A Closer Look at the Peach Orchard

James N.

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Asst. Regtl. Quartermaster Antietam 2021
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One of the most argued-about aspects of the Battle of Gettysburg concerns the unauthorized advance by the Union III Corps led by Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles in the early afternoon of July 2, 1862. While I do not propose to reopen that particular controversy, the subject affords a perfect example for armchair historians and Sunday-morning quarterbacks of the importance of actually visiting historic sites in order to gain insight of why certain decisions may have been made at the time of the battle.

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Although I'm no particular fan of Dan Sickles, actually standing here in Sherfy's Peach Orchard it's easy to get an idea of why he thought this was a position worth taking. The first two photos depict its importance as an elevated platform for artillery; this ground beside the Emmitsburg Road served as the apex of Sickles' two divisions, that of Andrew Humpheys positioned along the road to the north of here; and David Birney's angling to the south-southwest across the Wheatfield and into Devils' Den to the base of Little Round Top. The actual terrain here can be especially misleading or confusing viewed soley from a map; indeed it has been shown variously as flat; a knoll; or even a short ridge, including the land along the Emmitsburg Road.

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These two photos were taken from near the summit of the hilltop peach orchard during a talk by an NPS ranger and are looking to the northeast; just above the rear of the passing tour bus can be seen the Abraham Trostle Barn near where Sickles made his headquarters. Notice especially how the ground perceptibly falls away toward the trees on Cemetery Ridge in the background. Sickles felt the higher ground here and along the Emmitsburg Road were preferable to the lower ground he occupied on that portion of Cemetery Ridge and at the base of Little Round Top. Asking the opinion of the army's chief engineer, brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren who seems neither to have agreed nor objected, Sickles sent asking for permission to advance from the commander, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade; receiving no reply, Sickles took it upon himself to initiate the move.

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Of course the unauthorized move placed the army's left flank in extreme danger, because it was here that the Confederate First Corps of Lt. Gen. James Longstreet had massed to assault and hopefully turn the Federal left. Sickles advance overextended his corps, one of the smaller ones in the Union army, composed of only two divisions unlike all but one other ( the XII ), all of which had three. The Peach Orchard was perilously close to the south end of Seminary Ridge as seen below from the position of another of Sickles' batteries overlooking the Emmitsburg Road; note the observation tower above the wooded treeline on the ridge for an idea of its nearness. Although Humphreys sent out Berdan's Sharpshooters and other pickets as a skirmish line it failed to seriously retard the advance of William Barksdale's Mississippi Brigade when it attacked around 5pm.

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Note above that the gun line is elevated here not only above the level of the road, but also the fields stretching away towards Seminary Ridge.- this was not so apparant as I remember the first time I visited Gettysburg in 1961 during the Centennial, what with distractions like the Stuckey's which then stood across and a little to the north of the road . Although the present cannon and monuments represent Sickles' batteries at the beginning of the conflict for the Peach Orchard, once Barksdale's howling Mississippians overran these guns and drove the supporting infantry back in the direction of the Trostle Farm, the elevation became a stronghold of Confederate artillery; guns from here participated the following day in the great artillery duel preceding Pickett's Charge.

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I was invited to open a discussion about what happened there, as it's not too well known or analyzed. I too have a thing for walking the ground, last went to walk the ground of Jarama, (unsuccessfully) where the Lincoln battalion fought. Though a different war, it is connected to the US civil war in that regard.

My very brief opinion on Sickles; The failure wasn't Sickles, the failure rests with those placing Sickles in a command rank that enabled him to have such a large impact on the battlefield. Sickles was completely out of his depth, though he wasn't the only one, the nature of the conflict meant people acting up in ranks that were completely above their capabilities.

It is argued that Sickles advance may have saved the Union that day whether he meant it or not. That is an absolute unknowable as Sickles usurped command of the prepared defence. Topping Meade. He was quite probably clueless as to that, but his maneuver caused Meade to effect a scramble defence, adjusting (and when i say adjusting i don't mean shuffling a couple of companies around) to the man who had taken command of the field that day. Sickles that day assumed command of the union field.

There was a problem at the time of the civil war, and that was having a bar room full of generals all operating within a few square miles of each other. Believe it or not, people with stars on their shoulders usually think their ideas are better than the other guy with stars on his shoulders. This problem has not gone away, and exists today in modern professional armies, the battlefields are just scaled up to theatre size. Half of what took place in Europe post D Day was down to Generals measuring each others swagger stick.

Destroying a prepared defense is inexcusable.
 
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