Sherman Sherman's Wartime Record

What does any of this have to do with Sherman? Sherman and Thomas could have brought Rosecrans back to command after McPherson died, even over Grant's objection. They did not even attempt it.
McClellan, Burnside, Hooker and even Grant got second and sometimes third chances. McClernand got a new command in Louisiana after Grant relieved him.
Rosecrans problems were with Edwin Stanton and a large part of it stemmed from the demise of Salmon Chase. John Sherman became the main man in Ohio. Both Chase and Benjamin Wade were viewed as unreliable.
Grant was elected President twice, went on a successful world tour, and wrote a popular memoir. William Rosecrans is just an obscure Civil War general. We know who he is, but does anyone outside a few Civil War roundtables know of Rosecrans?
 
The only specific problem I can say I recall between Rosecrans and Sherman was that Sherman (and Grant) wanted A. J. Smith's Corps back from Rosecrans in Missouri to join Thomas in Tennessee. Rosecrans wanted Smith to stay longer; Sherman (and Grant, and possibly/probably Thomas) wanted Rosecrans to send Smith sooner. Rosecrans did send him, but slowed the process, which is why Smith is just arriving in Nashville when Hood attacks Schofield at Franklin.
 
What does any of this have to do with Sherman? Sherman and Thomas could have brought Rosecrans back to command after McPherson died, even over Grant's objection. They did not even attempt it.
McClellan, Burnside, Hooker and even Grant got second and sometimes third chances. McClernand got a new command in Louisiana after Grant relieved him.
Rosecrans problems were with Edwin Stanton and a large part of it stemmed from the demise of Salmon Chase. John Sherman became the main man in Ohio. Both Chase and Benjamin Wade were viewed as unreliable.
Grant was elected President twice, went on a successful world tour, and wrote a popular memoir. William Rosecrans is just an obscure Civil War general. We know who he is, but does anyone outside a few Civil War roundtables know of Rosecrans?
Lincoln said post Chickamauga that “he must do something for General Rosecrans” and appointed him to command in Missouri.
Missouri was a political and military quagmire plagued by political fighting and guerrilla warfare.
As military commander he repulsed Price from Missouri into Kansas.
For his efforts he was relieved by Grant ( who later wanted to relieve Thomas from command)
Rosecrans remained popular and a potential political force. Garfield wanted to nominate him for the vice presidency in 1864. Rosecrans’ acceptance telegram never arrived. The supposition at the time was that Stannton’s War Dept intercepted it and prevented it from reaching the nominating convention in Baltimore.
Rosecrans was a political threat to some in Washington. It was in their interest that he be removed from command. No less a personage than Garfield - a politician himself- believed that.

The statement that Rosecrans is unknown outside of a few rounds tables is typical of the ignorance - in the sense of lack of knowledge - of many who post on this site. Rosecrans has been discussed in depth in numerous books in recent years. I have mentioned them in my posts. That people who post on this site haven’t read them is not Rosecrans defenders’ fault. Perhaps some should be more reserved in their pronouncements until they have done more research.
 
What does any of this have to do with Sherman? Sherman and Thomas could have brought Rosecrans back to command after McPherson died, even over Grant's objection. They did not even attempt it.
McClellan, Burnside, Hooker and even Grant got second and sometimes third chances. McClernand got a new command in Louisiana after Grant relieved him.
Rosecrans problems were with Edwin Stanton and a large part of it stemmed from the demise of Salmon Chase. John Sherman became the main man in Ohio. Both Chase and Benjamin Wade were viewed as unreliable.
Grant was elected President twice, went on a successful world tour, and wrote a popular memoir. William Rosecrans is just an obscure Civil War general. We know who he is, but does anyone outside a few Civil War roundtables know of Rosecrans?
Assignments to commands at the senior general level were solely the prerogative of POTUS, and the orders were usually issued by SECWAR in POTUS's name. Even Grant could not assign Rosecrans.

Legally, assignment to army, department or corps command is solely vested with POTUS.

