Biggest mistake of the war

the confederacy experienced an almost continuous retreat of southern armies and permanent loss of territory all through that war.
Control of some areas went back and forth during the war. This happened in just about every Confederate state. When Sherman left Atlanta he didn't leave a garrison to control the place. Confederates re-occupied the city. And didn't Richard Taylor regain lost territory in Louisiana?
 
If we assume the South did not start the war in the expectation of the above events, then they must have been confident that no matter the advantages possessed by their larger more developed adversary, those that they did have was sufficient to win their war for independence. If so, then the events of the war shows pretty clearly I think, those advantages were not sufficient, i.e., they underperformed in achieving what was expected of them, i.e., Southern Independence.
It is my opinion that the key strategic miscalculations made by the decision makers in the South were:


1) A miscalculation of how long the war effort was likely to be sustained by their enemy.
This is a miscalculation they had in common with the Union. Both sides thought the war would be short and that they would win it; both were incorrect.
2) A miscalculation of how likely foreign intervention (in line with US independence in the 1770s-1780s) was.


Aside from this, however, I also want to point out that it seems plausible to me that the Southern decision makers could have had a probability estimate of how likely the following outcomes were:

- The North lets them go, as suggested by e.g. Winfield Scott
- A short war followed by Confederate independence
- A long war followed by Confederate independence
- Defeat

And that they could have compared those to the likely outcome without independence:
- The North continues to do what the South feels is imposing on their way of life
- The North lets the South do fundmentally what it wants

And decided that, all told, they'd rather fight than not. We know throughout history that revolts have come up in conditions that were felt to be intolerable (there's one in Poland in 1863 for example) and we shouldn't ignore that the same thing was going on from the Southern perspective just because their idea of what was intolerable includes "infringing on slavery".
 
It is my opinion that the key strategic miscalculations made by the decision makers in the South were:


1) A miscalculation of how long the war effort was likely to be sustained by their enemy.
This is a miscalculation they had in common with the Union. Both sides thought the war would be short and that they would win it; both were incorrect.
2) A miscalculation of how likely foreign intervention (in line with US independence in the 1770s-1780s) was.

100% agree with this.
 
I know others have studied this more than I have, but the reading I've done so far makes me think that the cotton embargo was a miscalculation. Trying to strongarm the British and European powers into intervening doesn't strike me as that feasible in retrospect. I wonder whether an appeal to self-interest was the more effective strategy. An independent southern nation might have been seen as a means to limit the growth of American power and competitiveness. Maybe strengthening an independent confederacy might have been useful in that respect, if the breakaway nation could have proven itself in a more sustained way on the battlefield.

ARB
The problem for the Confedracy was there was far more British trade with the North then the South. There was a major drought in the Ukraine in the early part of the ACW and we have at least on thread in it. King Corn was far more important then King Cotton until at least Summer 1863 . By the summer of 1863 the UK was buying cotton from Union controlled Louisiana and the Seaward Island's of South Carolina as well of course from Egypt and British India. So there was never a serious need by the UK to recognize the Confedracy.
Led
 
I know others have studied this more than I have, but the reading I've done so far makes me think that the cotton embargo was a miscalculation. Trying to strongarm the British and European powers into intervening doesn't strike me as that feasible in retrospect. I wonder whether an appeal to self-interest was the more effective strategy. An independent southern nation might have been seen as a means to limit the growth of American power and competitiveness. Maybe strengthening an independent confederacy might have been useful in that respect, if the breakaway nation could have proven itself in a more sustained way on the battlefield.

ARB
The problem for the Confedracy was there was far more British trade with the North then the South. There was a major drought in the Ukraine in the early part of the ACW and we have at least on thread in it. King Corn was far more important then King Cotton until at least Summer 1863 . By the summer of 1863 the UK was buying cotton from Union controlled Louisiana and the Seaward Island's of South Carolina as well of course from Egypt and British India. So there was never a serious need by the UK to recognize the
It's not a matter of being correct, it is a matter of how one views military prowess. The Union won, so the manner and the reasons why they won is irrelevant. Everything else after that is theory and doesn't have much meaning or importance. Understand that the how and the why is a matter of a means to an end, period. Nobody on this board witnessed anything anecdotally anything, so what you read is nothing but theory. Nobody is an expert on war theory, so what you read is an opinion or a what if scenario. Anyone can grade a military's war performance in any manner they choose and determine war prowess through the metric they choose, like using a median and the metrics they choose to measure whether an army did poorly, mediocre or outstanding.

I choose to use my infantry experience and education as a median to grade the Civil War war performance, especially how ground wars were/are conducted. I think the Confederates underperformed because they had the advantages to win but squandered it: dug in era where being fortified was precedent, knew the terrain and had a spy network that tracked the Union's movements. Incorporate the fact the south had plenty of military institutions People who never experienced that have a difficult time understanding what I am trying to convey, and definitely don't understand how advantageous that was in that time of war.

Insert your purported term 'vastly superior army' in conjunction with the above-mentioned advantages and they still lost. All that statement does is corroborate my theory that the Confederates underperformed. Considering all those advantages the Confederates should have won or lasted way longer than four years and didn't, so they underperformed or the Union overperformed. Incorporate the superior numbers theory and yet the Confederates had a higher battlefield casualty rate. A vastly superior army with all those advantages should have never had that high of a casualty rate, nor should they have surrendered in four years. This is just a introduction to what I believe, and there's more but I'll refrain for now. I do believe that the Confederates lacked the man power to hold long trenches in order to have a long flank, but that unrealistic deference people have for the Confederates makes that theory implausible. .

