Lincoln Abraham Lincoln--was he really right about "pressing" the fight?

ratwod

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Apr 19, 2011
Lincoln continually wanted a Union commander who would "take it to the enemy". That is, Lincoln wanted very aggressive commanders. He finally ended up with commanders he liked...Grant, Sherman, etc.

However, did that really make sense early in the war? The Confederate Army at the beginning was better prepared and better organized with better commanders.

To assume that a simply having an aggressive general would win the war sounds a little...well, silly. Generals are important, but without an army, they aren't particular useful.

Later in the war when the Union had a clear advantage in material and men, a general willing to fight a war of attrition would be successful. But, early in the war?

I'm specifically thinking of Gettysburg. I'm not convinced at all that Meade made the wrong decision in not chasing the Army of Virginia.
 
Lincoln continually wanted a Union commander who would "take it to the enemy". That is, Lincoln wanted very aggressive commanders. He finally ended up with commanders he liked...Grant, Sherman, etc.

However, did that really make sense early in the war? The Confederate Army at the beginning was better prepared and better organized with better commanders.

To assume that a simply having an aggressive general would win the war sounds a little...well, silly. Generals are important, but without an army, they aren't particular useful.

Later in the war when the Union had a clear advantage in material and men, a general willing to fight a war of attrition would be successful. But, early in the war?

I'm specifically thinking of Gettysburg. I'm not convinced at all that Meade made the wrong decision in not chasing the Army of Virginia.
My understanding is General McDowell certainly thought so but due to political pressure McDowell was forced to go on the offensive and as we know he was defeated at 1st Bull Run.
Their has been a lot of debate in past threads about Lincoln being justified about being angry and frustrated with Meade not pursuing and destroying the AnV. Many of our posters have made a strong case that Meade did the best he could and Lincoln's anger was unjustified.
Leftyhunter
 
I'm not convinced at all that Meade made the wrong decision in not chasing the Army of Virginia.

I agree with you 100%. It would have been both stupid and impossible. The Army of the Potomac was knocked to pieces at Gettysburg (and knocked its adversary just as bad or worse).

Read the literature and you will learn the Army of Northern Virginia's position against the Potomac River during the retreat was essentially impregnable.

There were also couriers that ran the Gettysburg battle news back into Virginia and munitions were raced northward to re-supply Lee's Army.

All of that stuff was paddled across the river to meet any threat from Meade. He would have been nuts to attack and IMO he knew better.
 
I agree with you 100%. It would have been both stupid and impossible. The Army of the Potomac was knocked to pieces at Gettysburg (and knocked its adversary just as bad or worse).

Read the literature and you will learn the Army of Northern Virginia's position against the Potomac River during the retreat was essentially impregnable.

There were also couriers that ran the Gettysburg battle news back into Virginia and munitions were raced northward to re-supply Lee's Army.

All of that stuff was paddled across the river to meet any threat from Meade. He would have been nuts to attack and IMO he knew better.

Best not to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
 
Lincoln continually wanted a Union commander who would "take it to the enemy". That is, Lincoln wanted very aggressive commanders. He finally ended up with commanders he liked...Grant, Sherman, etc.

However, did that really make sense early in the war? The Confederate Army at the beginning was better prepared and better organized with better commanders.

To assume that a simply having an aggressive general would win the war sounds a little...well, silly. Generals are important, but without an army, they aren't particular useful.

Later in the war when the Union had a clear advantage in material and men, a general willing to fight a war of attrition would be successful. But, early in the war?

I'm specifically thinking of Gettysburg. I'm not convinced at all that Meade made the wrong decision in not chasing the Army of Virginia.

Are you speaking only of the east and what became the Army of the Potomac and its commanders and what became the Army of Northern Virginia and its commanders?

Or are you speaking of all the US forces, east, central/west, far west, Gulf, Southeast, etc?

Because the US commanders in the central/west/etc. were certainly aggressive in 1861-63, and it certainly paid dividends at the time in West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, the Indian Territory, and New Mexico...

Best,
 
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Lincoln continually wanted a Union commander who would "take it to the enemy". That is, Lincoln wanted very aggressive commanders. He finally ended up with commanders he liked...Grant, Sherman, etc.

However, did that really make sense early in the war? The Confederate Army at the beginning was better prepared and better organized with better commanders.

To assume that a simply having an aggressive general would win the war sounds a little...well, silly. Generals are important, but without an army, they aren't particular useful.

Later in the war when the Union had a clear advantage in material and men, a general willing to fight a war of attrition would be successful. But, early in the war?

I'm specifically thinking of Gettysburg. I'm not convinced at all that Meade made the wrong decision in not chasing the Army of Virginia.

Lincoln always wanted generals that would fight. After all, that's what generals and soldiers are paid for. But in the beginning he was willing to fight a fairly soft war - respecting property and leaving slavery intact. Lincoln wasn't looking for a war of attrition at the beginning. As the war evolved, his attitude hardened, and it became clear that a war of attrition would be the only successful strategy.
 
