Chancellorsville 11th Corp--- Hard fighters at chancellorsville

Somehow, the regiments that made up Eleventh Corps never got that attention.

That's only a guess, but its the most logical.

This comes from Stephen Sears' book 'Chancellorsville' and I allude to it since O.O. Howard was the corps commander at Gettysburg. It might help to look under the circumstances Howard got command of the corps:

'When he promoted Daniel Sickles to head the Third Corps, Hooker stepped on the toes of Oliver Otis Howard, a divisional commander in the Second Corps. Howard hastened to inform Hooker that his commission as a major general predated Sickles's and that therefore he should have at least an equivalent command. Hooker took the point, and to keep the Eleventh Corps out of Carl Schurz's hands he gave it to Howard. The men of the Eleventh Corps, "the only compact representation of the 90 or 100,000 Germans who have entered the Army," Schurz complained to President Lincoln, had expected they "would remain in the hands of one of their own...They look at me as their natural head and representative."

'In his new post, Otis Howard later admitted, "I was not at first getting the earnest and loyal support of the entire command." Nor was he the sort to turn the situation around by his force of personality. Howard was a West Pointer and courageous enough — he had lost his right arm leading his brigade at Seven Pines on the Peninsula — but he was not strong-willed and forceful in command. Howard's passion was religious orthodoxy. "I think he is the most earnest and devoted Christian I ever saw," a man in the Second Corps wrote of Howard; he reported the general was forever distributing religious tracts and Bible verses among his troops. The man found this refreshing in an all-too-often godless army, but among the Germans of the Eleventh Corps, many of whom were freethinkers, the activities of 'Old Prayer Book' were not so welcome. All in all, it was an unpromising appointment on Hooker' part. The Eleventh Corps would go on to campaign under a general it neither liked or trusted, and Howard was marching quite out of step with his command."

That says a lot right there. He pretty much wasn't the right fit for this corps, I think.

As for Barlow, who was given command of the corps' First Division prior to Gettysburg, it seems he was quite xenophobic towards his Germans. On top of that, he was a strict disciplinarian, which might be persuasively argued was the last thing his men needed for morale-building after Chancellorsville. Not a good mix there, either.

Once given some decent ground on which to fight, the Eleventh Corps gave a good account of itself on East Cemetery Hill on July 2.
 
Just some thoughts of a veteran and officer.

Well expressed thoughts as always, and I thank you for pointing all of that out.

But it is true that some units seem to be considered "elite" or "superior" for reasons other than good PR work by their commanders.

There are people as individuals who one would trust confidently to handle a difficult task, and those one would not be so sure of.


It may be unfair to ask one unit in a diffeernt situation than the first unit to do "equally well", same with horses and men, but some units did do more great deeds than others.

And if one is trying to make all as capable as possible via training and leadership, it would be useful, I presume, to know what things don't work for one reason and another - somehow the Eleventh Corps seems to have gotten more than its "share" of those.

Does this make sense to anyone, or is it just confused babble?

As for Barlow, who was given command of the corps' First Division prior to Gettysburg, it seems he was quite xenophobic towards his Germans. On top of that, he was a strict disciplinarian, which might be persuasively argued was the last thing his men needed for morale-building after Chancellorsville. Not a good mix there, either.

Just quoting this part as the rest is "Yeah, that makes sense." no need to comment stuff. (but I will note hearty agreement on East Cemetary Hill)

Barlow seems to have had an abrasive personality - I don't know if he was particularly xenophobic towards his Germans, or just extremely demanding and judgmental in general, here.

Its a nitpicking arguement to determine which - for purposes of this discussion, he was most efinately the wrong thing they needed.

A guy like Hancock, who would mix profanity with charisma, yes. A Barlow, who was by nature more of a martinet than many West Pointers - no. Not that kind of rigid intolerance and inflexibility.

Frankly, now that I'm thinking about it, I think appointing Howard to corps command was a bad idea period - out of step or not. But that's a rant on Howard, and has nothing to do with this corps.

So yes - but Sigel, while well loved, does not seem to have molded the raw material into good regiments and brigades well either.
 