Saphroneth never experienced war on any front, so he doesn't know from an anecdotal standpoint how war strategies are implemented nor does he understand the advantages and disadvantages of operations and tactical movements to win a war or to measure anything outside primitive European wars. He plays a Civil War theory game backed by formulas.

He is inspired by "sabermetrics" to grade war performances based on obsolete European wars and applies it to the CW. Sabermetrics is the intense study and analysis of baseball performance, using player statistics and compiled mathematical formulas and equations. It’s complicated stuff, not for the fainthearted or math-challenged. He uses the same formulas to estimate war performance. For an example, let's say we are to measure Robert E. Lee's war performance from a sabermetric standpoint.

First we would have to go back in history or use a modern general as the metric. Let's say Napoleon is our metric to measure if Lee was a poor, mediocre or great general. If you come up with a reliable dataset and insert the metrics you would like to use as a median to made a general great: strategy, tactics, wins and losses, total forces given to a commander, then compare the commanders. Sample of battle data scraped and processed into data frame. Then constructed a linear model from that sample of battles. For each battle, separate combatants’ forces into infantry, cavalry, artillery, and navy. Then you could then weight a general’s numerical advantage or disadvantage compared to their adversary, and better isolate the general’s ability as a tactician. That resulting model would be surprisingly conservative in its weights, suggesting that raw soldier quantities have a relatively small effect compared to other factors such as terrain or technology, which further research could investigate in more detail. You can do this thing with casualties, brigades, leadership and so on. You can use any median and an metrics to come up with your own assessment come up a conclusion. Well, if you use those metrics Lee was a below average general., compared to Napoleon. I personally believe Lee was an above average general. I don't believe he was great, but definitely above average. Comparing Lee to Napoleon using using formulas and those metrics Lee was a terrible general. I don't believe that one. I hope you get my point?

I'm not knocking anyone, and I am not saying anyone is correct. I'm just trying to show how we are viewing war prowess. He didn't prove anything, he just used some theories backed by math formulas to present some hypothetical scenario, and I personally don't buy his method because it is not reality. You can, I'm not trying to alter your thinking. I'm using my own experience in conjunction with my own type of math to come up with a conclusion. I stand by me previous statements: the Confederates underperformed and had all the battlefield advantages and still lost, and lost badly. Also, had a higher battlefield KIA percentage as well. And lost 100% of their territory and never had a stronghold on except for the Richmond-Washington DC corridor that eventually collapsed. That's how I measure war prowess.
I will have to respectfully disagree with the premise the Confederacy should have won. The Confedracy was doomed from the beginning.
1. The Confedrate economy is dependent on exports and slaves.
A. If the Union offers freedom and food to the slaves then they will escape their owners if possible which is what happened.
B. The British more then aptly proved in the ARW and the War of 1812 that slaves will fight for their freedom if given an opportunity to do so. Why the Confedrate leaders were to dense to realize this is a mystery.
C. Agricultural exports are heavy and bulky and require big slow ships. Small fast blockade runners to Carribean ports won't provide enough revenue to support the war effort. A nation dependant on maritime trade needs a navy big enough to safeguard it's trade routes and that was a bridge to far for the Confedracy.
2. The American South is terribly divided by race and class. Sixty percent of the South's population is white and deeply hates the forty percent of the population that is not white. That means for I e the Confederate Army is effectively reduced by forty percent from what it could be. The Confedracy will simply run out of military aged white males that can perform as soldiers.
At least ten percent of the available white Southern men ( 104k) will enlist in the Union Army not good for the Confedracy.
In civil wars the smaller side looses if it can't get foreign miltary intervention and the ACW is not an exception to the rule.
Leftyhunter
 
Control of some areas went back and forth during the war. This happened in just about every Confederate state. When Sherman left Atlanta he didn't leave a garrison to control the place. Confederates re-occupied the city. And didn't Richard Taylor regain lost territory in Louisiana?
I think the statement in question is correct in relation to the whole war. However, I will rephrase it if you want, to 'never permanently regained any lost territory' .
 
It is my opinion that the key strategic miscalculations made by the decision makers in the South were:


1) A miscalculation of how long the war effort was likely to be sustained by their enemy.
This is a miscalculation they had in common with the Union. Both sides thought the war would be short and that they would win it; both were incorrect.
2) A miscalculation of how likely foreign intervention (in line with US independence in the 1770s-1780s) was.


Aside from this, however, I also want to point out that it seems plausible to me that the Southern decision makers could have had a probability estimate of how likely the following outcomes were:

- The North lets them go, as suggested by e.g. Winfield Scott
- A short war followed by Confederate independence
- A long war followed by Confederate independence
- Defeat

And that they could have compared those to the likely outcome without independence:
- The North continues to do what the South feels is imposing on their way of life
- The North lets the South do fundmentally what it wants

And decided that, all told, they'd rather fight than not. We know throughout history that revolts have come up in conditions that were felt to be intolerable (there's one in Poland in 1863 for example) and we shouldn't ignore that the same thing was going on from the Southern perspective just because their idea of what was intolerable includes "infringing on slavery".
Certainly the southern leaders did not indulge in much precise analytical rigor in deciding for war. If they had, I believe they would have come up with a reading not unlike Sherman's well known analysis of the South's war for independence and written at the very beginning of the War.

As an aside, most southerners seems to have been familiar with the American Revolution only and were not aware that historically, , most revolts ended very badly.
 
I know others have studied this more than I have, but the reading I've done so far makes me think that the cotton embargo was a miscalculation. Trying to strongarm the British and European powers into intervening doesn't strike me as that feasible in retrospect. I wonder whether an appeal to self-interest was the more effective strategy. An independent southern nation might have been seen as a means to limit the growth of American power and competitiveness. Maybe strengthening an independent confederacy might have been useful in that respect, if the breakaway nation could have proven itself in a more sustained way on the battlefield.

