2nd Manassas 2nd Manassas

General John Buford:

Name BUFORD, John aka "Old Steadfast"
Born March 4 1826, Woodford Cty KY
Died December 16 1863, Washington DC
Pre-War Profession Graduated West Point 1848, frontier duty, Utah expedition.
War Service
Captain, 2nd Dragoons (since March 9, 1854);
Captain, 2nd Cavalry (change of designation August 3, 1861);
*Major and Assistant Adjutant General (November 12, 1861);
Brigadier general, USV (July 27, 1862);
Commanding Cavalry Brigade, 2nd Corps, Army of Virginia (July 27 - September 12, 1862);
Commanding Reserve Brigade, Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac (February 12 - May 22, 1863);
Commanding the division (May 22-27, June 9 - August 15, and September 15-November 21, 1863); Commanded 1st Divn/Cavalry Corps in Gettysburg campaign, held Heth's advance before Gettysburg,
*Major general, USV (to rank from July 1, 1863-given December 16th, 1863.
General Buford later served through the Bristoe Campaign, but just before the commencement of the Mine Run Campaign he was struck down by typhoid and had to relinquish his command on November 21, 1863.

NOTES:
* Staff assignment with General Pope.*December 16, 1863, promoted on his death bed to the rank of Major General Regular Army, having to be assisted by Captain A. J. Alexander in signing the document and as a witness; held in the arms of Captain Myles Keogh, died of typhoid fever at General Stoneman's home in Washington, DC; moments after he received his promotion. Stanton withholding the promotion due until he (Stanton) was certain that General Buford would not recover. Back dated the promotion to July 1st, 1963. (First day of the Battle of Gettysburg).
One of the unsung heroes of Gettysburg. Half-brother of US General Napoleon Bonaparte Buford. Cousin of CS General Abraham Buford; Ranked: USMA 16th in 1848 (U.S Military Academy aka West Point. Wounded in the knee, during withdrawal from Second Bull Run/Manassas; Buried at West Point. Favorite horse: Silver Eagle and served as a Caparisoned Horse--General Stoneman leading. [In Military Funerals, the 'riderless horse' is correctly termed "Caparisoned Horse." The riderless horse, in full formal attire, with the boots of the rider reversed in the stirrups; is a statement that 'The Rider will never ride again."]
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Library of Congress - National Archives - West Point [United States Military Academy.] notes on General John (Jno)Buford - Union/US Cavalry:

John Buford to Ambrose Burnside, August 12, 1863. The papers of George Hay Stuart, collection 913, manuscript division, Library of Congress. The circumstances underlying this letter provide another fascinating view of the deep schisms in Kentucky resulting from the Civil War. John Buford was married to a woman whose maiden name was Duke. Her first cousin was Col. Basil Duke, of Morgan's Raiders, then incarcerated in the Ohio Penitentiary. Buford was writing to General Bunside, commander of the Department of the Ohio, to seek permission for his mother-in-law to visit Duke at the prison to facilitate settlement of the estate of Buford's father-in-law, who was Colonel Duke's uncle. The author does not know whether the requested permission was granted.

Abraham Lincoln to Edwin M. Stanton, December 16, 1863, United States Military Academy. manuscript collection.

See Buford's oath of office, dated December 16. 1863. Micro- film M1064, Letters received by the Commissions Branch of the Adjutant General's Office, 1863-1870, roll 9, file no. Bi 115 CB 1863, National Archives.

See letter to Edwin M. Stanton, December 16, 1863, written for Buford by Capt. A. J. Alexander. Microfilm M1064, Letters received by the Commissions Branch of the Adjutant General's Office, 1863-1870, roll 9, file no. B1115 CB 1863, National Archives

John Buford's service record; see Buford's commission as a major general. Microfilm Ml 064, Letters received by the Commissions Branch of the Adjutant General's Office, 1863-1870, roll 9, file no. B 15 CB 1863, National Archives.

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http://www.rocemabra.com/~roger/tagg/generals/general36.html

UNION CAVALRY CORPS, FIRST DIVISION
4,021 men
BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN BUFORD

Speaking for many of his peers, artilleryman Col. Charles Wainright described John Buford as "straight-forward, honest, conscientious, full of good common sense, and always to be relied on in any emergency," and "decidedly the best cavalry general" in the Army of the Potomac. In fact, Buford was one of the finest cavalrymen in American history. He was a man who liked to lead from the front, frequently up with the skirmishers and accompanied by the divisional flag. A former Indian fighter, he was all business, driving himself as relentlessly as he drove his men, with the result that six months after Gettysburg he would be dead of what the doctors called "exposure and exhaustion." Buford's hard-bitten attitude shone in his face. One observer had recently gotten close enough to get an impression of him as being "of a good-natured disposition, but not to be trifled with," a "singular-looking party . . . with a tawny mustache and a little, triangular gray eye, whose expression is determined, not to say sinister."