FOX’S REGIMENTAL LOSSES
CHAPTER VIII.
20TH CORPS.—(HOOKER'S).
Rocky Face Ridge; Resaca; Cassville; New Hope Church; Dallas; Pine Knob; Golgotha; Culp's Farm; Kenesaw Mountain; Peach Tree Creek; Siege Of Atlanta; March To The Sea; Siege Of Savannah; Argyle Island; Monteith Swamp; Averasboro; Bentonville; Nashville.(*)
This corps was formed April 4, 1864, by taking the Twelfth Corps, which was composed of the veteran divisions of Williams and Geary, and adding to it Butterfield's newly organized division. At the same time, two divisions of the Eleventh Corps (+) were broken up and distributed to the divisions of Williams, Geary and Butterfield. The badge of the Twelfth Corps was retained, and there was no good reason why its number should not have been retained also; the brigade and division generals of the Twelfth Corps retained their respective commands, and little change was made other than the increase by accessions of transferred material.
Each division now contained three brigades, containing in all 52 regiments of infantry, and 6 batteries of light artillery, numbering 21,280 officers and men present for duty. It was all veteran material, the most of the regiments having served with the Army of the Potomac in many of the greatest battles of the war, and, later on, at Wauhatchie and Lookout Mountain. Major-General Joseph Hooker was placed in command. It was a grand corps, and worthy of the hero who was to lead it.
In addition to the three divisions of Williams, Geary and Butterfield, there was a Fourth Division, under command of Major-General Lovell H. Rousseau. This division was detached on post or garrison duty and never joined the corps; in fact, the men of the Twentieth were unaware of the existence of a Fourth Division. A part of Rousseau's Division was engaged in the Tennessee campaign against Hood, in 1864, and was present at the battle of Nashville.
The Twentieth Corps started, May 4, 1864, on the Atlanta campaign, and during the next four months participated in all the important battles, its hardest fighting occurring at Resaca, May 15th, at New Hope Church, May 25th, and at Peach Tree Creek, July 20th. It was also actively engaged in the investment and siege of Atlanta, sustaining losses daily in killed and wounded while occupying the trenches. During the four months fighting from Chattanooga to Atlanta, it lost over 7,000 men killed, wounded and missing. Before reaching Atlanta, Hooker had a disagreement with Sherman, and asked to be relieved. He was succeeded by Major-General Henry W. Slocum, the former commander of the Twelfth Corps, and one of the ablest generals in the Union armies. General Butterfield, commanding the Third Division, was succeeded during the campaign by General William C. Ward. Upon the evacuation of Atlanta, some troops of the Twentieth Corps--Coburn's Brigade of Ward's Division--were the first to enter and occupy the city, the entire corps remaining there to hold their important prize, while Sherman and the rest of the Army marched in pursuit of Hood. On November 15, 1864, Sherman and his men started on their grand march through Georgia to the Sea, the Army of the Cumberland--Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps--forming the Right Wing, under command of General Slocum. General A. S. Williams, of the First Division, succeeded to the command of the corps, with Jackson, Geary, and Ward as division generals. When it started on this march, the corps numbered 13,741, present for duty, and contained 47 regiments of infantry, 1 of engineers, 1 of pontoniers, and 4 batteries of light artillery. It was actively engaged at the siege of Savannah, and upon Hardee's evacuation, December 20th, Geary's Division was the first to enter the city.Leaving Savannah in February, 1865, the Army marched northward through the Carolinas, and at the battle of Averasboro (N. C.), the Twentieth Corps was the only infantry engaged; loss, 77 killed, and 475 wounded. Three days later, Jackson's and Ward's Divisions were hotly engaged in General Slocum's battle at Bentonville. At the close of the campaign, in April, 1865, Major-General Joseph A. Mower was assigned to the command of the corps, whereupon General Williams resumed his old command, that of the First, or Red Star Division.
Williams, whose commission as brigadier dated May 17, 1861, had commanded this division from the beginning of the war. It was remarkable as being the only division which served during the war without a change of commander. Williams commanded it at Winchester, May, 1862, and rode at its head in the Grand Review of May, 1865; he was absent only when in temporary command of the corps. He commanded the Twelfth Corps at Antietam, Mansfield having been killed while going into action; also, at Gettysburg, Slocum being in command then of the Right Wing. He also commanded the Twentieth Corps while on the March to the Sea and through the Carolinas; at the battles of Averasboro and Bentonville. He was an able officer, enjoying to the fullest extent the respect and confidence of every officer and man in his division. Denied the commission of a major-general which he had earned so well, and superseded in command of his corps, the gallant old patriot made no sign of complaint, and continued to serve his country faithfully and well. The persistent refusal to recognize Williams' services together with the influence and motives which prompted such action were discreditable, to say the least.
The campaign in the Carolinas having ended in Johnston's surrender, the Twentieth Corps marched on to Washington, where it participated in the Grand Review, and was then disbanded.
 