ARB
The problem for the Confedracy was there was far more British trade with the North then the South. There was a major drought in the Ukraine in the early part of the ACW and we have at least on thread in it. King Corn was far more important then King Cotton until at least Summer 1863 . By the summer of 1863 the UK was buying cotton from Union controlled Louisiana and the Seaward Island's of South Carolina as well of course from Egypt and British India. So there was never a serious need by the UK to recognize the
It's not a matter of being correct, it is a matter of how one views military prowess. The Union won, so the manner and the reasons why they won is irrelevant. Everything else after that is theory and doesn't have much meaning or importance. Understand that the how and the why is a matter of a means to an end, period. Nobody on this board witnessed anything anecdotally anything, so what you read is nothing but theory. Nobody is an expert on war theory, so what you read is an opinion or a what if scenario. Anyone can grade a military's war performance in any manner they choose and determine war prowess through the metric they choose, like using a median and the metrics they choose to measure whether an army did poorly, mediocre or outstanding.

I choose to use my infantry experience and education as a median to grade the Civil War war performance, especially how ground wars were/are conducted. I think the Confederates underperformed because they had the advantages to win but squandered it: dug in era where being fortified was precedent, knew the terrain and had a spy network that tracked the Union's movements. Incorporate the fact the south had plenty of military institutions People who never experienced that have a difficult time understanding what I am trying to convey, and definitely don't understand how advantageous that was in that time of war.

Insert your purported term 'vastly superior army' in conjunction with the above-mentioned advantages and they still lost. All that statement does is corroborate my theory that the Confederates underperformed. Considering all those advantages the Confederates should have won or lasted way longer than four years and didn't, so they underperformed or the Union overperformed. Incorporate the superior numbers theory and yet the Confederates had a higher battlefield casualty rate. A vastly superior army with all those advantages should have never had that high of a casualty rate, nor should they have surrendered in four years. This is just a introduction to what I believe, and there's more but I'll refrain for now. I do believe that the Confederates lacked the man power to hold long trenches in order to have a long flank, but that unrealistic deference people have for the Confederates makes that theory implausible. .

Saphroneth never experienced war on any front, so he doesn't know from an anecdotal standpoint how war strategies are implemented nor does he understand the advantages and disadvantages of operations and tactical movements to win a war or to measure anything outside primitive European wars. He plays a Civil War theory game backed by formulas.

He is inspired by "sabermetrics" to grade war performances based on obsolete European wars and applies it to the CW. Sabermetrics is the intense study and analysis of baseball performance, using player statistics and compiled mathematical formulas and equations. It’s complicated stuff, not for the fainthearted or math-challenged. He uses the same formulas to estimate war performance. For an example, let's say we are to measure Robert E. Lee's war performance from a sabermetric standpoint.

First we would have to go back in history or use a modern general as the metric. Let's say Napoleon is our metric to measure if Lee was a poor, mediocre or great general. If you come up with a reliable dataset and insert the metrics you would like to use as a median to made a general great: strategy, tactics, wins and losses, total forces given to a commander, then compare the commanders. Sample of battle data scraped and processed into data frame. Then constructed a linear model from that sample of battles. For each battle, separate combatants’ forces into infantry, cavalry, artillery, and navy. Then you could then weight a general’s numerical advantage or disadvantage compared to their adversary, and better isolate the general’s ability as a tactician. That resulting model would be surprisingly conservative in its weights, suggesting that raw soldier quantities have a relatively small effect compared to other factors such as terrain or technology, which further research could investigate in more detail. You can do this thing with casualties, brigades, leadership and so on. You can use any median and an metrics to come up with your own assessment come up a conclusion. Well, if you use those metrics Lee was a below average general., compared to Napoleon. I personally believe Lee was an above average general. I don't believe he was great, but definitely above average. Comparing Lee to Napoleon using using formulas and those metrics Lee was a terrible general. I don't believe that one. I hope you get my point?

I'm not knocking anyone, and I am not saying anyone is correct. I'm just trying to show how we are viewing war prowess. He didn't prove anything, he just used some theories backed by math formulas to present some hypothetical scenario, and I personally don't buy his method because it is not reality. You can, I'm not trying to alter your thinking. I'm using my own experience in conjunction with my own type of math to come up with a conclusion. I stand by me previous statements: the Confederates underperformed and had all the battlefield advantages and still lost, and lost badly. Also, had a higher battlefield KIA percentage as well. And lost 100% of their territory and never had a stronghold on except for the Richmond-Washington DC corridor that eventually collapsed. That's how I measure war prowess.
I will have to respectfully disagree with the premise the Confederacy should have won. The Confedracy was doomed from the beginning.
1. The Confedrate economy is dependent on exports and slaves.
A. If the Union offers freedom and food to the slaves then they will escape their owners if possible which is what happened.
B. The British more then aptly proved in the ARW and the War of 1812 that slaves will fight for their freedom if given an opportunity to do so. Why the Confedrate leaders were to dense to realize this is a mystery.
C. Agricultural exports are heavy and bulky and require big slow ships. Small fast blockade runners to Carribean ports won't provide enough revenue to support the war effort. A nation dependant on maritime trade needs a navy big enough to safeguard it's trade routes and that was a bridge to far for the Confedracy.
2. The American South is terribly divided by race and class. Sixty percent of the South's population is white and deeply hates the forty percent of the population that is not white. That means for I e the Confederate Army is effectively reduced by forty percent from what it could be. The Confedracy will simply run out of military aged white males that can perform as soldiers.
At least ten percent of the available white Southern men ( 104k) will enlist in the Union Army not good for the Confedracy.
In civil wars the smaller side looses if it can't get foreign miltary intervention and the ACW is no
Control of some areas went back and forth during the war. This happened in just about every Confederate state. When Sherman left Atlanta he didn't leave a garrison to control the place. Confederates re-occupied the city. And didn't Richard Taylor regain lost territory in L

Certainly the southern leaders did not indulge in much precise analytical rigor in deciding for war. If they had, I believe they would have come up with a reading not unlike Sherman's well known analysis of the South's war for independence and written at the very beginning of the War.

