I'm just book-ending the December 8th period with the relevant messages. The communications on December 8th were colored by the mistaken impression that Pemberton had abandoned Grenada and Grant had an open path south. In a reality that would be expressed to Sherman a few days later, Pemberton was still at Grenada with his entire force, rendering Grant's movements completely dependent on Sherman's success at Vicksburg.
Well that is pretty muddled. I asked what you were trying to prove and it appears you don't think you were proving anything at all.
On June 8th, Sherman receives his orders from Grant. Then Sherman leaves to carry out those orders. As soon as he can, Sherman heads off downriver and is soon out of communication with Grant and Halleck. Everything Sherman does from that point is done within the context of those specific orders.
It is absolutely normal in military operations to find that information about what is going on out of a commander's sight ends up being out of date, incomplete, inaccurate, distorted, or just plain wrong. That is why Grant's orders gave Sherman wide latitude and broad authority.
- It is well known that Grant wanted no part of McClernand running an independent operation inside Grant's command area.
- It is well known that Halleck and Grant worked to grab McClernand's troops and put them to use before McClernand came down to command them
What Grant thought of it was irrelevant. Grant asked Halleck why men were showing up in his department with vague orders to report to McClernand. Halleck authorized Grant to use the men in his department in any way he saw fit. Grant used that discretion to push even farther south and order Sherman to join him from Memphis. Halleck later issued a direct order to go no farther south and instead send Sherman back to Memphis to command an expedition to take Vicksburg.
Grant's opinion is very relevant. Halleck and Grant are deliberately working what used to be called "The Old Army Game" on McClernand. McClernand is a civilian politician with little actual military experience. He gets blind-sided because he is clueless.
McClernand had played the sort of politics he was used to, using his personal relationship with Lincoln and political connections to get what he could not get through the military command structure (he'd tried to push himself to high command through McClellan early in 1862, McClellan had not gone for it). So he concocted his plan, sold it to Lincoln and Stanton, figured that was a done deal, and never noticed what was going on afterwards. Maybe he did not care that he had ticked off Halleck and would be trampling over Grant's authority. Maybe he did not even think about it, self-satisfied, assuming they would just lay down and let themselves be run over.
So McClernand heads off to round up all those troops he promised to recruit (he did a good job of it). Back in Washington, Halleck is the one who has to handle all the details and work involved in setting up this "Army of the Mississippi". Lincoln and Stanton are off to other things. McClernand is recruiting across Indiana and Illinois, getting ready to get married. Halleck, never a fan of political generals anyway, was insulted by this treatment; it outraged his sense of the proper military order, if nothing else. Having a subordinate like McClernand go outside channels, not only over Grant's head but also over Halleck's own head, would tick any commanding officer off.
A soldier who'd come up through the Old Army of the 1840s-1850s would have been on the lookout for payback from above. McClernand acted like he had no clue what he had done. Halleck looked for a loop-hole, some order or regulation he could use to rework the situation to what he wanted. He found one in Stanton's October 21, 1862 order authorizing McClernand to do all this. That order gave Halleck all the power and authorization he needed.
Careful reading of Stanton's order leads Halleck to this:
- McClernand had authority to raise and organize troops and send them to Memphis
- Sending those troops into Grant's area puts them under Grant's authority
- McClernand could lead an expedition down the Mississippi "When a sufficient force not required by the operations of General Grant’s command shall be raised ..."
- Halleck has authority over them as described: "The forces so organized will remain subject to the designation of the general-in-chief, and be employed according to such exigencies as the service in his judgment may require."
From there, everything is easy. Halleck needs Grant involved and Grant is not a Halleck-buddy -- but Grant doesn't like McClernand, who he doesn't see as competent, and McClernand is tromping all over Grant's authority doing this. Everything Grant and Halleck do is completely within the orders and regulations, they just never explicitly say they are yanking the rug out from under McClernand as they go about doing it.
I think you're focusing on the OR instead of reading the entire conversation from the Papers of Ulysses S Grant, starting with Grant's letter to Halleck on October 26th. Halleck repeatedly hinted that Lincoln was calling the shots.
Nope. I have been reading broadly on the Civil War for decades. I have read everything you have mentioned so far and many other things over the years. Stop talking about what you ***think*** I do not know. Post clear evidence of your own position instead.