JEB Stuart And The Battle Of Gettysburg - Was He Responsible For Lee's Defeat

If you're referring to the alleged dressing-down that is depicted in Mr. Turner's movie, the source for that is Col. Thomas T. Munford, who was at least 15 miles away when it supposedly happened. There are four people who know what happened in that room: Stuart, Lee, Marshall and Venable. Marshall hated Stuart, but he left no account of anything suggesting that there was an unpleasant encounter.


IIRC, and I may not be, but didn't Munsford claim to have heard it from H.B. McClellan ?

Respectfully,

William
 
IIRC, and I may not be, but didn't Munsford claim to have heard it from H.B. McClellan ?

Respectfully,

William

Sears wrote: No one witnessed his meeting with Lee (or at least no one, including Lee and Stuart, left a record of it), but the report making the rounds in the army was that Lee's greeting was abrupt and frosty. As soldier-historian Porter Alexander put it, "although Lee said only 'Well General, you are here at last,' his manner implied rebuke, and it was so understood by Stuart." Stuart seems to have confided his chastisement to his aide Henry McClellan, who regarded the incident as painful beyond description.

In the absence of any report of Lee running out and hugging Stuart on his return, it isn't unreasonable to suggest that Lee dressed Stuart down - however subtly. Lee certainly did assume firmer control over Stuart from then on and his final Gettysburg Battle Report famously indicated the ANV embarrassment of the absence of cavalry.

That said, Stuart made every effort to send reports, but the messengers were captured, so he actually was keeping Union authorities well informed. It seems reasonable to believe Stuart shared his emotion/frustration with McClellan and that could have easily "made the rounds" in the army.

The Gettysburg debacle was Lee's fault from soup to nuts. It was ill conceived, initiated immediately after the loss of Jackson (and questionable reorganization), geographically extended well beyond logistical comfort, assumed no difference in AOP soldiers fighting spirit on their own soil, assumed a very unhealthy overconfidence in himself and the ANV, and lastly, Lee was unable to admit he was defeated. He certainly had several lieutenants to underperform at crucial times, but it was Lee himself who unilaterally continued to order frontal assaults on Days 2 and 3.
 
It took me a little while to realize exchanging ideas with Corporal Wittenberg is like playing chess with Bobby Fischer. (Think I'm exaggerating? Read his book: "Plenty of Blame to go Around." Or/and , check out his curricula vitae.) Once I discovered he gives battlefield tours with Ed Bearss and Jeff Wert, I knew I was cooked, but delighted to have crossed sabers with him, nonetheless.
 
Sears wrote: No one witnessed his meeting with Lee (or at least no one, including Lee and Stuart, left a record of it), but the report making the rounds in the army was that Lee's greeting was abrupt and frosty. As soldier-historian Porter Alexander put it, "although Lee said only 'Well General, you are here at last,' his manner implied rebuke, and it was so understood by Stuart." Stuart seems to have confided his chastisement to his aide Henry McClellan, who regarded the incident as painful beyond description.

In the absence of any report of Lee running out and hugging Stuart on his return, it isn't unreasonable to suggest that Lee dressed Stuart down - however subtly. Lee certainly did assume firmer control over Stuart from then on and his final Gettysburg Battle Report famously indicated the ANV embarrassment of the absence of cavalry.

That said, Stuart made every effort to send reports, but the messengers were captured, so he actually was keeping Union authorities well informed. It seems reasonable to believe Stuart shared his emotion/frustration with McClellan and that could have easily "made the rounds" in the army.

The Gettysburg debacle was Lee's fault from soup to nuts. It was ill conceived, initiated immediately after the loss of Jackson (and questionable reorganization), geographically extended well beyond logistical comfort, assumed no difference in AOP soldiers fighting spirit on their own soil, assumed a very unhealthy overconfidence in himself and the ANV, and lastly, Lee was unable to admit he was defeated. He certainly had several lieutenants to underperform at crucial times, but it was Lee himself who unilaterally continued to order frontal assaults on Days 2 and 3.

I think Lee's line re: the "absence of cavalry" is blame shifting.
 
The Gettysburg debacle was Lee's fault from soup to nuts. It was ill conceived, initiated immediately after the loss of Jackson (and questionable reorganization), geographically extended well beyond logistical comfort, assumed no difference in AOP soldiers fighting spirit on their own soil, assumed a very unhealthy overconfidence in himself and the ANV, and lastly, Lee was unable to admit he was defeated. He certainly had several lieutenants to underperform at crucial times, but it was Lee himself who unilaterally continued to order frontal assaults on Days 2 and 3.

I blame the Union Army.
 
In the absence of any report of Lee running out and hugging Stuart on his return, it isn't unreasonable to suggest that Lee dressed Stuart down - however subtly. Lee certainly did assume firmer control over Stuart from then on and his final Gettysburg Battle Report famously indicated the ANV embarrassment of the absence of cavalry.

