Longstreet Longstreet was a "defensive" General

Longstreet operated both defensively and a subordinate general. His attacks at 2nd Manassas and the Wilderness were were similar to Chickamauga in that the Union army had been weekend prior to the attack, and he consistently arrived fashionably late. At Gettysburg, the terrain was undesirable along with plenty of Union artillery, not unlike Malvern Hill. His tardiness somewhat carried over to petulance as Gettysburg progressed.
The four assaults I've mentioned are regarded by multiple, qualified military analysts and qualified historians as well-planned and well-executed. Let's apply this level of scrutiny to that legendary flank attack that so many have celebrated over the decades at Chancellorsville. It was executed more slowly than should have been the case - ulimately resulting in a reconnaissance in the dark that led to the mortal wounding of its designer. It was discovered early on but was completely misinterpreted as a retreat. While it wended its way slowly northward it was observed on multiple occasions but the reports sent back to XI Corps HQ were simply rejected. And when it finally was launched, it struck from the west against a south-facing Union line.
 
The four assaults I've mentioned are regarded by multiple, qualified military analysts and qualified historians as well-planned and well-executed. Let's apply this level of scrutiny to that legendary flank attack that so many have celebrated over the decades at Chancellorsville. It was executed more slowly than should have been the case - ulimately resulting in a reconnaissance in the dark that led to the mortal wounding of its designer. It was discovered early on but was completely misinterpreted as a retreat. While it wended its way slowly northward it was observed on multiple occasions but the reports sent back to XI Corps HQ were simply rejected. And when it finally was launched, it struck from the west against a south-facing Union line.
100% agree with this. In fact while I believe Jackson was probably better operating independently and was a very good corps commander he also had his flaws. He didn't get along with subordinates (loved placing people under arrest), and he was not the best tactically. Having said that him and Longstreet were both as good as any commander during the war, and you are never going to find anyone perfect, just like I know Lee had his flaws, but I feel he was as good as any army commander during the war, just like Grant was. If we were going to make a list of outstanding corps commanders, Longstreet, Jackson, Thomas, and Hancock are probably in alot of people's top 5, and rightfully so. But when it came to the tactics on the offense or defense, Longstreet was 2nd to none.
 
I don't disagree about it being somewhat apples and oranges. Though he was pouting even on Day 2 to an extant. It's just when the attack got going he pushed it as hard as he could. When I say pouted and dragged his feet. I'm really thinking of two specifics.

1.) On day 2, Lee meets with Longstreet and goes over his original attack plan based on Johnston's faulty intelligence on the Union left flank. If i'm off on times on this please correct me anyone. Lee then leaves Longstreet to discuss his plans with Early. In the time while Lee is gone, Longstreet does nothing to prepare his troops to be ready to move out, knowing that he will be going south when Lee gets back. Even if Lee had later changed his mind Longstreet wasn't getting his men ready to move. Instead Lee gets back around 11:00 AM and Longstreet doesn't move out till 1:00. Part of the reason is Longstreet was waiting on Law, but he still could of started the march and had Law bring up the rear if necessary, any number of decisions could have hastened the start time. It then takes him nearly 3 hours to get his men into position, most of the march can be blamed on the guide (who's name is escaping me right now) who supposed knew the terrain but didn't. Longstreet gets into position and the Yankees are not where they thought they were, and then you have the Conference between Longstreet and Lee where the decision to change the attack to an echelon attack happens.

2.) On day 3 Lee's plan was much different than what actually happened. Lee planned for a dawn/early morning attack that coincided with Ewell's attack on Culp's Hill. Longstreet drags his feet and doesn't have his command ready for the assault. Instead he drags his feet hoping the attack gets cancelled. Because of this the attack is delayed and then there is no coordination between Ewell and Longstreet's attacks.
I strongly suggest reading Cory Pfarr's excellent 2019 book. He does a nice job of demolishing much of the concocted mythology generated after the war by Early, et al. that became some of the "accepted wisdom" regarding the supposed delay on July 2, etc.

The terrain and Union alignments on July and September 20 regarding an assault are most certainly "apples and oranges". Take a look at a good map of each.
 
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I strongly suggest reading Cory Pfarr's excellent 2019 book. He does a nice job of demolishing much of the concocted mythology generated after the war by Early, et al. that became some of the "accepted wisdom" regarding the supposed delay on July 2, etc.