Dear Elennsar;

Where my issues lay open, to be considered; is that it is not right to judge the 11th Corps against the 20th Corps, and or any other Corps.

As PvtClewell has summarized, the 11th Corps was not blessed with leaders that 'listened' to men on a high level. I'm sure in the regiments the leaders were very aware and had to get flack from both ends; attempting to keep the peace in the ranks and keeping a General command off your bird/clusters and or writing you up for court-martial.

Further, 11th Corps was a veteran Corps. They knew what to do, the leadership is the driver. No car or Corps can operate effectively when their Commanding General is impaired, even by prejudice and or by some false sense of superiority.

Again, I must say that 11th Corps did suffer unjustly, from the affairs at Chancellorsville; and General Joe Hooker had flaws as well, to which when he was transferred from the more higher duties back to a Corps and Military Department command, he excelled.

Problem is, there is a need to understand, it is easier for a commanding officer to be replaced than the entire Corps, e.g. 11th.

Where any Corps is assigned is the reasons by the commanding general. Upon their shoulders are the responsibilities and change, as to learn from it and improve by it.

Each major blunder is replaced by the newest. At one time, the First Battle of Manassas/Bull Run was McDowell's embarrassment, it was replaced by other blunders and commanding generals to whom were in charge.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
 
Where my issues lay open, to be considered; is that it is not right to judge the 11th Corps against the 20th Corps, and or any other Corps.

Then how does one properly weigh their performance?

"They did the best they could." is really not a useful analysis, in my opinion, however true.
 
Flanked

Bottom line is, they got flanked. In this case, Lee's left hook was REALLY pronounced. 11th Corps was dug in facing south. Ultimately its the commanders responsibility to put their troops into positions where they can suceed. In my opinion Howard should've been more vigilant with reconaissance. Hooker tells Howard to look for a flank attack, but Howard IS the flank so by definition that is what he should be looking for to begin with.
 
Dear Elennsar;

Performance, accomplishing the mission, results, casualties as low as possible, functioning for the purpose of the commanding officer's larger plan.

For example; 100th Corps is to take the Pepsi can off the table and hold it. 200th Corps is to go over to the Pepsi can and peel open the tab. Both have necessary missions, both are necessary. In cooperation 100th Corps and 200 Corps is to move the Pepsi can to the commanding general's desired point of location, such as battlefield to his advantage and not the enemy's, to remove forces off the field of battle to allow another to occupy it, thus forcing the enemy into worse conditions; e.g., 100th and 200th Corps moving the Pepsi off the table, 300rd Corps moves to the table and sets down a Coke can. This moving the enemy off that portion of the table which was just occupied by the Pepsi can.

How well these Corps do the job is how they are judged. Each Corps is not in competition but, works as an extention of the commanding general's over all plan on how to win the field.

If Corps 100 fumbles and tips the can, drops it, etc., so will the value or rating on performance. Did Corps 200 recover the mistake of Corps 100; or did they just stay with their task, not interfer with Corps 100's ability to recover the can. Many factors are weighted in performance evaluation.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
 
Dear CW1865,

I agree sir.

I am one to feel, that General Howard should had more guards and pickets. It has been said, I think Shelby Foote in one of his interviews, said that the pickets saw rabbits and deer running towards them.

That should have been a 'heads up' in my opinion, and a warning shot should have been fired as to alarm the camp. Better to be wrong than to not warn the camp.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
 
11th Corps---Hard fighters at chancellorsville

Under better generals, Howard was a better commander and XI corps, a better combat outfit.(not saying they were great, merely better, when under the command of better superior officers)
 
Barlow seems to have had an abrasive personality - I don't know if he was particularly xenophobic towards his Germans, or just extremely demanding and judgmental in general, here.