Buford was quiet and sober, quite in contrast to the flamboyant types which so often gravitated toward the cavalry. "He is kind, and always on hand when there is fighting to be done. . . . He don't put on so much style as most officers," wrote one grateful subordinate in the 8th Illinois. The man might have been speaking of Buford's plain, unpolished manner, or his wardrobe--in the field he usually wore an old hunting shirt "ornamented with holes," ancient blue corduroy breeches tucked into a pair of ordinary cowhide boots, and always had a big pipe and tobacco pouch sticking out of his shirt pockets. It was obvious this trooper was made of sterner stuff than the "nice little dandy," his superior Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, with whom he had campaigned on the Plains; and the "circus rider gone mad," fellow brigadier general George Custer. Buford was not shy about advertising his grim streak. He once hanged a guerrilla, in an area seething with Secessionist sympathies, and left the corpse dangling from a tree limb under the sign "This man to hang three days; he who cuts him down before shall hang the remaining time."

Coming from a family whose tradition of turning out soldiers dated back to the rough Northern English fighters of the Wars of the Roses, Buford was born in Kentucky and raised in Rock Island, Illinois. He attended West Point and graduated in the upper half of the Class of 1848. Posted to the dragoons, he saw his first combat in the Sioux campaign of 1855, then went west with the Mormon expedition and stayed in Utah until the commencement of the Civil War, when his regiment marched 1,100 miles overland to return to Washington, D.C.

Buford's War career was slow getting started, however. In the summer of 1862, when Maj. Gen. John Pope came to Washington to take command of the Army of Virginia, he was surprised to find Buford there in an unimportant staff job, where he had been since the previous November. Pope at once obtained for Buford a promotion to brigadier general and gave him command of the Reserve Cavalry Brigade of his Army of Virginia. Buford was one of the only officers to emerge from Pope's disastrous Second Bull Run Campaign with an enhanced reputation. He showed talent at reconnaissance as often as Alfred Pleasonton revealed his inadequacy, consistently providing Pope's headquarters with timely intelligence about Longstreet's Corps's approach to the battlefield that was fatally ignored. During the climactic battle there in late August 1862, Buford ordered a charge against Rebel horsemen south of the battlefield at Lewis farm, marking one of the first times in the war that Union cavalrymen initiated a stand-up cavalry fight. In the clash, Buford was wounded so badly in the knee that he was left on the field for dead.

The wound laid Buford low until the next year. In the meantime, during the Antietam and Fredericksburg Campaigns he acted as cavalry advisor to McClellan and Burnside. When Hooker consolidated the cavalry into an army corps in February 1863, Buford returned to the command of the elite Reserve Brigade, where he exercised his talents in training recruits--especially in teaching his troopers the advantages of fighting on foot rather than in the saddle, techniques from his old dragoon days which would become Union cavalry doctrine as the war wore on.

Although Buford performed well in the Chancellorsville Campaign, cavalry chief Brig. Gen. George Stoneman's abortive raid took him away from the important action. When Stoneman was replaced soon after that miserable showing, Buford was considered as a replacement. But Buford was modest, and cultivating connections with newspapermen was beneath him. As a result, commanding Maj. Gen. Joe Hooker gave command of the cavalry to the flashier, publicity-savvy Alfred Pleasonton (though in later years Hooker agreed that Buford would have been a better choice). Buford was given a division.

At Brandy Station on June 9, Buford did not distinguish himself; he fought a passive defensive battle all afternoon. As the Gettysburg Campaign developed in the following couple of weeks, however, he was again energetic and invaluable in reconnaissance, passing on information about the enemy that went entirely unappreciated by Pleasonton. Physically, Buford was still weakened by his knee wound. But, although he had had been in command of the division little over a month, Buford in the summer of 1863 was a seasoned, supremely talented officer in his prime.

On the evening of June 30, recently arrived in Gettysburg and already skirmishing with Confederate infantrymen to the west, Buford told Col. Tom Devin, "The enemy must know the importance of this position and will strain every nerve to secure it, and if we are able to hold it [until friendly infantry can come up] we will do well." Buford's signal officer noticed "He seemed anxious, more so than I ever saw him."