As an aside, most southerners seems to have been familiar with the American Revolution only and were not aware that historically, , most revolts ended very badly.
The Confedrate leadership somehow completely forget about British Army Major Lord Dunsmore who sucessfully recruited escaped slaves into an effective infantry force.
Leftyhunter
 
Control of some areas went back and forth during the war. This happened in just about every Confederate state. When Sherman left Atlanta he didn't leave a garrison to control the place. Confederates re-occupied the city. And didn't Richard Taylor regain lost territory in Louisiana?

And? I just don't understand how you measure lost territory? The Confederates lost 100% of its territory permanently by 1865. What are you trying prove? Other than the Richmond-Washington D.C. corridor which eventually was lost where did the Confederates have a stronghold? For an example: Sherman "left" Atlanta on his free will and not by force, so its not like the Confederates regained it through military action. Atlanta was abandoned and left for the vultures, but the Confederates reoccupied it because there was nobody there to defend it. It was abandoned because it had no strategic value and Sherman's mission was to not to build garrison in a Atlanta. What purpose would Sherman have had building a garrison in Atlanta? What military importance was Louisiana? Can you show me by 1865 where the Confederates had a stronghold? No, they lost all their territory.
 
I will have to respectfully disagree with the premise the Confederacy should have won. The Confedracy was doomed from the beginning.
1. The Confedrate economy is dependent on exports and slaves.
A. If the Union offers freedom and food to the slaves then they will escape their owners if possible which is what happened.
B. The British more then aptly proved in the ARW and the War of 1812 that slaves will fight for their freedom if given an opportunity to do so. Why the Confedrate leaders were to dense to realize this is a mystery.
C. Agricultural exports are heavy and bulky and require big slow ships. Small fast blockade runners to Carribean ports won't provide enough revenue to support the war effort. A nation dependant on maritime trade needs a navy big enough to safeguard it's trade routes and that was a bridge to far for the Confedracy.
2. The American South is terribly divided by race and class. Sixty percent of the South's population is white and deeply hates the forty percent of the population that is not white. That means for I e the Confederate Army is effectively reduced by forty percent from what it could be. The Confedracy will simply run out of military aged white males that can perform as soldiers.
At least ten percent of the available white Southern men ( 104k) will enlist in the Union Army not good for the Confedracy.
In civil wars the smaller side looses if it can't get foreign miltary intervention and the ACW is no

Okay, but what I was trying convey in this thread has been lost. I was just giving my opinion in conjunction with my own experience on how ground wars were/are conducted, especially in that era that they should have lasted way longer and could have possible won. I get what you are saying, but the environment was ripe for the Confederates to inflict some serious damage, and they didn't. Judging things from all their advantages they had and could have capitalized but they tanked it. You are talking about a total war effort and I understand. But strictly from a strategic standpoint to win a war they underperformed, or the Union overperformed. There have been primitive and contemporary armies who were outgunned in every aspect but still won or lasted way longer. I personally believe the Confederates felt the same way. What army enters a war knowing that the best they could do was cause a draw? I don't buy it. The Confederates lost on every front: lost the strategically. Lost all its territory. Lost a war of attrition. Lost a pyrrhic war, because they had a higher battlefield KIA percentage. But they had some tactical wins. LOL. The Confederates had an all-encompassing defeat.

I will go back to the OP, the biggest mistake was the Confederates never prepared for war. If they did, it was ripe for perhaps a different outcome, and that is my opinion. Again, I believe the Confederates felt the same way, because no army enters a war thinking the best they can do is cause a draw. That is absurd.
 
I was just giving my opinion in conjunction with my own experience on how ground wars were/are conducted, especially in that era that they should have lasted way longer and could have possible won.
I think that isn't really the case in that era, though. From 1854-1871 the Great Powers conducted multiple significant land wars against what were either peer competitors or something close to peer competitors.
The durations of the fighting were:

Crimean War (French, British, Ottomans vs. Russia): 1.5-2.5 years, with the Crimean fighting itself taking one year.
Second Italian War of Independence (France vs. Austria): approx. 11 weeks
Second Schleswig War (Denmark vs. Austria and Prussia, chiefly Prussia): 5 months
Austro-Prussian War (Austria vs. Prussia and Italy): 7 weeks
Franco-Prussian War (France vs. Prussia and the German Confederation): ~6 months

The American Civil War (which encompassed four years, and which had significant engagements at least 42 months apart) is the clear outlier.
 
I know others have studied this more than I have, but the reading I've done so far makes me think that the cotton embargo was a miscalculation. Trying to strongarm the British and European powers into intervening doesn't strike me as that feasible in retrospect. I wonder whether an appeal to self-interest was the more effective strategy. An independent southern nation might have been seen as a means to limit the growth of American power and competitiveness. Maybe strengthening an independent confederacy might have been useful in that respect, if the breakaway nation could have proven itself in a more sustained way on the battlefield.