The terrain and Union alignments on July and September 20 regarding an assault are most certainly "apples and oranges". Take a look at a good map of each.
I have not read Pfarr's book, though I'm not talking about about an early morning attack, that is a myth and I understand that. I'm talking specifically about the time between Lee meeting with Longstreet where the discussion about how to place McLaw's takes place which going by Pfanz, Bowden and Ward, and Wirt, I believe takes place around 9:00 in the morning. Clearly by having the discussion then, Longstreet couldn't have been ordered before that to be ready for a morning assault, however, he does know after that meeting that he will be the primary corps making the assault that day, and yet, in the couple of hours that Lee is gone to discuss things with Ewell, he does nothing to prepare his two divisions to move. Others have blamed him as well for the amount of time it took him to get into position once he did start marching, but that is mostly Johnston's fault as he was to direct the march, and led them into view of the signal corps on LRT, and instead of following Alexander's artillery path they backtracked costing them much time.
 
In all my readings Longstreet does seem salty throughout Days 2 and 3, but his fighting on Day 2 was well led, though if he had his troops to move when Lee returned from visiting with Ewell, they may have been able to get into position an hour or two earlier, and that may have made a difference as they were also running out of daylight during the assault.

Day 3 Longstreet pouted even worse, and didn't lead the assault with any vigor, again I'm not commenting on how successful it could or could not of been, but most agree Longstreet led with no energy behind it. I don't think this takes away from him overall as a commander. Over the course of the war Longstreet was as good as they came. All leaders had good and bad days.
He wasn't just salty but furious with Lee he had been planning the Gettysburg Campaign with Lee on a daily basis and according to Longstreet backed up with what Alexander said also who was pretty neutral when it came to his writing Lee completely ignored the plan and decided to fight a battle on ground of the enemies choosing for no apparent tactical gain.

This was totally opposite to what Lee had promised Longstreet which was to avoid contact with the enemy unless they could manoeuvre the enemy to attack them with good defensive ground.

Longstreet lost 1 division commander badly wounded four top notch brigade commanders dead and many of the ANV best men in a battle that should have never took place.

I'm going to put my cards on the table here and state I have never seen Lee as a great field commander to me he's more a figurehead who men would follow due to his noble demeanour and heritage , Longstreet and Jackson on the other hand I view as the best corps commanders of the war and Lee was lucky to have them.

Personally I think Longstreet had Lee's number but considering how popular Lee was with the men I doubt he was going to make waves with Lee or Davis but I certainly think in my opinion it was a major motivation for him to move west and work under Johnston or get his own command.
 
He wasn't just salty but furious with Lee he had been planning the Gettysburg Campaign with Lee on a daily basis and according to Longstreet backed up with what Alexander said also who was pretty neutral when it came to his writing Lee completely ignored the plan and decided to fight a battle on ground of the enemies choosing for no apparent tactical gain.

This was totally opposite to what Lee had promised Longstreet which was to avoid contact with the enemy unless they could manoeuvre the enemy to attack them with good defensive ground.

Longstreet lost 1 division commander badly wounded four top notch brigade commanders dead and many of the ANV best men in a battle that should have never took place.

I'm going to put my cards on the table here and state I have never seen Lee as a great field commander to me he's more a figurehead who men would follow due to his noble demeanour and heritage , Longstreet and Jackson on the other hand I view as the best corps commanders of the war and Lee was lucky to have them.

Personally I think Longstreet had Lee's number but considering how popular Lee was with the men I doubt he was going to make waves with Lee or Davis but I certainly think in my opinion it was a major motivation for him to move west and work under Johnston or get his own command.
Furious seems overblown to me, looking at the evidence. In fact in Wirt's biography of Longstreet, he presents three very convincing pieces of evidence that this was embelished by Longstreet long after Lee had died.

1.) In a letter to Louis Wigfall he basically supports the invasion, and implies that more troops should be supplied to give it a better chance for success. No where in the letter does he mention Lee agree to the tactical defensive.

2.) Lee is asked in 1868 if he ever consented to fighting a defensive battle, which he responds is preposterous. I do think he would have preferred that, and I will get into that in just a minute.

3.) In a 1873 letter to McLaws, Longstreet says his only objection to the invasion of the North was "the delay that extensive preparations for a campaing in the enemy's country would entail", again no mention of objecting to fighting any type of offensive action.