Assignment of lesser officers could, under the pre-1857 regulations, be done by either POTUS (through SECWAR) or the GINC, and post-1857 was only POTUS/SECWAR in peacetime. The editing of the rules by Jeff Davis didn't exclude GINC from such in wartime.

Assigning officers to divisions who were in a department was the prerogative of POTUS or the GINC by Scott's interpretation, but not to department commanders etc.

Department commanders had the right to appoint brigadiers.
 
Sherman wanted 200,000 just to hold the Ohio River, not to defeat the enemy in their own country.

He wrote to his father-in-law in December: "If the Country has 640,000 volunteers, or even 500,000 – at least 200,000 of them should be in Kentucky or on the Ohio River, and though I may be mistaken I am still firmly of the opinion that unless that number of armed men, are distributed along that line, it will fall into the hands of the Rebels. Even now they reach the Ohio at several points, and the only reason why not at all, is because they have other designs."

Albert Castel wrote: "Later Sherman and his apologists claimed that in referring to 200,000 troops he had in mind a campaign to open up the entire Mississippi Valley. … The subject of Sherman’s interview with Cameron, however, was not long-range strategy but the immediate situation in Kentucky.”

With all due respect Sir, that may be a response to something but it's not a response to the post I was making a reply to which used the "some newspaper guys said he was nuts" posit to prove that Sherman was crazy.

Specifically, as I pointed out, those reporters were in the room when Sherman laid out his views to Cameron. I'll skip the fact that he was NOT offering a blueprint for the war, he was speaking off the cuff and had been told it was all in confidence.

Furthermore, as your own citation clearly states, what Sherman was saying was that if the country raised 600,000 troops that one third of them should be sent to defend one third of the country, ie. the part in the middle that was his responsibility. I have yet to ever encounter someone who can explain to me why this was an insane or even unreasonable opinion.

Most importantly, there were eight men in the room: Cameron, six reporters and Sherman. Cameron later reported to McClellan that Sherman asked for 200,000. The reporters subsequently wrote that Sherman said 200,000. Sherman himself, in his memoirs, says he spoke of needing 200,000.

What he did - or did not - say to his wife's father is not what the "Sherman is nuts" tale that the newspapers ran with. If Sherman did write that, it was months later, and he was speaking about fortifying every strategic point along the Ohio/Kentucky line against an attack at any one point by AS Johnson and a large army. One could argue that he was right in general, and in fact Johnston SHOULD have concentrated his forces for that kind of offensive, but chose to disperse them and let Grant chew them up piecemeal.

But that's another discussion. The POINT is that what the reporters based their slander on was a completely reasonable point of view offered by an officer to his boss on what would nowadays be called "background". Again, any comments he may have made to Thomas Eqing, and why Ewing chose to repeat them, is another topic entirely.
 
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It was suggested earlier that Sherman benefitted in his '64 campaigns by having the uniquely "innovative" Army of the Cumberland under his command. Is there any evidence that the AotC was better than any other Union armies in any specific way, and especially beneficial to Sherman?

The only comment I found of Sherman noting something unique about the AotC was not flattering. This is from a letter from Sherman to Grant in June '64 during the Atlanta campaign:

sherman 2.png
 
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Does it matter what his war time record was or if he was mediocre during those battles that didn't make much of an impact? Who is keeping score? I think all those battles and operational maneuvers in the northern part of the south were pretty much to soften up the Confederacy for Sherman's March to the Sea, which was the coup de grâce. People want to grade generals for all the wrong reasons. Sherman gets an (A) because he knew what it took to defeat the Confederates, and he implemented it.


1). Sherman understood the slave owners psyche.

Sherman understood the very constitution of the southern elite, and he understood the very fundamental reason to why they wanted war. He knew the southern aristocracy was a patrician society with excess pride and their fundamentally reason for fighting was to protect their patrimony: slaves, land and mansions. Conversely, the average Confederate soldier's well being was never considered.