Buford was the first to make contact with Lee's army, and became the first hero of the battle. Knowing that Lee's infantry would be coming on July 1, and having decided that Gettysburg was good defensive ground, Buford decided to resist the enemy as long as he could in order to give the rest of the Union army time to concentrate. His men used dragoon tactics--three-quarters of his troopers fighting in a heavy skirmish line while the remaining quarter held their horses--and held the advance of A.P. Hill's infantrymen to a crawl until Maj. Gen. John Reynolds arrived with the advance units of his First Corps. When the infantry deployed, Buford's men dropped off to their flanks to provide protection, while at the same time continuing to provide timely intelligence on the arrival of new Confederate units. It was an example of a consummate professional showing an eye for good ground, tactical sense, and tenacity at a moment of crisis. When the Federal infantry retreated to Cemetery Hill in the late afternoon, Buford helped deter a Confederate advance by taking a menacing position on the Union left, near the Emmitsburg Road.
The next morning, July 2, Buford's men were the only cavalry on the field, patrolling a broad area around the Peach Orchard, performing the valuable duty of guarding the army's left flank and reporting enemy movement. Pleasonton, however, withdrew Buford's entire force to Westminster to refit in the army's rear. Buford's 2,600 troopers rode off the field in the late morning of July 2 with nobody to replace them--a fact that would have dire consequences for the Union left later that day. They would never reenter the battle.

A man that never quit driving himself, Buford contracted typhoid in the fall, and, exhausted, died in December.
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For further reading:
Longacre, Edward G. General John Buford. Conshohocken, 1995
Phipps, Michael A. & John S. Peterson. "The Devil's to Pay": General John Buford, USA. Gettysburg, 1995
Wittenberg, Eric. "John Buford and the Gettysburg Campaign." Gettysburg Magazine 11, July 1994

Excerpted from "The Generals of Gettysburg: The Leaders of America's Greatest Battle" by Larry Tagg
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http://www.brotherswar.com/Gettysburg-1b.htm

(Another good profile of General Buford-with pictures)


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Getting back to the original question of this thread, it seems the consenus answer is that Longstreet was slow, but it was completely justified. Any dissenters to that?

And if not, how about the flip side? Hennessy claims that Jackson was slow in supporting Longstreet's attack, and that this was partially responsible for Lee missing his chance to destroy Pope. Is that a fair assessment?
 
I would have to substitute acted with due prudence ,rather than the term slow.

"The richest endowments of the mind are temperance,prudence,and fortitude.Prudence is a universal virtue which enters into a composition of all the rest, and where she is not fortitude loses it's name and nature." Voltaire
 
I would have to substitute acted with due prudence ,rather than the term slow.
That could be applied to all the commanders who were considered slow. Consider if you will, that it appears that the successful ones had an attitude that incorporated "**** the torpedoes, full speed ahead." or "Get there first with the most."

Just a thought.

Ole
 
Getting back to the original question of this thread, it seems the consenus answer is that Longstreet was slow, but it was completely justified. Any dissenters to that?

I wouldn't call it slow but extremely cautious.


And if not, how about the flip side? Hennessy claims that Jackson was slow in supporting Longstreet's attack, and that this was partially responsible for Lee missing his chance to destroy Pope. Is that a fair assessment?

I would say that by waiting on Porter's attack to fully develop, it weakened the chance for Jackson to get in a blow.

Jackson's right and center were under attack and had expended most of their ammo.

Longstreet and Jackson can't be blamed. The blame must fall on Lee.

Here the fault again was inadequate reserves to follow up a successful attack.

Sincerely,
dvrmte
 
That could be applied to all the commanders who were considered slow. Consider if you will, that it appears that the successful ones had an attitude that incorporated "**** the torpedoes, full speed ahead." or "Get there first with the most."

Just a thought.

Ole

Jackson's tactics usually involved immediate attack and play it out as it goes along.

Like Groveton/Brawner's Farm it didn't always turn out perfect but he was able to achieve his goal of drawing Pope into battle on ground of his choice.



dvrmte
 
Getting back to the original question of this thread, it seems the consenus answer is that Longstreet was slow, but it was completely justified. Any dissenters to that?

I don't consider it slow either. Hennessy does a good job showing that Longstreet's march to link up with Jackson wasn't slow.

Hennessy claims that Jackson was slow in supporting Longstreet's attack, and that this was partially responsible for Lee missing his chance to destroy Pope. Is that a fair assessment?

I would say there were others factors preventing Pope's destruction which were more important. Plus, Jackson was so low on ammo that Longstreet had to send over some from his own stock when he arrived on the field.
 
I always thought Reynolds would have made a fine commander of the AoP. I would have liked to have been a fly on the wall in the meeting where he "turned down" command.

It's probably a good thing Reynolds turned it down. Being a Republican was more important to the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War than military competence.

