100,000 man army

atlantis

Sergeant Major
Joined
Nov 12, 2016
Prior to Lincoln being sworn in, the CS congress created a 100,000 man provisional army of 1 year volunteers. Why if there no war with US and was this a prudent or rash move. Would a better signal have been sent to the US if instead the CS had focused on standing a small regular army.
 
Prudent move. Even if one hopes for the best, national security is always based on planning for the worst.

Even in diplomacy if one has little strength, they have little leverage as well.
 
Let’s try to remember that there are absolutely competing claims here. After the “signals” already sent - ‘the USA is a sovereign nation faced with rebellion against its authority’ vs ‘the CSA is an independent sovereign nation’ - there isn’t the wiggle room on either side to quibble about the meaning of any troop number. The die being already cast, politically speaking, the rest truly is logical preparation.
 
Ah, but you would have us believe that it was a war of Northern aggression.

Regards,
Don Dixon

Well wasn't it? Lincoln didn't have to call forth the 75,000 state troops two days after Ft. Sumter fell since no one was killed from the Confederate shelling. <sarcasm> This was actually stated in another thread (Confederate War Aims, post #554) earlier today.
 
Well wasn't it? Lincoln didn't have to call forth the 75,000 state troops two days after Ft. Sumter fell since no one was killed from the Confederate shelling. <sarcasm> This was actually stated in another thread (Confederate War Aims, post #554) earlier today.
Well, the Union army was going to travel overland to invade the Deep South. As we know 4 states took exception to such a provocative measure.
 
Well, the Union army was going to travel overland to invade the Deep South. As we know 4 states took exception to such a provocative measure.
The Southern states did not know that when the Confederacy pummeled a United States fort and her troops with artillery for 34 hours which was the most serious act of Southern aggression against U.S. facilities and personnel that began back during November 1860.
 
The Southern states did not know that when the Confederacy pummeled a United States fort and her troops with artillery for 34 hours which was the most serious act of Southern aggression against U.S. facilities and personnel that began back during November 1860.
The path was certainly clearer after Lincoln’s call for 75,000 troops. Imo, he underestimated the response from the border states to his proclamation. The “serious act of aggression” was anticipated prior to Lincoln dispatching the warship to the harbor.
 
Well, the Union army was going to travel overland to invade the Deep South. As we know 4 states took exception to such a provocative measure.

Prior to the firing on Fort Sumter the U.S. Army consisted of less than 16,000 officers and men, most of whom were stationed in company sized units west of the Mississippi. With the exception of Massachusetts, and to a much lesser extent New York and New Jersey, the Northern state militias were essentially small numbers of dysfunctional marching clubs (i.e., when Lincoln later called up the 75,000 militia after Fort Sumter most of the regiments had to be created from scratch rather than existing units). What extant Union Army are you talking about that was going to travel overland to invade the poor innocent deep South? Virginia and Tennessee didn't go with the Confederacy because they were outraged over Lincoln's "provocation," but because their leadership had been preparing for war for several years in advance.

The problem for the South was that the fire eaters grossly under estimated the unwilling of the North to permit the destruction of the Union, and the military and other resources it would take to establish an independent South.

"We have cotton, and slaves,......and arrogance." Rhett Butler, Gone With the Wind.

Regards,
Don Dixon
 
Much has been made of southern preparations for war but how much was real and how much just bluster. How much progress had been made standing up this 100,000 man army by the firing on ft. Sumter.
 
Prior to the firing on Fort Sumter the U.S. Army consisted of less than 16,000 officers and men, most of whom were stationed in company sized units west of the Mississippi. With the exception of Massachusetts, and to a much lesser extent New York and New Jersey, the Northern state militias were essentially small numbers of dysfunctional marching clubs (i.e., when Lincoln later called up the 75,000 militia after Fort Sumter most of the regiments had to be created from scratch rather than existing units). What extant Union Army are you talking about that was going to travel overland to invade the poor innocent deep South? Virginia and Tennessee didn't go with the Confederacy because they were outraged over Lincoln's "provocation," but because their leadership had been preparing for war for several years in advance.

The problem for the South was that the fire eaters grossly under estimated the unwilling of the North to permit the destruction of the Union, and the military and other resources it would take to establish an independent South.

"We have cotton, and slaves,......and arrogance." Rhett Butler, Gone With the Wind.

Regards,
Don Dixon
Va and Tn’s leadership had been preparing for war for years? Please describe the measures taken for this mobilization. Va voted down secession and Tn voted against a secession convention prior to Ft. Sumter and the “Call to Arms.” From Va’s Gov. Letcher:

TO SECRETARY CAMERON
Executive Department,
Richmond, VA., April 16th, 1861.

Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War:

Sir:--I received your telegram of the 15th, the genuineness of which I doubted. Since that time I have received your communication mailed the same day, in which I am requested to detach from the militia of the State of Virginia "the quota designated in a table," which you append, "to serve as an infantry or riflemen for the period of three months, unless sooner discharged."

In reply to this communication, I have only to say, that the Militia of Virginia will not be furnished to the powers at Washington, for any such use or purpose as they have in view.