I think Lee, Longstreet, and everyone would prefer a defensive battle, but Gettysburg was a meeting engagement, and after day 1, Lee had the better of Meade's army, day 2 they were within a razor's edge of dislocating Meade's army, it would probably have been smarter not to attack on day 3, but knowing what they knew then, and what we know now is two separate things. Lee's plan for day 3, was also bungled from the start. He planned a dawn assault coordinated between Longstreet and Ewell, but Longstreet didn't have his command ready.

None of this takes away from how well Longstreet commanded his assault on Day 2 or that Day 3 was a longshot at best, it still doesn't excuse Longstreet for how he acted and behaved that day.

Just my 2 cents.
 
He wasn't just salty but furious with Lee he had been planning the Gettysburg Campaign with Lee on a daily basis and according to Longstreet backed up with what Alexander said also who was pretty neutral when it came to his writing Lee completely ignored the plan and decided to fight a battle on ground of the enemies choosing for no apparent tactical gain.

This was totally opposite to what Lee had promised Longstreet which was to avoid contact with the enemy unless they could manoeuvre the enemy to attack them with good defensive ground.

Longstreet lost 1 division commander badly wounded four top notch brigade commanders dead and many of the ANV best men in a battle that should have never took place.

I'm going to put my cards on the table here and state I have never seen Lee as a great field commander to me he's more a figurehead who men would follow due to his noble demeanour and heritage , Longstreet and Jackson on the other hand I view as the best corps commanders of the war and Lee was lucky to have them.

Personally I think Longstreet had Lee's number but considering how popular Lee was with the men I doubt he was going to make waves with Lee or Davis but I certainly think in my opinion it was a major motivation for him to move west and work under Johnston or get his own command.
I might not disagree with some of your points about Lee. Personally, I think much of the context for what Lee did at Gettysburg was a result of what happened at Fredericksburg and especially Chancellorsville. Keep in mind that even at Chancellorsville he had to be "talked down" from what would likely have been a bloody defeat on May 4 attacking Hooker's very strong defensive lines. He got away with a reckless splitting of his force in the presence of a much larger enemy at that battle and I'm not sure he fully understood that. Hooker should have been able to hammer Lee but pulled up short on April 30, allowed himself to get flanked on May 2 by ignoring the ample warnings, and then was concussed on May 3.
 
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I have not read Pfarr's book, though I'm not talking about about an early morning attack, that is a myth and I understand that. I'm talking specifically about the time between Lee meeting with Longstreet where the discussion about how to place McLaw's takes place which going by Pfanz, Bowden and Ward, and Wirt, I believe takes place around 9:00 in the morning. Clearly by having the discussion then, Longstreet couldn't have been ordered before that to be ready for a morning assault, however, he does know after that meeting that he will be the primary corps making the assault that day, and yet, in the couple of hours that Lee is gone to discuss things with Ewell, he does nothing to prepare his two divisions to move. Others have blamed him as well for the amount of time it took him to get into position once he did start marching, but that is mostly Johnston's fault as he was to direct the march, and led them into view of the signal corps on LRT, and instead of following Alexander's artillery path they backtracked costing them much time.
Fair points but I do think any of the "delay" analysis on July 2 is ambiguous and I don't think that affected what actually ended up happening.
 
Fair points but I do think any of the "delay" analysis on July 2 is ambiguous and I don't think that affected what actually ended up happening.
I would argue that if Longstreet starts his attack at 3:00 instead of 4:00 that extra hour daylight comes in extremely handy later on in the echelon attack. Many of the breakdowns in leadership happen at dusk, and while not the only reason, that extra hour would have been extremely helpful for the confederate cause on day 2.
 
I would argue that if Longstreet starts his attack at 3:00 instead of 4:00 that extra hour daylight comes in extremely handy later on in the echelon attack. Many of the breakdowns in leadership happen at dusk, and while not the only reason, that extra hour would have been extremely helpful for the confederate cause on day 2.
Maybe, maybe not. I can argue that things might have been different if it had started at 3:45 instead of 4. Maybe if Ewell's attack began sooner than it did, that would have changed things. And there's evidence that the attack on the Confederate right was not intended as an echelon attack. We can micro-manage just about every incident in the war. I don't think it alters the overall assessment of the attack.
 