"Like many of the other corps commanders, Reynolds was considered a conservative Democrat of the McClellan mold, which made him suspect in the eyes of the radical members of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War; one of those members, chairman Senator Benjamin Wade, had recently declared that he wanted Reynolds removed from the army. But Reynolds was a quiet man about his politics, just as he was quiet about most everything else. This distinguished him in eyes of men like Wainwright: "General Reynolds is very different from Hooker, in that he never expresses an opinion about other officers," he wrote. "I can get nothing out of him."

http://www.civil-war-tribute.com/aop-john-fulton-reynolds-bio.htm
 
It's probably a good thing Reynolds turned it down. Being a Republican was more important to the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War than military competence.

"Like many of the other corps commanders, Reynolds was considered a conservative Democrat of the McClellan mold, which made him suspect in the eyes of the radical members of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War; one of those members, chairman Senator Benjamin Wade, had recently declared that he wanted Reynolds removed from the army.

Didn't know Sen. Wade was involved at this point. Always ready and willing to put politics first. Lincoln seemed to have him under control, but it still might have had some influence on his decision.

To date, the conservative Democrat generals had been too easy-going to get the job done. But being a Republican sure didn't help Pope one "pinch of owl-dung". :laugh1:
 
Brass_Napoleon, sir;

Personal opinon based on what I have read from the Official Records of the Rebellion; Lieutenant-General James Longstreet, Major-General J. Early's account in addition--

I am of the belief that Lt. General Longstreet was prompt in his assignment and attack and though Lt. General Jackson T. J. Jackson (Stonewall) was exhausted and couldn't produce the results as desired.

General Robert E. Lee, being 'the commanding' officer of the battle of Second Manassas (Bull Run), should have listened more to his 'Lieutenants' and take advantage of the ground as the CSA did during the First Battle of Manassas (Bull Run). Lee's forces in some respects were in the same position as the Union forces at First Bull Run/Manassas.

Having the field after First Manassas/Bull Run--the best ground should have been seized however; leadership of General Lee and his "Lieutenants" gave him the victory, even with a disadvantage of not having his plan work to perfection--

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted,
M. E. Wolf
 
But being a Republican sure didn't help Pope one "pinch of owl-dung".

Not in the field. But it sure helped him get off the hook by passing the blame off onto Porter. And the radical Republicans in Congress went along with it.
 
Brass_Napoleon, sir;

Personal opinon based on what I have read from the Official Records of the Rebellion; Lieutenant-General James Longstreet, Major-General J. Early's account in addition--

I am of the belief that Lt. General Longstreet was prompt in his assignment and attack and though Lt. General Jackson T. J. Jackson (Stonewall) was exhausted and couldn't produce the results as desired.

General Robert E. Lee, being 'the commanding' officer of the battle of Second Manassas (Bull Run), should have listened more to his 'Lieutenants' and take advantage of the ground as the CSA did during the First Battle of Manassas (Bull Run). Lee's forces in some respects were in the same position as the Union forces at First Bull Run/Manassas.

Having the field after First Manassas/Bull Run--the best ground should have been seized however; leadership of General Lee and his "Lieutenants" gave him the victory, even with a disadvantage of not having his plan work to perfection--

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted,
M. E. Wolf

I agree and add that had Lee's battle been as well executed as his campaign up to that point, Pope wouldn't have had an orderly retreat.

Once Longstreet's men lined up on Jackson's right, Pope didn't have a chance.

I believe there were several opportunities missed for the destruction of Pope but little if any for Pope to achieve any kind of victory.


dvrmte
 
During the 24+ hr. period between Longstreet being up and his attack, didn't Lee consider a movement around Pope's right to Sudley Springs and beyond? I think I read that somewhere. Seems to me that had Lee moved a relatively small blocking force to the rear of Pope at the stone bridge and fords, he could have had the Cannae he wanted. He surely had enough time to do it. Did he have enough men?
 