Your object is to subjugate our Southern States, and a requisition made upon me for such object---an object, in my judgment, not within the purview of the Constitution, or the act of 1795---- will not be complied with. You have chosen to inaugurate civil war, and having done so, we will meet it, in a spirit as determined as the Administration has exhibited towards the South,

Respectfully,
John Letcher


From Gov. Harris to Sec. Cameron April 17, 1861

Tennessee will not furnish a single man for the purpose of coercion, but 50,000 if necessary for the defense of our rights and those of our Southern brothers".
 
Much has been made of southern preparations for war but how much was real and how much just bluster. How much progress had been made standing up this 100,000 man army by the firing on ft. Sumter.

My research interest in the Austrian arms which were imported for the Federal and Confederate Armies led me to the question of why it was necessary for both sides to import the massive quantities of European military arms that were brought in during the war. The national government's arms holdings, and those seized from the national arsenals in the South by the state militias for the Confederacy, are readily quantifiable. That led to my interest in the condition of the state militias effective 31 December 1860. A discussion of state preparedness - North and South - and the numbers and condition of state owned arms for the militia would take an almost book length treatise to respond adequately to your questions/comments.

Since there was as yet no Confederate government, the preparation which was occuring in the South was at the state level, and I will cite several very abbreviated examples. In 1858 the Mississippi legislature appropriated $125,000 to arm volunteer infantry companies and $150,000 to arm volunteer cavalry companies. In March 1859 the arms in the state arsenal were overhauled. In December 1859 the legislature voted an additional $150,000 for the purchase of arms. In the same two-year period the Militia Act of 1808 allocated $400,000 from the national government to arm the entire militia of the United States.

The Virginia General Assembly had originally budgeted $5,800 for military purposes in 1859, giving an idea of Virginia's normal pre-war military appropriations. Later in the year it voted $320,000 to refurbish the Richmond Arsenal, reestablishing Virginia's capability to manufacture its own military arms. On 31 January 1860 the General Assembly passed an act appropriating $180,000 to purchase “such arms, equipments and munitions as may be required for the immediate use of the state." On 29 January 1861 the General Assembly passed an act requiring the Colonel of Ordnance, under the direction of the Governor, to “procure the necessary arms, equipments and munitions of war, for the defense of the state,” and appropriated $800,000 for the purpose. The act also authorized the governor to employ an engineer to construct coast, harbor, and river defenses, and further directed the construction of three arsenals in the state. On 14 March the Assembly passed an act authorizing the issuance of $1,000,000 in treasury notes to fund the defense of the state. On 30 April the Succession Convention authorized the governor to issue $2,000,000 in treasury notes for defense of the state. The Ordnance of Succession was not ratified by the people of Virginia until a referendum on 23 May. A discussion of Virginia's actions to set up the Richmond Arsenal and procure munitions in this two year time frame is of a length which is not appropriate for this forum. Mississippi's and Virginia's actions involved real money for real arms.

Tennessee took lower cost measures. In September 1860 Governor Harris wrote to the Ordnance Office asking if the state could purchase a machine for transforming flintlock arms to percussion. The machinery at the Pittsburgh Arsenal was available and was transferred along with 3,000 percussion hammers and nipples to Tennessee with the state billed for the equipment under its Militia Act allocation. Tennessee then transformed 3,000 flintlock muskets using the cone-in-barrel technique at the state arsenal at Nashville. After succession, the machinery was used to transform additional muskets for Tennessee and the Confederacy, including 1,500 Virginia Manufactory muskets.

Similar actions were occuring in the states all across the South. Meanwhile in the North suggestions that the arms and organization of the militia might be improved were met with ridicule in the state legislatures. So much for any Army of Northern Aggression in 1861. As stated previously, the problem for the South was that the fire eaters grossly under estimated the unwilling of the North to permit the destruction of the Union, and the military and other resources it would take to establish an independent Confederacy.

Lost Cause: Your comments immediately above have no bearing on the preparations of Virginia and Tennessee for war. They just reflect the unwillingness of Governors Letcher and Harris to respond to Lincoln's call for 75,000 volunteers following the firing on Fort Sumter.

Regards,
Don Dixon
 
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My research interest in the Austrian arms which were imported for the Federal and Confederate Armies led me to the question of why it was necessary for both sides to import the massive quantities of European military arms that were brought in during the war. The national government's arms holdings, and those seized from the national arsenals in the South by the state militias for the Confederacy, are readily quantifiable. That led to my interest in the condition of the state militias effective 31 December 1860. A discussion of state preparedness - North and South - and the numbers and condition of state owned arms for the militia would take an almost book length treatise to respond adequately to your questions/comments.

Since there was as yet no Confederate government, the preparation which was occuring in the South was at the state level, and I will cite several very abbreviated examples. In 1858 the Mississippi legislature appropriated $125,000 to arm volunteer infantry companies and $150,000 to arm volunteer cavalry companies. In March 1859 the arms in the state arsenal were overhauled. In December 1859 the legislature voted an additional $150,000 for the purchase of arms. In the same two-year period the Militia Act of 1808 allocated $400,000 from the national government to arm the entire militia of the United States.