I'm just throwing this out there to see if it sticks. But the following comes from the book 'D*a*m*n Dutch' by David Valuska and Christian Keller:

'Another member of the Eleventh Corps who specifically blamed the Germans for the corps' performance at Gettysburg was Brigadier General Francis Barlow, commander of the First Division. After the battle, Barlow wrote to a Harvard classmate, "But these Dutch won't fight. Their officers say so and they say so themselves and they ruin all with whom they come in contact." It is well known that Barlow disliked a lot of people in the Army of the Potomac, but his hatred for the Germans was legion. Because of his position of authority, Barlow's loud denunciations likely exacerbated the German regiments' already poor reputation in the army.'

Then, on page 152, there's a picture of Barlow with this caption: "Brigadier General Francis C. Barlow, nicknamed "Dogberry" by members of the 153rd Pennsylvania (like that one, Pam? I do). He wrote to his mother he had "always been down on the Dutch."

I don't know if this would be considered proof of ol' Dogberry's xenophobia toward the Germans, but it appears to me to be a heavy lean in that direction. Ironic, isn't it, that he blames the Germans, but then it was his ill-advised move to Blocher's Knoll that jeopardized the whole 11th Corps line in the first place. A mini-Sickles.

Plus, Valuska was my freshman year history professor in college and I have no quarrel with his research or interpretations.

Dogberry Barlow. I like that. :smile:
 
I bow to Valuska's and Keller's research. That is going well beyond the limits of what can be treated as anything other than bigotry - or at least, intolerance. (Bigotry implies doing it without cause - yes, I am nitpicking a little, not trying to dispute the point however)

That attitude could not be better calculated to make his men want nothing to do with him.

A mini-Sickles...hmmm.

Not quite. But its such a tempting comparison.

Did he try (after being given a brigade and latter a division) to be transfered out of the Eleventh Corps? His original regiment was in the Second, and after recovering from his injuries (and with the Eleventh sent elsewhere), he returned to said corps - so I wonder.

But that's for another thread, or perhaps a PM.
 
Interesting

And actually what is interesting about the gross generalizations is that the martial abilities of the French are admired (how many officers do you see sticking their hand in the pocket like Napoleon), including the use of kepis and Zouaves....and the martial abilities of the Germans are looked down upon.

The Franco-Prussian War has yet to happen, but boy how THAT worm would turn.
 
Dear List Members:

Name BARLOW, Francis Channing
Born October 19 1834, Brooklyn NY
Died January 11 1896, New York NY
Pre-War Profession Lawyer.
War Service 1861 Pvt. in 12th New York, mustered out after 3 months, Lt Col. in 61st New York, April 1862 Col., Peninsula campaign, Antietam (w), September 1862 appointed Brig. Gen. of Volunteers, commanded a 2nd Bde/2nd Divn/XI Corps, Chancellorsville, commanded 1st Divn/XI Corps at Gettysburg (w,c), commanded 1st Divn/II Corps at Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, Petersburg, sick leave, commanded 2nd Divn/II Corps at Sayler's Creek.
Brevet Promotions Maj. Gen. U.S.V. August 1 1864.
Post War Career Politician, US marshal, state attorney general, lawyer.
Notes Left for dead on the field at Gettysburg, he was comforted by Confederate Gen. John B. Gordon.
-----------------

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXIII [S# 60]
UNION CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA, VIRGINIA, WEST VIRGINIA, MARYLAND, AND PENNSYLVANIA, FROM JANUARY 1 TO APRIL 30, 1864.--#5
SPECIAL ORDERS No. 40.
HDQRS. OF ARMY, ADJT. GEN.'S OFFICE,
Washington, January 26, 1864.
1. Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow, U.S. Volunteers, is hereby relieved from duty in the Department of the South and assigned to the Second Army Corps. He will report, by letter, to Major-General Hancock, U. S. Volunteers, at Harrisburg, Pa., for recruiting duty for that corps.
* * * * * * * * * *
By command of Major-General Halleck:
E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assisant Adjutant-General.