Maybe, maybe not. I can argue that things might have been different if it had started at 3:45 instead of 4. Maybe if Ewell's attack began sooner than it did, that would have changed things. And there's evidence that the attack on the Confederate right was not intended as an echelon attack. We can micro-manage just about every incident in the war. I don't think it alters the overall assessment of the attack.
Curious what evidence you have that it wasn't intended as an echelon attack. Almost every modern historian I've read has it as that. It wasn't obviously originally intended as that, but my understanding of the timetable is

8:00 AM Johnstson comes back from his faulty scout of the Union left wing
8 - 9:00 AM Lee has meeting with Longstreet, Hill, Hood, and McLaws where we get the flanking attack up the Emmitsburg road
9:00 - 11:00 AM Lee meets with Ewell to discuss plan to coordinate with Longstreets attack
11:00 AM Lee returns, and Longstreet asks to wait on Law's brigade
1:00 PM Longstreet moves out
3:00 - 3:15ish Hood / McLaws begin moving into position and notice Union III Corps is in there way.
3:15 - 3:30 McLaws and Hood sent repeated messages to Longstreet that the predicted attack won't work.
3:30 Lee comes on scene and him and Longstreet meet and echelon attack is decided.
4:15 Echelon attack begins. Each brigade begins to step off about every 15 minutes - Law and Robertson both attack at same time.
4:20 - Benning goes into support Law
4:45 - 5:00 Anderson launches his attack
5:30 - 6:00 Kershaw goes in Supported by Semmes
6:00 - 6:15 Barksdale goes in and attacks up Emmitsburg Road / Woof attacks south to support Kershaw
6:00 - 6:30 - Wilcox, Perry, and Wright all goes in one shortly after the other continuing the echelon assault.
6:30 - 7:00 Assault breaks down as Mahone and Posey do not really engage, and Pender is mortally wounded.
7:00 - Johnson begins his assault on Culp's Hill
7:30 - Anderson, Semmes, and Kershaw are making the final attack on LRT
7:30 - Avery and Hays make there night attack on Cemetery Hill.

This is my close approximation from reading different sources as to the timetable of Day 2. Some of this is off top of my head, as I'm not at home to check my sources so may not be 100% accurate.
 
Curious what evidence you have that it wasn't intended as an echelon attack. Almost every modern historian I've read has it as that. It wasn't obviously originally intended as that, but my understanding of the timetable is

8:00 AM Johnstson comes back from his faulty scout of the Union left wing
8 - 9:00 AM Lee has meeting with Longstreet, Hill, Hood, and McLaws where we get the flanking attack up the Emmitsburg road
9:00 - 11:00 AM Lee meets with Ewell to discuss plan to coordinate with Longstreets attack
11:00 AM Lee returns, and Longstreet asks to wait on Law's brigade
1:00 PM Longstreet moves out
3:00 - 3:15ish Hood / McLaws begin moving into position and notice Union III Corps is in there way.
3:15 - 3:30 McLaws and Hood sent repeated messages to Longstreet that the predicted attack won't work.
3:30 Lee comes on scene and him and Longstreet meet and echelon attack is decided.
4:15 Echelon attack begins. Each brigade begins to step off about every 15 minutes - Law and Robertson both attack at same time.
4:20 - Benning goes into support Law
4:45 - 5:00 Anderson launches his attack
5:30 - 6:00 Kershaw goes in Supported by Semmes
6:00 - 6:15 Barksdale goes in and attacks up Emmitsburg Road / Woof attacks south to support Kershaw
6:00 - 6:30 - Wilcox, Perry, and Wright all goes in one shortly after the other continuing the echelon assault.
6:30 - 7:00 Assault breaks down as Mahone and Posey do not really engage, and Pender is mortally wounded.
7:00 - Johnson begins his assault on Culp's Hill
7:30 - Anderson, Semmes, and Kershaw are making the final attack on LRT
7:30 - Avery and Hays make there night attack on Cemetery Hill.

This is my close approximation from reading different sources as to the timetable of Day 2. Some of this is off top of my head, as I'm not at home to check my sources so may not be 100% accurate.
There's no question that it ended up being an echelon attack essentially by brigades. The question is whether it was intended to unfold that way. The plan was for Mclaws and Hood to drive up the Emmitsburg Road, rolling up what Lee thought was the Union left flank, with Anderson attacking from the center. But they discovered Sickles had effectively moved his III Corps up to the area of the road, which changed the attack plan and resulted in the way it developed. Two other asides: Lee was involved with Longstreet's original 'delay" and Ewell's intended demonstration on the left got underway late - that had nothing to do with Longstreet.
 