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XII/2 [S# 16]
AUGUST 16-SEPTEMBER 2, 1862.--Campaign in Northern Virginia.
No. 127.--Reports of General Robert E. Lee, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Northern Virginia, of operations August 13--September 2.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
June 8, 1863.
GENERAL: I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the operations of this army from the time it crossed the Rappahannock through the battle of Manassas. Many of the sub-reports of these operations I have been obliged to retain, because they contain the narrative in part of the latter operations of the campaign. Of those operations succeeding the battle of Manassas I have not yet made a report, as I have not yet received full reports from Jackson's corps.
I am, with the greatest respect, your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE,
General.
General S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.
[excerpt]
BATTLE OF MANASSAS.
General Jackson crossed the Rappahannock at Hinson's Mill, about 4 miles above Waterloo, and passing through Orleans encamped on the night of the 25th near Salem, after a long and fatiguing march. The next morning, continuing his route with his accustomed vigor and celerity, he passed the Bull Run Mountains at Thoroughfare Gap, and proceeding by way of Gainesville, reached the railroad at Bristoe Station after sunset. At Gainesville he was joined by General Stuart with the brigades of Robertson and Fitzhugh Lee, who continued with him during the rest of his operations, vigilantly and effectually guarding both his flanks. General Jackson was now between the large army of General Pope and the Federal capital. Thus far no considerable force of the enemy had been encountered, and he did not appear to be aware of his situation. Upon arriving at Bristoe the greater part of the guard at that point fled. Two trains of cars coming from the direction of Warrenton were captured and a few prisoners were taken. Notwithstanding the' darkness of the night and the long and arduous march of the day, General Jackson determined to lose no time in capturing the depot of the enemy at Manassas Junction, about 7 miles distant, on the road to Alexandria. General Trimble volunteered to proceed at once to that place with the Twenty-first North Carolina and the Twenty-first Georgia Regiments. The offer was accepted, and to render success more certain General Jackson directed General Stuart to accompany the expedition with part of his cavalry, and as ranking officer to assume the command. Upon arriving near the Junction General Stuart sent Colonel Wickham, with his regiment, the Fourth Virginia Cavalry, to get in rear of the enemy, who opened with musketry and artillery upon our troops as they approached. The darkness of the night and ignorance of the enemy's numbers and position made it necessary to move cautiously, but about midnight the place was taken with little difficulty, those that defended it being captured or dispersed. Eight pieces of artillery, with their horses, ammunition, and equipments, were taken. More than 300 prisoners, 175 horses, besides those belonging to the artillery, 200 new tents, and immense quantities of commissary and quartermaster's stores fell into our hands. General Jackson left Ewell's division, with the Fifth Virginia Cavalry, under Colonel Rosser, at Bristoe Station, and with the rest of his command proceeded to the Junction, where he arrived early in the morning. Soon afterward a considerable force of the enemy, under Brigadier-General Taylor, approached from the direction of Alexandria, and pushed forward boldly to recapture the stores that had been lost. After a sharp engagement the enemy was routed and driven back, leaving his killed and wounded on the field, General Taylor himself being mortally wounded during the pursuit. The troops remained at Manassas Junction during the rest of the day, supplying themselves with everything they required from the captured stores.

In the afternoon the enemy advanced upon General Ewell at Bristoe from the direction of Warrenton Junction. They were attacked by three regiments and the batteries of Ewell's division and two columns of not less than a brigade each were broken and repulsed. Their places were soon supplied by fresh troops, and it was apparent that the Federal commander had now become aware of the situation of affairs, and had turned upon General Jackson with his whole force. In pursuance of instructions to that effect, General Ewell, upon perceiving the strength of the enemy, withdrew his command, part of which was at the time engaged, and rejoined General Jackson at Manassas Junction, having first destroyed the railroad bridge over Broad Run. The enemy halted at Bristoe. General Jackson's force being much inferior to that of General Pope, it became necessary for him to withdraw from Manassas and take a position west of the turnpike road from Warrenton to Alexandria, where he could more readily unite with the approaching column of Longstreet. Having fully supplied the wants of his troops, he was compelled, for want of transportation, to destroy the rest of the captured property. This was done during the night of the 27th, and 50,000 pounds of bacon, 1,000 barrels of corned beef, 2,000 barrels of salt pork, and 2,000 barrels of flour, besides other property of great value, were burned. Taliaferro's division moved during the night by the road to Sudley, and crossing the turnpike near Groveton, halted on the west side, near the battle-field of July 21, 1861, where it was joined on the 28th by the divisions of Hill and Ewell. Perceiving during the afternoon that the enemy, approaching from the direction of Warrenton, was moving down the turnpike toward Alexandria, thus exposing his left flank, General Jackson advanced to attack him. A fierce and sanguinary conflict ensued, which continued until about 9 p.m., when the enemy slowly fell back and left us in possession of the field. The loss on both sides was heavy, and among our wounded were Major-General Ewell and Brigadier-General Taliaferro, the former severely.

The next morning, the 29th, the enemy had taken a position to interpose his army between General Jackson and Alexandria, and about 10 a.m. opened with artillery upon the right of Jackson's line. The troops of the latter were disposed in rear of Groveton along the line of the unfinished branch of the Manassas Gap Railroad, and extended from a point a short distance west of the turnpike toward Sudley Mill, Jackson's division, under Brigadier-General Starke, being on the right; Ewell's, under General Lawton, in the center, and A. P. Hill's on the left. The Federal Army was evidently concentrating upon Jackson with the design of overwhelming him before the arrival of Longstreet. The latter officer left his position opposite Warrenton Springs on the 26th, being relieved by General R. H. Anderson's division, and marched to join Jackson. He crossed at Hinson's Mill in the afternoon and encamped near Orleans that night. The next day he reached the White Plains, his march being retarded by the want of cavalry to ascertain the meaning of certain movements of the enemy from the direction of Warrenton, which seemed to menace the right flank of his column.

