1864 Campaigns: Grant's Approach vs Sherman's Approach, Which Do You Prefer?

Grant's Approach vs Sherman's Approach, Which Do You Prefer?

  • Grant's Approach

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1864 Campaigns: Grant's Approach vs Sherman's Approach, Which Do You Prefer?

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On the Confederate side its often discussed the different approaches advocated by Joseph Johnston and Robert E. Lee and which was more effective. On the Union side, to a lesser extent, we have the same situation with Grant and Sherman. Despite being close partners, Grant and Sherman differed in their approach and employed different strategies for the 1864 Overland and Atlanta campaigns. Which approach do you prefer?

Grant's Approach:

-Focus on Lee's army not as much on Richmond, "Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee's army goes, you will go also."
-
Aggressively bring enemy army to battle, employ attritional strategies

Criticisms:
- Less focus on maneuvering
- Heavy casualties, attacking entrenched positions

"There was but one way which was certain to give the AoP the advantage of choosing its battle ground, and that was the way adopted by General Sherman in his Atlanta Campaign, which was conducted contemporaneously with this campaign of Grant's in Virginia. That way was to flank the enemy out of position after position, until by some fortunate combination of circumstances he could be brought to bay in a place where our great superiority of numbers would tell."
Historian John Codman Ropes

"In every instance we have attacked the enemy in an entrenched position we have failed, except in the case of Hancock at Spotslvania, which was surprise discreditable to the enemy. So, likewise, whenever the enemy has attacked us in position, he has been repulsed. I think Grant has had his eyes opened, and is willing to admit that Virginia and Lee's army is not Tennessee and Bragg's army. "

June 5th, 1864 George Meade Papers

Sherman's Approach:
- Objective "enemy war resources", less focus on enemy army
- Tended to avoids heavy losses with flanking maneuvers, did conduct frontal assaults on notable occasions

Criticisms:

- Missed opportunities, let enemy army escape
- Can be overly Cautious

"Thomas and Sherman worked together during the campaign but they frequently disagreed over tactics and strategy. While Sherman preferred a campaign of limited engagements and maneuver, Thomas sought to deliver a knockout blow that would take the AoT out of action. On two occasions, at the beginning and the end of the campaign, Thomas suggested tactics that might have achieved this goal, but Sherman declined Thomas' suggestions. Sherman did not want to engage his forces in an all out battle."
George Thomas: Virginian for the Union by Christopher Einoif


"Despite his fierce, burning, war is hell reputation, Sherman was not a very aggressive general. Their are a number of occasions in the Atlanta campaign, Bentonville, where he does not manage his forces well and lets the enemy get away. He demonstrates a much greater preference for chess board war, maneuver war, than fighting."
Historian Ethan Rafuse

My thoughts on this came mainly from Hart's book on Sherman and Fuller's on Grant, among many other minor sources. Hope this makes for an interesting discussion.:smile:
 
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Sherman's Approach:
- Objective to capture Atlanta, less focus on enemy army
- Avoids heavy losses, flanking maneuvers, let enemy risk battle
I don't think this is the 100% right description of "Sherman's approach".
First, it wasn't so much about Atlanta. Let's give word to W.T. Sherman himself:

I will not let side issues draw me off from your main plan in which I am to knock Joe Johnston, and do as much damage to the resources of the enemy if possible.
(his letter to U.S. Grant of 10 April)

So his objective would be "enemy war resources". Of course, it will lead him to Atlanta, but nonetheless.
Second, he had his share of frontal assaults:
Resaca on May 14-15, New Hope Church on May 25, Pickett's Mill on May 27, Kennesaw Mountain on June 27 and Utoy Creek on August 6.
And his official report on Kennesaw Mountain gives his clear view that it was his conscious decision - to show the army that he will not stick to the single mode of offense and to disapprove the belief that he'd never assault fortified lines.
 
I don't think this is the 100% right description of "Sherman's approach".
First, it wasn't so much about Atlanta. Let's give word to W.T. Sherman himself:

I will not let side issues draw me off from your main plan in which I am to knock Joe Johnston, and do as much damage to the resources of the enemy if possible.
(his letter to U.S. Grant of 10 April)

So his objective would be "enemy war resources". Of course, it will lead him to Atlanta, but nonetheless.
Second, he had his share of frontal assaults:
Resaca on May 14-15, New Hope Church on May 25, Pickett's Mill on May 27, Kennesaw Mountain on June 27 and Utoy Creek on August 6.
And his official report on Kennesaw Mountain gives his clear view that it was his conscious decision - to show the army that he will not stick to the single mode of offense and to disapprove the belief that he'd never assault fortified lines.

Thanks for the info, you make good points I'll edit my initial post.
 