This is my first post on this board. I have a very healthy respect for Lee, Longstreet, and Jackson, and feel like we do too much of one better than the other. From my readings and studying of Longstreet, he was probably one of the most tactically sound Corps commanders on either side during the war. I don't know that he was as brilliant in independent operations as say Jackson, but was probably better tactically in organizing his men during a defense or assault. If you gave Longstreet a order he was usually meticulous in how he carried it out.

The quick assessment is always of him as a defensive general, but that I think that comes primarily from his disagreements with Gettysburg and that he wanted a defensive campaign. But I can't think of any commander during the war who carried out more large scale successful attacks then Longstreet. I want to just touch on these to show his flexibility.

2nd Manassas - probably the least tactically efficient of the 4, but also earlier in the war. The attack was somewhat piecemeal compared to later attacks, but still, he launched an attack trying to coordinate 5 divisions (another reason I think Lee thought the 2 Corps structure was so unwieldy, thats alot of units to coordinate in a battle) against Pope's left wing, and utterly crushed Pope, with better coordination they may have bagged the whole lot.

Gettysburg - Not going to discuss day 3 here, just looking at Day 2 for now, some accuse him of being slow, but I can't blame him too much, I do think if he had followed Alexander's artillery that would have allowed the attack to start sooner, and given more daylight for when the echelon moved onto Hill's corps. But Longstreet launched a well timed echelon attack. That drew in major Union reinforcements, and I'm a believer that if Anderson uses his whole division, and Pender doesn't get injured, that the combination of those attacks with Early's attacks on cemetary hill would have undone the Union positions that day. Longstreet times Barksdale and Wofford's attacks to roll up the III corps position. Again he's shown success with a massive flank attack at 2nd Manassas and a Echelon attack on Day 2 at Gettysburg.

Chickamauga - Maybe one of the best frontal attacks of the war. Obviously the wooded terrain aids in protecting the attacking troops from artillery fire, as well as the fact that Woods division pulls out of the line, but the fact of the matter is Longstreet amasses in a much similar manner to Upton at Spotsylvania the idea of depth of attack. Amassing an 8 brigade attack force in 5 lines. I believe he learned from day 3 at gettysburg that depth of attack was what was needed.

Lastly, the Wilderness - Longstreet meets Hancocks II corps attack head on and stops it with Field and Kershaw's division, and then uses the railroad cut to launch a hard flanking attack that almost stops Grant in his tracks. If not for him getting injured the Confederates may have taken the Brock road and forced Grant back across the Rappahannock river.

I think Longstreet gets mistreated because of the attacks against him post war, though he himself wasn't always fair in his postwar writings either. I rank him as one of the best Corps commanders in the war, I don't know that he would have been successful in Army command, but I would have been curious to see it play out over Bragg and Johnston, I don't think he would have done any worse than Johnston. I won't say he was better than Jackson or vice versa they were both good in their own rights. I feel like it's very similar to the Grant and Lee debates. They were both probably the two best commanders during the war, and it's really a personal preference who's best.
Appreciate your input and a great first post. I can agree with your assessment of Longstreet. I too believe that Gettysburg and post-war allegations created this "defensive only" side of Longstreet. I also think his offensive battles/victories are overshadowed by Jackson, the Valley Campaign, Chancellorsville, etc. Not saying that Jackson wasn't effective on the offensive, but when examined, the charges and battles you mentioned above are some of the greatest of the war. Interesting how Longstreet gets criticized for July 2nd, yet he went on to say about that day: "the best three hours fighting ever done by any troops on any battlefield"
 
This seems to come up often in discussions. Many say Longstreet was only effective while entrenched and on the defensive. I'll read certain articles and see "Longstreet" followed by the word "defense". When I think about Longstreet's performance in the CW... I believe he performed just as well on the offensive as General Jackson and other commanders.

Was Longstreet a "defensive" General?

I often wondered if the "defensive" title came from the aftermath of the Gettysburg campaign and his reputation years after that battle...
To some degree, Longstreet's defensive brand is his own doing. His autobiography and some interviews I've read quote him as saying that he was against Lee's Gettysburg campaign unless Lee could bring on a defensive fight for the AoNV.
 