Lincoln continually wanted a Union commander who would "take it to the enemy". That is, Lincoln wanted very aggressive commanders. He finally ended up with commanders he liked...Grant, Sherman, etc.

However, did that really make sense early in the war? The Confederate Army at the beginning was better prepared and better organized with better commanders.

To assume that a simply having an aggressive general would win the war sounds a little...well, silly. Generals are important, but without an army, they aren't particular useful.

Later in the war when the Union had a clear advantage in material and men, a general willing to fight a war of attrition would be successful. But, early in the war?

I'm specifically thinking of Gettysburg. I'm not convinced at all that Meade made the wrong decision in not chasing the Army of Virginia.

You say that the Confederate army was better prepared and better organized. Was it?

When McDowell argued for more time to prepare his men, Lincoln brought up the above point, saying: "You are green, it is true; but they are green, also; you are green alike."

It did make sense for Lincoln to want aggressive commanders. He recognized that idle time early on helped the Confederacy more than the Union, politically and militarily. As a fledgling country, the more opportunity the Confederacy had to establish its infrastructure, raise troops, and construct defenses, the harder victory would be. Plus, Lincoln and many northerners believed that many southerners did not support secession. (They were right, but the number was smaller than they believed.) To defeat the Confederate army in Virginia quickly might disrupt the Confederate government as a whole.

It was optimistic and we will never know what an early Union victory in Virginia would have caused. But we do know that what caution and delay led to. McClellan did pretty much exactly what you suggest--take time to build and refine the army. The result was continued frustration in Virginia while aggressive Union commanders in the West were scoring battlefield victories and securing Confederate territory.
 
You say that the Confederate army was better prepared and better organized. Was it?

When McDowell argued for more time to prepare his men, Lincoln brought up the above point, saying: "You are green, it is true; but they are green, also; you are green alike."

It did make sense for Lincoln to want aggressive commanders. He recognized that idle time early on helped the Confederacy more than the Union, politically and militarily. As a fledgling country, the more opportunity the Confederacy had to establish its infrastructure, raise troops, and construct defenses, the harder victory would be. Plus, Lincoln and many northerners believed that many southerners did not support secession. (They were right, but the number was smaller than they believed.) To defeat the Confederate army in Virginia quickly might disrupt the Confederate government as a whole.

It was optimistic and we will never know what an early Union victory in Virginia would have caused. But we do know that what caution and delay led to. McClellan did pretty much exactly what you suggest--take time to build and refine the army. The result was continued frustration in Virginia while aggressive Union commanders in the West were scoring battlefield victories and securing Confederate territory.

As First Bull Run was fought, without Stonewall Jackson, Lincoln would likely have been correct.
 
Lincoln always wanted generals that would fight. After all, that's what generals and soldiers are paid for. But in the beginning he was willing to fight a fairly soft war - respecting property and leaving slavery intact. Lincoln wasn't looking for a war of attrition at the beginning. As the war evolved, his attitude hardened, and it became clear that a war of attrition would be the only successful strategy.

I'd point out that Lincoln and the Union, both politically and military, were learning. Unlike Europe, there were no experience of total war, civil war or large standing battle hardened professional armies.
 
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No one can know for sure, of anything that did not happen. But, there are some historical points that, to me, are interesting.

As noted by jgoodguy, First Bull Run, just missed being a Union victory and its loss was not due to one Army being in better condition than the other. McClellan could have almost walked into Richmond, if he had only moved with any speed at all. Instead of waiting around for Johnston to concentrate his forces from Northern Virginia. If little Mac had moved with any speed and shown any aggressiveness at all, he could have engaged the ANV, at least 24 hrs away from its reinforcements.

Aggressiveness to push forward into the confederacy was vital to a Union victory. Unlike the confederacy who could win their independence, by Not Losing, the Union had to win the war by winning.

Lincoln was clear enough, that delays, no matter how beneficial to the Union, was as likely as not, to be more beneficial to the confederacy.

The contrast between the pace of war in the Eastern and Western Theatres could not be more striking, in ref. to fighting mobile and aggressive campaigns.
 
I'd point out that Lincoln and the Union, both politically and military, were learning. Unlike Europe, there were no experience of total war, civil war or large standing battle hardened professional armies.

True, although it is worth pointing out that given the distances, expeditionary warfare, and action against a peer (i.e. "Western") enemy army, the 1846-48 war was quite the crucible for the junior officers who served in Mexico and became senior officers in 1861-65, both in the US and among the rebels.

Technology was different, of course, but in terms of deploying a field force, and keeping a force sustained and in action in enemy country, the junior officers who served under Taylor in northeastern Mexico and especially Scott in central Mexico got what amounted to an on-the-job equivalent of a command and staff college course, simply through their duties as line and staff officers, especially those who served on the corps-level staffs of Taylor and Scott. Likewise, the naval officers who served in the blockading squadrons on the Gulf and Pacific coasts, including the Gulf of California/Sea of Cortez, had experiences that stood them in good stead in 1861-65 in terms of distant operations on enemy coasts.