Sherman did not follow the conventional rules of war and fought an irregular war. He knew what it took to win:

Sherman is misunderstood by just about everyone, that's because he didn't follow the Marquess of Queensbury rules of boxing, he threw off the gloves. He demolished the heartland of the Southern aristocrats: their land and slaves—and left them impotent and discredited before their helpless women and children. Facing little opposition once they left Atlanta, Sherman’s men destroyed the very infrastructure that supported slavery and upheld the slaveholding elites—plantations, communications, factories, and government facilities. Southern military officers put great capital in the idea of the sanctity of the Southern homeland. They deemed themselves great raiders and marauders, who harassed fixed garrisons and terrorized timid populations. Sherman, however, gave the Confederacy the raid of its life. The central objective could be summed up quite simply: Freeing the unfree and humiliating the arrogant.

Sherman was the only one who could have done the job:

Sherman goes down in history similar to a Greek tragic hero, like Ajax. He was the only general of the entire CW who could have done the job to end the war. But that's never discussed. His racism, nervous breakdown and his minor battle record are discussed.
It's well known Sherman was also a racist. That said lets go back to the war time OP.

Yes. But it is not well known that the irony of it all is that it took a racist to put down some virulent racists.
 
With all due respect Sir, that may be a response to something but it's not a response to the post I was making a reply to which used the "some newspaper guys said he was nuts" posit to prove that Sherman was crazy.

Specifically, as I pointed out, those reporters were in the room when Sherman laid out his views to Cameron. I'll skip the fact that he was NOT offering a blueprint for the war, he was speaking off the cuff and had been told it was all in confidence.

Furthermore, as your own citation clearly states, what Sherman was saying was that if the country raised 600,000 troops that one third of them should be sent to defend one third of the country, ie. the part in the middle that was his responsibility. I have yet to ever encounter someone who can explain to me why this was an insane or even unreasonable opinion.

Most importantly, there were eight men in the room: Cameron, six reporters and Sherman. Cameron later reported to McClellan that Sherman asked for 200,000. The reporters subsequently wrote that Sherman said 200,000. Sherman himself, in his memoirs, says he spoke of needing 200,000.

What he did - or did not - say to his wife's father is not what the "Sherman is nuts" tale that the newspapers ran with. If Sherman did write that, it was months later, and he was speaking about fortifying every strategic point along the Ohio/Kentucky line against an attack at any one point by AS Johnson and a large army. One could argue that he was right in general, and in fact Johnston SHOULD have concentrated his forces for that kind of offensive, but chose to disperse them and let Grant chew them up piecemeal.

But that's another discussion. The POINT is that what the reporters based their slander on was a completely reasonable point of view offered by an officer to his boss on what would nowadays be called "background". Again, any comments he may have made to Thomas Eqing, and why Ewing chose to repeat them, is another topic entirely.

Sherman's own words describe his breakdown. In a letter to his wife: "I find myself riding a whirlwind unable to guide the storm... I have my forces dependent on railroads liable to interruption, and of a size that will not compare with our enemies. To advance would be madness and to stand still folly… the idea of going down to history with a fame such as threatens me nearly makes me crazy, indeed I may be so now." (1st Nov '61)

He wanted 200,000 to defend the Ohio River line from Johnston's 12,000 men at Bowling Green and Zollicoffer's 6,000 men at the Cumberland Gap. So it was unreasonable.
 
Sherman's own words describe his breakdown. In a letter to his wife: "I find myself riding a whirlwind unable to guide the storm... I have my forces dependent on railroads liable to interruption, and of a size that will not compare with our enemies. To advance would be madness and to stand still folly… the idea of going down to history with a fame such as threatens me nearly makes me crazy, indeed I may be so now." (1st Nov '61)

He wanted 200,000 to defend the Ohio River line from Johnston's 12,000 men at Bowling Green and Zollicoffer's 6,000 men at the Cumberland Gap. So it was unreasonable.
How many did he need to make Georgia howl?
 
McClellan, McClernand, Rosecrans, Hooker, etc were not very good subordinates.