I don't disagree, but I want to be sure that you understand that in this context, "embarrassment" means something very different from what it normally means. In this context, "embarrassment" means "impeded, obstructed, entangled."
 
Which decisions in particular?

The track he chose that put him on the other side of the AoP from the ANV.

Without Stuart's intel. reports(and Lee's misuse of available cavalry) Lee was forced to make command decisions based upon his previous experience against the AoP, and that experience indicated that the AoP could not be as far North as it was or moving as fast as it did.
 
I think Lee's line re: the "absence of cavalry" is blame shifting.

When one closely rereads and analyzes Lee's final Gettysburg battle report covering July 1-3 and what followed, one finds a nearly complete blame shifting utilizing seriously artful sophistry.
 
It took me a little while to realize exchanging ideas with Corporal Wittenberg is like playing chess with Bobby Fischer. (Think I'm exaggerating? Read his book: "Plenty of Blame to go Around." Or/and , check out his curricula vitae.) Once I discovered he gives battlefield tours with Ed Bearss and Jeff Wert, I knew I was cooked, but delighted to have crossed sabers with him, nonetheless.

No worries. I appreciate the kind words.

Perhaps you would be well-served to learn the words of Sun Tzu: "Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster." :D
 
When one closely rereads and analyzes Lee's final Gettysburg battle report covering July 1-3 and what followed, one finds a nearly complete blame shifting utilizing seriously artful sophistry.

Given that Col. Charles C. Marshall--Lee's military secretary and one of the founders of the Southern Historical Society and one of the leaders of the Lost Cause cabal after war--was its author, that ought not come as any surprise.
 
Given that Col. Charles C. Marshall--Lee's military secretary and one of the founders of the Southern Historical Society and one of the leaders of the Lost Cause cabal after war--was its author, that ought not come as any surprise.

But the report was vetted by Lee was it not? So we can say with some justice that it says what Lee wanted it to say.
IMO, I agree given the character and diffidence of Lee indealing with personal relationships, I too, believe that those few words were condemnatory(if not hightly so considereing its source).


P.S. But I do agree that all OR's are usually unreliable when it comes to fixing blame, because of the very human trait of putting your best face forward.
 
Given that Col. Charles C. Marshall--Lee's military secretary and one of the founders of the Southern Historical Society and one of the leaders of the Lost Cause cabal after war--was its author, that ought not come as any surprise.

As a Maryland native from Harford County, Marshall is largely credited for numerous of Lee's writings, including the Final Order at Appomattox CH. You remind me that Marshall has not really been associated with Early's Lost Cause cabal leadership (like Pendleton, Jones etc) through writings condemning Longstreet's performance - at least he never spoke up against Early's overtly false charges against Longstreet. I think it finally Venable who years later repudiated the "Dawn Attack Order" fallacy.

The Gettysburg Report claimed that Lee didn't intend to deliver a battle so far from our base unless attacked - yet Lee was quoted famously about his plans to attack one early-arriving Union corps and driving one in on the next. The worst sophistry (IMO) involved the line: The result of this day's (Day 2) operations induced the belief that with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack."

Lee unilaterally determined to continue the attack. He foolishly ordered Longstreet to use McLaws and Hood's Divisions to attack again on Day 3 with no cover on their right. He had to have known that no "concert of action" at Culp's Hill was forthcoming after the early and mid-morning defeat of Ewell's corps. Lee seriously erred in ordering some of Hill's badly battered units into Pickett's Charge on Day 3 (many of whom had lost numerous key officers on Day 1). So, Lee's report indicated that Gen (Allegheny) Johnson was threatened on flank and rear on Culp's Hill on Day 3 "rendering it necessary for him to retire from his original position about 1pm."

Thus Lee knew there could be no concert of action in Pickett's Charge but he insisted on sending Pickett et al anyway.

And of course, Lee's letter to Davis of 7/31 reeks of Marshall's verbiage: No blame can be attached to the army for ITS failure to accomplish what was projected by me, nor should IT be censured for the unreasonable expectations of the PUBLIC. I am alone to blame, in PERHAPS expecting too much of its prowess & valour. It however in my opinion achieved under the guidance of the Most High a general success, though it did not win a victory".

Wow. Lee's only fault at Gettysburg was that he PERHAPS expected too much of his men - not that he made any error in ordering frontal assaults on Days 2 and 3. Any unreasonable expectation were those of the public - not Lee. Thus, maybe the army didn't have as much courage and valour as Lee thought. And of course, Lee doesn't acknowledge defeat, but credits the "Most High" for guiding the ANV to its "general success" at Gettysburg.