ARB
The problem for the Confedracy was there was far more British trade with the North then the South. There was a major drought in the Ukraine in the early part of the ACW and we have at least on thread in it. King Corn was far more important then King Cotton until at least Summer 1863 . By the summer of 1863 the UK was buying cotton from Union controlled Louisiana and the Seaward Island's of South Carolina as well of course from Egypt and British India. So there was never a serious need by the UK to recognize the
It's not a matter of being correct, it is a matter of how one views military prowess. The Union won, so the manner and the reasons why they won is irrelevant. Everything else after that is theory and doesn't have much meaning or importance. Understand that the how and the why is a matter of a means to an end, period. Nobody on this board witnessed anything anecdotally anything, so what you read is nothing but theory. Nobody is an expert on war theory, so what you read is an opinion or a what if scenario. Anyone can grade a military's war performance in any manner they choose and determine war prowess through the metric they choose, like using a median and the metrics they choose to measure whether an army did poorly, mediocre or outstanding.

I choose to use my infantry experience and education as a median to grade the Civil War war performance, especially how ground wars were/are conducted. I think the Confederates underperformed because they had the advantages to win but squandered it: dug in era where being fortified was precedent, knew the terrain and had a spy network that tracked the Union's movements. Incorporate the fact the south had plenty of military institutions People who never experienced that have a difficult time understanding what I am trying to convey, and definitely don't understand how advantageous that was in that time of war.

Insert your purported term 'vastly superior army' in conjunction with the above-mentioned advantages and they still lost. All that statement does is corroborate my theory that the Confederates underperformed. Considering all those advantages the Confederates should have won or lasted way longer than four years and didn't, so they underperformed or the Union overperformed. Incorporate the superior numbers theory and yet the Confederates had a higher battlefield casualty rate. A vastly superior army with all those advantages should have never had that high of a casualty rate, nor should they have surrendered in four years. This is just a introduction to what I believe, and there's more but I'll refrain for now. I do believe that the Confederates lacked the man power to hold long trenches in order to have a long flank, but that unrealistic deference people have for the Confederates makes that theory implausible. .

Saphroneth never experienced war on any front, so he doesn't know from an anecdotal standpoint how war strategies are implemented nor does he understand the advantages and disadvantages of operations and tactical movements to win a war or to measure anything outside primitive European wars. He plays a Civil War theory game backed by formulas.

He is inspired by "sabermetrics" to grade war performances based on obsolete European wars and applies it to the CW. Sabermetrics is the intense study and analysis of baseball performance, using player statistics and compiled mathematical formulas and equations. It’s complicated stuff, not for the fainthearted or math-challenged. He uses the same formulas to estimate war performance. For an example, let's say we are to measure Robert E. Lee's war performance from a sabermetric standpoint.

First we would have to go back in history or use a modern general as the metric. Let's say Napoleon is our metric to measure if Lee was a poor, mediocre or great general. If you come up with a reliable dataset and insert the metrics you would like to use as a median to made a general great: strategy, tactics, wins and losses, total forces given to a commander, then compare the commanders. Sample of battle data scraped and processed into data frame. Then constructed a linear model from that sample of battles. For each battle, separate combatants’ forces into infantry, cavalry, artillery, and navy. Then you could then weight a general’s numerical advantage or disadvantage compared to their adversary, and better isolate the general’s ability as a tactician. That resulting model would be surprisingly conservative in its weights, suggesting that raw soldier quantities have a relatively small effect compared to other factors such as terrain or technology, which further research could investigate in more detail. You can do this thing with casualties, brigades, leadership and so on. You can use any median and an metrics to come up with your own assessment come up a conclusion. Well, if you use those metrics Lee was a below average general., compared to Napoleon. I personally believe Lee was an above average general. I don't believe he was great, but definitely above average. Comparing Lee to Napoleon using using formulas and those metrics Lee was a terrible general. I don't believe that one. I hope you get my point?

I'm not knocking anyone, and I am not saying anyone is correct. I'm just trying to show how we are viewing war prowess. He didn't prove anything, he just used some theories backed by math formulas to present some hypothetical scenario, and I personally don't buy his method because it is not reality. You can, I'm not trying to alter your thinking. I'm using my own experience in conjunction with my own type of math to come up with a conclusion. I stand by me previous statements: the Confederates underperformed and had all the battlefield advantages and still lost, and lost badly. Also, had a higher battlefield KIA percentage as well. And lost 100% of their territory and never had a stronghold on except for the Richmond-Washington DC corridor that eventually collapsed. That's how I measure war prowess.
I will have to respectfully disagree with the premise the Confederacy should have won. The Confedracy was doomed from the beginning.
1. The Confedrate economy is dependent on exports and slaves.
A. If the Union offers freedom and food to the slaves then they will escape their owners if possible which is what happened.
B. The British more then aptly proved in the ARW and the War of 1812 that slaves will fight for their freedom if given an opportunity to do so. Why the Confedrate leaders were to dense to realize this is a mystery.
C. Agricultural exports are heavy and bulky and require big slow ships. Small fast blockade runners to Carribean ports won't provide enough revenue to support the war effort. A nation dependant on maritime trade needs a navy big enough to safeguard it's trade routes and that was a bridge to far for the Confedracy.
2. The American South is terribly divided by race and class. Sixty percent of the South's population is white and deeply hates the forty percent of the population that is not white. That means for I e the Confederate Army is effectively reduced by forty percent from what it could be. The Confedracy will simply run out of military aged white males that can perform as soldiers.
At least ten percent of the available white Southern men ( 104k) will enlist in the Union Army not good for the Confedracy.
In civil wars the smaller side looses if it can't get foreign miltary intervention and the ACW is no
Control of some areas went back and forth during the war. This happened in just about every Confederate state. When Sherman left Atlanta he didn't leave a garrison to control the place. Confederates re-occupied the city. And didn't Richard Taylor regain lost territory in L

Certainly the southern leaders did not indulge in much precise analytical rigor in deciding for war. If they had, I believe they would have come up with a reading not unlike Sherman's well known analysis of the South's war for independence and written at the very beginning of the War.