The Virginia General Assembly had originally budgeted $5,800 for military purposes in 1859, giving an idea of Virginia's normal pre-war military appropriations. Later in the year it voted $320,000 to refurbish the Richmond Arsenal, reestablishing Virginia's capability to manufacture its own military arms. On 31 January 1860 the General Assembly passed an act appropriating $180,000 to purchase “such arms, equipments and munitions as may be required for the immediate use of the state." On 29 January 1861 the General Assembly passed an act requiring the Colonel of Ordnance, under the direction of the Governor, to “procure the necessary arms, equipments and munitions of war, for the defense of the state,” and appropriated $800,000 for the purpose. The act also authorized the governor to employ an engineer to construct coast, harbor, and river defenses, and further directed the construction of three arsenals in the state. On 14 March the Assembly passed an act authorizing the issuance of $1,000,000 in treasury notes to fund the defense of the state. On 30 April the Succession Convention authorized the governor to issue $2,000,000 in treasury notes for defense of the state. The Ordnance of Succession was not ratified by the people of Virginia until a referendum on 23 May. A discussion of Virginia's actions to set up the Richmond Arsenal and procure munitions in this two year time frame is of a length which is not appropriate for this forum. Mississippi's and Virginia's actions involved real money for real arms.

Tennessee took lower cost measures. In September 1860 Governor Harris wrote to the Ordnance Office asking if the state could purchase a machine for transforming flintlock arms to percussion. The machinery at the Pittsburgh Arsenal was available and was transferred along with 3,000 percussion hammers and nipples to Tennessee with the state billed for the equipment under its Militia Act allocation. Tennessee then transformed 3,000 flintlock muskets using the cone-in-barrel technique at the state arsenal at Nashville. After succession, the machinery was used to transform additional muskets for Tennessee and the Confederacy, including 1,500 Virginia Manufactory muskets.

Similar actions were occuring in the states all across the South. Meanwhile in the North suggestions that the arms and organization of the militia might be improved were met with ridicule in the state legislatures. So much for any Army of Northern Aggression in 1861. At stated previously, the problem for the South was that the fire eaters grossly under estimated the unwilling of the North to permit the destruction of the Union, and the military and other resources it would take to establish an independent Confederacy.

Lost Cause: Your comments immediately above have no bearing on the preparations of Virginia and Tennessee for war. They just reflect the unwillingness of Governors Letcher and Harris to respond to Lincoln's call for 75,000 volunteers following the firing on Fort Sumter.

Regards,
Don Dixon
Since your speaking strictly logistical, we can expand the discussion to events surrounding military spending in Va prior to the war since it did not occur in a vacuum. In 1859, with the limited military budget and John Brown raid in recent memory, Virginia officials deemed funding was inadequate to defend itself with outdated flintlock firearms. Proceeding into 1860, additional funding was requested for additional firearms in defense of the state.
Newly elected Gov. Letcher created a commission for the development of new firearms. They visited the Springfield Armory (Ma), West Point Armory (Ny), and Harpers Ferry Armory, but ultimately decided on purchasing Enfields from England then later machinery at Tredager.
The election of Lincoln and failed peace conference(s) obviously put secession fever further in the air. Virginia voting down secession during the convention, but voted support the Confederacy in the event of war. Geographically located in the middle of the oncoming storm, defense spending was requested but insufficient for additional arms the engineering construction for coastal, harbor, and river defenses. The additional treasury notes were then printed. VA Delegates vote down secession April 04, including Va Unionist John Baldwin’s meeting with Lincoln. Ft. Sumter is then fired upon and Lincoln calls for 75,000 militia troops with Gov. Letcher’s response on April 17, and ultimately the state seceeding on May 23.

for further reading concerning the firearms procurement

 
The first act of Lincoln asking for 75,000 militia troops was to reclaim those parts of the Union that had been seized by the confederate 'insurgents'; mails, forts, vessels, etc.; there was no mention made for attempting a full scale invasion of the south at that time.
Lubliner.

Nor was he going to act immediately; he gave them twenty days to "disperse, and retire peaceably to their respective abodes."
 
Since your speaking strictly logistical,

How else would I be speaking? Preparation for war is always about logistics. You can have the best, most talented, most motivated army in the world, but if it doesn't have beans, bullets, and MOGAS - or the period equivalent materiel - it will fail.

"Amateurs study tactics. Professionals study logistics." Attributed to General of the Armies Omar Bradley

Regards,
Don Dixon
 
How else would I be speaking? Preparation for war is always about logistics. You can have the best, most talented, most motivated army in the world, but if it doesn't have beans, bullets, and MOGAS - or the period equivalent materiel - it will fail.

"Amateurs study tactics. Professionals study logistics." Attributed to General of the Armies Omar Bradley

Regards,
Don Dixon
Overlooking the attempted peaceful settlements, albeit failed, during defensive preparations.
 
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