I like Bruce Vail's point of view.
Grant in Virginia and Sherman in Georgia were acting as part of unified Union strategy, developed by Grant himself.
Of course, their personal qualities played role in their generalship - Grant was aggressive and had "killer instinct" to break enemy army, Sherman was more of logistician type.
But they also had different geographical conditions, they had different enemies against them.
"To make a Cannae one would need not only Hannibal, but also Terentius Varro".

I'm not ready to say, that the generals' personalities and different approach played key role here and not limitations imposed by geography and enemy armies.
 
I think that given the conditions of geography and logistics each general acted pretty appropriately. Might be that if places were switched each would've acted as the other did.

I'm not sure the approaches are different.

Sherman was carrying on the strategy against AoT that Grant had initiated. Sherman was always quick to credit his own successes to Grant.

You both may be right, It could be the same strategy just morphed based on situation. Though I still do feel their was something different about the way they approached their campaigns. I don't think the differences were to the extent of Johnston vs Lee but still tendencies seem present.
 
Both campaigns were strategic in nature; threaten a vital point, that the targeted csa army would have to defend, by meeting itts Union opponent in a battle of attrition.

The plan did not materialize, because, Johnston, would not stand and fight, even for Atlanta(at least that was what his confederate enemies thought) and, Grant's strategic plan of threatening Richmond, from three different direction, forcing Lee to stand and fight one of them at the expense of letting the other two forces to continue to advance on Richmond This plan failed, when Segal was driven completely out of the Valley, and Butler allowed himself to be bottle up at Bermuda Hundred. Allowing Lee to concentrate against only the AoP.

All the campaigns were coordinated, and even though the plans failed of completion, those that remained, Sherman and Grant, were still coordinated, in that the South could not assist either of their armies from each other. So both were necessary to complete either or both.

Personally, I like Sherman's campaign(the one that actually developed). The odds of surviving, were better following Sherman's war of maneuver, rather than Grant's resulting battles of attrition.
 
Both commanders relied on flanking maneuvers, although Sherman was probably a greater believer in the use of "indirect warfare." That being said, Sherman faced an opponent (Joe Johnston) who believed in giving up territory and position in order to engage the enemy in only favorable circumstances. In contrast, Grant's turning movements were more readily challenged by Lee, who believed in pursuing an aggressive offensive-defense at every step of the way, which led to greater blood letting in the east. But both commanders were focused on destroying enemy armies, with their secondary objectives being Richmond and Atlanta.
 
Per Bruce Vail, both operations were similar. Despite all the talk of going for Johnston or Lee, by 1864 the transportation system in the Confederacy was very weak.
The coastal sea going trade was inoperable.
The railroad system was degrading from inadequate to dangerous.
The road system was poor and the horses and mules necessary to utilize it were diminishing.
Both Grant and Sherman protected their own logistics system and seriously degraded the Confederate system.
Lee could not afford to allow the Army of the Potomac to block the Weldon RR, but he could not stop it either.
The Confederacy could not stand two sieges simultaneously, so when McPherson took a position on the RR east of Atlanta, Hood had no real choice other than to fight offensively.
 
Some follow ups to narrow the discussion.

I think my main question is would Grant and Sherman, had they been in the others position, have conducted the campaigns in a different manner? Would Grant have been more aggressive at places like Snake Creek Gap and adopt some of Thomas' suggestions? Would Sherman have been more likely to listen to Meade, avoiding frontal assaults, defending against enemy assaults and conducting flanking maneuvers? Was there any daylight between the way Grant and Sherman fought?

If the answer is no to the questions above, then the thread is obsolete and I would be better off trying to compare them as a team to other generals. If the answer is yes, then we can debate whether Grant or Sherman would have been more successful in different roles.

Your thoughts?
 
The answer is not in Grant and Sherman, but moreso in their opponents, and the geography they were fighting in. Lee is not going to willingly give ground. Johnston would stand, maybe fight a little, but more than willing to fall back if he had any inclination Sherman was trying to move around him. Lee was waiting til the last possible moment to move because he was not sure Grant was moving by the flank or not.

Sherman also has a lot more space to work with. Grant could not move by his right flank. He had to go left each time due to supply resources, etc. Grant also has a large body of water if he goes far enough to his left, or deeper and wider rivers as they empty out in the Chesapeake.
 
Some follow ups to narrow the discussion.

I think my main question is would Grant and Sherman, had they been in the others position, have conducted the campaigns in a different manner? Would Grant have been more aggressive at places like Snake Creek Gap and adopt some of Thomas' suggestions? Would Sherman have been more likely to listen to Meade, avoiding frontal assaults, defending against enemy assaults and conducting flanking maneuvers? Was there any daylight between the way Grant and Sherman fought?