Appreciate your input and a great first post. I can agree with your assessment of Longstreet. I too believe that Gettysburg and post-war allegations created this "defensive only" side of Longstreet. I also think his offensive battles/victories are overshadowed by Jackson, the Valley Campaign, Chancellorsville, etc. Not saying that Jackson wasn't effective on the offensive, but when examined, the charges and battles you mentioned above are some of the greatest of the war. Interesting how Longstreet gets criticized for July 2nd, yet he went on to say about that day: "the best three hours fighting ever done by any troops on any battlefield"
Just my opinion, but I'll put Longstreet's overall tactical record up against Jackson's any old day. People tend to confuse the operational level with the tactical. Jackson's reputation is built largely on operational maneuver, independent or semi-independent, with the Valley Campaign, the Second Bull Run Campaign, and the Maryland Campaign setting the tone. As I've pointed out in too many threads, he was consistently mediocre at the tactical level, demonstrated in a number of battles - First Kernstown, McDowell, Port Republic, the Seven Days, Cedar Mountain, Brawner's Farm, 2 BR Day 2, Chantilly, and Fredericksburg (the nearly fatal "gap"). Against this, Longstreet has a limited sample at the operational level - Knoxville - which without doubt did not go well. (I discount Suffolk because that had limited objectives and operational maneuver really wasn't a central feature). As for tactical performance, Longstreet had a higher percentage of combats where he showed greater skill at planning and execution. As for the "defensive" issue, too many people IMHO have taken Longstreet's views about the proper handling of the invasion of Pennsylvania and the decision on July 3 and turned him into some robot who had a McClellan-like aversion to being aggressive when it made sense. On the invasion and July 3, he was right, by the way. One can be an officer who knows how and when to pack a punch without being stupid enough to order banzai attacks.
 
To some degree, Longstreet's defensive brand is his own doing. His autobiography and some interviews I've read quote him as saying that he was against Lee's Gettysburg campaign unless Lee could bring on a defensive fight for the AoNV.
Of course, that requires somebody to simply ignore facts - the assaults at 2 BR, Gettysburg July 2, Chickamauga, and the Wilderness. A lot of this still goes back to an inordinate fascination with one battle in Pennsylvania and the Longstreet Defensive Doll invented by Shaara, Burns, and Maxwell for simplistic public consumption.
 
Just my opinion, but I'll put Longstreet's overall tactical record up against Jackson's any old day. People tend to confuse the operational level with the tactical. Jackson's reputation is built largely on operational maneuver, independent or semi-independent, with the Valley Campaign, the Second Bull Run Campaign, and the Maryland Campaign setting the tone. As I've pointed out in too many threads, he was consistently mediocre at the tactical level, demonstrated in a number of battles - First Kernstown, McDowell, Port Republic, the Seven Days, Cedar Mountain, Brawner's Farm, 2 BR Day 2, Chantilly, and Fredericksburg (the nearly fatal "gap"). Against this, Longstreet has a limited sample at the operational level - Knoxville - which without doubt did not go well. (I discount Suffolk because that had limited objectives and operational maneuver really wasn't a central feature). As for tactical performance, Longstreet had a higher percentage of combats where he showed greater skill at planning and execution. As for the "defensive" issue, too many people IMHO have taken Longstreet's views about the proper handling of the invasion of Pennsylvania and the decision on July 3 and turned him into some robot who had a McClellan-like aversion to being aggressive when it made sense. On the invasion and July 3, he was right, by the way. One can be an officer who knows how and when to pack a punch without being stupid enough to order banzai attacks.
Agree with this for the most part. Jackson and Longstreet's strengths really actually complimented each other well. Lee could use Jackson as a vanguard to move out and disrupt and deceive the enemy while he brought Longstreet up to deliver the final blow. Because of Jackson falling at Chancellorsville and the fact it was a massive assault, many have the view of Jackson as this offensive wizard. But in reality just like Longstreet his record shows successes and failures at both. He was really good (minus Peninsula Campaign) at getting his men into battle, but his tactical decisions weren't always the best, but he was aggressive and tenacious. He held out multiple days against Pope at 2nd Bull Run, at Fredericksburg there was the tactical flaw in AP Hill's part of the line, but at the same time he acted promptly like a good commander should once there was a breach, and he kept reserves in place if he needed them. We also like to hold all commanders to perfection, or to what happened in Napoleonic times, but even those guys were flawed and had good days and bad.