On the 28th, arriving at Thoroughfare Gap, he found the enemy prepared to dispute his progress. General D. R. Jones' division, being ordered to force the passage of the mountain, quickly dislodged the enemy's sharpshooters from the trees and rocks and advanced into the gorge. The enemy held the eastern extremity of the pass in large force, and directed a heavy fire of artillery upon the road leading through it and upon the sides of the mountain. The ground occupied by Jones afforded no opportunity for the employment of artillery. Hood, with two brigades, and Wilcox, with three, were ordered to turn the enemy's right, the former moving over the mountain by a narrow path to the left of the pass, and the latter ****her to the north by Hopewell Gap. Before these troops reached their destinations the enemy advanced and attacked Jones' left, under Brig. Gen. G. T. Anderson. Being vigorously repulsed, he withdrew to his position at the eastern end of the Gap, from which he kept up an active fire of artillery until dark and then retreated.

Generals Jones and Wilcox bivouacked that night east of the mountain, and on the morning of the 29th the whole command resumed the march, the sound of cannon at Manassas announcing that Jackson was already engaged. Longstreet entered the turnpike near Gainesville, and moving down toward Groveton, the head of his column came upon the field in rear of the enemy's left, which had already opened with artillery upon Jackson's right, as previously described. He immediately placed some of his batteries in position, but before he could complete his dispositions to attack the enemy withdrew, not, however, without loss from our artillery. Longstreet took position on the right of Jackson, Hood's two brigades, supported by Evans, being deployed across the turnpike and at right angles to it. These troops were supported on the left by three brigades under General Wilcox and by a like force on the right under General Kemper. D.R. Jones' division formed the extreme right of the line, resting on the Manassas Gap Railroad. The cavalry guarded our right and left flanks, that on the right being under General Stuart in person. After the arrival of Longstreet the enemy changed his position and began to concentrate opposite Jackson's left, opening a brisk artillery fire, which was responded to with effect by some of General A. P. Hill's batteries. Colonel Walton placed a part of his artillery upon a commanding position between the lines of Generals Jackson and Longstreet by order of the latter and engaged the enemy vigorously for several hours. Soon afterward General Smart reported the approach of a large force from the direction of Bristoe Station, threatening Longstreet's right. The brigades under General Wilcox were sent to re-enforce General Jones, but no serious attack was made, and after firing a few shots the enemy withdrew. While this demonstration was being made on our right a large force advanced to assail the left of Jackson's position, occupied by the division of General A. P. Hill. The attack was received by his troops with their accustomed steadiness and the battle raged with great fury. The enemy was repeatedly repulsed, but again pressed on to the attack with fresh troops. Once he succeeded in penetrating an interval between General Gregg's brigade, on the extreme left, and that of General Thomas, but was quickly driven back with great slaughter by the Fourteenth South Carolina Regiment, then in reserve, and the Forty-ninth Georgia, of Thomas' brigade. The contest was close and obstinate, the combatants sometimes delivering their fire at ten paces. General Gregg, who was most exposed, was re-enforced by Hays' brigade, under Colonel Forno, and successfully and gallantly resisted the attacks of the enemy until, the ammunition of his brigade being exhausted and all his field officers but two killed or wounded, it was relieved, after several hours of severe fighting, by Early's brigade and the Eighth Louisiana Regiment. General Early drove the enemy back with heavy loss and pursued about 200 yards beyond the line of battle, when he was recalled to the position on the railroad where Thomas, Pender, and Archer had firmly held their ground against every attack. While the battle was raging on Jackson's left General Longstreet ordered Hood and Evans to advance, but before the order could be obeyed Hood was himself attacked, and his command at once became warmly engaged. General Wilcox was recalled from the right and ordered to advance on Hood's left, and one of Kemper's brigades, under Colonel Hunton, moved forward on his right. The enemy was repulsed by Hood after a severe contest and fell back, closely followed by our troops.

The battle continued until 9 p.m., the enemy retreating until he reached a strong position, which he held with a large force. The darkness of the night put a stop to the engagement and our troops remained in their advanced position until early next morning, when they were withdrawn to their first line. One piece of artillery, several stands of colors, and a number of prisoners were captured.