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXIII [S# 60]
UNION CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA, VIRGINIA, WEST VIRGINIA, MARYLAND, AND PENNSYLVANIA, FROM JANUARY 1 TO APRIL 30, 1864.--#18
GENERAL ORDERS No. 11.
HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS,
Cole's Hill, Culpeper Co., Va., March 25, 1864.
Under the provisions of General Orders, No. 10, headquarters Army of the Potomac, of March 24, 1864, the following organization is announced for the Second Army Corps:
The original regiments of the Second Corps will be consolidated into two divisions, with the following arrangements of brigades and assignment of commanders:
First Division, Brig. Gen. F. C. Barlow commanding:
First Brigade, Col. Nelson A. Miles, Sixty-first New York Volunteers, commanding: Sixty-first New York Volunteers, Eighty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, One hundred and fortieth Pennsylvania Volunteers, One hundred and eighty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, Twenty-sixth Michigan Volunteers, Sixth Minnesota Volunteers.
Second Brigade, Col. T. A. Smyth, First Delaware Volunteers, commanding (temporarily): Twenty-eighth Massachusetts Volunteers, One hundred and sixteenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Sixty-third New York Volunteers, Sixty-ninth New York Volunteers, Eighty-eighth New York Volunteers.
Third Brigade, Col. Paul Frank. Fifty-second New York Volunteers, commanding: One hundred and eleventh New York Volunteers, One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Volunteers, One hundred and twenty-fifth New York Volunteers, Thirty-ninth New York Volunteers, Fifty-second New York Volunteers, Fifty-seventh New York Volunteers, Seventh New York Volunteers (detachment).
Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke, Fifty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, commanding: Fifty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, One hundred and forty-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, One hundred and forty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Sixty-fourth New York Volunteers, Sixty-sixth New York Volunteers, Second Delaware Volunteers.
Second Division, Brig. Gen. John Gibbon commanding:
First Brigade, Brig. Gen. A. S. Webb commanding: Seventh Michigan Volunteers, Fifteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, Nineteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, Twentieth Massachusetts Volunteers, Forty-second New York Volunteers, Eighty-second New York Volunteers, Nineteenth Maine Volunteers, Fifty-ninth New York Volunteers, Twenty-sixth Wisconsin Volunteers.
Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. J. T. Owen commanding: Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Seventy-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, Seventy-second Pennsylvania Volunteers, One hundred and sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, One hundred and eighty-fourth Pennsylvania Volunteers, One hundred and fifty-second New York Volunteers.
Third Brigade, Col. S.S. Carroll, Eighth Ohio Volunteers, commanding: Fourth Ohio Volunteers, Seventh West Virginia Volunteers, One hundred and eighth New York Volunteers, Twelfth New Jersey Volunteers, Tenth Battalion New York Volunteers, Eighth Ohio Volunteers, Fourteenth Indiana Volunteers, Fourteenth Connecticut Volunteers, First Delaware Volunteers.
This order will take effect at once. Division commanders are authorized and desired to make such arrangement with each other as will bring their new commands together, as far as practicable, without depriving the men of shelter.
The records of the late Third Division, Second Corps, will be transmitted to the adjutant-general at these headquarters.
The division formerly known as the First Division, Third Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. D. B. Birney, will hereafter be designated as the Third Division, Second Corps.
The division formerly known as the Second Division, Third Corps, to which Brig. Gen. J. B. Carr has been assigned as commander, will hereafter be known as the Fourth Division, Second Corps.
Each of these divisions will be reduced to two brigades, with the following arrangement of regiments:
Third Division, Maj. Gen. D. B. Birney commanding:
First Brigade, Brig. Gen. J. H. H. Ward commanding: Twentieth Indiana Volunteers, Eighty-sixth New York Volunteers, One hundred and twenty-four New York Volunteers, Fortieth New York Volunteers, Ninety-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, One hundred and tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, One hundred and fourteenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, One hundred and forty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, Third Maine Volunteers, Second U.S. Sharpshooters. Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. Alexander Hays commanding: Fourth Maine Volunteers, Seventeenth Maine Volunteers, Third Michigan Volunteers, Fifth Michigan Volunteers, Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers, Sixty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, Sixty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, One hundred and fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, First U.S. Sharpshooters.
Fourth Division, Brig. Gen. J. B. Carr commanding:
First Brigade, Brig. Gen. G. Mott commanding: Fifth New Jersey Volunteers, Sixth New Jersey Volunteers, Seventh New Jersey Volunteers, Eighth New Jersey Volunteers, One hundred and fifteenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, First Massachusetts Volunteers, Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Sixteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, Eleventh New Jersey Volunteers.
Second Brigade, Col. William R. Brewster, Seventy-third New York Volunteers, commanding: Seventieth New York Volunteers, Seventy-first New York Volunteers, Seventy-second New York Volunteers, Seventy-third New York Volunteers, Seventy-fourth New York Volunteers, One hundred and twentieth New York Volunteers, Eleventh Massachusetts Volunteers, Eighty-fourth Pennsylvania Volunteers.
All officers of the general staff rendered supernumerary by the operation of this order will report to the chiefs of their respective departments at these headquarters for instructions.
Staff officers not on the general staff, becoming supernumerary under this order, will rejoin their regiments for duty.
The organization of the staff of the corps will be announced hereafter.
The artillery brigade will retain its present organization, with such changes of batteries as may be ordered from artillery headquarters.
By command of Major-General Hancock:
FRANCIS A. WALKER,
Lieutenant Colonel, Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
(Seems to me after leaving 11th Corps and General Howard, he is assigned to General W. S. Hancock.).

