Lee What Could Lee Have Done Differently in 1864?

Marse Robert

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I've briefly studied the Overland Campaign, but I'd definitely like to study the 1864 campaigns in more detail when I have time.

I was wondering, could Lee have realistically done anything to stop Grant in 1864? It seems like Grant had found the winning strategy, and it was only a matter of time—but I'd like to test this assumption. Thoughts?

Grant and Lee.jpg
 
In one sense, Lee did stop Grant from achieving his goals in 1864. Lee successfully prevented Grant from outmaneuvering the ANV during the Overland Campaign. Grant was forced to alter his strategy of flanking and destroying the ANV in the field, by crossing the James River and attempting to cut off the supply lines through Petersburg and Richmond.
 
I suspect the answer is not a lot. Once Grant had made the plan to keep on going south and around the flank of the ANV. Therefore keeping Grant from achieving his aim which he did was as good as it would get without being able to achieve a major victory on the battlefield which he couldn't do as he had to keep an army in the field that was capable of opposing the Yankees.
 
As long as Lincoln‘s re-election wasn‘t sure the whole affair was everything but useless.
But I must admit that they could have ended it afterwards.

But well....it might be not that easy to surrender the ANV even after November 1864 -

does anyone command more specific knowledge about the letters and communication of Lee between November 1864 and April 1865.
What did he tell Jefferson Davis after November 1864 about continuing the war?
 
He could have put his forces in defensive positions blocking the fords crossing the Rapidan. Cold harbor gave a glimpse of what could have been achieved with a blocking strategy. As long as he stayed in front of Grant, Grant had 2 choices-frontal assault or flank. Field works neutralized frontal assaults and interior lines neutralized flanking moves. 1864 offered the opportunity to bleed the army of Potomac given the bulldog nature of Grant.
Even with the way 64 did play out Lee made Grant realize he wasn't fighting a Bragg or AS Johnston but a peer.
 
He could have put his forces in defensive positions blocking the fords crossing the Rapidan. Cold harbor gave a glimpse of what could have been achieved with a blocking strategy. As long as he stayed in front of Grant, Grant had 2 choices-frontal assault or flank. Field works neutralized frontal assaults and interior lines neutralized flanking moves. 1864 offered the opportunity to bleed the army of Potomac given the bulldog nature of Grant.
Even with the way 64 did play out Lee made Grant realize he wasn't fighting a Bragg or AS Johnston but a peer.
Not a bad idea, but the big disadvantage with manning the crossing points was that Lee could not be certain of the exact location, route or direction of Grant's offensive movement, and whether Grant intended to strike the right or left flank of the ANV. To compensate for this uncertainty, Lee placed his three Corps in widely scattered positions close to rail and road networks. This did make sense because once Grant's intentions were known, it would be possible for the ANV to move quickly to the point of contact. In fact, this is exactly what happened; Ewell and Hill's Corps were able to trap the AotP in the Wilderness, while Longstreet (further away at Gordonsville), came up by the 2nd day of that fight.
 
Once two large Confederate armies were being supported by Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, with some help from Florida and Alabama, the end game had arrived. Only the how and when was contingent. As for President Lincoln's re-election, Grant and Sherman had three months from August 1, 1864 until the election to affect his odds of re-election. Then they had 4 months more when Lincoln would still be in charge until McClellan took office to win the war. Lee couldn't really run out the clock. It was a defective strategy.
 
Once two large Confederate armies were being supported by Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, with some help from Florida and Alabama, the end game had arrived. Only the how and when was contingent. As for President Lincoln's re-election, Grant and Sherman had three months from August 1, 1864 until the election to affect his odds of re-election. Then they had 4 months more when Lincoln would still be in charge until McClellan took office to win the war. Lee couldn't really run out the clock. It was a defective strategy.
That may very well be the truth...but at those stakes quite everybody in a comparable situation would probably have bet on that horse...even if odds were extremely long...(odds had been long for quite a time then for the South...)
 
That may very well be the truth...but at those stakes quite everybody in a comparable situation would probably have bet on that horse...even if odds were extremely long...(odds had been long for quite a time then for the South...)
Except they were gambling with their soldiers lives. The money involved was 100s of Millions. Enormous sums in those times.
But wars are easier to start than they are to end, that is certain.
 
The better question is whether Hood or Johnston could have done something differently in 1864.

The loss of Atlanta followed by the destruction of the Army of the Tennessee at Nashville is what killed the Confederacy, not Grant vs Lee.

Sherman's March to the Sea demonstrated to everyone that the Confederacy had no ability to stop the Union invasion.

At Appomatox, Grant outnumbered Lee 60,000 to 20,000. And Sherman was approaching with another 60,000 men.
 
As long as Lincoln‘s re-election wasn‘t sure the whole affair was everything but useless.
But I must admit that they could have ended it afterwards.

But well....it might be not that easy to surrender the ANV even after November 1864 -

does anyone command more specific knowledge about the letters and communication of Lee between November 1864 and April 1865.
Lee was spending a great deal of his time planning on how to utilize freedmen should the Richmond Congress authorize their use. He also did send feelers to Grant.

 
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He could've cut loose from Richmond, the very millstone of his Army. Without the burden of defending Richmond, Lee would've been more apt to be mobile, and the ANV, being mobile was deadly. Its a really good question.

He couldn't cut loose from Richmond; I doubt Davis would have allowed it.
 
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