McClernand is pretty easy to understand. He was a much better general than Grant, and he knew it. Indeed, prettymuch every great "Grant" success (until mid-1863) is underpinned by a successful McClernand. The problem is largely one that McClernand expected to be acknowledged for his successes, whereas Grant wanted to take the credit for McClernand's successes. Indeed, without McClernand, Grant's career would have come to a shameful conclusion when he abandoned the field at Belmont, leaving a thousand Federals behind to be captured. McClernand went back to rescue them.

Something quite similar appears to be the case with Hooker in 1863/4. He wants to take the credit for his own achievements rather than letting his superiors do it.

The conflict with Rosecrans was also based around Grant wanting to take credit for Rosecrans' achievements, which Rosecrans characterised as “insatiable and conscienceless egotism.”

One has to ask oneself, is it that Grant was egotistical, or everyone else that came into conflict with him in this manner?
 
McClernand is pretty easy to understand. He was a much better general than Grant, and he knew it. Indeed, prettymuch every great "Grant" success (until mid-1863) is underpinned by a successful McClernand. The problem is largely one that McClernand expected to be acknowledged for his successes, whereas Grant wanted to take the credit for McClernand's successes. Indeed, without McClernand, Grant's career would have come to a shameful conclusion when he abandoned the field at Belmont, leaving a thousand Federals behind to be captured. McClernand went back to rescue them.

Something quite similar appears to be the case with Hooker in 1863/4. He wants to take the credit for his own achievements rather than letting his superiors do it.

The conflict with Rosecrans was also based around Grant wanting to take credit for Rosecrans' achievements, which Rosecrans characterised as “insatiable and conscienceless egotism.”

One has to ask oneself, is it that Grant was egotistical, or everyone else that came into conflict with him in this manner?
Grant had one of the most powerful men in Washington backing him. (Do I really need to mention his name?)
The Republicans needed to create a hero general for 1868 if not 1864. The Radicals never really loved Lincoln until after April 15,1865. Their original candidate and would be hero Fremont challenged Lincoln in 1864. (Their nightmare was McClelkan winning in 1862) Politics is the key in understanding why generals rose, fell or survived.
No one really doubts the role of political interest in governmental actions today. Why doubt it 160 years ago? Were they better people than we?
 
McClernand is pretty easy to understand. He was a much better general than Grant, and he knew it. Indeed, prettymuch every great "Grant" success (until mid-1863) is underpinned by a successful McClernand. The problem is largely one that McClernand expected to be acknowledged for his successes, whereas Grant wanted to take the credit for McClernand's successes. Indeed, without McClernand, Grant's career would have come to a shameful conclusion when he abandoned the field at Belmont, leaving a thousand Federals behind to be captured. McClernand went back to rescue them.

Something quite similar appears to be the case with Hooker in 1863/4. He wants to take the credit for his own achievements rather than letting his superiors do it.

The conflict with Rosecrans was also based around Grant wanting to take credit for Rosecrans' achievements, which Rosecrans characterised as “insatiable and conscienceless egotism.”

One has to ask oneself, is it that Grant was egotistical, or everyone else that came into conflict with him in this manner?
Actually, McClernand was not a better general. The problem with McClernand is that he was a glory hound, who not only wanted to be acknowledged for his own successes, but for others successes as well. Fellow division and corps commanders complained about McClernand trying to exaggerate his part in the battles. In '62-63 letters, Sherman described McClernand as "deceitful" and "unfit" and a politician "who looks to self-aggrandizement and is not scrupulous of the means" and "a dirty dog, consumed by a burning desire for personal renown."

The conflict with Rosecrans was based around Rosecrans always thinking he knew better than his superiors. In an 1863 letter, Sherman compared Rosecrans to Grant:
"Rosecrans may be Grant's superior in intellect, but not in sagacity, purity of character, and singleness of purpose. Rosecrans is selfish and vainglorious. Grant not a bit so. He would never appropriate the just fame of another.
...
I would rather serve under Grant than Rosecrans, for in an extended country like this any one of us may be worsted, Grant would stand by his friend, but Rosecrans would sacrifice his brother if he stood in the way of his popular renown."
Rosecrans had continuing chronic problems with his superiors. It wasn't just while serving under Grant.
 