The expeditionary operations in New Mexico and California, both overland and maritime in California, although tiny in scale compared to the 1861-65 operations, were also very useful lessons in peripheral operations and military government, for that matter, as were Scott's operations in Central Mexico, in terms of successful military government.

Best,
 
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you have brought up several points however on Lincoln's idea that he needed a general who could do the math was precisely the point to push the war in all directions. At the Antietam and emancipation there was no going back to South would never agree to any piece without slavery intact at this point they would have to take away the ability of the South to continue the war and the will to fight it that's what Grant did and Sherman total war and break the will of the people so it would end completely it sounds harsh but look at what happened even after all of that. For another hundred years they would believe they were constitutionally and morally right and to this day some will say we fort for our rights . All of this after their loss can you imagine what would be said if we had a piece agreement.
 
True, although it is worth pointing out that the distances, expeditionary warfare, and action against a peer (i.e. "Western") enemy army in the 1846-48 war with Mexico was quite the crucible for the junior officers in Mexico who became senior officers in 1861-65, both in the US and among the rebels.


The expeditionary operations in New Mexico and California, both overland and maritime in California, although tiny in scale compared to the 1861-65 operations, were also very useful lessons in peripheral operations and military government, for that matter, as were Scott's operations in Central Mexico, in terms of successful military government.

Best,





And, in ref. to this particular thread, it points out to me, that what should have been learned by CW commanders from their experiences from Taylor and Scott, was how speed and mobility, coupled with an aggressive planning, can, to a great extent, compensate for lack of numbers or resources.
 
And, in ref. to this particular thread, it points out to me, that what should have been learned by CW commanders from their experiences from Taylor and Scott, was how speed and mobility, coupled with an aggressive planning, can, to a great extent, compensate for lack of numbers or resources.

True. Grant (USMA, 1843) and McClellan (USMA, 1846) both served under Scott (Grant also served under Taylor), and both men saw a significant amount of action on multiple battlefields, and both were recognized with brevet first lieutenant and brevet captain for battlefield service: Grant at Molino del Rey and Chapultepec and McClellan at Contreras and Chapultepec. Grant, of course, was infantry and McClellan, an engineer.

Interesting that Grant saw action under Taylor and Scott, McClellan only Scott; the conclusion that Grant learned more from his exposure to two such different general officers than McClellan did serving under Scott is worth considering.

Best,
 
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The Confederate Army at the beginning was better prepared and better organized with better commanders.

(...)

I'm specifically thinking of Gettysburg. I'm not convinced at all that Meade made the wrong decision in not chasing the Army of Virginia.
First of all if you look out west I don't agree that the CSA armies where better or had better generals.

And Meade did chase Lee's army pretty well considering the situation. (the road network, his very serious looses, especially corp commanders.. and the weather)

But in the end when he cough up with Lee, he decided not to attack Lee in a good defensive position that is well entrenched... and with a tired army that have lost a lot of men and officers.. and with a lot of senior officers who have been promoted to replace looses...

So I agree Meade was right, but not in what you write. ;-)
 
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And, in ref. to this particular thread, it points out to me, that what should have been learned by CW commanders from their experiences from Taylor and Scott, was how speed and mobility, coupled with an aggressive planning, can, to a great extent, compensate for lack of numbers or resources.
on these points you'll get no argument from me I for myself do not know if total war was the answer may be something more humane might have worked. But what ever they did they needed to have the people not just the military supporting the war to stop I believe the southern people especially the women were the backers of there man with them in support the man found it hard to stop I think Sherman felt the same way stop the people supporting the war and it will end.
 
on these points you'll get no argument from me I for myself do not know if total war was the answer may be something more humane might have worked. But what ever they did they needed to have the people not just the military supporting the war to stop I believe the southern people especially the women were the backers of there man with them in support the man found it hard to stop I think Sherman felt the same way stop the people supporting the war and it will end.



Very true. But, I do think that technically, in modern terms, neither side fought a total war, wherein All major and minor aspects of a country's governmental, social and economic resources are bent to the single issue of winning a War. Such a war was beyond the capabilities, IMO, of the raw and relatively unsophisticated societies involved in the CW.
 
True. As far as fighting generals, the US had its share, even early on in 1861-62 ... Grant, obviously; Sumner, Mansfield, Kearny, Hooker, Stevens, Lyons, Curtis, Pope, Etc.

And its share of "deliberate" generals: McClellan, Buell, Halleck, Thomas, etc.

The inference that comes from the above, of course, is that the commanders who mastered what might be called "deliberate aggressiveness" - Grant being the archetype - were those that won the greatest successes and endured to the end of the war...

Interesting to think if some of those who fell early on - Mansfield, Kearny, Stevens, Lyons, perhaps CF Smith - had lived, whether they would have risen from aggressive division or corps commanders to capable army-level commanders.

Best,
 
Very true. But, I do think that technically, in modern terms, neither side fought a total war, wherein All major and minor aspects of a country's governmental, social and economic resources are bent to the single issue of winning a War. Such a war was beyond the capabilities, IMO, of the raw and relatively unsophisticated societies involved in the CW.
no you are absolutely right, but for the time they attempted their best to dissuade the people from attending this again.
 
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