As an aside, most southerners seems to have been familiar with the American Revolution only and were not aware that historically, , most revolts ended very badly.
The Confedrate leadership somehow completely forget about British Army Major Lord Dunsmore who sucessfully recruited escaped slaves into an effective infantry force.
Okay, but what I was trying convey in this thread has been lost. I was just giving my opinion in conjunction with my own experience on how ground wars were/are conducted, especially in that era that they should have lasted way longer and could have possible won. I get what you are saying, but the environment was ripe for the Confederates to inflict some serious damage, and they didn't. Judging things from all their advantages they had and could have capitalized but they tanked it. You are talking about a total war effort and I understand. But strictly from a strategic standpoint to win a war they underperformed, or the Union overperformed. There have been primitive and contemporary armies who were outgunned in every aspect but still won or lasted way longer. I personally believe the Confederates felt the same way. What army enters a war knowing that the best they could do was cause a draw? I don't buy it. The Confederates lost on every front: lost the strategically. Lost all its territory. Lost a war of attrition. Lost a pyrrhic war, because they had a higher battlefield KIA percentage. But they had some tactical wins. LOL. The Confederates had an all-encompassing defeat.

I will go back to the OP, the biggest mistake was the Confederates never prepared for war. If they did, it was ripe for perhaps a different outcome, and that is my opinion. Again, I believe the Confederates felt the same way, because no army enters a war thinking the best they can do is cause a draw. That is absurd.
With 20/20 hindsight the Secessionists drank their own Kool aid and didn't have the smarts that Sam Houston and William Sherman had from the very beginning of the ACW that starting with Ft.Sumter the Confedracy defeated itself.
For examples of out manned out gunned armies post 1870 you can if you like PM me since we can't go past the Reconstruction era.
Based on the size of the Confedrate Army they did as well as reasonably could be expected. Conventional Wars are won on the offensive and that's going to require at a minimum a two to one manpower superiority ratio plus much better logistics then the Confedracy had. As many have pointed out the Confedracy desperately needed what the Colonial Rebels had and that was massive foreiegn military intervention which has been discussed countless times wasn't in the cards for the Confedracy.
Leftyhunter
 
The problem for the Confedracy was there was far more British trade with the North then the South. There was a major drought in the Ukraine in the early part of the ACW and we have at least on thread in it. King Corn was far more important then King Cotton until at least Summer 1863 .
There is no significant evidence that "King Corn" was ever considered by British decision makers, though there is evidence that it was mentioned once or twice in public discourse (and I use the word "once or twice" advisedly, it was not common).
 
I know others have studied this more than I have, but the reading I've done so far makes me think that the cotton embargo was a miscalculation. Trying to strongarm the British and European powers into intervening doesn't strike me as that feasible in retrospect. I wonder whether an appeal to self-interest was the more effective strategy. An independent southern nation might have been seen as a means to limit the growth of American power and competitiveness. Maybe strengthening an independent confederacy might have been useful in that respect, if the breakaway nation could have proven itself in a more sustained way on the battlefield.

ARB
The problem for the Confedracy was there was far more British trade with the North then the South. There was a major drought in the Ukraine in the early part of the ACW and we have at least on thread in it. King Corn was far more important then King Cotton until at least Summer 1863 . By the summer of 1863 the UK was buying cotton from Union controlled Louisiana and the Seaward Island's of South Carolina as well of course from Egypt and British India. So there was never a serious need by the UK to recognize the
It's not a matter of being correct, it is a matter of how one views military prowess. The Union won, so the manner and the reasons why they won is irrelevant. Everything else after that is theory and doesn't have much meaning or importance. Understand that the how and the why is a matter of a means to an end, period. Nobody on this board witnessed anything anecdotally anything, so what you read is nothing but theory. Nobody is an expert on war theory, so what you read is an opinion or a what if scenario. Anyone can grade a military's war performance in any manner they choose and determine war prowess through the metric they choose, like using a median and the metrics they choose to measure whether an army did poorly, mediocre or outstanding.

I choose to use my infantry experience and education as a median to grade the Civil War war performance, especially how ground wars were/are conducted. I think the Confederates underperformed because they had the advantages to win but squandered it: dug in era where being fortified was precedent, knew the terrain and had a spy network that tracked the Union's movements. Incorporate the fact the south had plenty of military institutions People who never experienced that have a difficult time understanding what I am trying to convey, and definitely don't understand how advantageous that was in that time of war.

Insert your purported term 'vastly superior army' in conjunction with the above-mentioned advantages and they still lost. All that statement does is corroborate my theory that the Confederates underperformed. Considering all those advantages the Confederates should have won or lasted way longer than four years and didn't, so they underperformed or the Union overperformed. Incorporate the superior numbers theory and yet the Confederates had a higher battlefield casualty rate. A vastly superior army with all those advantages should have never had that high of a casualty rate, nor should they have surrendered in four years. This is just a introduction to what I believe, and there's more but I'll refrain for now. I do believe that the Confederates lacked the man power to hold long trenches in order to have a long flank, but that unrealistic deference people have for the Confederates makes that theory implausible. .

Saphroneth never experienced war on any front, so he doesn't know from an anecdotal standpoint how war strategies are implemented nor does he understand the advantages and disadvantages of operations and tactical movements to win a war or to measure anything outside primitive European wars. He plays a Civil War theory game backed by formulas.