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXIII [S# 60]
UNION CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA, VIRGINIA, WEST VIRGINIA, MARYLAND, AND PENNSYLVANIA, FROM JANUARY 1 TO APRIL 30, 1864.--#24
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
April 18, 1864.
Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
I desire to have assigned to duty, according to their brevet rank, Major-Generals Barlow and Ricketts, now on duty with this army. «57 R R--VOL XXXIII» Major-General Barlow has been so assigned by the lieutenant-general commanding, pending the action of the President of the United States.
GEO. G. MEADE,
Major-General.
-----
Respectfully submitted,
M. E. Wolf
 
While not haveing read all posts on this I would like to point out there were a number of men in the 11th Corp that fought small but effective delaying action as things fell apart around them. The other Federal units on the line to their east did not stand and broke as well, but have had no stigma attached to them as was attached to the 11th. Could this have been from their commanders being better at fingerpointing and having better political connections than the 11th Corp's German officers? Jackson's attack drove over 2 miles against the Federals and the 11th Corp did not have that much of the Federal defensive line, so think of the other units that broke and retreated.
 
The Germans in the 11th Corps

C. SCHURZ,
Major-General, Comdg. Third Division, Eleventh Army Corps.

Schurz took command of the Eleventh Army Corps on the first day at Gettysburg, temporarily replacing Howard. Howard, covered himself by leaving an entire division-Steinwehr's, with well placed artillery, on Cemetery Hill, while the other divisions moved northeast of Gettysburg. The history accorded the Eleventh Corps might have been different if Ewell had made a frontal attack on Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1. A successful attack was not a sure thing, as many neo-confederates maintain.

I've never researched Barlow, so if he didn't like Germans, what was his real reaction when placed under Schurz, a Lincoln political appointment, and a German, on that first day at Gettysburg?

Schurz had a court of inquiry after Wauhatchie, Tenn. and while he stayed in the army, the West Pointers made sure he never got a command after the battle of Wauhatchie.

I wonder if Gen. Howard, wasn't the luckiest general in the Union army. I was never impressed with him through Gettysburg. Even Meade gave Hancock the superior command over Howard, who had more corps experience. Gettysburg was Hancock's first corps combat command. Previously Hancock had seen battle as a division commander. So on the first day, with Reynold's dead, you have Howard and Schurz and Doubleday who gets blamed for retreating by Howard.
I've never seen it in print, but I don't think it was a coincidence that Meade got rid of Howard, by getting the 11th Corps transferred to Tennessee, soon after Gettysburg.

I believe all the division commanders in the 11th Corps were replaced by 1864, even Steinwehr. And Howard moved to higher command fighting under Sherman. That general sure had longevity after Chancellorsville.
 
i do not know---

From how I read this summery it was just the NY regiment was ready for battle...This regiment fell back in good order, while I figure the rest of the 11th Corps collapsed.

It was the night that save the union army that day at Chancellorsville...