Our loss was severe in this engagement. Brigadier-Generals Field and Trimble, and Colonel Forno, commanding Hays' brigade, were severely wounded, and several other valuable officers killed or disabled, whose names are mentioned in the accompanying reports.

continued
 
On the morning of the 30th the enemy again advanced, and skirmishing began along the line. The troops of Jackson and Longstreet maintained their positions of the previous day. Fitzhugh Lee, with three regiments of his cavalry, was posted on Jackson's left, and R. H. Anderson's division, which arrived during the forenoon, was held in reserve near the turnpike. The batteries of Col. S.D. Lee took the position occupied the day before by Colonel Walton, and engaged the enemy actively until noon, when firing ceased and all was quiet for several hours. About 3 p.m. the enemy, having massed his troops in front of General Jackson, advanced against his position in strong force. His front line pushed forward until engaged at close quarters by Jackson's troops, when its progress was checked and a fierce and bloody struggle ensued. A second and third line of great strength moved up to support the first, but in doing so came within easy range of a position a little in advance of Longstreet's left. He immediately ordered up two batteries, and two others being thrown forward about the same time by Col. S. D. Lee, under their well-directed and destructive fire the supporting lines were broken and tell back in confusion. Their repeated efforts to rally were unavailing, and Jackson's troops, being thus relieved from the pressure of overwhelming numbers, began to press steadily forward, driving the enemy before them. He retreated in confusion, suffering severely from our artillery, which advanced as he retired. General Longstreet, anticipating the order for a general advance, now threw his whole command against the Federal center and left. Hood's two brigades, closely followed by Evans', led the attack. R. H. Anderson's division came gallantly to the support of Hood, while the three brigades under Wilcox moved forward on his left and those of Kemper on his right. D.R. Jones advanced on the extreme right, and the whole line swept steadily on, driving the enemy with great carnage from each successive position until 10 p.m., when darkness put an end to the battle and the pursuit. During the latter part of the engagement General Wilcox, with his own brigade, was ordered to the right, where the resistance of the enemy was most obstinate, and rendered efficient assistance to the troops engaged on that part of the line. His other two brigades, maintaining their position in line, acted with General Jackson's command. The obscurity of night and the uncertainty of the fords of Bull Run rendered it necessary to suspend operations until morning, when the cavalry, being pushed forward, discovered that the enemy had escaped to the strong position of Centreville, about 4 miles beyond Bull Run. The prevalence of a heavy rain, which began during the night, threatened to render Bull Run impassable and impeded our movements. Longstreet remained on the battlefield to engage the attention of the enemy and cover the burial of the dead and the removal of the wounded, while Jackson proceeded by Sudley Ford to the Little River turnpike to turn the enemy's right and intercept his retreat to Washington. Jackson's progress was retarded by the inclemency of the weather and the fatigue of his troops, who, in addition to their arduous marches, had fought three severe engagements in as many days. He reached little River turnpike in the evening, and the next day, September 1, advanced by that road toward Fairfax Court-House.

The enemy in the mean time was falling back rapidly toward Washington, and had thrown out a strong force to Germantown, on the Little River turnpike, to cover his line of retreat from Centreville. The advance of Jackson's column encountered the enemy at Ox Hill, near Germantown, about 5 p.m. Line of battle was at once formed, and two brigades of A. P. Hill's division (those of Branch and Field, under Colonel Brockenbrough) were thrown forward to attack the enemy and ascertain his strength and position. A cold and drenching rain-storm drove in the faces of our troops as they advanced and gallantly engaged the enemy. They were subsequently supported by the brigades of Gregg, Thomas, and Pender, also of Hill's division, which, with part of Ewell's, became engaged. The conflict was obstinately maintained by the enemy until dark, when he retreated, having lost two general officers, one of whom, Major-General Kearny, was left dead on the field.

Longstreet's command arrived after the action was over, and the next morning it was found that the enemy had conducted his retreat so rapidly that the attempt to intercept him was abandoned. The proximity of the fortifications around Alexandria and Washington rendered their pursuit useless, and our army rested during the 2d near Chantlily, the enemy being followed only by the cavalry, who continued to harass him until he reached the shelter of his intrenchments.

In the series of engagements on the plains of Manassas more than 7,000 prisoners were taken, in addition to about 2,000 wounded left in our hands. Thirty pieces of artillery, upward of 20,000 stand of small-arms, numerous colors, and a large amount of stores, besides those taken by General Jackson at Manassas Junction, were captured.