These reports are many light years away from "It was all my fault." Yet despite the written record, Longstreet has come to take most of the blame for Gettysburg and thus the war, while people like Shelby Foote make it into the Ken Burns TV series insisting Lee himself took the blame and said so to Jefferson Davis as well.
 
The Gettysburg Report claimed that Lee didn't intend to deliver a battle so far from our base unless attacked - yet Lee was quoted famously about his plans to attack one early-arriving Union corps and driving one in on the next.

There is considerable doubt regarding the veracity of Trimble's claim that Lee said that to him.


The worst sophistry (IMO) involved the line: The result of this day's (Day 2) operations induced the belief that with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack."

Why is that sophistry?


Lee unilaterally determined to continue the attack.

Isn't that part of his job? Why stress "unilaterally?" What were his realistic alternatives on July 3, looking at it from what he knew at the time?


He foolishly ordered Longstreet to use McLaws and Hood's Divisions to attack again on Day 3 with no cover on their right.

Do we have orders from Lee that say this? Where are those orders? My understanding is that Pickett's Division was used on the right on Day 3.

He had to have known that no "concert of action" at Culp's Hill was forthcoming after the early and mid-morning defeat of Ewell's corps.

How so? How would he have known, at the end of Day 2, that there could be no concert of action?


Lee seriously erred in ordering some of Hill's badly battered units into Pickett's Charge on Day 3 (many of whom had lost numerous key officers on Day 1).

Why is it an error to have troops take part in the attack? Were there not officers placed in key open positions? Why can't troops attack with replacement officers?


So, Lee's report indicated that Gen (Allegheny) Johnson was threatened on flank and rear on Culp's Hill on Day 3 "rendering it necessary for him to retire from his original position about 1pm."

Thus Lee knew there could be no concert of action in Pickett's Charge but he insisted on sending Pickett et al anyway.

What was Lee's realistic alternative at that point, based on what he knew at the time? At what point did the plan become to attack the center of the Union line?

Wow. Lee's only fault at Gettysburg was that he PERHAPS expected too much of his men - not that he made any error in ordering frontal assaults on Days 2 and 3.

What did Lee know about his men attacking Union positions up to July 2? What was the realistic alternative Lee could have used on July 2? July 3?


Any unreasonable expectation were those of the public - not Lee. Thus, maybe the army didn't have as much courage and valour as Lee thought. And of course, Lee doesn't acknowledge defeat, but credits the "Most High" for guiding the ANV to its "general success" at Gettysburg.

These reports are many light years away from "It was all my fault." Yet despite the written record, Longstreet has come to take most of the blame for Gettysburg and thus the war, while people like Shelby Foote make it into the Ken Burns TV series insisting Lee himself took the blame and said so to Jefferson Davis as well.

Lee did take the blame--at first. As the troops came back on July 3 he said it was all his fault. Lee offered to resign, but Davis refused the offer. One can argue, perhaps, that Lee knew in advance his offer would be refused, but then Hooker probably was sure his offer to resign prior to Gettysburg would be refused. His later reports, though, did blame others for the defeat, at least to some extent.
 
The track he chose that put him on the other side of the AoP from the ANV.
Lee's orders sent him to the other side of the AoP from the ANV.

The specific path he took to get there was based on the most up to date intel he had from his scouts as far as where the AoP was.

So should he have A) disobeyed Lee's orders, or B) assumed all his scouting reports were completely wrong? And if B), then why have scouts?

Without Stuart's intel. reports(and Lee's misuse of available cavalry) Lee was forced to make command decisions based upon his previous experience against the AoP, and that experience indicated that the AoP could not be as far North as it was or moving as fast as it did.
No, he was not forced to. He chose to. And that is on R.E. Lee.
 
Lee's orders sent him to the other side of the AoP from the ANV.
The specific path he took to get there was based on the most up to date intel he had from his scouts as far as where the AoP was.
So should he have A) disobeyed Lee's orders, or B) assumed all his scouting reports were completely wrong? And if B), then why have scouts?
No, he was not forced to. He chose to. And that is on R.E. Lee.


There is no question of disobedience. Lee suggested two routes for Stuart, with his own preference noted, leaving the final decision to Stuart, who made a rational decision based on the facts known to him at the time(including Lee preference). There is no doubt that it was Stuarts call, and he made i., Authorized by Lee himself(just as the other route would have been).
Objectively, after the fact, the choice was unfortunate for Lee's conduct of the battle.


P.S. I think we both are really on the same page as to the main person responsible.
 
As I recall, there were others in addition to Trimble who reported similar comments by Lee regarding this aggressive idea. I'm not at home with handy access to my library, but I'll check later on who else may have commented.

This comment is sophistry (IMO) involved the line: The result of this day's (Day 2) operations induced the belief that with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack." because..........