If the answer is no to the questions above, then the thread is obsolete and I would be better off trying to compare them as a team to other generals. If the answer is yes, then we can debate whether Grant or Sherman would have been more successful in different roles.

Your thoughts?

I guess I am somewhat at a loss here...I thought Sherman and Grant were against frontal assaults and that is why Sherman was so beloved by his troops - that he would not sacrifice them NeedlessLy. He did have them take frontal assaults but it was rare. Grant upon his return from the West - pretty much the same except for Cold harbor - which he stated in his dieing memoirs, that he regretted that attack more than any other assault he had ever ordered. I thought Grant and Sherman were aggressive, but they do not throw away lives as, perhaps a great example in the North - as Burnside did - time and again.

I know that does not answer you entire question but it is what I believe to be true
 
I guess I am somewhat at a loss here...I thought Sherman and Grant were against frontal assaults and that is why Sherman was so beloved by his troops - that he would not sacrifice them NeedlessLy. He did have them take frontal assaults but it was rare. Grant upon his return from the West - pretty much the same except for Cold harbor - which he stated in his dieing memoirs, that he regretted that attack more than any other assault he had ever ordered. I thought Grant and Sherman were aggressive, but they do not throw away lives as, perhaps a great example in the North - as Burnside did - time and again.

I know that does not answer you entire question but it is what I believe to be true

I think Sherman was loved by his troops and he tried to protect his men. On occasion he did do frontal assaults Chickasaw Bayou and Kennesaw Mountain but I don't think he overly committed to that strategy.

In regard to Burnside he was mild compared to Grant. For Grant it wasn't only Cold Harbor, Spotsylvania and 2nd Petersburg were pretty high casualties. Grant's total casualties in Overland, Petersburg, Appomatox campaigns per wiki were roughly 100,000. Now I'm not criticizing Grant, if this was part of an attritional strategy then it makes sense to do frontal assaults and take heavy casualties to outlast Lee. I however don't think this strategy endeared Grant to the AoP crowd who tended to try and avoid heavy losses hence Meade's views.

The answer is not in Grant and Sherman, but moreso in their opponents, and the geography they were fighting in. Lee is not going to willingly give ground. Johnston would stand, maybe fight a little, but more than willing to fall back if he had any inclination Sherman was trying to move around him. Lee was waiting til the last possible moment to move because he was not sure Grant was moving by the flank or not.

Sherman also has a lot more space to work with. Grant could not move by his right flank. He had to go left each time due to supply resources, etc. Grant also has a large body of water if he goes far enough to his left, or deeper and wider rivers as they empty out in the Chesapeake.

Very good points, thanks for the post. It does seem like the campaigns turned out the way they did largely because of terrain and opponents. Fuller does imply though that Grant chose to use less flanking maneuvers on Lee because he wanted to prevent him from reinforcing Johnston by engaging him. That had Grant acted like Sherman, Lee would have just withdrawn back to Richmond and reinforced Johnston. Now Fuller might be miss reading Lee's intentions or awarding Grant greater freedom then he had? Also was Lee at any point planning on reinforcing Johnston?

"Grant's objective, which was not to flank Lee out of one position after the other until he sought refuge behind the fortifications of Richmond, but to hammer him to the extent that Johnston could not be reinforced. It was largely because he hammered Lee that Sherman's maneuver was so successful. The suggestion that Grant should have operated as Sherman did is, therefore, inapt. Had Grant done so, he would have had either to assault Richmond a more costly task than attacking field entrenchments or have invested the fortress as he eventually had to do but with this difference that as Lee would not have suffered severely, Johnston would have been reinforced and Sherman held back."
 
The Rise of U.S. Grant, A.L. Cooper, Books for Library Press, 1931 and 1970. The campaigns were similar all the way to the detached cavalry operations. Sherman and Grant designed Sherman's railroad logistics and Grant could rely on the Potomac and the James and the other Chesapeake Bay Rivers.
 
On the obvious side, based on casualties to both sides, I would prefer Sherman's approach. Whether Lee would have allowed Sherman to make the same kind of moves that Johnston and Hood experienced is another matter entirely. Grant was up against an entirely different Confederate force than Sherman opposed.
 
"As Lincoln put it: "If a man can't skin he must hold a leg." Very much the same campaign devised by Grant and endorsed by Lincoln.
 
"As Lincoln put it: "If a man can't skin he must hold a leg." Very much the same campaign devised by Grant and endorsed by Lincoln.
Except that it was Grant who grew up in the family of a tanner, not Lincoln. So it could have been Grant's saying in the first instance. :smile coffee:
 
Except that it was Grant who grew up in the family of a tanner, not Lincoln. So it could have been Grant's saying in the first instance. :smile coffee:

Grant was not keen on hanging around the tannery, skinning or holding legs, or hunting. Lincoln may have been less squeamish.
 
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