The history of the achievements of the army from the time it advanced from Gordonsville leaves nothing to be said in commendation of the courage, fortitude, and good conduct of both officers and men. The accompanying reports of the medical director will show the number of our killed and wounded. Among them will be found the names of many valuable and distinguished officers, who bravely and faithfully discharged their duty, and, with the gallant soldiers who fell with them, have nobly deserved the love and gratitude of their countrymen. The reports of the several commanding officers must necessarily be referred to for the names of those whose services were most conspicuous. The list is too long for enumeration here. During all these operations the cavalry under General Stuart, consisting of the brigades of Generals Robertson and Fitzhugh Lee, rendered most important and valuable service. It guarded the flanks of the army, protected its trains, and gave information of the enemy's movements. Besides engaging the cavalry of the enemy on several occasions with uniform success, a detachment, under the gallant and lamented Major Patrick, assisted by the Stuart Horse Artillery, under Major Pelham, effectually protected General Jackson's trains against a body of the enemy who penetrated to his rear on the 29th before the arrival of General Longstreet. Toward the close of the action on the 30th General Robertson, with the Second Virginia Regiment, under Colonel Munford, supported by the Seventh and Twelfth, made a brilliant charge upon a brigade of the enemy's cavalry, Colonel Munford leading with great gallantry, and completely routed it. Many of the enemy were killed and wounded, more than 300 prisoners were captured, and the remainder pursued beyond Bull Run. The reports of General Stuart and the officers under his command, as well as that of General Jackson, are referred to for more complete details of these and other services of the cavalry.
Respectfully submitted.
R. E. LEE,
General.
======================================================
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHEASTERN VIRGINIA,
Chantilly, Va., September 3, 1862.
Mr. PRESIDENT: My letter of the 30th ultimo(*) will have informed Your Excellency of the progress of this army to that date. General Longstreet's division, having arrived the day previous, was formed in order of battle on the right of General Jackson, who had been engaged with the enemy since morning resisting an attack commenced on the 28th. The enemy on the latter day was vigorously repulsed, leaving his numerous dead and wounded on the field. His attack on the morning of the 29th was feeble, but became warmer in the afternoon, when he was again repulsed by both wings of the army, his loss on this day, as stated in his published report, herewith inclosed,(*) amounting to 8,000 killed and wounded. The enemy, being re-enforced, renewed the attack on the afternoon of the 30th, when a general advance of both wings of the army was ordered, and after a fierce combat, which raged until after 9 o'clock, he was completely defeated and driven beyond Bull Run. The darkness of the night, his destruction of the stone bridge after crossing, and the uncertainty of the fords stopped the pursuit.

The next morning the enemy was discovered in the strong position at Centreville, and the army was put in motion toward the Little River turnpike to turn his right.

Upon reaching Ox Hill, on September 1, he was again discovered in our front on the heights of Germantown, and about 5 p.m. made a spirited attack upon the front and right of our column, with a view of apparently covering the withdrawal of his trains on the Centreville road and masking his retreat. Our position was maintained with but slight loss on both sides. Major-General Kearny was left by the enemy dead on the field. During the night the enemy fell back to Fairfax CourtHouse, taking the roads, as reported to me, to Alexandria and Washington. I have as yet been unable to get official reports of our loss or captured in these various engagements. Many gallant officers have been killed or wounded. Of the general [officers], Ewell, Trimble, Taliaterro, Field, --------, [and] Mahone have been reported wounded; Colonels -------, MarshalI, Baylor, Neff, and Gadberry killed. About 7,000 prisoners have already been paroled, about the same number of small-arms collected from the field, and thirty pieces of cannon captured, besides a number of wagons, ambulances, &c. A large number of arms still remain on the ground. For want of transportation valuable stores had to be destroyed as captured, while the enemy, at their various depots, are reported to have burned many millions of property in their retreat. Nothing could surpass the gallantry and endurance of the troops, who have cheerfully borne every danger and hardship, both on the battle-fieldi and march.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE,
General.
His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS,
President Confederate States of America.
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General Robert E. Lee, being 'the commanding' officer of the battle of Second Manassas (Bull Run), should have listened more to his 'Lieutenants' and take advantage of the ground as the CSA did during the First Battle of Manassas (Bull Run). Lee's forces in some respects were in the same position as the Union forces at First Bull Run/Manassas.

During the 24+ hr. period between Longstreet being up and his attack, didn't Lee consider a movement around Pope's right to Sudley Springs and beyond? I think I read that somewhere. Seems to me that had Lee moved a relatively small blocking force to the rear of Pope at the stone bridge and fords, he could have had the Cannae he wanted. He surely had enough time to do it. Did he have enough men?

Seems to me the key to cutting off Pope's escape was Henry Hill, as it was the key at First Manassas, and I think Lee knew it all along. That's why he was so anxious to get Longstreet moving (but around Pope's left, not his right that I remember). But in this particular battle he wisely did listen to Longstreet and delayed the attack until the Porter threat was gone. Even with the late start, he would have got it if it weren't for Reynolds and some true heroism on Chinn Ridge.

Of course there was at least one other occasion where Lee didn't listen to Longstreet, and we all know how that turned out...
 
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