Politics is the key in understanding why generals rose, fell or survived.
No one really doubts the role of political interest in governmental actions today. Why doubt it 160 years ago? Were they better people than we?
No one doubts that politics was involved to some extent. But job performance mattered more.
 
Does it matter what his war time record was or if he was mediocre during those battles that didn't make much of an impact? Who is keeping score? I think all those battles and operational maneuvers in the northern part of the south were pretty much to soften up the Confederacy for Sherman's March to the Sea, which was the coup de grâce. People want to grade generals for all the wrong reasons. Sherman gets an (A) because he knew what it took to defeat the Confederates, and he implemented it.


1). Sherman understood the slave owners psyche.

Sherman understood the very constitution of the southern elite, and he understood the very fundamental reason to why they wanted war. He knew the southern aristocracy was a patrician society with excess pride and their fundamentally reason for fighting was to protect their patrimony: slaves, land and mansions. Conversely, the average Confederate soldier's well being was never considered.

Sherman did not follow the conventional rules of war and fought an irregular war. He knew what it took to win:

Sherman is misunderstood by just about everyone, that's because he didn't follow the Marquess of Queensbury rules of boxing, he threw off the gloves. He demolished the heartland of the Southern aristocrats: their land and slaves—and left them impotent and discredited before their helpless women and children. Facing little opposition once they left Atlanta, Sherman’s men destroyed the very infrastructure that supported slavery and upheld the slaveholding elites—plantations, communications, factories, and government facilities. Southern military officers put great capital in the idea of the sanctity of the Southern homeland. They deemed themselves great raiders and marauders, who harassed fixed garrisons and terrorized timid populations. Sherman, however, gave the Confederacy the raid of its life. The central objective could be summed up quite simply: Freeing the unfree and humiliating the arrogant.

Sherman was the only one who could have done the job:

Sherman goes down in history similar to a Greek tragic hero, like Ajax. He was the only general of the entire CW who could have done the job to end the war. But that's never discussed. His racism, nervous breakdown and his minor battle record are discussed.


Yes. But it is not well known that the irony of it all is that it took a racist to put down some virulent racists.
Not a big achievement, as Sherman and his 60,000 plus troops had only Joe Wheeler's small force of troopers to contend with. While Thomas had The Army Of Tennessee to deal with.
 
I think people overestimate the sway Lincoln had over the Republican Party in 1864.
It was not certain - even to Lincoln- that he would be renominated much less re-elected.
Fremont was briefly a third party candidate until he withdrew in order to have a unified vote against McClellan. Interestingly Montgomery Blair - increasingly conservative- was almost immediately replaced by William Dennison - a radical of sorts- as Postmaster General the most patronage filled cabinet position.
Rosecrans - there he is again- was sought out by
Greeley in 1863 to replace Lincoln. He flatly turned down the proposal. Washburne - based on letters he received ( available able on line via LOC site) - thought about pushing Grant in 1864 (In one latter Washburne is advised to hold Grant until 1868 and opt for the Post Office instead.)

Rosecrans actually had good relations with a variety of people in Washington - Benjamin Wade for example who helped him in trying to discover the truth about Grant at Iuka. Stanton was the main one he had problems with. Does one really believe Stanton knew the situation in Tennessee better than Rosecrans? When Montgomery Meigs arrived in Tennessee he was surprised at how the obstacles were so different from what officials in Washington thought they were.
( Documentation for all these points in my book.)

Had Atlanta not been taken by Election Day there is a very good chance Lincoln would not have won. Atlanta’s fall is a product of the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns and the battle for the permanent possession of Chattanooga - Chickamauga.
What has this to do with Sherman?
Several things I think.
Sherman took over after the hard work had been done in Tennessee.
He was then given command of a very large army and basically flanked his way into Atlanta. Also Sherman is tied to Grant. Any discussion of Sherman must involve Grant.
I think quoting Sherman about Rosecrans is a bit disingenuous. Is he really going to criticize Grant?
 
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