He is inspired by "sabermetrics" to grade war performances based on obsolete European wars and applies it to the CW. Sabermetrics is the intense study and analysis of baseball performance, using player statistics and compiled mathematical formulas and equations. It’s complicated stuff, not for the fainthearted or math-challenged. He uses the same formulas to estimate war performance. For an example, let's say we are to measure Robert E. Lee's war performance from a sabermetric standpoint.

First we would have to go back in history or use a modern general as the metric. Let's say Napoleon is our metric to measure if Lee was a poor, mediocre or great general. If you come up with a reliable dataset and insert the metrics you would like to use as a median to made a general great: strategy, tactics, wins and losses, total forces given to a commander, then compare the commanders. Sample of battle data scraped and processed into data frame. Then constructed a linear model from that sample of battles. For each battle, separate combatants’ forces into infantry, cavalry, artillery, and navy. Then you could then weight a general’s numerical advantage or disadvantage compared to their adversary, and better isolate the general’s ability as a tactician. That resulting model would be surprisingly conservative in its weights, suggesting that raw soldier quantities have a relatively small effect compared to other factors such as terrain or technology, which further research could investigate in more detail. You can do this thing with casualties, brigades, leadership and so on. You can use any median and an metrics to come up with your own assessment come up a conclusion. Well, if you use those metrics Lee was a below average general., compared to Napoleon. I personally believe Lee was an above average general. I don't believe he was great, but definitely above average. Comparing Lee to Napoleon using using formulas and those metrics Lee was a terrible general. I don't believe that one. I hope you get my point?

I'm not knocking anyone, and I am not saying anyone is correct. I'm just trying to show how we are viewing war prowess. He didn't prove anything, he just used some theories backed by math formulas to present some hypothetical scenario, and I personally don't buy his method because it is not reality. You can, I'm not trying to alter your thinking. I'm using my own experience in conjunction with my own type of math to come up with a conclusion. I stand by me previous statements: the Confederates underperformed and had all the battlefield advantages and still lost, and lost badly. Also, had a higher battlefield KIA percentage as well. And lost 100% of their territory and never had a stronghold on except for the Richmond-Washington DC corridor that eventually collapsed. That's how I measure war prowess.
I will have to respectfully disagree with the premise the Confederacy should have won. The Confedracy was doomed from the beginning.
1. The Confedrate economy is dependent on exports and slaves.
A. If the Union offers freedom and food to the slaves then they will escape their owners if possible which is what happened.
B. The British more then aptly proved in the ARW and the War of 1812 that slaves will fight for their freedom if given an opportunity to do so. Why the Confedrate leaders were to dense to realize this is a mystery.
C. Agricultural exports are heavy and bulky and require big slow ships. Small fast blockade runners to Carribean ports won't provide enough revenue to support the war effort. A nation dependant on maritime trade needs a navy big enough to safeguard it's trade routes and that was a bridge to far for the Confedracy.
2. The American South is terribly divided by race and class. Sixty percent of the South's population is white and deeply hates the forty percent of the population that is not white. That means for I e the Confederate Army is effectively reduced by forty percent from what it could be. The Confedracy will simply run out of military aged white males that can perform as soldiers.
At least ten percent of the available white Southern men ( 104k) will enlist in the Union Army not good for the Confedracy.
In civil wars the smaller side looses if it can't get foreign miltary intervention and the ACW is no
Control of some areas went back and forth during the war. This happened in just about every Confederate state. When Sherman left Atlanta he didn't leave a garrison to control the place. Confederates re-occupied the city. And didn't Richard Taylor regain lost territory in L

Certainly the southern leaders did not indulge in much precise analytical rigor in deciding for war. If they had, I believe they would have come up with a reading not unlike Sherman's well known analysis of the South's war for independence and written at the very beginning of the War.

As an aside, most southerners seems to have been familiar with the American Revolution only and were not aware that historically, , most revolts ended very badly.
The Confedrate leadership somehow completely forget about British Army Major Lord Dunsmore who sucessfully recruited escaped slaves into an effective infantry force.
Okay, but what I was trying convey in this thread has been lost. I was just giving my opinion in conjunction with my own experience on how ground wars were/are conducted, especially in that era that they should have lasted way longer and could have possible won. I get what you are saying, but the environment was ripe for the Confederates to inflict some serious damage, and they didn't. Judging things from all their advantages they had and could have capitalized but they tanked it. You are talking about a total war effort and I understand. But strictly from a strategic standpoint to win a war they underperformed, or the Union overperformed. There have been primitive and contemporary armies who were outgunned in every aspect but still won or lasted way longer. I personally believe the Confederates felt the same way. What army enters a war knowing that the best they could do was cause a draw? I don't buy it. The Confederates lost on every front: lost the strategically. Lost all its territory. Lost a war of attrition. Lost a pyrrhic war, because they had a higher battlefield KIA percentage. But they had some tactical wins. LOL. The Confederates had an all-encompassing defeat.