Lee's suggesting "it was accordingly determined" instead of "I determined" purposfully suggests that Lee didn't act alone and that others share in the blame/responsibility for continuingthe attack. It gives no hint that Lee knew fully well that at least Longstreet opposed continuing the attacks and that Ewell was in no better position to successfully attack Cemetery/Culp's Hills on Day 3 than on Day 2. The verbiage also indicates that Lee mentioned nor seriously considered any other specific alternatives. In fact, Lee did not meet with any corps commanders prior to making his catastrophic decision. You asked why I stressed "unilaterally". That is because Lee usually conferred with his key subordinates on the evenings during battles so as to help him to fully comprehend the actual condition of his units and the relative success of the past day's results. Lee was rather oblivious to the the final results because he could not even see where his 1st corps positions were located as it was dark and he did not speak to Longstreet.

Lee's alternatives were to continue the frontal assaults, reposition one or more corps out of their 5-mile long line, move some units around the Union left and interpose between Meade and Washington once Stuart arrived, simply remain in defensive position and await an attack from Meade...Is that enough? Lee was misleading readers of his report into believing that his decision was being counseled by others because he wrote "the results of the day's operation induced the belief". He hadn't consulted with his 1st corps commander (or any other) as to the result of the day's operation. IMO, in his report, he was covering up his battlefield obstinacy and enlarged ego.

You asked: How would he have known, at the end of Day 2, that there could be no concert of action?
I said that by 1pm on Day 3, Lee knew that no proper concert of action would be possible from Ewell's corps regarding simultaneous attacks on Culp's/Cemetery Hills because he knew his troops had been driven off and that the heavy, early morning gunfire had not succeeded in improving Ewell's corps positions in that sector. And that was well before 1pm when Lee still had the opportunity to halt Pickett's Charge, whose artillery barrage began at just about 1:07 PM as we know. Thus, my comments are reasonable criticism of Lee.

You asked: Why is it an error to have troops take part in the attack? Were there not officers placed in key open positions? Why can't troops attack with replacement officers?

Some of the units in Hill's corps were seriously shot up on Day 1 and a very unhealthy portion of key officers were among those already killed and wounded. I think Lee was probably blissfully ignorant of many of these issues. One in particular was the need to use Brockenbrough's brigade as the far left unit in Pickett's Charge. I think its a big mistake to assume that key leaders can simply be replaced like checkers on a board - especially in a battle that Lee knew was probably his last best opportunity to win his battle of annilhilation against the Yankees. Many of those officers were being promoted to lead a desperate attack in which they hadn't ever held that degree of responsibility. We don't know what, if anything, AP Hill said to Lee about his concerns, but I doubt Lee was listening. At the last moment Hill was merely informed as a matter of fact of his troops' involvement on Day 3 and told that they were under Longstreet's overall command. Totally and unforgivably bad generalship and reflective of Lee who had talked himself into a box (with Davis & the cabinet) where he had to produce a signal victory and found that all his audacity wasn't helping when the Union commander didn't implode on cue.

Lee's only realistic alternative for "concert of action" was to hold off on Pickett's Charge and either redeploy for a different attack - or not attack frontally at all. Yet Lee's final report, in effect, implies that he was relying on "concert of action" for the success of the Day 3 assault. Sophistry at its worst, not to mention false. Lee knew there would be no "concert of action" but he did not stop Longstreet/Pickett et al.

I wonder how we would scoff and deride Burnside if he had the temerity to claim his only mistake at Fredericksburg was PERHAPS expecting too much of his men. Yet 7 months later, there was the invincible Lee making at least as dreadful an attack order.

You wrote: Lee did take the blame--at first. As the troops came back on July 3 he said it was all his fault. Lee offered to resign, but Davis refused the offer. One can argue, perhaps, that Lee knew in advance his offer would be refused, but then Hooker probably was sure his offer to resign prior to Gettysburg would be refused. His later reports, though, did blame others for the defeat, at least to some extent.

On Day 3, Lee was simply desperate to stop the tide of Pickett/Pettigrew survivors from heading directly back to Cashtown and beyond, so I'm sure he would say anything to stop the shocked men. "Its all my fault" was simply his desperate way of trying to implore them to stop running and form a defensive line in expectation of a counterattack by Meade. It was by no means any concrete acceptance or admission of blame. As you know, Lee later on didn't even admit defeat in his 7/31 letter to Davis. I have always thought that Lee's offer to resign was sincere - not because he felt blame, but because he knew defeat was just a matter of time. I think his ego was seriously dented in PA and I have to believe he just wanted out and felt he had shot his wad.
 
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The second day battle decimated the Union Army with the loss of 1 division.
All of Meades army had not gathered yet and Lee wanted to hit the Center of Meades
line before the rest of his army arrived.

There was such a mess up of orders that put off the attack until 3 in the afternoon. Thus allowing
Meade to reinforce. Too much blame to single out who caused what to happened. Historians
even disagree on what happened and who to blame.
 
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