At Gettysburg, they got routed again on day one....they were merge with other route units to hold the north side of Cemetery Hill but thier line was beached on the day two. The night, lack of support for the troops that beached the line and reinforcements saved them..

I not sharing the love...I am of German ancestry..


The 11 Corps had to couple of bad outing...
 
Questions--

If you look at the 11th Corps at Chancellorsville, it should have done well. Many of the Germans had past military experience from being in the various German and the Austrian armies. Many of the "Forty-Eighters" and other ethic German officers in the 11th had Military schooling in Germany and served as junior officers in the various German armies. The 11th Corps should have been a good mix the military experience and newbies.

At Chancellorsville the 11th had 27 regiments and 13 were ethic German ones. Only half or a little over half the 11 Corps was German.

My question is of the 27 regiments how many were rolled up by Jackson's men?

Of the regiments that were rolled up, busted, or routed by Jackson's men were ethnically German ones?

Does anyone have the answer to these questions, if we answer these questions it might explain how well the German regiments performed at Chancellorsville.

Let's be honest on the first day at Gettysburg they(11th) were blind sided by Ewell's men. They did not even know Ewell was coming down on them.
 
My question is of the 27 regiments how many were rolled up by Jackson's men?

Of the regiments that were rolled up, busted, or routed by Jackson's men were ethnically German ones?

Does anyone have the answer to these questions, if we answer these questions it might explain how well the German regiments performed at Chancellorsville.

I'm going to try my hand at this one, with the help of Stephen Sears and his book Chancellorsville, as well as a little Internet research.

Among the first units struck by Jackson were Von Gilsa's brigade of Devens' 1st Division, which had two units facing south (the 41st NY and the 45th NY) on the Orange Turnpike, while two more units (the 54th NY and the 153rd PA) were facing west, north of the turnpike. All four units were German. The 41st and 45th didn't fire a shot, while the 54th and the 153rd managed to fire several volleys before pulling back.

The 55th Ohio was next (non-German) on the turnpike, along with the 25th Ohio, 107th Ohio, 17th Connecticut and 75th Ohio, all facing south. Only the 107th, from Cleveland, was German.

Northeast of Von Gilsa's positions at the Hawkins farmstead was Schurz' (3rd) division. The 1st Brigade, under Schimmelfennig, included the 82nd Illinois, 68th NY, 74th PA, all German. Two non-German regiments were (best as I can figure) the 157th NY and the 61st Ohio.

The 2nd Brigade belonged to Krzyznowski and included the 82nd Ohio, 58th NY, 119th NY, 75th PA, and 26th Wisconsin. All were German.

Schurz' division basically folded when Devens' panicky survivors ran through and disorganized them.

Von Steinwehr's division was in reserve at Dowdall's Tavern and included Buschbeck's 1st Brigade that included the 29th NY, 154th NY, 27th PA and 73rd PA. The 29th was German and the 27th PA was "half German."

Barlow was in command of the 2nd Brigade, which included the non-German regiments (as far as I can tell) of the 33rd Massachusetts, 134th NY, 136th NY and 73rd Ohio.

Buschbeck's brigade, supported by survivors of fleeing regiments, was eventually overwhelmed, like everybody else.

It doesn't look good for the Germans. We have the 41st NY, 45th NY, 54th NY, 153rd PA, 107th Ohio, 82nd Ohio, 58h NY, 119th NY, 75th PA, 26th Wisconsin, 29th NY and 27th PA all being pushed back by Jackson.

I personally don't think the Germans were bad fighters. They just had poor leaders.
 
Judging by the 9th Ohio Infantry (Western theater), leadership (and location - as in where they were on the field) definately had more to do with it than being German.

Eleventh Corps was ill positioned to meet Jackson's attack, and with Barlow's (large, as I recall) brigade not in the front line/s, easily overwhelmed by Jackson's 20,000+ force.

It seems to have done no worse than the regiments that became Twelfth Corps in the Shenandoah - if anything, some of it did better (McDowell, anyone?).

Still, they did not give a particularly good account for themselves at either Gettysburg or Chancellorsville - even allowing for leadership failures and biased press, you'd hope for more.

Oh, before we forget. "Leatherbreeches" Dilger was an excellent artillerist. Kudos to him and his battery at both battles.
 
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