I will go back to the OP, the biggest mistake was the Confederates never prepared for war. If they did, it was ripe for perhaps a different outcome, and that is my opinion. Again, I believe the Confederates felt the same way, because no army enters a war thinking the best they can do is cause a draw. That is absurd.
With 20/20 hindsight the Secessionists drank their own Kool aid and didn't have the smarts that Sam Houston and William Sherman had from the very beginning of the ACW that starting with Ft.Sumter the Confedracy defeated itself.
For examples of out manned out gunned armies post 1870 you can if you like PM me since we can't go past the Reconstruction era.
Based on the size of the Confedrate Army they did as well as reasonably could be expected. Conventional Wars are won on the offensive and that's going to require at a minimum a two to one manpower superiority ratio plus much better logistics then the Confedracy had. As many have pointed out the Confedracy desperately needed what the Colonial Rebels had and that was massive foreiegn military intervention which has been discussed countless times wasn't in the cards for the Confedracy.
Leftyhunter
There is no significant evidence that "King Corn" was ever considered by British decision makers, though there is evidence that it was mentioned once or twice in public discourse (and I use the word "once or twice" advisedly, it was not common).
My point was and I can quote the source at home but by 1862 the British were importing far more corn then cotton from the US. The British knew that there was more to lose then to gain from recognizing the Confedracy.
Led
 
My point was and I can quote the source at home but by 1862 the British were importing far more corn then cotton from the US. The British knew that there was more to lose then to gain from recognizing the Confedracy.
Led
The actual figures are ...
(From the Report of the New York Stock Exchange)
1601911306078-png.png

... US Imports peaked at 16% of the total British supply!
King Wheat is obviously an illusion, just as much so as King Cotton. Britain can clearly survive without corn imports from the US, in some years domestic production alone is adequate to the task.
Noticeably post ACW imports from America crashed and the price per bushel increased considerably, so we already know what the domestic implications would be of no US Grain, historically not a lot of significance.
 
My point was and I can quote the source at home but by 1862 the British were importing far more corn then cotton from the US. The British knew that there was more to lose then to gain from recognizing the Confedracy.
Your first point doesn't lead to your second, notwithstanding that the mechanism by which "King Corn" would work is not well explained anyway.


I feel like I should go into a bit of detail about this.

So let's suppose there's a large amount of corn being exported from the US, and then Britain does something like recognizing the CSA or declaring war on the US.

How exactly does the export of corn change?

Well:

There is no embargo of corn exports.

In this case, neutral shipping (French, for example) will be able to sail into New York or Boston or wherever and take on loads of corn. They may be inspected by a British blockade, but will then be permitted to depart to wherever (including Britain).

There is an embargo of corn exports to Britain.

Same thing, but the corn is shipped to France and French corn is shipped to Britain.

There is an embargo on corn exports out of the US by all parties...

This actually might cause a food supply crisis. But there is another question here, which is:

...and the US government pays farmers for their unsellable corn.

This means the US government is now paying an enormous amount of money for a very large amount of corn that it can't do anything with - a difficult thing to do in the parlous economic situation brought on by a war with Britain, which would hit existing government revenues very hard. If the US is also paying farmers large subsidies to do very little with their corn then it seems obvious that an income tax is not really going to make up for this.

...but the US government does not compensate farmers for their corn sales.

In which case US farmers suffer major financial damage, as there is a massive glut in the US and there is no way to sell it beyond dropping the prices very low.
 
Your first point doesn't lead to your second, notwithstanding that the mechanism by which "King Corn" would work is not well explained anyway.


I feel like I should go into a bit of detail about this.

So let's suppose there's a large amount of corn being exported from the US, and then Britain does something like recognizing the CSA or declaring war on the US.

How exactly does the export of corn change?

Well:

There is no embargo of corn exports.

In this case, neutral shipping (French, for example) will be able to sail into New York or Boston or wherever and take on loads of corn. They may be inspected by a British blockade, but will then be permitted to depart to wherever (including Britain).

There is an embargo of corn exports to Britain.

Same thing, but the corn is shipped to France and French corn is shipped to Britain.

There is an embargo on corn exports out of the US by all parties...

This actually might cause a food supply crisis. But there is another question here, which is:

...and the US government pays farmers for their unsellable corn.

This means the US government is now paying an enormous amount of money for a very large amount of corn that it can't do anything with - a difficult thing to do in the parlous economic situation brought on by a war with Britain, which would hit existing government revenues very hard. If the US is also paying farmers large subsidies to do very little with their corn then it seems obvious that an income tax is not really going to make up for this.

...but the US government does not compensate farmers for their corn sales.

In which case US farmers suffer major financial damage, as there is a massive glut in the US and there is no way to sell it beyond dropping the prices very low.
We know how Sanctions work in practice because we have decades of case studies although they would be post WWII so we can't really discuss them on this forum. Basically they add costs that the British at the time didn't wish to have. During the ACW the British weren't going to go through with diplomatic recognion of the Confedracy and getting cheap corn was one of the more important reasons. Of course there were others but it boils down to a cost benefit analysis. At the end of the day the benefits if recognizing the Confedracy were not worth the costs.
Leftyhunter
 
It is my opinion that the key strategic miscalculations made by the decision makers in the South were:


1) A miscalculation of how long the war effort was likely to be sustained by their enemy.
This is a miscalculation they had in common with the Union. Both sides thought the war would be short and that they would win it; both were incorrect.
2) A miscalculation of how likely foreign intervention (in line with US independence in the 1770s-1780s) was.


Aside from this, however, I also want to point out that it seems plausible to me that the Southern decision makers could have had a probability estimate of how likely the following outcomes were:

- The North lets them go, as suggested by e.g. Winfield Scott
- A short war followed by Confederate independence
- A long war followed by Confederate independence
- Defeat

And that they could have compared those to the likely outcome without independence:
- The North continues to do what the South feels is imposing on their way of life
- The North lets the South do fundmentally what it wants

And decided that, all told, they'd rather fight than not. We know throughout history that revolts have come up in conditions that were felt to be intolerable (there's one in Poland in 1863 for example) and we shouldn't ignore that the same thing was going on from the Southern perspective just because their idea of what was intolerable includes "infringing on slavery".
Is this simply your opinion, or do you have any evidence that any responsible Confederate leader ever actually tried to make the evaluations you are describing?
 
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