miles S of Fredericksburg). Warning orders are apparently issued to the other three division commanders, as the orders of the next day refer to them; Anderson, Hood and then Pickett would march to Fredericksburg. Anderson should start immediately, then Hood. Pickett was instructed to march on the 20th.

As to Jackson, despite repeated pleas, he didn't start marching until 21st November, and the divisions arrived near Fredericksburg between the 1st and 3rd December. On the 5th Burnside seems to have authorised the crossing Sumner had proposed on the 17th November, but DH Hill's division now commanded the ford.



With the pontoons having arrived on 16 November (moving from Berlin on the 7th not the 12th November, and then being 3 days faster) and construction starting on the 17th then the first troops can be over on the 18th November. This means the whole AotP can be over on the 19th, and the wagons crossing on the 20th and 21st; if Burnside moves south to the Hanover Junction area then he reaches it with his whole force around the 23rd (four days after marching from Fredericksburg), leaving 11th Corps to cover the supply line.

This is a situation where I think Lee simply can't fight. Burnside has overwhelming force and Jackson is not going to arrive for another week to ten days. Thus Lee has to delay en route south from Hanover Junction to Richmond until Jackson arrives, but it's only about another ~24 miles from Hanover Junction to Richmond.


The manoeuvre situation as of mid November is really good, and it took special effort to throw it away.
 
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