I will nitpick a bit. I think the invasion was the right move. I would argue that Davis should have supported it more then he did. The brigades of Corse, Jenkins, and Cooke should have been with the army, and there's an argument to make that you could have added a couple other brigades from Beauregard and Hill's commands in Virginia and North Carolina. On top of that the brigades they sent (Daniel, Davis, Pettigrew) were green and Lee had wanted his veteran brigades in their place. At the end of the day though, much of the disaster of the invasion goes back to the fact that Stuart did not provide the intelligence Lee needed to fight a successful campaign, and there is plenty of blame to share in that decision, but ultimately that was one of the biggest factors. Though I'm also a believer that day 2 was a close run thing. If Mahone, Posey, Lane, and Thomas move forward, there was not much left on Cemetary ridge besides artillery, and while that artillery would have done damage, those four brigades would have struck at almost exact same time as Avery and Hay's commands were hitting the north side of Cemetary hill. That's almost 7300 men that would of been making an attack against a weakened portion of the line. In fact Avery and Hays are thrown back by reinforcements that had been used against Wright, Posey, and Wilcox. Those reinforcements wouldn't have been available if Posey, Mahone, Lane, and Thomas go forward. Obviously a lot of what if's but it put's credence to Lee's lament that the army wasn't properly coordinated that day, and Lee can take part of that blame, as does, Hill and Anderson. Longstreet on the other hand conducted his part of the attack with great skill. And inflicted more casualties then he took.
 
Agree with this for the most part. Jackson and Longstreet's strengths really actually complimented each other well. Lee could use Jackson as a vanguard to move out and disrupt and deceive the enemy while he brought Longstreet up to deliver the final blow. Because of Jackson falling at Chancellorsville and the fact it was a massive assault, many have the view of Jackson as this offensive wizard. But in reality just like Longstreet his record shows successes and failures at both. He was really good (minus Peninsula Campaign) at getting his men into battle, but his tactical decisions weren't always the best, but he was aggressive and tenacious. He held out multiple days against Pope at 2nd Bull Run, at Fredericksburg there was the tactical flaw in AP Hill's part of the line, but at the same time he acted promptly like a good commander should once there was a breach, and he kept reserves in place if he needed them. We also like to hold all commanders to perfection, or to what happened in Napoleonic times, but even those guys were flawed and had good days and bad.

I will nitpick a bit. I think the invasion was the right move. I would argue that Davis should have supported it more then he did. The brigades of Corse, Jenkins, and Cooke should have been with the army, and there's an argument to make that you could have added a couple other brigades from Beauregard and Hill's commands in Virginia and North Carolina. On top of that the brigades they sent (Daniel, Davis, Pettigrew) were green and Lee had wanted his veteran brigades in their place. At the end of the day though, much of the disaster of the invasion goes back to the fact that Stuart did not provide the intelligence Lee needed to fight a successful campaign, and there is plenty of blame to share in that decision, but ultimately that was one of the biggest factors. Though I'm also a believer that day 2 was a close run thing. If Mahone, Posey, Lane, and Thomas move forward, there was not much left on Cemetary ridge besides artillery, and while that artillery would have done damage, those four brigades would have struck at almost exact same time as Avery and Hay's commands were hitting the north side of Cemetary hill. That's almost 7300 men that would of been making an attack against a weakened portion of the line. In fact Avery and Hays are thrown back by reinforcements that had been used against Wright, Posey, and Wilcox. Those reinforcements wouldn't have been available if Posey, Mahone, Lane, and Thomas go forward. Obviously a lot of what if's but it put's credence to Lee's lament that the army wasn't properly coordinated that day, and Lee can take part of that blame, as does, Hill and Anderson. Longstreet on the other hand conducted his part of the attack with great skill. And inflicted more casualties then he took.
Agree with much of this. I do disagree on the point about Jackson getting his troops into battle. He actually failed at that at both Cedar Mountain and Brawner's Farm. At both he had a significant numerical advantage but simply failed to exploit it. As for the gap at Fredericksburg, he was fortunate that the attack from the Union left was under the "control" of Franklin and that Reynolds also failed to exploit the gap. Those facts - instead of some brilliant reaction by Stonewall - played a significant role in the result. As for Chancellorsville, even Jackson's flank attack was not that well-executed. It took longer than it should have to get in position and the movement was discovered fairly early in the process. A competent opponent would have taken advantage of the time to change dispositions to meet the attack. I certainly agree that all these guys had "good days and bad" but I think it's fair to assess their performance using a sufficient amount of data. And while you're correct that it's easy to hold them to "perfection", it's also easy to elevate them to that status. I think it's fair to say that over the many decades Longstreet has been subjected to far more "scrutiny" than Jackson.
 
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